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Abstract 
This thesis sets out to analyse the regulatory bodics' initiatives 011 offshore financial 
i 
centres (OFCs) ill the context of the hypothesis that Singapore is emerging as the new 
jurisdiction of choice for glohal wealth managcment. )'he focus is on four major 
areas; harmful tax practices, money laundering, conlldentiality and exchange of 
information. At a glance, these negative factors are the characteristics of solely an 
OFC. With initiatives made against their exact method of business and trade, how 
would the OFCs cope with the regulatory bodies' pressure, and yet not lose their 
mcans of survival? They may be facing wealthy and developed nations such as UK 
and USA, but as a group they have negotiating strength. The OFCs have banded 
together and madc their situations known in several fOlUms with the supranational 
organisations. The result has hecn a compromise of the "rules and regulations" laid 
out in the initiatives, without preventing the major OPCs limn functioning as 
.providers of financial services. 
Chapter 1 sets out the definitions of an OFC, their scope, influence and their positive 
characteristics which attract foreign funds and investment. 
Chapter 2 introduces the organisations behind the initiatives against OFCs. It reveals 
the policy approaches towards OFC practiccs of the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and 
snbsequent developments. On the private sector side, the Wolfsbcrg Principles have 
emerged, with a similar approach to the FATF Recommendations against money 
laundering. 
Chapter 3 explores two conccms of the initiatives; harmful tax practices, which 
includes tax evasion and money laundering. It examines the laws, or the lack there of, 
to fight tax evasion and money laundering. 
Chapter 4 investigates the OFCs' confidentiality and exchange of information 
positions, both common foundations of ofl:~hore financing. It presents the arguments 
for privacy and confidentiality in OFCs and how they can aid in the fight against 
money laundering without forgoing the confidentiality principle. Exchange of 
information can involve co-operation bctween nations thereby bringing into the 
picture sovereignty and the comity principle. 
Chapter 5 traces the responses of the principal opes to the concerns of the OECD and 
the FATF, as being havens for money laundering and tax evasion. It explores the laws 
and regulations of several OFCs to fight money laundering and tax evasion, tlnough 
legal mutual assistance and without compromising too much of the confidentiality 
promised to the investors. 
Chapter 6 introduces Singapore as the newly emerging wealth management ccntre. It 
shows how the English conunon law, regulatory bodies and authorities curb money 
laundering, participate in mutual legal assistance, and yet provide the same 
confidcntiality and solid banking infrastmcture as the leading wealth management 
centre, Switzerland. 
Chapter 7 concludes the analysis of the directives and recommendations of the 
supranational organisations and the responses of the major ()lICs. It demonstrates how 
Singapore is emerging as another jurisdiction of choice, as it has salisJ1ed the 
recommendalions of the OECD, FATF, FSF and Wolfsberg Principles in telms of 
harmful tax practices, money laundering, confidentiality and exchange of informalion. 
TIus position is fUllher reinforced by the number of major international banks and 
J1nancial institutions establishing major presences in Singapore. 
Introduction 
'Havens facilitate lhe plunder of public nlllds by COiTupt eliles in poor countries, 
I 
which can represent a major barrier [0 economic and social development'. I This 
observation which was made by Oxfam, ret1ects IJopulaI' sentiment concerning the 
detrimental practices facilitated by Offshore Financial Centres (OFCs). However, 
o FCs arc an integral parI of the global economy albeit an integral part of each of the 
formal and informal economics. At their simplest, OFCs may be conceptualised as 
providers of financial services by banks and other financial inslitutions to non-
residents.2 The definition provided by the Internalional Monetary Fund (IMFi as to 
what constitutes an OFC is: 'a centre where the bulk of the financial seclor is offshore 
on both sides of the balance sheet, (that is the cOlln[er-pruties of the majority of 
financial institutions' liabilities and assets are Ilon-I'esidellt~), where the transactions 
arc initiated elsewhere, and where the majority of institutions involved are controlled 
by nOll-residents.' Ine IMP has also provided a typology lhal classifies offshore 
t . In . 4 cell res mto t 'ee categones: 
" International Financial Centres (lFCs): provide a complete range of financial 
services, have advanced settlement and payment systems, support lru'ge domestic 
economies with deep and liquid capital markets, and have a regulatory framework 
I POlicy Department of Oxfom (Great Britain), Tax Competition alld Hm'ens, !l'om Oxfam's 
Presentation for UN Financing for Development NGO Hearings (7 November 2000) 2. 
2 llltemational Monetary Fund, Monetary and Exchange Affairs Department, Offshore Financial 
('cnh'es - The Role oft"e IMF (2000) 
<htl]J:!lwww.imf.org/externalll1plmae/oshorei2000Ieng/roJe.htm> at 10 July 2004. 
3 Ibid. . 
4 International Monetary Fund, Monetary and Exchange Affairs Department, Offshore Financial 
Celllres ·IMF Backgroulld Paper (2000) 
<http://www.imf.org/externalllIp/maeioslimeI2000/cngiback.htlll> all0 July 2004. 
1 
that is adequate to safeguard the integrity of their financial system. They include 
London, New York, and Tokyo amongst others. 
" Regional Financial Centres (RFCs): have developed financial markets and provide 
a wide range of financial services, have advanced settlement and payment systems, 
and have a regulatory framework that is appropriate for the structure and nature of 
their financial system. However, RFCs tend to SUppOlt smaller domestic 
economies and consequently act primarily as intelUlediaries for the flow of funds 
into and out of the region in which they are located. They include Bahrain, Hong 
Kong, and Singapore amongst others. 
" OFCs: provide a range of specialised financial serVIces to major financial 
institutions, have ml adequate infrastructure, but limited resources to intermediate 
the flow of capital into the region in which they are located, tend to be lightly or 
flexibly regulated, have low or no taxes, and usually have bank secrecy laws that 
vary in their degree of rigour. OFCs tend to be small economies and while many 
finffilcial institutions will register as being resident in these jurisdictions, these 
financial institutions will often, although not always, have little or no physical 
presence. They include Bermuda, Cayman Islands, and British Virgin Islands 
amongst others. 
For the purpose of this thesis, RFC's such as Hong Kong and Singapore, are 
considered parI of the OFC group. Hong Kong (also under threat limn Shanghai) acts 
as the intermediary for capital flows in and out of China, from regional sources such 
as Taiwan and South Korea. Singapore, on the other hand, with ils developed 
financial inJ1'astlUctme, is the Jinllncial clearing house for funds limn Indonesia to the 
south and Malaysia and Thailand to the n0l1h. 
2 
 
The mOHey flowing through OFCs is considerable and for several OFCs these flows 
support a financial services industry that accounts for a signitlcant portion of their 
! 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Based on data provided by the Bank for International 
Settlement eBl S), the IMF has calculated that on-balance sheet cross-bordcr assets 
held hy OFCs in 1999 amounted to approximately US$4.6 trillion. 5 An accuratc 
assessment ofthe size of the OFC scctor, however, remains impossible to calculate as 
the BIS is unable to collect accurate information. Smaller and more secretive OIlCs do 
not submit information to the BlS. Meanwhile, OIlCs do not tend to report 
information on the nationality of the associated lending and repository banks 
operating in their jurisdictions. At the same time, the BlS is usually unable to obtain 
information on off-balance shcct transactions concerning assets held by non-bank 
financial institutions.6 The enect of the incomplete natnre of this infonnation is to 
magnify the transparency problem.? Lack of transparency has also meant that trade 
statistics for the global economy remain inacclll'ate as the trade accounts for 
individual countries do not reflect the real position of their economics. In turn, these 
inacclll'acies can aff(;)ct a country's credit rating within the J1nancial markets. Such 
inaccuracies, however, are nothing new for as long ago as 1984, the balancc of trade 
statistics for the global ec01l0my indicated that the world was running a current 
account deJ1cH with itself of US$100 billion.s The important point is that a lack of 
transparency and accurate information on financial flows moving through the global 
economy makes questionahle, detrimental, and ncfarious activities, considerahly more 
, Ibid. 
• Ibid. 
7 It also contributes to volatility ill sliort term finaucial flows, which call have destaililising influences 
on the global economy. In this respect, see the work of Finallcial Stability Forum (FSF), Report of Ihe 
Fol'king Group Oil Cap,~al Flows (2000) <ht1p:/lwlVw.fsforum.org> at 25 April 2003. 
R TNaylor, Hot MOlley alld Ihe Politics qfDebl (1987) 11. 
3 
difficult to detect. Where opacity prevails, abuse of the financial services offered in 
the formal economy by actors in the informal economy becomes possible, while it is 
through this exploitation that the formal and informal economics become entwined.9 
While the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on 
Govel11mental Affairs of the United States Senate has expressed concern about OFCs, 
the Committee on Banking and. Financial Services of the House of Representatives 
has recognised that the services offered by OFCs can also be put to legal and 
beneficial purposes: IO 
Not all offshore financial centres are havens for money laundering, of course, 
and indeed, there are many legitimate reasons for corporations and citizens 
from other countries to transact business in such jurisdictions, including 
minimisation of tax exposure, freedom D'om exchange controls, and eoncel'lls 
over personal privacy or security. Offshore financial centres are also an 
integral part of a capital markets system in which funds are transferred 
electronically around the globe in search of the highest rate of return. 
In respect of the Committee's COlmnents, some of these legal and beneficial purposes 
include the following. First, the low tax regimes offered by OFCs can be used to 
optimise profits by minimising income, corporate, withholding, and other taxes. 
Second, financial structures can be created that allow financial institutions to make 
better use of their capital by minimising the impact of requirements thatJobligate them 
9 Kl'is Hintersecr, Criminal Finance: The Political Economy of Money Laundering in a Comparative 
Legal Context (2002) 225-7. 
to II/Iemaljollal COl/iller-Money Laundering and Foreign Anticorruption Act 0/2000,3 USC § 302 
(2000). 
4 
10 hold capital in reserve on their balance sheets. Third, the company formation and 
management facilities provided by OFes can be used 10 add Hexibility 10 corporate 
structures. Fourth, secrecy and confidentiality provisions embedded within the laws of 
OFes mean that companies can protect proprietary inJonnation, for example, by 
creating companies in these jurisdictions to hold intellectual pl'Operty and other assets 
that are sensitive to public exposure. Fifth, the Hexible regulatory regimes offered by 
opes can be used to avoid foreign exchange and capital controls and other obstacles 
that hinder trade. While they may be the most noteworthy services offered by OFes, 
financial secrccy services are not the most important. Even if financial secrecy laws 
were eliminated in all OFes tomorrow, the financial activity being routed through 
thcse jurisdictions would still be substantial. The Cayman Islands and its prominent 
position within the financial markets typifies the viable and profitable role whieh 
OFes perform, having signed the Tax Information Exchange Agreement with the US 
in November 2001, to provide fol' exchange of information upon request, inl'espect of 
criminal and civil tax matters. I I 
It is in the context of these benefits that this thesis has its origin. OFes arc an 
indelible part ofthe international financialll·amewol'k. Given the recent developments 
that seek to counter the perceived threat to the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) economies, it is usefhl to identify an OFC which 
meets the requirements of the various groups concerncd about OFCs. This thesis 
argues that, following a close examination of the requirements of the different 
initiatives, Singapore can be shown to meet those requirements. 11mt and (llher 
advantages make Singapore a compliant jurisdiction of choice. 
Il Hintcrsccl', above n 9, 229. 
5 
In order to determine what is an effective OFC, it is important to examine the 
different aspects of an OFC. Chapter 1 explorers the nuances of the terminology and 
provides a current definition of an OFC. It goes on to distinguish offshore from other 
centres, provides an insight into the features of an OFC and gives examples of 
difIerent OFCs. 
From Chapter I it is evident tbat there would be concerns among developed 
economies about some features of OFCs. Chapter 2 provides the background to the 
various supranational directives that have arisen in response to these concerns about 
havens of low taxes, secrecy and money laundering. The OECD's intentions were 
made known by the lfal'l/!fill Tax Competition: An Emerging Global LvslIe reportl2 
which was first released in 1998 and which was followed by 3 reports13 tracing the 
progress of the project to reduce harmful tax competition. The Financial Action Task 
Force (FATF) was involved through its issue of 40 recommendations in 1998 which 
aimed at combating money laundering. Since then, the FATF has released 4 reviews, 
one in each of the years 2000 to 2003,14 tracing the developments and updating the list 
of non-cooperative countries and territories to its anti-money laundering 
recommendations. The Financial Stabilily Forum (FSF) recognised the lack of 
financial infl'astructUl'e and co-operation which made some OFCs open for ahuse and 
illegal activity. Its main aim in increasing transparency and adhering to intemational 
12 Organisation for Economic Co~operatio!l and Development, llarn{/iil Tax Competition: An Emerging 
Global [ssile (1998 OECD). 
13 The three reports released by OECD are: Towords Global Tax Co-operatioll, Progress iI11dellt[f5'illg 
and Eliminating Harmflll Tax Praclices in 2000, 11,8 GECD's Pr~iect 011 Harmfiil1'ax1'ractices: Tlte 
2001 Progress Report in 2001 and The ORCD's Project on IIarmfiti 'I'ax Pl'llclices: Tile 2004 Progress 
Report in 2004. 
14 Financial Action Task Force~ Review to identify NOH-Cooperative Counfries OJ' Territories: 
Increasing the Worldwide Effectivelless of Anli-Money LOlllldering Measures (2000), (2001), (2002) 
and Amlllal Review of NOll-Cooperative COlll1ll'ies 01' Territories (20()3) <http://wwwl.oeed.orgllalr> 
at 2S April 2004. 
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financial regulatory standards was represented by its Report of the Working Group on 
Ojpho/,e Centres, which was delivered to the FSF's secretariat on AprilS, 2000.15 As 
illustrated in Chapter 2, the concerns of the FSF overlap some of ORCD's and 
FATF's. 1':Ioticing the importance of these t!n'ee supranational organisations, the 
private financial and banking sectors sought to improve their regulations such that 
they feU in line with the OECD, FATF and FSF, through the Wolfsberg Anti-Money 
Laundering Principles. 16 These principles were initiated by 11 banks and were made 
with the FATF's Recommendations in mind, with the slight difference that the parties 
involved arc not countries, but banks. 
While Chaptcr 2 discusses the measures undertaken by the supranational 
organisations, Chapters 3 and 4 present the four issues which arc the focus of those 
measures: harmful tax practices, money laundering, offshore confidentiality and 
disclosure of information. Some or all four factors arc evident in the OFCs. Chapter 3 
examines harmful tax practices, tax evasion and money laundering, revealing the pace 
oflhe OECD's project to cmb harmfhltax practices and the introduction of The USA 
Patriot Act17 which allowed easier access to foreign-based records in the US with the 
intention to stanlp out tax evasion and money laundering. Chapter 4 examines 
offshore confidentiality, which is one of the key characteristics of OFCs and the 
exchange of intormation between OFCs and the countries whose citizens own assets 
in the OFCs. As this involves cross-border issues, the principles of comity and 
sovereignty are discussed. 
15 F' 16 mancial Stability Forum, Report oflhe Working Group all Offshore Cenlres (2000 FSF). 
The Wol£,berg Group, Wolfsberg Anti-Molley Laundering Principles on Private Banking (2002) 
<http://www.wolfsherg-principles.comJprivat-ballking.html> at 10 July 2004. 
17 '1'11 fu e II title of tbe act is 'Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act 0(,200 I '. 
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Chapter 5 presents the responses of principal O1"Cs to the OECD's and 1"AT1"'s 
claims that they are tax havens and are open to illicit behaviour and exploitation 
through money laundering. Investigations into the O1"Cs reveal regulations to prevent 
the very concel'l1S which the OECD and 1"ATF have stated in their reports. All this has 
been done without compromising the confidentiality pledged to investors. Tlus 
chapter also reveals the responses of O1"Cs to the OECD's unflattering report of their 
involvement in harmful tax practices. Several isslles are examined, sllch as: lack of 
involvement in the discussions of the su~jects which were being reported; the uneven 
examination of the O1"Cs and OECD member countries which have similar 
characteristics of an OFC; the possibility of undermining sovereignty of the O1"Cs, 
which weakened the OECD report; and the demonstrated intention of the OPCs to 
prevent money laundering and harmful tax practices through law and rcgulations 
while protecting the confidentiality of their clients. 
Chapter 6 analyses Singapore, which is another altel'l1ative to an OFe, with its 
compliant jurisdiction in place to adhere to the OECD's views against harmful tax 
practices, the FATF's aim at preventing money laundering and the Wolfuberg 
Principles practiced by the branches oithe 12 major international private banks (ABN 
AMRO Flank N.V., Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi Ltd., Bmdays Bank, Citif,,'I'OUP, Credit 
Suisse Group, Deutsche Bank AG, Goldman Sachs, IISBe, J.P.Morgan Private Barne, 
Santander Central Hispano, Societe Generale and UBS AG) represented in Singapore. 
Fortified by law and regulations, the sound financial infrastructure is recognised by 
the growing amonnt of assets under mmlagement of the banking and fipancial sector 
of Singapore. The vote of confidence by foreign investors continues to strengthen in 
the island Republic. 
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However, the latest June 2004 report by DECD entitled A Process jiJl' Achieving a 
Global I,evei Playing Field,18 seeks to prevent this migration of business, and thus 
, 
will pose a' challenge that is to be addressed by Singapore and the other named 
significant financial centres.19 
Chapter 7 concludes this thesis with a summation of the foul' identified major 
concerns of the OECD and FA 1l'. Harmful tax practices, money laundering, 
confidentiality and exchange of information were disclk~sed extensively in their 
reporL,. In response, the OFCs have presented regulations which are in place 01' are 
being drafted to nullify the accusation of being a hmmful tax haven for money 
laundering and other illicit activities. 'Ole thesis concludes that Singapore is emerging 
as the new jurisdiction of choice for global wealth management. Singapore has in 
place the required infrastructure of a RFC, yet it has remained focused on the OECD's 
and FAT!"s recommendations against harmful tax practices and money laundering, 
all the while respecting the confidentiality ofthe investors. 
Why is tllis thesis significant? A s a result of the supranational initiatives being applied, 
new ndes by the re!,'1llatory bodies are heing formulated to facilitate the cross-border 
exchange of l1nancial information. These new rules fuel concerns that information is 
being coUected and exchanged without regard for financial privacy and human rights. 
Public scepticism is rife concerning the ability of governments to prevent 
unauthorised access to information and to resist the temptation to access such 
"Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development, A Process/or Achieving a Global Level 
Playing Field (2004 OECD). 
19 Besides Singapore, the other significant tlnancial centres named arc: Andorra, Barbados, BnUlei, 
Costa Rica, Duhai, Guatemala, Hong Kong-China, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Macao~China, Malaysia 
(Labuan), Marshal! Islands, Monaco, Philippines alld Uruguay. 
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information for political, economic or other purposes. There are also concel11s that 
information is being collected ill an indiscriminatc, rathcr than risk-based, mamIeI'. 
To date, these new rules are being shaped solely by the developed countries, more 
specifically, members of the OECD, which seek to maintain control over this segment 
of the global economy. Offshore financial centres which are not members of the 
OECD ("Non-OECD OFCs"), the small and developing economies ("SDRs"), and 
trust and estate professionals, feci that they have been relegated to a subordinate role 
in the fOI111Ulatioll of these rules. 
There is uncertainty abont a process foJ' change controlled by the dominant 
pmticipants in the global market foJ' financial services. In particular, a flawed process 
premised OJ] a restricted perspective will lead to flawed conclusions and fail to 
achieve the stated objectives of all parties. Business will simply migrate to 
jurisdictions overlooked or excused from full compliance with the new rules. There is 
a counterview that calls for new regulation premised on a tmly level playing field, one 
in which all countries conducting cross-bordor financial services participate 011 an 
equal basis in setting the new standards which will affect them. 
Trade in services is a rapidly expaIlding component of global trade. Many of the 
smaller jurisdictions competing with the OEeD member cOllntries in the provision of 
international financial services already have regulatory environments which meet 01' 
exceed standards existent in OECD member countries. The design of global rules for 
the conduct of trade is more universal for supranational bodies such as the World 
10 
Trade Organisation CWTO) which utilises processes developed to lessen inequities 
being imposed on smaller and developing countries?O 
There has also been a shift in emphasis in the stmcture of the offshore world and 
market environment for regulators, advisors and company and trust service companies. 
In the late 1990's and especially in the 21 5t century, the move to fcwer, better offshore 
financial centrcs has gathered pace. The legislative and supervisory changes required 
by international agencies have, in fact, created a more transparent and more 
professional regime. Those centres which remain in five years will embody leading 
edge approaches to regulation and serviee development. 
One of the more evident trends of the past five years has been the emergence of low 
tax rather than no tal{ jurisdictions. Even though the Isle of Man and Gibraltar have 
cOlrnnitted to a zero-based corporate tax environment, foJ' the vast majority of OFCs 
the reality of acceding to the will of the OECD, the IMF, the European Commission 
CEC) al1d the FATF has been that zero tax is no longer on the agenda. 
For the more diverse and experienced centres like Jersey, the Isle of Man, Guel'l1sey, 
Singapore and the Bahamas, participating in the fonnulation of intemal reg1dation 
represents a future of greatcr co-operation where information may be exchanged, 
more business is referred and the world becomes somewhat less hostile. A key selling 
point oftllese jurisdictions is the modernity oftheir regulation. They have moved in II 
J 
20 Kyle Bagness and Robclt W Staiger, 'Multilaleral Trade Negotiations, Bilateral OppOltuuism and the 
Rules of GA1T!WTO' (2003) JOlll'l1ai ()( Illtemational Ecollomics Department of Economics, 
Columbia University Discussion Paper Series. 
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few short years from an absence of any regulation to becoming vibrant examples of 
creative and appropriate regulation.21 
All seriously-minded OFC's today demonstrate an independent regulator, usually in 
the [onn of a tlnancial services commission, with a financial intelligence unit to 
handle suspicious transactions reports. What will distinguish offshore centres in the 
future is not the quality of their regulation- as that is a prerequisite. Instead it will be 
the quality of service provision, the diversity of talent "- the depth in the advisory 
community, and creativity and innovation ill products and services.22 
This thesis sets out the initiatives introduced by the supranational agencies, the issues 
that these reports highlight, and the regulatory responses by the leading OFCs. 
The conclusion, as Reynolds23 has identified, is the emergence of Singapore as a 
financial centre with the attributes of an OFC, the credibility of an IFC and the depth 
of financial and legal infrastructure and innovative legislation to attract the second 
largest amount of managed funds outside of Switzerland. The thesis of tllis study is 
that Singapore is now becoming the new global wealth management centre for 
investors. 
Sound fundamentals have il)spired confidence in Singapore as a wealth management 
centre. Socio-political stability, a strong domestic economy, a clean and efficient legal 
infrastructure, best practice in financial sector regulation and supervision standards, 
21 Guernsey is a good example. Whell the UK's Financial Services Authority failed to act 011 the split 
capital scandal it was the Guelusey Financial Services Commission which blew the ·whistle. Bob 
Reynolds, 'Editor's Notes' (2003) 8 Qf}shore Red: An OFe News Update, 129. 
"Ibid. 
231bid. 
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and a ready pool of experienced professionals have attracted the world's top 20 
private banks and more than 30 of the top 50 US and European fund managers to set 
up in Singapore, serving Asia and beyolld.24 
24 Monetary Authority of Singapore, Wealth Management ill Singapore <http://mvw.mas,gov,sg>at25 
November 2003, 
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Cbapter 1: Wbat Is Offshore 
1.1 Introduction 
Tlus chapter sets out to define what is an offshore financial centre. With a clear 
definition, description of an OPC's features and examples of OFes, it is possible to 
understand the background to the supranational initiatives against OPCs. 
TIle term "offshore" was used originally to refer to the tax havens off the shores of the 
United Kingdom and the United States, and by extension to any company or trust 
located in a tax haven or a country where tax could be kept low. In the context of 
financial transactions, the term 'offshore' refers to transactions which take place 
between non-residents. By this deilnition 'offshore transactions' can take place in any 
jurisdiction, but as a result of their fiscal and secrecy rules, some jurisdictions attract a 
very high number of offShore transactions and oiTshore hanks, and have thereby 
become known as offshore financial centres?S 
Spitz asserts that the main new development is the amount of money offshore and the 
vast increase in the number of persons participating in offshore activities. He slates 
that, never before have so many ofishore companies and trusts been set up or have so 
many expatriates changed residence lor purely fiscal reasons. His second point it that, 
there is the increase in the number of countries offering tax haven or finance centre 
possibilities. In particular, he states the seeming high tax jurisdictions are wttively 
seeking new "onshore" business. His third point is that, the offshore area is found to 
25 Guy Stessens, MOlley Launderillg: A Nell' International Lml' 8lifol'cemen/ Model (2000) 93. 
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be widening its scope of offshore transactions and operations. Spitz argues that the 
esoteric is becoming more and more commonplace, and there is an ongoing merging 
of onshore and onshore. 26 
1.2 Scopc of Offshore 
Offshore goes well beyond tropical islands. Barker reports some interesting 
statistics. 27 There are now almost seventy offshore financial centres in the world, 
many within the jurisdiction of major economic powers with ostensibly high levels of 
taxation. The sums involved are huge. For example, the Cayman Islands is repOlied to 
be the fifth largest banking centre in the world, having approximately 580 banks (with 
$500 billion28 in holdings), 2,238 mutnal funds, 499 insurance companies and 40,000 
offshore entities in total. The Bahamas is also another major centre, with sixty 
insurance companies, 580 mutual funds, 418 banks and 100,000 onshore entities in 
total. The Channel Islands and the Isle of Man have approximately $525 billion in 
fOl'Cign-o\\~led assets. Financial sCivices account for 80% onsle of Jersey's income, 
the minimum non-resident account being $100,000. Switzerland, the world's largest 
private banking ccntre is managing about US$1.2 trillion of offshore assets while 
Singapore's olTshore funds are estimated at US120 billion. 29 In all, statisticians 
estimate that about $8 trillion worldwide is invested in onshore accounts and 
.• 30 
entitIes: 
-_ ....•....• _-----
26 Bany Spitz, illlel'llaliollal Tax Havens Guide (1999) 3. ' 
27 \Vil1iam B Barker, 'Optimal Intel11utional Taxation and Tax Competition: Overcome The 
Contradictions' (2002) 22 NOl'linveste!'l1 JOlll'l1al of in/emotio!lal Lmv & Business 161. 
28 For all olmolley mentioned in the tilesis, ullless othenvise specified, it is in United States dollars. 
29 Koil, Francis, Lee, Choon Li, and Jilldai, Pmthsmthi, 'Singapore as an Emerging Hilb for Wealth 
Management' (2003) November Pulses 16. 
30 BarkeI', above n 27. 
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1.3 Tet'minology: Offshore and Tax Havens 
The telm "offShore financial centre" or orc, is now the morc "politically cOll'ect" 
term for what used to bc called a "tax haven". However, the difference in vocabulary 
does make the important point that a jurisdiction may provide specific facilities for 
offshore financial centres without being in any gencral sense a tax haven.3l 
Chetcuti's paper, Compliance vs. Competitiveness: Adapting to the new international 
legal order shows the difficulty in delining the terllls, 'tax havens' and 'offShore 
financial centres'. 32 He asserts that, not only countries which we usually call 'tax 
havens' engage in the provision of offshore financial services. Vlhile London, New 
York, Frankfurt and Tokyo are among the largest offShore financial ccntres, Chetcuti 
states that none of these deserves the nomenclature of 'tax haven'. Nor are these 
centres typically regarded as OFCs. '111e difficulty of definition is evident from the 
recent discrepancies present in the various rankings or black lists issued by (he OECD, 
FATF and the Financial Stability Forum (FSF). 
In an attempt to narrow the scope of the definition, many have sought to define an 
OFC as a financial centre where the larger part ofthe financial service activity call1ed 
on is in respect of nOll-residents. Nonetheless, ill absolute terms more offShore 
business can he expected (0 be undertaken through London 01' New York than the 
OFCs so more narrowly defined. Then there is (he problem of categ0l1sing centres 
i 
31 Spitz, above n 26,4. 
32 Jean-Philippe Chetcuti, Compliance vs Competitiveness: Adapting to the new international legal 
order (2002) < bttp:iiwww.ciletcuticauchi.colll,ljpc/J'cscarchfillternalional-itlitiatives-O.hlm> at 25 April 
2004. 
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such as Luxembourg and Switzerland who dislike the "offshore" label given them by 
the G8 33 and FSF. There are also substantial differences between well established 
centres such as Hong Kong, Singapore, Jersey, Guemsey and the Isle of Man, which 
can be compared with Luxembourg and SVl'itzerland in the range and level o[financial 
services provided, and islands in the Pacific and Caribbean which engagc in providing 
J1nancial services to non-residents on a much more limited scale and with a much 
narrower range. 
Irrespective of definition, the trend internationally is to distinguish "not between 
onshore and offshore centres, but between centres which comply with international 
standards and those which do not.,,34 
The majority of the of(~hore financial centres world-wide are 'have-not' countries that 
rely on financial services to provide them with much needed employment and tax 
revenues resulting fi'om foreign company registration, bank services and tlUst 
management. A concerted effort by the developed nations to cm(ail these activities 
v.~11 most certainly hamper these developing nations in their effort for Hnancial 
autonomy and political sovercignty?5 
The differences between of[~hore countries and home countries have also become 
bll\l1'ed. In the struggle between states to attract investment in the face of high 
business costs (whether the costs be associated with expensive labour in developed 
countries or with lack of infrastructure in developing countries), m,any high tax 
33 Group of Eight, \vhich consists of Canada, France, Germany, Italy; Japan .. Russia, United Kingdom 
alld United States. 
34 Chetcllti, ahove II 32. 
35 Matt Blackmail, 'Still in the Line of Fire' (1999) Shore to Shore 
<ilttp:/Iwww.goldhaven.com/LineofFire.htm> at 25 November 2003. 
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jurisdictions act like tax havens, offering low tax burdens as an incentive to business. 
For instance, after lower tax or incentive countries attracted a substantial share of the 
world's shipbuilding (and the jobs associated with shipbuilding) away from home 
countries, many home countries began offering tax incentives in an attempt to lure the 
shipbuilders back?6 
1.4 Role of Tax Havens in International Finance 
Regardless of the factors which inlluenced the development of the individual tax 
havens, all of those centres have become production interfaces linked to, yet separate 
fj'OlTI, onshore world capital markets and invisible production centres. The 
establishment of a network of such ccntres37 has constituted a new secondary trading 
system that is global in scope, unlike the largely intra-continental systems that 
preceded it. Motivated by economics of convenience, these offshore havens have 
served as an international common propelty resource for trans-national private-sector 
b · . I c: b . 38 usmess Il1 at east,lve aslC respects: 
(i) As centres of domicile through which intemational companies can incorporate 
and operate commercial holding companies and overseas subsidiaries in the 
most advantageous fiscal climate subject to minimal exchange control. 
(ii) As holding companies, which are used predominantly to control industrial or 
invcstment companies by holding major shares, to finance companies in a 
group by generating funds through the floatation of bond issues, and, not least, 
to receive dividends, interest, or royalty and licensing payments. 
36 Spitz, above n 31,5. 
37 Whether based on the Euromarkets or trans-national banking. 
38 Anthony Sanfield Ginsberg, Tax liavens (1991) 63-8. 
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(iii) As locations Ii-om and through which to exploit international capital and 
money markets with a greater fi'eedom of action than might be feasible from 
their cOlUltries 0 f origin. Eurobonds create an urgent need for the services of 
countries with favourable tax legislation, such as an absence of withholding 
tax on interest ,md dividends, regardless of the bondholder's residence. 
Because Eurobonds are bearer securities that protect the anonymity of the 
holder, this is particularly important fol' the growing category of Eurobond 
investors who havc taken care to arrange their affairs so that they escape 
liability to tax anywhere. 
(iv) As secure havens for international earnings, savings, and pools of liquidity for 
investment in a tax-neutral environment. 
(v) As assembly centres for components produced externally in on-shore centres 
and re-exported on-shore, through free trade zones. 
Hence, OFes have found themselves under attack. They are accused of introducing 
practices designed to encourage nOll-compliance with the tax laws of other countries. 
More specifically, they have been accused of allowing themselves to be used to hide 
drug mOlley, for tax fraud, for the circumvention of t'Jreign inheritance laws and for 
money lanlldering and the promotion of corruption in general, with the implied 
assumption that all the money they held came there iIlegally.39 
1.5 Offshore versus Onshore Institutions 
, 
< 
39 Elias Neocleotls, Offihore jillallcial cell/res - Recellt developments (2002) The Legal 500 < 
h!tp:llwww.legaI500.com/devs/cYPfUS/oflcyoCOOl.htm> at 22 October 2003. 
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International tax planning has matured past a point of the mere establishment of 
holding structures and private accounts in offshore jurisdictions. International tax 
planning now includes such choices as where to operate the production plant, where 
to locate technology development, where [0 base the multinational infOlmation centre, 
and where to place service centres. Alongside established palticipants such as the 
Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Switzerland, countries like Ireland, Belgium, and 
Cyprus have become aggressive players in offshore/international tax planning 
procedures. 40 
OFCs playa key role in facilitating the growing mobility of finance and the shaping 
of complex webs of interactions and relationships involving the nation-states, 
multinational corporations, the wealthy elite and ordinary citizens.'!! The emergence 
of multi-tasked financial institutions located in tax havens, as opposed to traditional 
bank organisations located in home jurisdictions, has expanded and diversified 
international finance. Multinationals, through years of shifting their funds offshore to 
escape uncompetitive tax burdens, now operate their own financial companies in 
competition with home jurisdiction banks. Companies can often provide, at a reduced 
cost, their own project financing, their own insurance, and just about any other service 
that used to be sourced from homc institl1tions. 
Offshore offers the potential for tailored financing, which has led to the development. 
of financial instruments offering an alTay of variations in types of interest, maturity 
dates, advance refunding and conversionpossibilities. Offshore offers the potenlial for 
structured insurance and reinsurance. Many high-risk insurance policies (such as 
40 Spitz, above 11 36, 7. 
41 Prem Sikka, 'The Role Of Offshore Financial Centres In Globalization' (2003) 6(4) Joumal of 
MOlley Laundering COlllro1311. 
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political risk or environmental casualty) could not be written onshore because of 
government reh'ulation and taxation, and many insurance companies would be forced 
to significantly increase premiums if they were not allowed to reinsure groups of risk. 
If an offsbore centre attracts a poor reputation, corporate work shifts elsewhere. For 
an offuhore jurisdiction, reputation means everything. 42 
1.6 What do the Offshore Centres offer 
The principal products stocked by lhe of(~bore supermarkets are companies and trusts. 
"Offshore companies" usually bold investments and may be involved in trading. 
"Offshore trusts" protect the ownership of assets and, frequently of the companies 
themselves. The ultimate beneficiaries are usually individuals residing in high lax 
countries. 
The number of offshore companies is expanding exponentially. They are put there for 
a very good reason: An offshore company can be used for any purpose for which a 
company ill a high tax country can be used, and it generally does not have lo pay tax 
in the offshore jurisdiction. 'nle bulk of offshore companies simply collect income 
consisting of dividends, loan interest or patcnt l'Oyalties, and licence fees. But many 
arc also used for business purposes. S!1uctured correctly, the offshore company plays 
a tul'lltable role using lax-exempt income to make more tax-exempt income. Apart 
from tax, an offshore company can be used for other purposes such as privacy and 
, 
fi'eedom fiUID exchange control, or protection of assets against future developments in 
4> Spitz, above 11 40, 7-8. 
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the home country. Though companies in most offShore jurisdictions offer basic 
similarities, there are useful differences. For example, what information must be 
contained in the bylaws? Can the hue promoters and heneficial owners be kept 
entirely out of thc picture? What are the costs of incorporation? How much time is 
involved, and can it be accelerated? Are there limits on the powers of the company? Is 
there any limitation of liability? Can there be bearer shares, no par value shares, 
preference shares, and redeemable shares or shares with special rights? 43 
The offshore tmst is, in reality, a mutant designed specifically to meet the needs of 
offshore investment. Orthodox trust law mles have been modified 10 make the lIust 
more commercially viable and mobile. These include laws relating to bankruptcy and 
enforcement of creditors' claims which preserve the integrity of onshore assets and 
provisions specifying the governing law of the tmst and jurisdiction. The offshore 
tmst is oilen closely linked to other offshore companies and, consequently, there exist 
changes to company law complementary to the onshore trust. The legal source for the 
offshore trust is statutory. The onshore trust itself, like its intcrnational business 
company 01' offshore company neighbour, is bound by confidentiality rules.44 
Offshore service providers are now moving up thc value chain and creeping into more 
of a company's myriad business· processes. Services range from functions requiring 
low technical training and no direct user contact to "front office" tasks, where 
outsourced personncl handle customer contact and provide interactive responses, such 
43 Ibid, 9-10. 
44 Rose-Marie Antoine, C01ifidentiality in 0.0"/101'0 Financial Law (2002) 13. 
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as remote online help-desk assistance, and, at a still higher level, telemarketing, 
d d· I' I . I' . I 45 customer care, an me Ica -or msurance-c alllls reso utlOn WIt 1 customers. 
An example of a different approach is Switzerland, which has traditionally been thc 
world's guardian of bank secrecy, and now is being pressured towards some openness. 
This has been good for banking business in Austria, where secret savings accounts, 
available withont any proof of identity, are eagerly promoted. Although theoretically 
restricted to Austrian citizens, there are an estimated 26 million savings accounts and 
an Austrian population of 8 million.46 This practice is considered by the European 
Union as "a llagrant breach of the principle of identification". This is outlined in the 
European Union (EU) anti-money laundering directive 9 I/308IEEC,47 which requires 
banks to know the identity of their customers. As discussed in subsequent chapters, 
severe pressure is currently heing brought to bear on onshore and offshore 
jurisdictions to fight money laundering. 
Singapore, as discussed in chapter 6, has not traditionally been considered a part of 
the offShore industry, offering such trust and offuhore company facilities. However 
whilst providing an openness as such, it is now likc Austria, beginning to capture 
some of this offshore activity and business. 
As offShore outsoUl'cers add value, it is possible to envisage a global economy in 
which key elements of customer relationships and the delivery of a company's core 
i 
45 William Bierce, Slaying Afloat When Going OffShore (2002) Optimize 
<http://www.oplimizemagazine.cOln/issllcl0081Iaw.htm> at 25 April 2004. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Council Directive (EC) No 91!308IEFX; of 10 .Julie 1991 Preventioll of the Use of the FinaJ/cial 
SystemfoJ' the Purpose of Money Launderil1g [1991] OJ L 166, 77. 
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business services are integrated and supported by offshore suppliers - rather than the 
company itself. 48 
1.7 Types ofOI?Cs 
According to Spitz, there are five basic types of OFes, lllany of which are known as 
ax havens:49 
Countries that have no incollle tax or that grant extensive tax exemptions; 
2 Countries that only tax locally generated income (territorial basis of 
taxation that exempts foreign income); 
3 Countries that combine features of (l) or (2) with a treaty network; 
4 Low tax financial centres in countries offering special legislation; and 
5 High tax countries offering special incentives for offshore companies and 
qualifying holding companies. 
Examples of OFCs by category are set out below in a non-exhaustive Iist: 50 
1 Countries that have no income tax or that grant extensive tax exemptions: 
Andorra, Anguilla, the Bahamas, Bahrain, Bermuda, Bmnei (individuals), 
Campione, the Cayman Islands, the Cook Islands, French Polynesia, Grenada, 
Kuwait, Maldives, Monaco, Nauru, Oman (individuals only), the Turks and 
Caicos Islands, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Vanuatu. 
8 Bierce) above n 45. 
9 Spitz, above n 43. 
" [bid. 
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i 
2 Countries that impose no income tax on foreign source income: Costa Rica, 
Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, France (special rules), Guatemala, 
Hong Kong, Ireland (non-resident company), Jordan, Kenya, Lebanon, Liberia, 
Macau, Panama, South Africa, Umguay, Venezuela, Singapore. 
3 Countries that can be used as low tax areas but also have certain tax treaty 
benefits: Cyprus, the Netherlands, the Netherlands Antilles, Switzerland. 
4 Low tax financial centres and countries offering special inccntives al1d 
privileges: Angola, Anguilla, Antigua, Barbados, the British Virgin Islands, 
Brunei, Cyprus, Gibraltar, Grenada, Guernsey, Hong Kong, Ireland, the Isle of 
Man, Jamaica, Jersey, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Macau, Madeira, Malta, 
the Marshall Islands, Mauritius, MontselTat, the Netherlands, Nevis, 
Philippines, Puerto Rico, San Marino, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, 
St. Helena, St. Vincent, Switzerland, Tuvalu, Western Samoa51 
5 High tax countries offering special incentives and privileges for offshore 
companies and qualifying holding companies: Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, 
France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the Netherlands Antilles, 
Singapore, Spain, Switzerland, the United Kingdom. 
1.8 Conclusion 
51 Certain Coulltries mentioned in this point also offer tax treaty benefits. 
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From the above definitions and developments of OFCs, it can be seen why their 
success has provoked closer scrutiny by the international community and regulatory 
agencies, which have become less tolerant of the kind of competition offered by OFCs. 
On 26 June 2000, the OECD published report on hmmful tax practices and 
identified 35 tax havens that would face sanctions if they did not cooperate.52 A week 
earlier, 011 22 June 2000, thc FATF report on Money Laundering named 15 
jurisdictions that did not sufliciently combat hot money53. Moreover, on 26 May 2000, 
the FSF identified 37 jurisdictions which wcrc financial centres with significant 
offshore activities. 54 The recent 2003 EU agreement on a system of tax on savings 
income that aims to abolish bank secrecy also affects OFCs, as the agreement is 
dependent on equivalent measures being negotiated with third country financial 
centres. 55 Therefore, never before has the pressure been so high Ol1 the OFCS.56 The 
nature ofthis pressure is analysed in Chapter Two. 
52 Organisation fOl" Economic Co~operation and Development, To-wards Global Tax Co-operation: 
Progress il11del1tifj'illg and Eliminating Harmflll Tax Practices (2000 OECD). 
" Hot money is most often associated with capital flight, which itself will be a combination of clean, 
grey (associated with illegal activity), and dirty money (associated with criminal activity), depending 
on the cil'curnstances, Financial Action Task Force, Review to Identify plan-Cooperative Comlfries OJ' 
Territories: {Jlcreasing the Worldwide Ej}ecliveness of Anti-Money Laundering Measures (2000). 
51 Financial Stability FOl1lll1, Report oflhe Working Group 011 QfJ"/lOre Centres (2000 FATF). 
55 Council Directive (EC) No 20031481EC of 3 June 2003 T,,,,,lion ofSm'ings income illihe Forlll of 
llllerest Payments [2003] OJ L l57, 38. 
"Mallias Levin, Centre for European Policy Studies research report, The Pl'o.Ipects for Offshore 
Fillancial Centres in Europe (2000). 
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Chapter 2: Snpranational Directives and their Progress 
2.l Introduction 
The definitions and features of OFCs ouilined in chapter I show the rationale for the 
supranational initiatives against OFCs that emerged over the last fifteen years. 
Understanding the initiatives and OFCs responses to them, is critical in determining 
which OFCs are jurisdictions of choice in the current environment. 
In recent years, the offshore industry and the relevant jlll'isdictions have faced 
enOlllious challenges in relation to their status as 'tax havens' and overly broad 
assertions that offshore companies are being used for money laundering. The OECU 
and the FATF have issued several reports 57 seeking commitments to eliminate what 
they consider to be 'harmful tax competition' and gain greater transparency (in the 
case of the former) and to promote the adoption of international standards of anli-
money laundering regulatory frameworks (in the case of the latter).58 This chapter 
briefly describes the make-up of the relevant regulatory bodies. It then sets out and 
analyses the reports and recommendations of the OEeD and FATI'. The last sections 
analyses the Wolfuberg Principles which are the product of the efforts of the private 
sector to reduce and prevent money laundering in line with several or the FATF's 40 
57 Financial Action Task Force, Review to IdentifY Non-Cooperative Countries or Territories: 
Increasing the Worldwide Effectiveness of All/i-Moll~Y Laundering Measures (2000 FATF), Financial 
Action Task Force, Annual Review of Non-Cooperatii'e Countries or Territories (2003 FATF), 
Organisation for Economic Co~operation and Development, International Tax Avoidance and Evasion 
(J 987 OECD), Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Hannful Tax Competition: 
All Emerging Global [.,sue (1998 OECD), Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 
Towards Global Tax Co-opera/ioll: Progress ill idel1lijj>illg alld Eliminating Harl1l[1I1 Tax Practices 
(2000 OECD) 
'" Discussed extensively below, but see generally, O/I,llOre IncOlporations Limited, 'Onshore 
Jurisdictions - Ready for Stand against OECD' (September 2002) Asiall Legal Business. 
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Recommendations. The analysis of the recommendations will show that the four 
critical issues for OFes to addrcss arc harmful tax practices, money laundering, 
confidentiality and exchange of information. These arc addressed in detail in the 
subsequent chapters. 
2.2 Supnmational O.·ganisations 
(a) Organisation jar Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
The OECD is an organisation with 30 Member countries, including allll1embel's of 
the 08 and EU, sharing a stated commitment to democratic govel'mncnt and the 
market economy. 59 The OECD assists member governments to address the economic, 
social and governance challenges of a globalised economy.60 It is also an organisation 
designed, and mandated to promote the interests of its Member States.6! 
(b) Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 
59 Twenty counirlcs originally -signed the Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development 011 14 December 1960. Since then a further ten countries have become members of 
the Organisation. Organisation for Economic Co-operation alld Development, Ratification of the 
Convention 'iflhe GEeD <hHp:llwww.oced.org> at 25 Novemher 2003. 
60 Historically the research units within the OECD bave made significant contributions partiCUlarly in 
the area of ecollomies. It appears that neither these research units nor the souud l1leth(J?o1ogy which 
they Honnally adopt, were involved in the production oflhe OECD Report. ' 
61 The Couvention 011 the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris, 14 
December 1960 at Article 1 (a) states: 
The aims oflhe Organisation tOI' Economic Co-operation and Development sllal! be to 
promote policies designed to achieve the highest sustainable economic growth and 
employment and a rising standard of living in Member countries, while maintaining 
fillancial stability, and thus to contribute to the development of the world economy. 
28 
The FATF was established in 1989 and has 28 Member countries largely overlapping 
with that of the OECD.62 Its primary role has becn to establish standards relating to 
mOlley laundering laws and practices and to work to implement these standards 
throughout the world. The FATF has assumed a broader mandate to combat teJ1'orism 
following the attacks in the U.S. 
Like the OEeD, the FATF has restricted membership. Regional bodies such as the 
Caribbean Financial Action Task Force63 SUppOlt the work of the FATF. Although 
such regional bodies facilitate input fi'Om non-FATF members at a lower level, these 
groupings are 'Junior partncrs" in the processes undertaken by the FATF.64 
The need to cover all relevant aspects of the fight against money laundering is 
reflected in the scopc of the 40 FATF Recommendations which were originally drawn 
up in 1990. In 1996 the Forty Recoll1lnendations6S were revised to take into account 
the experience gained over the previous six years and to reJlect the changes which had 
OCCUlTcd in the money laundering area. 66 'Il1ey covel' the criminal justicc system and 
law enforcement; the financial system and its regulation, and international 
cooperation.67 
62 Financial Action Task Forco, Members & Db"el1'ers (2004) 
<http://,,~vw l.oecd.org/fatf/Mcmbersen.htlll> at 1 June 2004. For a full list of FATF Member 
countries see Appendix A. . 
6J Members of Caribbean Financial Action Task Force comprise Anguilla, Antinglla and Ilarhuda, 
Aruba, The Ilahumas, Ilarbados, Belize, Bennu<!a, Ilritish Virgin Islands, They Cayman Islands, 
Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Dominica, Grenada, Jamaica, Montserrat, Netherlands, Antilles, 
Nicaragua, Panama, st. Kitts and Nevis, 8t. .Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, 
Trinidad and Tobago, Turks and Caicos Islands and Venezuela. 
6< Stikeman Elliot, Towards a Level Playing Field·· Regulating COI])orale Vehicles ill O'oss-Border 
7hmsactiol1s (2002) 6-7. i 
65 For a IhH list orthe 40 Recommendations, see Appendix G. 
66 During the period 1990 to 1995, the FATF also elaborated valinu. Interpretative No!es which are 
designed to clarify the application of specific Recommendations. Smue of these Interpretative Notes 
have been updated in the Stocktaking Review to reflect changes ill the Recommendations. The FATF 
adopted a new Interpretative Note to Recommendation 15 0112 July 1999. 
67 Financial Action Task Force, 71w Forty Recommendations (2003 FATF) 
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(c) Financial Stability fiol'lI/lI (fiSF) 
The FSF's recent focus on OFes stems fTOm its work concerning the stability of the 
global financial system.68 As an organisation, the FSF providcs a cross-disciplinill'y 
forum for those interested in regulatory matters to meet, discuss, and pursue various 
initiatives with respect to the international financial system. At a summit of the 08's 
finance ministers and central bank governors on 3 October 1998, Hans Tietmeyer, the 
then President of the Deutsche Bnndesbank, was given a mandate to prepare a report 
that would recommend new structmes to enhance eo-operatioll among national and 
international regulatory and supervisory hodies and public international i1nancial 
institutions. On 11 February 2000, Tietmeyer presented his report 69 where he 
observed lhat supervisory initiatives with respect to the international l1nancial system 
over the previous few years had sharpened awareness of various risk-related issues. 
He asserted that the existing international regulatOlY framewOl'k remains imperfect 
because it is viewed as having been grafted onto a system of nation-Slates. In 
particular, the regulatory responsibilities remain fi'agmented among a number of 
cenlral banks, public financial institutions, and sector-specific groupS.70 Although he 
identilied various areas where existing supervisory arrangements could be 
strenbythened, Tietmeyer rejected both wholesale institutional reform aud a substantial 
reworking of existing arrangements. In other words, in his view, the nation-state is to 
remain the primary political construct through which regulatory issues related to the 
I 
6E FillaHcial Stability Forum, Fillancial Stability Forum: What We Do (2004) 
<hllp://www.fsformn.org/about/wlmt_we __ do.html> at 10 July 2004. 
69 Hans Tiehncyer j International Co-operation and Co-ordination in the Area of Financial ;\1arket 
Supervision and S1Irveillonce (1999 Financial Stability Forum). 
70 Ibid 3. 
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international financial markets are to be addressed. Instead, Tietmeyer recommended 
the creation of an international public f011un, the FSF, through which intel11ational 
regulatory efforts could be co-ordinated.71 
The FSF was convened in April 1999 to promote international financial stability 
tln'ough information exchange and intcl11ationaI co-operation in financial supervision 
and surveillance. Like the FATF, it was also established pursuant to a GS initiative. At 
its inaugural meeting on 14 April 1999, the FSF established a so called "0 FC" 
(Offshore Finance Centre) working group. The purpose of this group was to consider 
any potential role of llnancial institutions in non-OECD countries, in the stability of 
the world's financial systemn 
In May 200n, the FSF encouraged OFCs to undel1ake needed reforms and asked the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) 10 put in place an assessment program that would 
ensure progress on a lasting basis.73 Almost all of the 42 jlll'isdictions that the FSF 
identified as having offshore financial activities have undergone an initial assessment 
by the IMF. These assessments identify strengths and weaknesses in relation to 
relevant international standards and codes and set out recommendations for 
improvement.74 
71 Ibid 6. 
?2 Stikcman Elliot, above 1164,6-7. 
?3 Fhlaucial Stability Fonllll, 'FSF Reviews its Offshore Fhlaucial Centres (OFCs) Initiative' (Press 
Release, 5 April 2004). 
74 The 42 jurisdictions are: Switzerland ,Luxembourg, Ireland (Dublin [nternational Pinaneial Services 
Cent'e), Jersey) Guernsey, Isle of Man, Hong Kong, Singapore~ Andorra) Gibraltar, 1v1aita, Mouaco, 
Benlluda, Barbados, Bahrain, Macao and Malaysia (Labuan), Cypms, Liechtenstein, Anguilla, Antigua, 
Aruba, Bahamas, Barbuda, Belize, British Virgin Islands, Cayman [slands, Netherlands Antilles, St 
Christopher and Nevis, Sf Lucia, St Vincent & the Grenadines, Turks & Caicos~ Costa Rica} Panama} 
Lebanon, Mauritius, Cook Islands, fVfarshaH Islands, Nauru, Niue} Samoa and Vanuatu, International 
MOJ1etary Fund, Ojls/wre Financial Centres The Assessment Program - All Update (2004) 
<http://www.imf.orgiextemai/np/mf(l/2004/el1g/03J204.hl111> at 10 July 2004. 
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(d) International Monetmy Fund 
Tbe IMF is an organisation of 184 countries, established to promote international 
monetary co-operation, exchange stability, and orderly exchange agreements; to foster 
economic growth and high levels of employment; and to provide temporary financial 
assistance to countries to help ease balance of payments adjllslmcnt.75 The IMF is 
currently conducting assessments76 of non-OECD IFCs, in part using discriminatory 
assessment criteria in the sensitive area of corporate and trust service providers, which 
the IMF docs not apply to assessments of OECD Statcs.77 
In the IMF's assessment program of OFCs, the focus was placed on four areas:78 
.. Regular monitoring of OFCs' activities and compliance with supervisory 
standards; 
.. Improved transparency of OFC supervisory systems and activities; 
o Teclmical assistance in collaboration with bilateral and multilateral donors; 
.. Collaboration with standards-setters and the onshore and offshore supervisors to 
strengthen standards and exchange of information. 
(e) Links be/ween Supranational Organisations 
There is significant COml1:1011ality of membership of supranational organisations 
seeking to control the regulation of international financial services. Essentially, with 
, 
, 
"Inlcmational Monetary Fund, IMF Member Quolas alld Voting PoweJ; and IMP Board ojGovemol's 
(2004) <htlp:llwww.imf.orglextemallnp/sec/memdir/mombers.hlm> at 10 July 2004. 
'16 International Monetary Fund, above 11 75. 
71 The voting rights of the G8, OEeD and other members of the IMF, which are set by economic 
contribution to the IMF, are sct out in Appendix A. 
78 intemationai Monetary Fund, above 11 74. 
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the exception of the International Tax and Investment Organisation (InO) which is 
composed of, and ftmded by SDEs, the organisations are the same developed 
countries operating in different forums. 
As the supranational organisations put out their reports containing guidelines and 
recommendations, the Wolfubel'g Principles emerged from the private sector's attempt 
to combat money laundering. 
The similarity of composition and the complementary interlocking programmes of 
these organisations afe perceived by the SDEs as suggesting a single agenda, [hat of 
the major developed countries. 79 Accordingly, when one supranational body provides 
a recommendation or suggested course of action, endorsement frolll another 
organisation is, in substance, endorsement by the same member states. It is not an 
impartial validation as the process may imply to those unfamiliar with the overlapping 
memberships between such organisations. 
For the purpose of this thesis, given the overlap across supranational organisations, 
each with a different focus, and the related approach of the Wolfsberg signatories, it is 
intended to take the three approaches of the OECD, PATF and WoIfSherg Principles 
to provide a broadly comprehensive range of initiatives against OFes. In the context 
of these three approaches it is possible to determine what constitutes a compliant OFe 
jurisdiction. It will become clear that, to be a jurisdiction of choice for global wealth 
management, being a compliant OFC jurisdiction is essential. 
79 S,,,, Nicholas Kochan, The Dirly War on MOlley Laundering (2003) Global Agenda 
<http://www.giobalagendamagazine.comi2003il1icholaskochall.asp> at 10 July 2004 alld Ronald 
Sanders, 'The Fight against Fiscal Colonialism: The OECD and Small Jurisdictions' (2002) 365 The 
Round Table: The Commol/wealth Joul'I1al of inle/'ll(//iollal Affairs 325. 
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The remainder of this chapter provides an outline and analysis of the 
recommendations of each body. Chapters 3 and 4 provide a detailed examination of 
the key aspects of: harmful tax practices, money laundering, ofll;hOl'e confidentiality 
and exchange of information. How a jurisdiction responds to these issues is a key 
determinant of its attraction for global wealth management. 
2.3 OECD RepOI't on Harmful Tax Practices80 
2.3.1 The OECD's Position 
In May 1996, Ministers called upon the OEeD to "develop mcasures to counter the 
distorting effects of hannfhl tax competition on investment and financing decisions 
and the consequences for national tax bases, and repmt back in 1998",s1In l'esponse 
to the Ministers' request, the OECD's Committee on Fiscal Affairs launched its 
project Oll harmfill tax competition, The Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging 
Global Issue I'CpOl't82 addressed harmful tax practices in the form of tax havens and 
hannful preferential tax regimes in OReD Member countries and non-Member 
countries and thcir dependencies. It focused on geographically mobile activities, such 
as financial and other service activities. The report den ned the factors to be used in 
identifying harmful tax practices and went on to make 19 wide-ranging 
Recommendations to counteract such practices. 
so Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, above 11 12. 
" Ibid J. 
82 Ibid. 
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In approving the repOlt on the 9 April 1998,83 the OECD Council adopted a 
Rccommendation to the Governments of Member countries and instructed the 
Committee to pursue its work in this area and to develop a dialogue with nOll-member 
countries. Luxembolll'g and Switzerland abstained from voting in Council on the 
approval of the report and the adoption of the Recommendation. 
The existcnce of low or no income laxes is not in itself enough to constitute harmful 
tax competition. Rather, when low or no taxes are combined with other legislative or 
administrative featlll'es, such as "ring-fencing", a lack oftransparcncy, or the absence 
of exchange of information, it was asserted then harmful tax competition, may arise. 
The OECD report provided a framework for identifYing harmful regimes and suggests 
counter-measures for them.84 Accordingly, harmonising tax rates across countries or 
installing minimum tax levels was not the stated aim. Countries would remain free to 
decide their own tax rates, with checks and balances coming fi'om competitive forces 
of the global marketplace.85 It was envisaged by the OECD report that this would 
encourage countries 10 adopt "best practice" policies on taxation. 
The OECD's 1998 JIal'/J{fill Tax Competition: An Emerging Global [sslIe report drew 
a distinction between three situations in which the tax levied on income from 
geographically mobile financial and other service activities in one country is lower 
than the tax that would he levied on the same income in another country: 86 
" Ibid. 
"Ibid 26-34. 
"Ibid 15 [26J. 
,. Spitz, above n50, 236-7. 
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1) the first country is a tax haven and, as such, generally imposes no or only 
nominal tax on that income; 
2) the first country collects significant revenues from tax imposed on income 
at the individual or corporate level but its tax system has preferential 
features that allow the relevant income to be subject to low 01' no taxation; 
or 
3) the ill's! country collects significant revenues fi'om tax imposed on income 
at the individual 01' corporate level, but the effective tax rate that is 
generally applicable at that level is lower than the (ax rate levied in the 
other country. 
Each of these situations may have undesirable effects when seen l1"om the perspective 
of the other country. However, the repOli was careful not to suggest that there was 
some general minimum effective tax rate on income below which a country would be 
considered to be engaging in harmful tax practices. 87 
2.3.2 The OECD's Concept of "Tax Haven" 
The OBeD report defined a tax haven that conducts harmful tax competition in the 
three above mentioned situations and other activities such as: 88 
@ Practices which prevent the effective exchange of l"Clcvan! information with other 
governments on taxpayers benefiting from a low or no tax rate. 
.. General lack of transparency. 
&7 Ibid. 
" Blackman, above n 35. 
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* The absence of a requirement that the activity be substantial (investment that is 
purely tax driven.) 
The OECD's concept of "tax haven" thus refers to tax jurisdictions that offer 
themselves as a place that non-residents can use to escape tax obligations in their 
COllntries of residence. A number of factors identify these jurisdictions, in particular 
the virtual absence of taxes (combined with minimum business presence requirements) 
and a lack of legislative and administrative transparency. Dank secrecy and other 
features that prevent effective exchange of information are also discernible. 89 
2.3.3 The Recommendations !lnli the Guidelines 
In order to deal with harmful preferential tax regimes, OECD countries agreed to 11011-
hinding Guidelines for Dealing with Hal1llful Preferential Tax Regimes. They 
undertook to eliminate within five years of the adoption of the OECD's repmi on 
harmful tax competition (or, if a parlicular "grandfather clause" applies, no later than 
December 31, 2(05) the features of those preferential tax regimes identified as 
harmful under the guidelines.90 
In the latest 2004 progress report on the OEeD's campaign against harmful tax 
practices, it was reported that while there is an overwhelming majority of countries 
and jnrisdictions which have agreed to work towards transparency and effective 
exchange of information, a small number have not yet made commitments to those 
i 
89 Spitz, above n 87, 238. 
90 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, above n 85, 10. 
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principles.91 These countries are identified in a List of lIneo-operative Tax Havens 
issued by the Committee in April 2002 and revised in May 2003 and December 2003 
to remove Vanuatu92 and the Republic of Nauru,93 rcspectively, D:om the list. The 
OBCD was very pleased that Vanuatu and the Republic of NaulU have joined the 
growing number of countries that are connnitted to transparency and effective 
exchange of infC!1mation and hopes that the remaining countries will follow this 
example. The remaining uneo-operative tax havens arc Andorra, the Principality of 
Liechtenstein, Liberia, the Principality of Monaco, and (he Republic of the Marshall 
Islands.94 The OECD is cUl1'ently engaged in a constructivc ongoing dialoguc with a 
number of these countries and looks forward to fhtul'e commitments to transparency 
and effective exchange of information.95 
In addition to the tax haven list and the guidelines, both of which are of a multilateral 
character, recommendations were made on how the OECD countries might strengthen 
tht;ir domestic and bilateral measures against harmful tax practices. At the national 
Icvel, OECD countries have been encouraged to adopt controlled foreign corporation 
ceFe) or equivalent legislation96 111is generally enables the home counl!y of the 
parent to excrcise taxing rights over low laxed foreign subsidiaries that the parent 
91 Organisation fb .. Economic Co·operation and Developmellt, rlle DECD's Project on Harll/ful Tax 
Practices: 11,e 2004 Progress Report (2004 OECD). 
92 Organisation fbr Economic Co-operation and Development, Vanuatu lvlake..\' Commitment and is 
Removed from GBCD List of Uuca-operative l{,x lIavells (2003) 
<l1ttp:llwww.oecd.oJ.g/doeumentJ4110.23~O.ell_2649_37453_251255311J_37453.00.1111111> at 14 
January 2004. . 
93 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Nouru is Removed.fi'om OEeD List of 
Ullco·operative Tax Hervells (2003) 
<ht!p:llwww.oecd.org/doclll11ent/3110,2340,en.2(49)O 1185 .J.1863583 _1_1_1.37453 ,OO.hlm!> at 14 
Jannmy 2004. 
"' Organisation for Economic Co·operation and Development, ahove 11 91,14 [/.7]. 
95 Ibid. 
96 0 RCn Recommendatioll I: "Controlled Foreigll Corporations (CFCs) - COllntries that do not have 
CFC mlcs consider adopting them." OECD Reconllnendation 2: "Foroign investment fimd or 
equivalent rules· Countries tllat do not have stich rules adopt them to entities covered by practices 
cOllsidered to bc hal1nful tax cOlllpetition." 
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controls. The OECD countries are also encouraged to adhere to certain defined 
standards in providing tax rulings and to apply strictly the 1995 OECD Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines, which provide for internationally agreed-upon standards for 
establishing prices on intragroup transactions.97 
Bilaterally, OECD countries have been encouraged to intensify their exchange of 
infol111ation on tax havens and preferential tax regimes. 98 A provision is being 
considered for the OECD's Model Tax Convention 99 that would deny entities 
operating under harmful tax regimes access to certain or all of the Convention's 
benefits. Furthermore, the OECD report asked countries to consider terminating any 
treaties they might have with tax havens. lOo 
After defining the factors to he used in identifying harmfhl tax practiccs, the repmi 
went on to make 19 wide-ranging recommendations to counteract such practices. The 
recommendations set out ill the report and the accompanying guidelines addressed the 
problem of harmful tax practices fi'Olll different angles. Taken together, the 
recommendations with the guidelincs represent a comprehensive approach by member 
countries for dealing with the problems of harmful tax compctition created by tax 
havens and harmful preferential tax regimes. Some of the recommendations 
97 OEeD Recommendation 6: IITransfcr-pricing rules - Counh'ics follow the guidelines set out ill the 
OECD 1995 guidclines 011 transfer priclllg and not promote hannfh! tax competition." Transfer prices 
- paymcnts fi'om olle part of a multinational ellterprise for goods or services provided by another -
may diverge from market prices for reasons of marketing or fmancJaI policy, or to minhllise tax. To 
ensme tlmt the tax base of a multinational enterprise is divided fairly, it is important that !ransfurs 
within a group should approximate those which would be negotiated between independent finns. 
9B OECD Recommendation 8: "Exchanges of information - Countries should undertake programsito 
intensify exchange of infOlmatioll conceming transaction" in tax havens and preferential tax regimes 
constituting harmful tax competition." 
9' "OECD Model Tax Convention 011 Income and 011 Capita!", as read Oll 28 January 2003. 
100 OECD Recommendation 12: "Tax treaties with tax havens - Conntries consider terminating their tax 
conventions with tax havens and consider not enterirlg into tax treaties with such countries in the 
future." 
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encomage countries to refrain from adopting hannful tax practices. Others address the 
issue indirectly by focusing on lax evasion and avoidance, because many forms of 
harmful tax competition are aimed at taxpayers willing to engage in tax evasion and 
lax avoidance. 
It is the view of the OECD that, the effectiveness of many of the recommendations 
concerning domestic legislation and tax treaties depends in patt upon whether they 
can be implemented in a coordinated way. Consequently, one of the main 
recommendations was lor the establislmlent of a forum on hunnful tax practices in 
order to monitor the application of the guidelines and to undertake an ongoing 
evaluation of existing and proposed regimes. 101 The forum would assess the 
effectiveness of countermeasures and to propose ways to improve their effectiveness. 
It would also be responsible lor monitoring the implementation of the other 
recommendations. \02 
TIle 19 recommendations made were broken into three categories:!03 
" Recommendations conceming domestic legislation: starting ii'om various 
counteracting measures currently foulld in domestic laws; these 
recommendations indicate how to increase their effectiveness; 
" Recommendations concerning tax treaties: these rccommendations deal with 
ways of cnsuring that the benefits of tax conventions do not unintentionally 
make policies constituting harmful tax competition more attractive or prevent 
; 
101 OEeD Rccornmendation 15: "Guidelhlcs and a fonull on hal1l1ull tax practices - Member counh'ies 
endorse the guidelines set out in the following list dealing with hanufuJ preferential tax regimes." 
'02 Spitz, above 89,239-40. 
!O3 See Appendix H for a ful! list of the 19 recommendations. 
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the application of domestic counteracting measures, as weIl as ways to ensure 
that the exchange of information provisions of tax treaties are used in a more 
effective way; and 
.. Recommendations for intensification of international cooperation: these 
recommendations, including the guidelines, put forward new ways through 
which countries will he ahle to act collectively against harmful tax competition. 
These recommendations may also be distinguished on the basis of the amount of 
cooperation needed to implement the recommendations. The first set of 
recommendations can be achieved largely unilaterally, which is to say they can he 
implemented solely through domestic legislation. The second set of recommendations 
involves bilateral negotiations to modify tax treaties, while the final set involves or 
requires multilateral cooperation in order to he cffective.104 
2.3.4 Analysis ofthe OECO's 19 Rccommemiations 
Recommendation 1 states that countries that do not have CFC or equivalent 
legislation are to start establishing them and that those countries who do have such 
legislature, continue to harness them to stem harmful tax practices. This 
recommendation sets the tone of the OECD's main purpose: to combat harmful tax 
practices and it should start at a national level where CFC legislation provides for 
taxation of low-taxed foreign subsidiaries. 111e CFC rules are inlended to tax the 
income of multinational investors that is most easily transfened. The recommcndati<)ll 
, 
encourages countries to extend their CFC regimes to income arising in tax havens or 
'M Steven Sicker, 'Offshore Financial Centers and 'Harmful Tax Competition': The Year 2000 in 
Review' (200 1) 22 7iIX Noles international 557. 
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harmful preferential regimes and would coordinate the legislation in terms of their 
effectiveness in counteracting halmful tax practices. 105 
Recommendation 2 continues the similar path of foreign cOlJlorations and investmcnts, 
stating that taxation rules have to be laid for foreign invcstments funds. For countries 
without such lUles in place, they should consider establishing them while for the 
countries which have such legislation in place, should have the rules directed al 
preventing abuse with harmful tax practices. 
Recommendation 3 concerns eliminating double taxation by granting exemptions of 
tax to foreiga entities. Countries which take on tins approach in eliminating double 
taxation should take care that exemptions arc not granted to entities which have 
benefited tln'Ough tax practices that constitute harmllli tax competition. 
Recommendation 4 recogaises that globalisation has made taxation all the more 
complicated and encourages rules to be put in place for the rep0l1ing of international 
transactions and foreign operations of resident taxpayers. Countries which have such 
legislation in place should consider exchanging information to have a morc effective 
and accurate tax system, thus minimising harmful tax competition. 
Recommendation 5 continues the notion of exchanging infonuation to reduce harmflll 
tax competition. It recommends that decisions which concern the position of a 
taxpayer be revealed before planned transactions and releasing the ruling d\)tails such 
, 
as granting, denying or revoking the taxpayer's request to the public. 
105 Joann M Weiner and Hugh J Aul!, 'The OECD's RepOlt on Harmful Tax Competition' (1998) 51 
National Tax .lolll'llal601, 605. 
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Recommendation 6 deals with transfer pricing. Transfer prices are payments from one 
Palt of a multinational enterprise for goods 01' services provided by another. They may 
diverge from market prices for reasons of marketing or financial policy, or to 
minimise tax. To ensure that the tax base of a multinational enterprise is divided fairly, 
it is important that transfers within a group should approximate those which would be 
negotiated between independent Ihms.106 Countries are encouraged to follow the 
transfer pricing rules as set out in OECD's 1995 Guidelines on li'ansfer Pricing so 
that the trans fur pricing ruJes applied by the countries would not fall in line with 
hmmful tax c0l11petition. 107 
Recommendation 7 is similar to recommendations 4 and 5 as it too dwells on the 
importance of information what it concerns tax collection. The benefiting paity here is 
intended to be the tax authorities. By reviewing the legislation to strengthen the 
countries' tax authorities powel' to view banking information, this can in some way 
come into conflict with the private banking sector's principle of client confidentiality. 
It is up to the individual country to maintain a balance between banking 
confidentiality and the abuse of the system through hmmful tax practices. 
Recommendation 8 pushes for co-operation between countries in the exchange of 
information, particularly for that of tax havens or OFes. Transactions that take place 
in OFCs or tax havens and contribute to halmfl.ll tax competition should be recorded 
and made available to the resident countries. With recommendations 4, 5 and '{ in 
, 
106 Pieter J Vogelaar, 'Developments with Regard to the GECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines' (Paper 
presented at the tenth meeting of the Ad Hoc Group of Experts on Intel11ational Cooperation ill Tax 
Matters, Geneva, J 0-14 September 200 I) 1. 
107 Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development) Transfer Pricing Guidelines for 
MIII/illa/iollai Eilleiprise" alld Tax Admillistrations (1995 OEeD). 
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place, recommendation 8 is simply to {urther the same intention but with the co-
operation between countries and especially the OPCs. 
Recommendation 9 concerns entitlement to treaty benefits. Countries are encouraged 
to not extend tax treaty benefits to countries whose practices are considered to be in 
line with harmful tax practices. Countries are also advised to take into consideration 
the OECD's Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital which was last updated 
in January 2003 when forming their tax conventions. lOB 
Recommendation 10 concerns the clarification of the status of domestic anti-abuse 
rules and doctrines in tax treaties. The Commentary on the Model Tax Convention is 
to be clarified to remove any uncertainty or ambiguity regarding the compatibility of 
domestic anti-abuse measures vvith the Model Tax Convention. 
Recommendation II involves the co-operation and involvcment of countries in their 
list of specific exclusion provisions in their tax treaties. The details, such as certain 
entities or income are to be provided to the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs. As 
such, they will have a reference to benefit their negotiations in tux conventions and 
will serve as a hasis for discussions in forums. Revealing such information is a huge 
step forward in the exchange of information to prevent harmful tax practices and give 
support to the OECD's campaign against harmful tax competition. 
lOB Organisation of Economic Co~opcration and Development~ lv/ode! Tax Convention on Income and 
011 Capital (2003 DEeD). 
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Recommendation 12 advises countries which have existing tax treaties with tax 
havens to tenllinate the treaties. Tax havens only serve to perpetuate hmmful tax 
competition and maintaining tax treaties with them would only aid in the competiiion. 
Recommendation 13 concerns the co-ordinated enforcement regimes such as joint 
audits and co-ordinated training programmes among countries. With such co-
ordinated effort, taxpayers who benel1t from practices constituting harmful tax 
competition can he stopped. 
Recommendation 14 calls upon the assistance in the recovery of tax claims. Countries 
are encouraged to review the cummt rules applying to the enforcement of tax claims 
of other countries while the ORCD Committee on Fiscal Affairs pursues its work in 
this area with a view to drafting provisions that could be included in tax conventions 
for that purpose. This is not easy, as a country which maintains sovereignty over itself 
does not have any obligation to a second country to help collect the second countly's 
taxes. Tlus runs into conflict with the principle of comity. 
Recommendation 15 covers establishing guidelines and a fOl'llm on harmful tax 
practices. OECD member countries should endorse the guidelines on harmfid 
preferential tax regimes set out in 1998 Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging 
Global hsue report, strengthening their legislative and administrative practices to 
combat harmfld tax practiccs. 109 If the countries are founel to have tax regimes which 
constitute to harlllfhl tax practices, they havc up to December 31, 2005 to rCIl;IOVC 
, 
them. 'I111'ough forums, member countries should raise their co-operation to an 
109 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, above 11 90. 
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international level hy co-ordinating their cffOlis in tTcaties and encourage non-
member countries to join them in their effmis. 
Recommendation 16 extends the intention of tbe forum between member countries of 
the ORcn to establish a list of tax havens based on the factors identified in the 1998 
Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue repmi. IIO 
Reconmlendation 17 concerns the links with tax havens. Conn tries which have 
established political or economic links with tax havens are to take care that their links 
do not give way to harmful tax practices. Also, countries with dependencies that have 
similar links to tax havens do not allow the links to contribute to harm fbi tax 
competition. 
Recommendation 18 cOl1llnissions the OECD Committce of Fiscal Affairs to be 
responsible for developing and actively promoting a set of principles that should 
guide tax administrations in the enforcement of the 19 Recol1llnendations. As this 
Committee is led by tbe members of the OECD, OFCs which are not memhers may 
feel left out as they are not consulted in this seemingly international effort which will 
no doubt affect them the greatest. 
Recol1llnendation 19 takes the OECD 19 Recommcndations beyond the OECD 
members. Motivated by the sole intention and joint efforts at combating harmful tax 
competition, OECD members recognise that they eal1not succeed if they are not 
, 
supported internationally, thus it is imperative that they encourage nOll-members to 
lIO Ibid. 
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take on the guidelines through engaging them in various fomms. This extends the 
influence ofthe Recommendations to that oftax havens and OFCs. 
2.3.5 OECD Initiatives Uptlates 
On Isth Apri12002, almost two months after its original deadline date of28 tl1 February 
2002111, the DECO released its list of uncooperative countries or territories involved 
in harmful tax practices. 
The following jurisdictions, which had not yet made commitmcnts to transparency 
and effective exchange of information, were identified by the OECD's Committee on 
Fiscal Affairs in the List of Unco-operative Tax Havens.1l2 
.. Andorra 
e The Principality of Liechtenstein 
e Liberia 
o The Principality of Monaco 
.. The Republic of the Marshall Islands 
" The Republic ofNaum 
.. The Republic of Vanuatu I 13 
l!l Organisation for Economic Co-operation alld Development, The OECD Is""es The List of Unco-
operative Tax Hm'ells (2002) 
<http://wlVw.occd.org/documentIJ9/0.231.0.en_2649_33745_2082323_1_1_1_37453.OO.htm1> at 14 
January 2004. 
112 Ibid. 
113 Asia Pacific Offshore Institute, \V\vw,asiaoff"ihore,org. 
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Since the OEeD began its initiative against what it perceived as harmful tax practices, 
where 35 jurisdictions wcre listed as tax havens, lt4 31 jurisdictions initially made 
commitments, induding the BVI and Samoa. I1S 
In 'JI1C GECD's Project on Harmful Tax Practices: 'JIlc 2004 Progress Report, 
Vanuatu and the Republic of Naul1l have joined the growing number of countries that 
are committed to transparency and effective exchange of information, resulting in the 
removal of these two countries in the List of Un co-operative Tax Havens.1l6 
2.3.6 Analysis ofOECD's Campaign against Harmful Tax Competitioll 
GECD's Concept of Harmful Tax Competition Flawed 
One of the major weaknesses of the "Harmful Tax Practices" report can be identilied 
as the vagueness of the concept of 'harmful tax competition' itself. While the report 
concedes that tax competition can, indeed, be beneficial, 'when tax competition 
ceases to be beneficial and starts to be harmful is not clear, and is esscutially, 
subjective'. 117 In delennining whether a jurisdiction has a low or nominal tax rate, the 
1998 OReD Reportll8 failed to provide an exact tlgurc or range that would determine 
the threshold. 1l9 For example, ill the Tax Reform Act of 1986,120 the US Congress 
114 Organisation for Economic Co-opt.'ration tUld Development, Towards Global Tal,; Co-operation, 
Progress in ]delllijj;ing and Eliminating flarll/jid Tax Practices (2000 OECD). Also available at 
alJpendix IJ is the fulllig! orthe 35 potential tax havens. 
I 'Ibid. 
116 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development~ above n 95, 14. 
111 Mason Gaffney, '1llletllational Tax Competitioll - A Discussion of the OECD RepOlT and its 
Implications' (1986) Private Clienl131tsilless 304-5. 
us Organisation for Economic Co~operatioll and Development, above n lIO. 
119 See Alexander Townsend, Jr, 'The Global Schoolyard Bully: The Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development's Coercive Emll'!s to Control Tax Competition' (2001) 25 Fordham 
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l 
reduced tho maximum marginal rate on corporate income to thirty-four percent. 
Compared to other industrialised nations at that time, this rate was IOW. 12l However, 
the United States has not found itself a target, even though it likely diverl~ significant 
revenue from other nations 122 due to finl1s seeking the greatest return on their 
capital. 123 
The OECD acknowledges that countries should be free to design their own tax 
systems. 124 However, this must be according to internationally accepted standards. 
The problem is that the "international accepted [tax 1 norms" with which offshore 
financial jurisdictions are encouraged to align themselves, are non-existent. '1110 
implication is that such norms are, in fact, those which will be determined solely by 
high tax, onshore countries all'aid of tax competition. 'What the report really objects 
to is thal some countries, such as "tax havens", advocate totally free markets in capital 
and investment and are not willing to impose' the distortions as the OEeD countries 
do through their tax systems,.125 ntis suggests, perhaps unintentionally, that the only 
justifiable tax regime is one which supports the welfare state through high taxes in a 
mixed economy. 
TIle notion of harm is misplaced in another sense. Given that the jurisdiction to tax is 
recognised as territorial and that onshore countries have no solid claim to investments 
_ ... _ ..•.. _--------------- ------
[u(ematlonal Lall' Jaul'llal215, 256. (expressing the need foJ' all example of an appropriate tax rate to 
\lllide jurisdictions) . 
20 Tax Reform Act 1986 (P.L.) s99-514. 
121 See Karen B Brown, 'Harmful Tax Competition: The OECD View' (1999) 32 George Washingtol1 
Ja/ll'llal of Illtemlliiotlal Em!' and Economic", 311, 316 (book review) (stating that 34% was a 
comparatively low marginal corporate tax rate) i 
122 See Mitchell B Weiss, 'Intemational Tax Competition: An Effieie,,' or Inefficient Phenomenon?' 
(2001) J 6 Akron Tax Journal 99, 10& (providing Latin American countries as examples) 
12J Javier G Salinas, 'The OECD tax competition initiative: a critique of its merits in Ihe global 
marketplace.' 25 HOllston Journal of Jntel'l1alionoi Law 531, 555. 
174 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, above n 118, 15. 
125 Gaffiley, above II 117, 308. 
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outside of their borders, no real harm has taken place: 'Lost opportunities to which 
one has no right in the first place are not harms suffered in any thing but metaphorical 
sense'. 126 The OECD's accusation of 'poaching' must be assessed against the 
backdrop of a global envirornnent which lacks a consensus on the qucstion of the 
ownership of taxable worldwide income. 127 
A significant flaw in the OEeD's argument is the way in which the well-established 
legal distinction between tax avoidance and tax evasion is diluted with the result that 
all tax planning efforts are treated a~ unethical and unlawful. The capacity of offshore 
financial centres to allow persons to 'escape' tax is condemned in totality, implying 
that such centres may not legitimately facilitate any kind of tax mitigation or planning 
within their borders. This means, further, that disclosure can then be justified as a tool 
to thwart such tax planning. 128 
The el1'OneOUsness of the OEeD's argument is highlighted even more by the fact that 
several onshore financial centres olIer similar tax functions to non-residents. Y ct, 
these are not treated as engaging in 'hurmfhl tax competition'. 
TIle US facilitates non-resident investment by reducing tax in exactly the sanle way as 
other 'hannful tax practices'. For example, by putting shipping operations in the 
United States, a combination of credits and allowances which are granted, produces 
zero tax. The United States (Delaware) has beaten Panama and Liberia at their own 
\26 [bid 309. 
J27 Alltoine, above 1l44, 314-5. 
l28 Ibid. 
; 
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game, because if there is one tiling better than paying no tax, it is paying negative tax. 
The government actually pays tax credits. 129 
Similarly, the OECD report pays scant respect or regard for the well-established rule 
of international law which states that one state does not enforce the tax laws of 
another. This mle recobrnises the territorial application of tax law. 130 The OECD 
simply asserts the inaccurate presumption that it is unfair or harmful for offshore 
countries to continue enforcing this rule. 131 This is despite the fact that the rule 
continues and, presumably, will continue to be applied by onshore nations outside the 
offshore fimmcial concept. 
The OECD report goes one step further. It accuses offshore financial centres of 'ring 
fencing' and discriminatory practices. 132 This speaks to a legal system where the 
positive benefits of the fiscal policy are reserved only foj' nOll-residents. Tllis is a 
simplistic and inaccurate assumption made about offshore financial jUl'isdictions as a 
whole. Several olTshore financial centres, such as Hong Kong and Singapore, in fact, 
do not make distinctions between residents and locals in their tax policies. This is also 
the case in Thc Bahamas and the Cayman Islands, f[)J example, where thcre arc no 
direct taxes but rather, consumption taxes, which apply to all. Fmther, even if such a 
claim for other offshore nations is accepted, this places them in the same category as 
several other onshore jurisdictions which exempt non-residents 11'0111 paying taxes on 
I 
129 Spitz, above n 102,6. 
130 Gilbert N M 0 Morris, 'The Loss of Sovereignty, the United Nations, and Offuhore Financial 
Celltres' (2001) 10 Tax Noles fnlernaliollal1297. 
13l Tel1Y Dwyer, 'The New Fiscal Imperialism' (2002) 18(4) Policy 12. 
132 Organisation fbr Economic Co~operation and Development, above n 124,26. 
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such items as their bank deposits. Indeed, the very criteria used by the OECD in 
identifying 'harmful' tax havens are challenged by offShore countries. 133 
Competing Philosophies 
TIle first five years of the initiatives against on:~hore financial centres can be viewed 
as driven by a different philosophical approach on how to deal with the major flaw in 
the system of direct taxation - that capital is mobile. But there is another problem 
relating to Ihis [OI1U of taxation, which is that of a new political correctness which 
states that tax competition be viewed as essentially unjust competition. 
Whichever way it is interpreted, a direct system of income tax in large Palt must rely 
on voluntary compliance by its cilizens for it to WOl'k. 134 This in part explains the 
effOlt expended by onshore treasuries on negative publicity about the offShore world. 
However, it remains a fact that, historically speaking, some jurisdictions such as the 
US, the UK and Canada have had relatively high taxpayer compliance, l3S while tax 
evasion has been endemic in many European and Latin American countries. 136 It is 
b . h b . . E 137 I . . ecause tax evaSIOn as een so pervasIVe m mope t mt automatic repOl'tmg 
appeals so much to the EU govenunents, but not, unsUlprisingly, to Switzerland, 
133 Antoine, ahoven 128,314-9. 
lH Johll Hasse!dine, 'Increasing Voluntmy Compliance: The Case of Tax Amnesties' (1989) 6(4) 
Australian Tax rOl'llm 509. 
B5 Cedric Sandford, 'Intemational Comparison of Administrative and Compliance Costs of Taxation' 
(1994) II Australian Tax Forum 291. 
136 Vito Tanzi, Taxation ill an Integrating World (1995). 
137 Bmce Baltlett, Europe', Underground Economies (1998) National Centre for Policy Allalysis 
<http://,,~vw.ncpa.Ol'glbalba278.html> at 10 July 2004. 
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Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg and now Guernsey, which arc favoured jurisdictions 
for discrete banking. 138 
While traditionally the UK has favoured the liberty and privacy of the individual and 
championed the rule of law, the Government's current position B9 in support of 
automatic exchange of information can be understood only as driven by the need to 
keep a mandatory withholding tax ft'om driving the Eurobond market out of the City 
of London and the desire to maintain competition among the various income rates 
internally within the EU. Its perceived high-handed and inappropriate attitude towards 
. .. I b d d' I' 140 Its overseas terntones can on y e un erstoo m t liS context. 
Uneven !land 
As discussed above, having produced its repOli entitled, !larmjiil Tax Competition: An 
Emerging Global Issue in 1998, 141 the OECD then initiated, in a unilateral and 
arbitrary manner, the identifIcation of j urisdietions that it considered to be competing 
in tax matters in a way that was harmful to its member-states. In 1998 the OECD 
indicated that there were 47 jurisdictions it deemed to be tax havens. Later that year 
six ofthescjurisdictions'wel'e dropped but the DECD never disclosed their identity. It 
can only be sl\I'lllised that the DECD decided to exclude these six undisclosed 
jurisdictions fol' politicall'easons such as the reluctance of its member-states to engage 
in a confrontation with the Governments cOllcel'l1ed. It is noteworthy, for instance, that 
'" COl/neil Directive (liC) No 20031481EC 0/3 JlIne 2003 Taxation a/Savings Illcoille ill the Forlll 0/ 
Interest Payments [2003] OJ L 157, 38. 
m Inland Revenue (United Kingdom), COl/ntering Cross-Border Tax Evasion by Individuals 
<http://wmv.inl.ndrevenlle.gov.ukJesdl> at 10 July 2004. 
140 Anthony Travers, Global concem (2003) The Lawyer Group <htlp:l/www.thclawyer.colll/cgi-
binlitem.cgi?id~99607&d~II&IF24&f~23> at 14 October 2003. 
141 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, above n 132. 
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Hong Kong was never named as a tax haven, yet, by every criteria that the OEeD 
established, Hong Kong should have been a prime target. Was Hong Kong's omission 
an indication that the OECD did not want to offend the Peoples Republic ofChina'll42 
When the OEeD produced a 1'ep011 in 2000 entitled, Towards Global Tax Co-
operation: Progress in ldentifj'ing and Eliminating Hal'l1l/ill Tax Practices,143 it was 
revealed that the Organisation was treating its member states quite differently from 
the unilateralist and arbitrary slance taken with the targeted jurisdictions. First, while 
the targeted jurisdictions were quite categorically named as "tax havens", some 
OEeD members, such as Switzerland, Belgium, POlillgal, Luxembourg, Canada and 
the United States, were described only as having regimes that were "potentially 
harmful". Second, the OECD carried out a unilateral evaluation of the jurisdictions 
they subsequently labelled as 'tax havens', but its own members each performed 'a 
self-review" to determine whether or not they had preferential tax regimes. 
One observation offered by one such labelled "tax haven", Antigua and Barbuda,t44 is 
that the OEeD countries arc the principal advocates of the virtues and merits of 
competition in the provision of goods and services globally. For them "competition" 
is the new panacea for the world's economic ills, because their industrial and 
agricultural capacity has reached the point where it needs unrestricted entry to global 
markets to continue to provide employment and profits to their people. Y ct, while 
they (G8) promote competition in everything else, they seemed to decry it in taxation. 
142 This was an observation made by Sir Ronald Sanders, High Commissioner to the United Kingdom 
for Antigua and Barbllda. Amanda Banks, Sandel'S Renews Attack on OECD (2003) Tax-News.com 
<hltl.:llwww.tax-news.com/asp/story/story.asp.lstorynamc·1 0447> at 10 July 2004. 
143 Organisation for Economic Co-operation find Development, above n 115. 
144 Ronald Michael Sanders, 'The OECD's 'Harm!hl Tax Competition' Scheme: 11m Implications For 
Antigua And Barbuda' (Speech delivered at the luncheon meeting of the Antigua aud Barbuda 
Chamber ofCOllllllerce and Industry, Antigua and Barbuda, 27 March 2001). 
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ll1eir objection appears to be derived from the fhet that, in a globalised world, the 
mobility of financial and other services, such as shipping and internet gambling, 
provide an opportunity for small states, and pose a threat to them. The low tax or no 
tax regimes of these small states coupled with literacy in English and good 
telecommunications gives them all advantage with which many OECD countries 
cannot compete. Instead of trying to vie with small states by lowering their own taxes, 
the OECD responded by demanding that these small jurisdictions change their tax 
systems and structures or face damaging sanctions. 
In an OECD paper entitled: Globalisalion: Impact on Tax Policy and 
Administration, 145 the OECD revealed its thinking behind the 'hannfili tax 
competition' scheme. It says: 
In tins ncw global environment multinational enterprises will continue to 
move their manufactUl'ing activities to low-cost countries ... All countries will 
be forced to compete for this footloosc investment: either by lowering 
regulatory standards or creating incentives, particularly tax incentives, to 
attract business to their jurisdictions.146 
Sanders suggests a fear in the OECD countries that they will lose investment in a 
range of activities to developing countries that offer tax incentives to win investors.147 
The OECD's concern is that its member states will lose investors who would 
145 Presented to a Ministerial Conference hosted by the Government of Barbados in association with the 
Commonwealth Secretariat and the Global FOIllIll on International Taxatioll oftne OEeD, 8-9 January 
2001. 
1<6 Ibid. 
'" Ibid. 
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otherwise be subject to their high taxation. Their pUlIJose is to tax the profits and 
interest income of those investors wherever they may be, The consequence would be 
to deprive small developing countries from advancing their economic development 
through their tax stmctures and systems. 
Of course, the OECD argument represents the views of its member statcs which have 
reached a high level of industrial development precisely because of tax competition in 
which they IUI'ed foreign investment into their countries by tax hreaks, In fact, many 
ofthem continue to do SO,148 
In the United States, for instance, institutions, both banks and non-banks, held more 
than $1 ,8 trillion in deposits fi'Ol1l foreign persons at the end of20()O.149 That money is 
there because the US exempted the holders of tbose accounts from taxes on their 
interest income. The US banking system, particularly in Florida and New York, could 
face collapse ifthcsc trillions of dollars were to be withdrawn and taken elsewhere - a 
fact well known to the Governor of the State of Florida, .T E Bush, who lobbied 
strongly against US excbange of infol1l1ation with tax authorities of other 
governments, including those fi'om the DECO. In Junc 2001, Governor Bush sent a 
letter to US Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill arguing that regulation, contemplated by 
the Irual1d Revenue Service, to allow information to be passed to other countries about 
interest payments made to their nationals "would place US banks at a competitive 
l"lbid. 
149 Bureau or Economic Analysis (BEA), U.S. Depaltment of COlllmerce, 'The Net International 
Investment Position oflhe United Slates at Yearend 2000' Harlan W. King (ed.), in Survey a/Current 
Business, JIlly 2001. 
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disadvantage relative to banks in the Caribbean and Europe ... and would seriously 
hamper the ability of US banks to continue to attract foreign depositors.,,!50 
The United Kingdom also operates similar regimes designed to attract funds to its 
banks and bond markets fi'om overseas. It is therefore very significant that in its 1998 
report, the OEeD declared that, "the tax treatment of interest on cross-border savings 
instruments, particularly bank deposits, is not considered in this first stage of the 
projcct".15! 
Modification of OECD Stance 
Hence, it was the new Republican administration of George W Bush, which came to 
office in January 200J, that caused the OECD to review its initiative which had been 
strongly supported by the previons Democratic Party government of Bill Clinton and 
particularly hy his Treasury Secretary, Lawrence Summers. Much of the Sllccess with 
the Bush government was due to the collaboration of some Caribbean governments 
with the Center for Freedom and Prosperity (CFP) in Washington. TIle CFP was 
established by a group opposed to tax harmonisation and inJi:mnation exchange on the 
"0 Cited ill Mike Godliey, US TreaslIIJ' (0 Review Proposed In/ormalioll Exchange Rules (2001) Tax-
Ne\ys,com <http://www.tax-news.com> at 3 November 2003. 
151 In Harry Huizinga and Gaetan Nicodemc's "Arc International Deposits Tax-Driven'r', European 
Commission Economic Paper No 152, by using data on the cross-border ownership of deposilq and on 
the tax rates and infonnatioll-sharillg regin}es (domestic and international) in efteet in difterent 
conntries) Harry and Gactan find that some mechanisms arc morc influential than others ill driving 
deposits offshore. In particnlar, high income aod wealth taxcs and domestic rep01ting of interest to the 
tax authorities (15 OECD cOllntries reqnire their banks to generally report 'illterest paid and to whom it 
is paid') are strong influences. A point estimate is that a tax that lowers the net interest mum, by 100 
hasis points causes deposit placements ahroad to increase hy 146 per cellt. In contrast, there is less 
evidence that interest withholding taxes discourage snch depositing, likely becanse the rates of 
withholding tax are typically rather low. 
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basis of the damage that would be done to the US economy.152 The CFP informed 
members of the US Congress and Senate and the new US Govel'mnent of the serions 
flaws in the OECD initiative. As a consequence, the new US Secretary of the 
Treasury, Paul O'Neill, caused the OECD to amend its initiative.153 While there were 
other countries, sllch as Canada, that earlier saw the wisdom of such change, they 
lacked the strength to resist the domination of the OECD by the 15 EU countries who 
had been the driving fClI'ce behind this scheme. In the event, the OECD modiHed its 
initiative in November 2001, but ollly to refocus it on what O'Neill called its "core 
element", ie, "the need for (OECD) countries to be able to obtain specific information 
fi'Oln other cOllntries upon request in order to prevent non-compliance with their tax 
laW8".154 
Thus the OECD initiative switched its focus to "transparellcy" and "effuctive 
exchange of information" .155 
GEeD's Authority 
A fundamental difficulty still remained. It was one that had far reaching implications 
and was by no means limited to this particular initiative of the OEeD. Should the 
offshore jurisdictions around the world accept that the OEeD has the right or 
authority to set itsel I' 1111 [0 make tax rulings which they expect lion-members to follow'? 
By doing this, would these jurisdictions, targeted by the OEeD as 'tax havens', not be 
152 Center for Freedom and Prosperity <i1ttll://www.fr-eedolllandprosperity.ol.glGlallce/glance.shtml> at 
to July 2004. 
'53 Paul H O'Neill, 'OECD Harmful Tax Practices Initiative' (Statement delivered before the Senate 
COIlllllittee Oil Governmental AftaiTS PeIluanent Subcommittee ollinvestigatiolls, July 18th, 2001). 
154 Sanders, above 11144. 
'55 Ibid. 
58 
opening the floodgates to a raft of other demands by an organisation with no 
international authority except the coercive power of its member states? TIle OECD is 
a multinational grouping of thhty countries. It is not an international organisation and 
it has no legal authority to speak for the world or to establish rules, norms or standards 
for any state except its 0\'I1l members. Nonetheless, it is now dictating terms on what, 
in short, could bc described as cross-border tax matters. 
The jurisdictions have now had to take serious account of it in reaching a decision 
about whether or no! to make a commitment to the OECD on the two remaining 
aspects of "transparency" and "effective exchange of information". By the same token, 
they also had to consider carefully the consequences to their economies of the 
application of sanctions hy those members of the OECD who are important partners to 
them in trade and financial services. The key players in this regard would have been 
the US, Canada and the UK. 
The OECD report Hamifiil Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue itself 
acknowledges that there is no compelling reason why any two countries should have 
the same tax policies and structure. It views this as a political decision. 156 Mitchell, an 
opponent of the OECD, has accused the 'unelected paper-pushers' and bureaucrats at 
the OECD of sceking to set up a 'lax cartel' that would set tax policy for the world. 
His view is that this campaign is a backdoor manoeuvre aimed at 'undermining 
national sovereignty' of countries by placing the setting of a global tax poliey in a few 
hands. l57 
156 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, above 11 141, 15[26]. 
151 Dan Mitchell, 'Harmful Tax Competition: An Emergulg Global Isslle' , (Research paper, Centre for 
Freedom and Prosperity, 1998) and Dall Mitchell, 'An OECD Proposal to Eliminate Tax Competition 
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September 11, 2001 
Prior to September 11, 2001, Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill and his staff opposed 
certain aspects of the OReD harmful tax competition initiative and were lukewarm on 
the rest of it. However this attitude changed in the wake of the atrocities. Evidence of 
the changed mood in the US was an executive order by President George W Rush on 
24th September 2001 158 requiring jurisdictions to establish a new counter-terrorism 
economic sanction and export control regime under the threat of more economic 
penalties. Further, the US introduced The USA Patriot Act159 imposing a series of 
extra-territorial meaSllres targeting offShore financial institutions in the belief that 
they could be used 10 fund terrorist organisations. The belief that the terrorists and 
particularly the al-Qaeda organisation of Osama Rin Ladcn had used off.~hore 
financial centres to move moncy to finance their activities caused the US Treasury to 
temper its criticism of the OEeD initiative. In the first place, the US needed the other 
OEeD member-states to help forge its coalition againsllerl'orislll, and in the second it 
was easy to believe thaI financial institutions in small jurisdictions might have 
ullwittingly provided facilities for terrorist organisations through legitimate 
companies. As it turns out, mosl of the terrorist bank accounts were actually in OEeD 
COllntries including the US and the UK. 160 
q[{.vhore Financial Services by OECD Members 
Would Mean Higher Taxes and Less Privacy', (Research paper, Economic Policy Studies, Washington 
DC: The Heritage Foundation, 2000). 
'58 George W Bush, Execi/live Order 011 Terrorist Financing (2001) The White IIOllse 
<http://www.whitehollse.gov/llewslrcleasesI2001l09/200 I 0924-I.html> at 14 May 2004. 
159 "Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct Tel1'orism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of200 1 ". 
i60 Sanders" above n 155. 
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Sanders offered some interesting findings worth noting: 161 80% of the total offshore 
financial services industry is located in the OBCD countries. The remaining 20% is in 
the non-OBeD countries, with even this segment dominated by a few large centres 
such as Hong Kong and Singapore which, the OEcn had not named as 'tax havens'. 
Tllis means that approximately less than 10% of olTshore business in the world is 
done in the targeted jurisdictions. 
Account should also be taken of the fact that searches of banks throughout the world 
for money used to finance terrorism in the wake of the atrocities of II th September 
2001 in New York and Washington, revealed that most of the hundreds of millions of 
dollars of the al-Qaeda organisation and other terrorist groups was found in the hanks 
of OECD countries. 162 Only US$20 million was discovered in The Bahamas after a 
search by that country's authorities, and even then it was in a branch of a bank 
headquartered in all OECD country. Despite these findings, the pressure for OFCs to 
adhere to the "transparency" and "effective exchange of information" requirements is 
only increasing. As fittingly put by the Minister of Finance of the Bahamas, Sir 
William AlIen:'63 
'·'Ibid. 
'.2Ibid. 
The events of September II and their consequences are very unlikely to leave 
financial services unaffected. Already, there are indications of a likely 
adjustment in the trade off between individual privacy and collective security. 
The balance is a delicate one. 
'.3 Sir William Allen, Minister of Bahamas, News Detail, Bahamas Financial Services 1I0ard, 2 
October 200 l. 
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2.4 Tile FA TF 40 Recommendations 
2.4.1 The Focus ortbe FATF Report 
In response to the mounting concerns over money laundering, the FATF was 
established by the G-8 Summit that was held in Paris in 1989. Recognising the threat 
posed to the banking system and to financial institutions, the G-8 Heads of State or 
Government and Prcsident of the European Connnission convened the Task Force 
from the G-8 member States, the European Commission, and eight other cOllntries. 164 
The FATF is an intcr-govcrmnental body whose purpose is the development and 
promotion of policies, both at national and international levels, to combat money 
laundering and terrorist financing. It is therefore a "policy-making body" which works 
to generate the necessary political will to bring about national legislative and 
regulatory reforms in these areas. 
In 1990, the FATF issued 40 recommendations 165 intended to fight the phenomenon 
of money laundering. Based on those recommendations, the members of the FATF 
underwent a process of intemal monitoring designed to bring their illtemallegislation 
and procedures into line with the recommendations on money laundering. 'Ille report 
Oil non-cooperative countries or territories released ill 2000166 was a logical extensioll 
1M Financial Action Task Force, More abollt the FATF and its Work <http://www.fatf-
\iafi.orgiAbolltFATFen.htm> at 10 July 2004. 
65 Financial Action Task Force, above n 67. Fol' a f"lllis! of the 40 Recommendations, see Appendix 
G. 
166 Financial Action Task Force) Review 10 Identifj' Non-Cooperative Countrie.s OJ' Territories: 
Increasing the Worldwide Effectiveness of Allti-Mol/ey Lalllldering Measures (2000 FAT!'). 
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of this process, turning as it did from internal housecleaning measures to the 
examination of offshore jurisdictions. 
The reason Jor this change of focus can be summarised by the following excerpt ii-om 
the introduction to the report: 167 
167 Ibid. 
168 Ibid. 
Existing anti-money-Iaundering laws arc undermined by the Jack of regulation 
and, essentially, by the numerous obstacles on customer identification, in 
certain countries and territories, notably oJJshore financial centres. 
Recent years have witnessed a sharp increase in the number of jurisdictions 
otlering financial services without appropriate control or regulation and 
protected by strict banking secrecy. 
To ensure the stability of the international financial system and effective 
preventions of money laundering, it is desirable that all financial centrcs in the 
world should have comprehensive control, regulation, and supervision systems. 
It is also important that all financial intermediaries or agents be subject to 
strict obligations, notably as regards the prevention, detection, and punishment 
of money laundering. 
Firstly, the report168 identified what the FA TF considered to be the detrimenlal 
rules and practices that obstruct international cooperation against 1,lOney 
; 
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laundering. Secondly, it outlined the steps that would be taken by the FATF to 
"encourage constmetive anti-money-laundering action." 
TIle 11 criteria 169 identifying detrimental rules and practices that "enable 
crimillals and money launderers to escape the cHect of anti-money-laundering 
measures" are broken down into four categories: 
o loopholes in l1nancial regulations; 
.. obstacles raised by other regulatory requirements; 
.. obstacles to international cooperation; and 
.. inadequate resources tor preventing and detecting money laundering 
activities. 170 
2.4.2 Analysis of the 1"ATF 40 Recommendations 
The first set of criteria concel'lls regulatory loopholes. Within this category, the FATF 
identified five sub-classes of detrimental rules and practices, which are summarised as 
follows.17I The first sub-class concems regulatory and supervisory practices that fall 
seriously ShOlt of recognised international standards regardless of whether these 
practices relate to the regulation and supervision of financial institutions that operate 
either onshore or offuhorc. These criteria follow from Recommendation 26!'12, which 
l"Ibid 14, 
170 Hintersecr, ahove nil, 236-38. 
171 Financial Action Task Force, above 11 165, 
In FATF Recollunendation 26: "The competellt authorities supervIsmg banks or otber financial 
institutions or intennediaries~ or other competent anthorities, should ensnre that the supervised 
institutions have adequate programs to guard against money laundering, These authorities should co-
operate and lend expertise spontaneously or on request with other domestic judicial or 1mv enforcement 
authorities in money laundering investigations and prosecutions,)) 
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states that financial institutions should have in place adequate programmes to guard 
against money laundering. 
The second sub-class relates to procedures for the incorporation and licensing of 
financial institutions. These criteria arc based on Recommendation 29m , which states 
that the appropriate domestic authorities should implement and enforce effective legal 
and regulatory measures to protect financial institutions registered and operating in 
these jurisdictions li'om infiltration by criminal organisations. The type of procedures 
regarded as inadequate hy the FATF include a lack of rules that obligate financial 
institutions to investigate the hackground of the corporate officers and to verify the 
true identity of the benelicial owners of the corporate counter-parties with whom they 
do business, rudimentary requirements within countries concerning the registration 
and licensing of financial institutions that seek to operate in their jurisdictions, and the 
absence of measures within countries to guard against a signilieant investment being 
made in or control or management functions being obtained over the financial 
institutions operating in their jurisdictions by criminal organisations. 
The third sub-class involves inadequate customer identification requirements 
conceming the opening and operation of accounts. These criteria follow Ii'mn 
Recommendations 10, 1 I and 12.174 In par1icular, these recommendations respectively 
concern the need for financial institutions not to maintain anonymous accounts or 
accounts in obviously fictitious names, the requirement to verifY a client's and 
bencl1ciary's identity, and the need to maintain relevant records for a reasonably time 
< 
m FATF Recommendation 29: "The competent authOlities regulating or supervlSlIlg fiuancial 
institutions should take the necessary legal or regulatory measures to guard against control or 
acquisition of a significant pal1icipatioH in financial institutions by criminals or their confederates," 
174 Financial Action Task Force, above n 171,6-7. 
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period. In the context of Recommendations 10, II and 12, the FATF notes that the 
associated obstacles are of two types. The first concerns a lack of any legal obligation 
to verify a counter-party's identity. In pmiicular, lack of effective legal requirements 
to verify both a client's and beneficiary's identity at the time a commercial 
relationship is initiated and no obligation to re-verify this information when 
questionable activities arise. Also included are no requirements for financial 
institutions to develop and maintain a money laundcring training programme for 
employees. The second pertains to procedural obstacles. In particular, no obligation to 
maintain records for a reasonable period of time (five years) and the existence of legal, 
administrative, or othcr obstacles that hinder the exchange of information with other 
domestic as well as foreign regulatory and law enforcement agencies. By their nature, 
these procedural obstacles tend to hinder the exchange of information concerning a 
client's and beneJ1ciary's identity and the financial activities conducted through the 
accounts they operate. 
The fourth sub-class concerns excessive legal pl'Ovisions embedded in domestic laws 
as well as administrative and other requirements that shelter questionable activities 
from regulatory oversight. These criteria follow from Recommendations 2 and 37.175 
Recommendation 2 is one of the Forty Recoll1mendation's general framework 
recommendations and it states that domestic secrecy laws should not be stlllctured in 
such a manner so as to inhibit the implementation of the recommendations. 
Meanwhi Ie, Recommendation 37 states that countries should have in place measures 
175 FATF Recommendation 2: I(Financial institution secrecy laws should be conceived so as not to 
inhibit implementation of these recommendations." FATF RecOlllinendatioll 37: "There should he 
procedures for mutual assistance in criminal matters regarding the use of compulsory measures 
including the production of records by financial institutions and other persons, the search of persons 
and premises, seizure and obtaining of evidence for use in money laundering investigations and 
prosecutions and iUl'elated actions in foreignjm'isdictions," 
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to provide assistance when requested to do so by other countries. These mutual 
assistance measures include compulsory. measures in respect of requiremeuts to 
produce records, conduct searches, and seize evidence for use in investigations. 
Although the FATF accepts that the use of secrecy and confidentiality services maybe 
valid in certain circumstances, the F ATl"s concerns relate to excessive secrecy 
measures that pre-empt both the supervision of financial institutions and the 
investigation of suspiciolls activities. In particular, measures that hinder investigations 
by domestic and foreign regulatory and law enforcement agencies especially llleasures 
that effectively block money laundering investigations and prosecutions because they 
can not be waived, revoked or lllodified by the relevant authOl'ities in appropriate 
circumstances. 
Finally, the fifth sub-class relates to the lack of a suspicious transactions reporting 
regime or the existence of such a regime whose operation is ineffective. At the core of 
the Forty Recommendations is the principle that financial institutions should report all 
of the suspicious activities they identity to the relevant authorities. Obviously, the 
control of money laundering will be hampered where no such authority has been 
designated to receive such rcpOlls. An equally significant pl'Oblem, however, concems 
situations where a jurisdiction designated such as authority, but the operation of that 
authority is ineffective. In particular, where the designated authority is staffed in a 
deJicient manner, lacks sufficient resources, is unable to disseminate material 
information as appropriate, 01' has ineffective powers to conduct investigations, the 
effect is the salJle as if no such authority had been designated. 
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The second set of crileria concerns obstacles that are embedded in a country's laws 
that hinder the investigation and prosecution of money laundering. This sel of criteria 
follows from Recommendation 15, 16 and 17. 176 Recommendation 15 states that 
financial institutions should he reqnired to promptly report suspicious activities. 
Recommendation 16 recommends the exemption of financial institutions fro111 civil 
and criminal liability where such a repOlt is made in good faith, even if the financial 
institution has no knowledge as 10 what constitutes the underlying crime, and 
regardless of whether any illegal activity has actually OCCUlTed. Meanwhile, 
Recommendation 17 conccl'lls measures that a country should put in place to prevent 
financial institutions !i'om passing on to clients, details of the infonnatioll that has 
been reported about the client's activities. 
At the same time, the F ATF recognises that it is insuftlcicnt, ineffective, and a waste 
of resources to develop and implement a suspicious reporting regime if the 
mechanisms of that regime do not operate in an effective mamler. Here, the FATF's 
concerlls focus on other domestic legal, rcgulatory, and administrative requirements 
that effectively neutralise the measures detailed under Recommendations 1 S, 16 and 
17 and they include the following. 177 First arc inadequate legal requirements within 
countries related to the registration of companies, trusts, charitable foundations, and 
other organisations with legal personality. In particular, inadequate measures within 
------""""""~""""---
],/6 FATF Recmmnendation 15: "If financial institutions suspect that fullds stem li'Olll a criminal 
activity, they shollid be required to report promptly their suspicions to the competent authorities." 
FATF Recommendation 16: I'Financial institutions, their directors, officers and employees should be 
protected by legal provisions fi'om criminal or civil liability for breach of any restricti,]" on disclosure 
of information imposed hy contract or by any legislative, regulatory or administrative p'1'ovision, if they 
repOIt their sllspicions in good faitb to the competent aulhorities, even if they did not know precisely 
what the underlying criminal activity was, and regardless of whether illegal activity actllally occurred." 
FATF Recommendation 17: HFhtallCial institutions, their directors, officers and empioyees, should not, 
or, where appropriate, should not be allowed to, wam their customers when information relating to 
them is being reported to the competent authorities." 
177 Financia! Actio]] Task Force, above II 174. 
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countries to identify, record, and make availahle information concerning the name, 
legal form, address, directors, and articles of association oflegal entities registered in 
their jurisdictions. Second are lack of requirements within countries to identify, verify 
and maintain current information on the benel1cial owners of legal entities. An 
example of such an obstacle would be a situation where intel111ediaries are allowed to 
intercede in 11 .transaction with the effect that the identity of the transaction's 
benel1ciary is hidden. This second set of criteria is to be read expansively as it is 
based on Recommendations 19 and 25. 178 These recommendations focus on additional 
money laundering control measures that may be required with respect to professions 
other than the banking profession and arc measures that relate to the regulation and 
monitoring of the activities of shell companies. Consequently, the FATF has flagged 
this second set of criteria as practices that arc especially detrimental and are therefore 
of particular concern. 
The third set of criteria concerns obstacles that hinder international co-operation in 
investigating and prosecuting money laundering. Given the transnational nature of 
organised crime, the control of money laundering requires more than the mere 
collection of information. Information must be shared as appropriate with other 
relevant domestic and foreign organisations in order to help build and bring 
comprehensive cases. Here, the obstacles of concem pertain to those that exist at the 
administrative and judicial level, while the associated criteria follow from 
178 FATF Recommendation 19: HFinancial institutions should develop programs against Jmoney 
lallndering. '111ese programs should include, as a minimum: (i) the development of internal policies, 
procedl.ues and controls, inclmHng the desi&'11ation of compliance officers at manageul.cnt level, and 
adequate screelling procedures 10 ensure high staudards wben hirlllg employees; (ii) all ongoing 
employee trailling programllle; (iii) all audit function to test the system." FATF Recommendation 25: 
"Coulltries should take nolice of tile potelltial for abnse of shell cOlporations hy monoy lal111dorers and 
should consider whether additional measures are required to prevent unlawltll use of such entities," 
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RecOlmnendation 32 179. This recommendation states that regulatory and law 
enforcement agencies should be in a position to promptly exchange information as 
and when necessary and without undue restrictions. 
The particular criteria identified by FATF to be of concel'll include (he following. First 
are obstacles that hinder co-operation among administrative authorities. These 
obstacles include legal or administrative requirements that either prohibit or unduly 
restrict the exchange of infOl1llation with both relevant foreign and domestic agencies 
especially the financial intelligence Uluts of other couniTies. These obstacles also 
include laws or regulations that prohihit domestic authorities from pursuing enquiries 
or investigations on behalf of forei!,'11 agencies. In effect, they include any obstruction 
that manifests an obvious unwillingness to respond constl'llctiveiy to enquiries and to 
support investigations. Second are obstacles that hinder intemaiional co-operation 
among judicial authorities. The identification of these obstacles follows from 
Recommendations 4, 36 and 40. 180 Recommendation 4 concerns the requirement to 
make money laundering a criminal offence, while the latter two recommendations 
179 FATF RecOlmnendation 32: "Each country should make efforts to improve a spontaneous or IInpon 
rcquesf' international information exchange relating to suspicious transactions, persons and 
corporations involved in those transactiom between competent authorities. Strict safeguards should be 
established to ensure that this exchange of information is consistent with national and international 
provisions on privncy and data protection. 'l 
1&0 FATF Recommendation 4: uEach country should take sllch measures as may be necessmy) including 
legislative ones, to enable it to criminaHse money laundering as set fmih hI the Vienna Convention, 
Each COWl try should extend the offence of dmg money laundering to one based all serious offcnces. 
Each connhy wouid determine which .serious Cl"imes would be designated as money laundering 
predicate offences ,11 FATF ReC0l11111endation 36: HCozoperative investigations among countries' 
appropriate competent authorities ShOllld be encouraged. One valid aud effective investigative 
lechnique in this respect is controlled delivery related to assets known 01' suspcctcd to bc the proceeds 
of crime. CotUllries are encouraged to SUppOlt this tcchnique, where possihle." FATF l~ccommelldatioJ1 
40: "Coulltries should have pl'Ilcedures in place to extradite, where possible, individuals charged with a 
money laundering ommce OJ' related offences. With respect to its national legal system, each country 
should recognise money laundering as all extraditable offence. Subject to their legal frameworks, 
cmmtries may consider simplifying extradition by allowing direct transmission of exh"adition reqnests 
bet\veen appropriate ministries~ extraditing persons hased only on ·warrants of atTests or judgements, 
extraditing their nationals, and/or introducing a simplified extradition of consenting persons who waive 
fonnal extradition proceedings," 
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relate to the exchange of information. An obvious red flag that identifies non co-
operative countries and territories is the absence of laws that make the laundering of 
the proceeds of crime a criminal offence. In general, related obstacles includc any 
legal, regulatory, administrative 01' other requirements that manifests an obvious 
unwillingness to respond to requests for assistance made under a mutual legal 
assistance trcaty. Particularly where the request relates to matters recognised to be 
offences under the law of both countries or to isslles involving tax and other fiscal 
offences. 
The fomth set of criteria concern the inadequate allocation of resources by 
governments to their rcgulatory and law enforcement agencies to enable these 
agencies to identity, investigate, and prosecute money laundering. The control of 
money laundering requires au integrated approach in that it requires the public and 
private sector to work together. In ascertaining whether at least the framework to 
allow for such an approach is in place on the public sector side, two sets of criteria are 
especially relevant. First are insufficient operational resources such that 
administrative and judicial authorities lack the necessary financial, technical, and 
human resources to do their jobs. l81 Second is the absence of a financial intelligence 
unit or equivalent body that is charged with collecting, analysing, and disseminating 
information to other administrative, judicial and law enforcement bodies. While 
financial institutions have primary responsibility for identifying and reporting money 
laundering activity, the state retains responsibility for analysing this information, 
conducting investigations, and of course bringing prosecutions. As a mat1,er of 
principle, to justify the bureaucratic and financial burden imposed on financial 
'" In this respect, a complimentmy issue of importance that has been idcntified by the PATF COllCe!1lS 
that of COll'llption, which lllust be addressed if efforts to control money laundering are to succced. 
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institutions to identity suspicious activities, governments should ensure that they have 
in place effective mechanisms to analyse and use the information they require to be 
collected. Otherwise, the private sector is forced to bear an unnecessary bUl'den that 
unduly ties up l1nancial resources. 1S2 
In October 2001, 8 more Recommendations from the J:I ATF were added, incorporating 
the global 11ght against terrorism into its combat against money laundering. 183 
2.4.3 FATl" Initiatives Updates 
In June 2000, the FATF released a second report. 184 This report represented the 
implementation of the first recommendation of the earlier report, namely the 
establishment of a list identifying non-cooperative countries or jurisdictions in the 
area of money-laundering. 
'I11e FATF identified 29 countries for review. IS; These countries were reviewed by 
four regional review groups which analysed the anti-money-Iaundering regimes in 
those jurisdictions. As provided for in the initial report, the reviewed jurisdictions 
were involved in face-to-face meetings and were invited to make comments on their 
respective draft reports. Of the 29 countries that werc studied, IS were ultimately 
considered to be non-cooperative. The report contains a summary of the conclusions 
reached with respect to each conntry under consideration. 
182 Hillterseer, above II 170, 238-41. 
183 See Appendix G. 
184 Financial Action Task Force, above II 169. 
185 See Appendix F. 
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011 October 5, 2000, the FATF issued a press release stating that of the jurisdictions 
identified, 15 had either changed their legislation or had made a commitment to 
change their legislation in response to the June 2000 reporL 186 Of the jurisdictions 
identified, only Lebanon, Niue, and Nauru had not made some type of legislative 
change OJ' political commitment to change or implement money laundering legislation. 
Nonvithstanding this commitment, the FAT!' declined to remove any jurisdiction 
fl'om the list of non-cooperative countries or tenitorics at that time. In addition, it 
stated that it would later review more jurisdictions for possible inclusion in the IiSt. IS7 
On 21st June 2002, the FATF released its mmual report that included the list of Non-
Cooperative Countries and Territories (NCCTs).188 
"The FATF issued its thirteenth annual report on21 s( June, which outlines the 
main achievements of the FATF in 20"01-2002 under the presidency of I-long 
Kong, China, including the significant progress that has been made in 
combating telTodst financing and in the work on non-cooperative countries 
and ten'hories (NCCTs). Four regional groups (Americas; Asia/Pacific; 
Europe; and AfHca and the Middle East) meet regularly to prepare the NCCTs 
discussions in the plenary. 
To decide whether a jurisdiction should be removed from the list, the FATF 
must first be satisfied that the jmisdiction has addressed the deficiencies 
previously identified by enacting significant legislation and regulations, The 
186 Financial Action Task Force, above II 184. 
187 Sicker, above n 104. 
, 
188 Financial Action Task _Force; Annual Review oj Non-Cooperative Countries or Territories (Paris: 
FATF,2002). 
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FATF removed I-hmgaI'Y, Israel, Lehanon; and St. Kitts and Nevis from the list 
of nOll-cooperative countries and telTitories (NCCTs) in the fight against 
money laundering." 
"The list of NCCTs is as follows: Cook Islands; Dominica; Egypt; Grenada; 
Guatemala; Indonesia; Marshall Islands; Myanmar; Nauru; Nigeria; Niue; 
Philippines; Russia; St. Vincent and the Grenadines; and Ukraine. For those 
jurisdictions which were identified as nOll-cooperative in 2000 and in 200 I 
and which had not made adequate progress, the FATF has a policy to 
recommend further countermeasl1l'es in a gradual, proportionate and Hexihle 
manner. Accordingly, the FATF calls on its members to update their 
advisories requesting that their Hnancial institntions give special attention to 
businesses and transactions with persons, including companies and linancial 
institutions, in listed countries or telTitodes to take into account the changes in 
the list. 
The FATF welcomed further progress made by a number of the IS 
jurisdictions on the list. On the basis of the progress made, Grenada, Niue, 
Russia and st. Vincent and the Grenadines will be invited to submit 
implementation plans to enable the FATF to evaluate the actual 
implementation of their legislative changes. At its next plenary meeting on 9-
11 October 2002, [he FATF reviewed again the situation of each NeeT." 
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In 2003, the same l'epOlt had several updates, including a fall from 15 to 9 NCCTs.189 
The FA TF recognised that St. Vincent and the Grenadines, listed as non-cooperative 
in the fight against money laundering in June 2000, had sufficiently addressed the 
deficiencies identified by the FATF through enactment and implementation of 
appropriate legal reforms. In October 2002, the Plenary recognised that Russia, 
Dominica, Niue and Marshall Islands, identified as NCCTs in June 2000, had 
addressed the identified deficiencies and therefore removed them from the NCCTs 
liSt. 190 And in February 2003, the Plenary removed Grenada from the list of NCCTs 
after enactment and implementation of legal reforms addressing idcntified 
deficiencies. Consequently, the procedures prescribed in FATF Recommendation 21 
were withdrawn. 191 To ensure continued effective implementation of these reforms, 
the FATF will monitor thc developments in St. Vincent & the Grenadines, as well as 
Dominica, Niue, the Marshall Islands, and Grenada, in consultation with the l'e1ev8nt 
FATF-style regional body and paliiculal'ly in the areas laid out in this NCCT l'eport. 192 
Although removed from the NCCTs list in June 2001, the Bahamas has becn 
subjected to FATF monitoring since that time. The FATF encouraged the Bahamas to 
improve mechanisms for international co-operation so that the FATF Illay end formal 
monitoring.193 
189 Finmlcial Action Task Force, Annual Review of Non-Cooperative Countries or Territories (Paris: 
FATF,2003). i 
190 For a deeper insight into the fulfilled regulations which will grant a country or territmy removal 
from the NCCTs list, please see Appendix J. 
191 Financial Action Task Force, NCC], initiative (2004) <http://wwwl.oecd.Ol'glfatflNCCT_en.MIll> at 
10 June 2004. 
192 Financjal Action Task Force, above n 189. 
193 Ibid. 
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The FATF welcomed the progress made by the Cook Islands, Egypt, Guatemala, 
Nigeria, the Philippines, Ukraine and Nauru in addressing deficiencies and calls upon 
them to continue this work 194 Until the deficiencies have been fully addressed and the 
necessary reforms have been sufficiently implemented, it believes that scrutiny of 
transactions with these jurisdictions, as well as those with Indonesia and Myamnar, 
continues to be necessary and reaflinns its advice of June 2000 to apply, in 
accordance with Recommendation 21, special attention to such transactions. The 
FATF notes with particular satisfaction that Egypt, Guatemala, and the Philippines 
have enacted most, if not all legislation needed to remedy the deficiencies previously 
identitied. On the basis of this progress, the FA 1F will invite those countries to 
submit implementation plans to enable the FATF to evaluate actual implementation of 
the legislative changes in each jurisdiction according to the principles agreed upon by 
its Plenary. 
With respect to jurisdictions de-listed in June 2002 and subject to the monitoring 
process from June 2002 to June 2003, future monitoring for St Kitts & Nevis will be 
conducted within the context of the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force's (CFATF) 
relevant monitoring mechanisms. Future monitoring of Hungary will be conducted 
within the Council of Emope's MONEYV AI, 195 and its relevant monitoring 
mechanisms. 
19'ibid l. 
195 1n 2002, the PC-R-EV formally challged its name to MONEYV AL. MONEYV Ali was established 
ill September 1997 by the Commillee of Ministers oftlle COllllCil of Em-ope to conduct self and mntnal 
assessment exercises of the anti-money laundering measures in place in 25 Council of Europe cmmh'ics, 
which are not members of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). The efforl includes encouraging 
jurisdictions to huprave their anti-money laundering measures in keeping with the FATF Forly 
Recommendations and to enhance international co-operation. MONEYV AL also engages in a regular 
typologies exercise focused on the methods and tTends or money Immdering activity. 
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At June 2003, the list of NCCTs comprised the following jurisdictions: Cook Islands, 
Egypt, Guatemala, Indonesia, Myanmar, Nauru, Nigeria, Philippines and Ukrainc, 
The FATF called on its members to update their advisories requesting that their 
financial instit1ltions give special attention to businesses and transactions with persons, 
including companies and financial institutions, in those countries 01' tell'itories 
'I" d' tl t b' t' 196 identllc 111 le l'epOl' as elllg non-coopera lve, 
The FATF noted with concern the failure by the governments of Indonesia and 
Myanmar to make more substantive progress since June 2002, Although they have 
enacted some anti-money laundering measures, serious deficiencies remain that will 
'nb'b" I 'f h' t' I d' t 197 I I It Imp cmcntatlon 0 comprc cnSlve anI-money alln enng sys ems, 
In February 2004, Egypt and Ukraine werc dropped from the list of NCCTs due to 
their substantial implementatioll of anti-money laundering reforms, 198 TIle anllual 
review report released on 2 July 2004 recognised the efforts of Guatemala and 
removed it fhHn the NCCTs list. 199 According to the 2004 review report, the 
remaining jurisdictions under the NCCTs list are: Cook Islands, Indonesia, Myanmar, 
Nauru, Nigeria and Philippines, 
2,5 Ii'iuandal Stability l"orum (Ii'SF) and Global Economic Stability 
Three general objectives define the scope of the FSF's work. The first is to identify 
points of vulnerability within the international financial system where detrimental 
196 F' , 
19' manc,"l Action Task Force, above 11 194, 
Ibid, 
198 r' 
199 :~nancial Action TIlSk Force, above n 19 t, 
, I'lllancial Action Task Force, Annual Review of Non-Cooperative Countl'ie.')' 01' Territorie.s (Paris: 
FATF, 2004), 
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practices may fester and problems and crises may develop. The second is to make 
recommendations and 10 oversee the actions necessary to address these vulnerabilities. 
The third is to improve communications and the exchange of infol1l1ation among the 
various authorities responsible for promoting international financial slability?OO The 
FSF noted:201 
Weakness in supervision and lack of co-operation by some OFCs together lead 
to two types of prohlems, which can be inter-related, in the oversight of the 
international financial system: prudential concerns, relating to the scope for 
efrective supervision of internationally active financial intermediaries; and 
market integrity concerns, relating to the effectiveness of international 
enforcement effurts in rcspect of illicit activity and abusive market behaviour. 
Of particular concern for the FS1' is the general lack of transparency and oversight 
related to the financial activities originating in and flowing tln'ough OFCs. In tills 
respect, its concerns overlap with those of 1'ATF and OEeD. However, while the 
FATF's and OECD's concerns arc focused on specific issues, the FSF's remit is much 
broader. 
As the FSF observes, "Implementation of standards varies considerably across OFCs, 
with some making serious effOits to adhere to intcl'I1ationally accepted standards, 
while others making little or no effort, or actively use supervisory laxity as a means of 
promoting their attractiveness to investors and cllst0l11crs.,,202 To adgress tllls concern, 
200 FilJallcial Stability Forum, Financial Stability Fomm: What We Do (2004) 
<h!tp:llwww.fsfonllll.orgiabolltfwhat_wc_do.html> at 10 July 2004. 
201 Financial Stability Forum, above n 54, 2. 
202 Ibid 13. 
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the FS1', like the 1'ATF and OECD, has adopted a "name and shame" strategy203 to 
bring international pressure to bear on countries in order to encourage them to modify 
their practices. TIle FSF's approach is set out in its initial report entitled Report a/the 
, 
Working Group on OJp.'hore Centres, which was delivered to the FSF's secretariat on 
April 5, 2000 (the "April 5, 2000 Report,,).204 The FSF surveyed a number of OFCs 
and based on this survey, recommended that the IMP, in collaboration with the World 
Bank, undertake a more detailed assessment,205 which is currently ongoing, This 
assessment fhellses on the adherence by OFes to international regulatory standards 
with the aim of encouraging OFC8 to adopt, where they are identified to be deficient, 
internationally recognised regulatory standards. To encourage OFCs to participate in 
the process, a combination of eoercioll and incentives have been used.20G They include, 
for example, the publication of a list of OFes that details their progress to date in 
improving their regulatory structures as well as the provision oftecJmical assistance to 
help countries bring their domestic regulatory structures into line with internally 
recognised standards. 
Contrary to conventional political policy, it is argued here that the adoption of a pure 
'name and shame' approach may even prove counterproductive. Tampering with 
r"'Putatiollal mechanisms might, at the same lime, uot only miss the target but also 
reach the wrong target.207 
2" Ihid 31. 
"'Ihid. 
205 Ibid 24. 
2(!6 Ibid 29. 
207 Donato Masciandaro and Alessandro POliolano, 'It takes (wo to tango: Intemationa 1 financial 
regulatioll and offshore celltres' (Working Paper No 1114, Universita di Leece Department of 
Economics, 2003). 
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Of particular note are the seven criteria used by the FSF in preparing its April 5, 2000 
RepOlt to identifY those countries deemed to be deficient in adhering to international 
regulatory standards, as these criteria arc the same as those used by the FATF and 
1. Lack of due diligence requirements imposed on financial institutions operating 
within their jurisdictions to check and verify the identity of the owners and 
beneficiaries that stand behind these companies; 
2. Inadequate rules imposed on financial institutions operating in their jurisdiction 
concerning the disclosure of material information to regulators and the financial 
markets; 
3. Restrictions and limitations either directly or indirectly imposed on regulatOl'y 
agencies that mean they are unable to develop adequate knowledge about the 
financial institutions and the activities they conduct within their jurisdictions; 
4. Insufficient allocation of resources to regulatory agencies to allow these agencies 
to effuctively monitor the activities of the financial institutions operating within 
their jurisdictions; 
5. Limitations imposed on regulatory agencies 111 respect of co-operating with 
regulators in other jurisdictions particularly those in IFCs; 
6. The existence of excessive secrecy laws that impedc the exchange of information 
with foreign counter-parties; and 
7. General lack of political will to improve the quality ofrcgulatory oversight. 
20, Financial Stability Forum, above 11206, 13. 
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The FSI' has noted that although these seven "regulatory weaknesses" exist to varying 
degrees within most OFCs, the standard of regulation varies across OFCs such that in 
some jurisdictions, the concerns to which thcse criteria give rise are minimal. The 
, 
Bahamas, for example, is a highly respected OFC that is often singled out as making 
extensive efforts to comply with international standards.209 
Several recommcndations with respect to the future focus of efforts to improve the 
transparcncy of OFCs were made in the report and these can be grouped into three 
· . 210 
mam categOries: 
I. Measures to implement customer identification and record keeping requirements; 
2. Initiatives to improve cross border co-operation with respect to the exchange of 
information; and 
3. Plans to provide technical assistance in ordcr to enhance the supervisory powers 
aud abilities of domestic regulators. 
The FSF recognises that adherence to international standards will not be automatic 
and that this goal will only be achieved over time. To assist OFCs in improving their 
domestic regulatory standards and capabilities, the April 5, 2000 Report set out a five 
stage process that the IMF and World Bank, with the FSF's assistance, is to 
oversee:211 
I. All OFC makes a commitment to pursue ref 01111; 
2. The OFC conducts a self assessment exercise to identify deficiencies; 
209 H' -
210 }"lersecl', above n 182,258-9. 
21i I'maneia! Stability Forum, above n208, 28. 
Ibid 26. 
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3. The OFC, in co-operation with the FSF, develops a plan and associated set of 
milestones to remedy the deficiencies; 
4. An independent third party conducts an independent review; and 
5. The OFe works with the FSF to monitor its progress and continued compliance 
with international regulatory standards. 
An important finding ofthc report was that, to date, OFCs do not appear to have becn 
casual factol's in creating instability within the financial markets. To date, no evidence 
has been found, for example, to SUppOlt detrimental changes in interest or currency 
rates of any economy.212 However, this does not mean that OFCs have neither been 
sources of past, nor will be of future, instability. As the financial markets grow evel' 
more interdependent, detrimental market practices and the problems to which they 
give rise will be transmitted throughout the international llnancial system much more 
quickly. To the extent that they protect Of promote questionable market practices, 
OFCs may be a source of instability. A conclusion of the report is a concern echoed 
by the FATF and OECD, which is that among the primary problems posed by OFCs 
to thc stability of the international financial system, is inadequate supervision and 
regulation of the legal entities 213 being created in and operating both within and 
through these jurisdictions. The 1"8F's concerns, like those of the FATF and OECD, 
are that significant growth in the assets held by these legal entities and the financial 
Hows they route through OFes, in combination with a lack of transparency and 
212 Contrary to this, the paper entilled 'Tax Havens: Releasing the Hidden Billions for Poverty 
Eradication' by the Policy Department ofOxfam (Great Britain) suggested that "Tax havens and OFCs 
are now thought to be central to the operation of global financial markets. Currency instability and 
rapid smges and reversals of capital flows arollnd the world became defilling feat\IIeS of the glohal 
financial system during the 19908. The fmaneial crisis that ravaged East Asia in the late 1990s was at 
least partly a result of these volatile globallllarkets." Policy Department of Oxfam (Great Britain) Tax 
Havells: Releasing the Hidden Billions fol' Poverty Eradication (2002) ATfAC Int,,,.national 
<http://attac.orgifi·a/toiVdoc/oxfam2.htm> at 22 Octoher 2003. 
213 In the context of the work pursued by eaclI organisation) ulegal entities') should be given wide 
meaning to illclude companies, trusls, charities alld any other economic vehicle with legal pemollality. 
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growing market interdependence, increases prudential and market integrity 
concerns?14 Together, the work of the FSF, FATF, and OECD is mutually reinforcing 
and it is therefore IlO wonder that OFCs have felt under tlueat from the international 
. 215 ~ 
commumty. . . 
2.6 Wolfsbel'g Anti-Money Laundering (AMI,) Principles 
On October 30, 2000, a new initiative to combat money laundering was unveiled216, 
What differentiates this initiative from many of the existing initiatives is that it has 
been put forward by the private sector, in the absence of coercion by a public sector 
body. Eleven banks originally signed the Wolfsberg Principles, which afe a non-
binding set of best practice guidelines governing the establishment and maintenance 
of relationships between private bankers and their clients?l7 As Dr Peter Eigen, the 
Chairman of Transparency International, observed on the release of the Wolfs berg 
Plinciples, "This is a unique event - few would expect the leading anti-corruption 
organisation and the leading banks to be standing all the same platfol'm.,,218 Guided by 
active and fanner FATF members who help ascertain whether these principles meet 
214 Financial Stability Forum, above tl 210, 16. 
m 'I' . 
, mlcrseer, ahove II 209, 258-62. 
"'The Wolf.sberg Gronp, 'Leading lutomaHon.1 Bank, Establish Anti-Money-taunderll1g Principles: 
Banks Work with Transparency International all Guidelines for Private Banking' (Press Release, 
pe!ober 30, 2000). 
17 For a hank to become a signatory oflhe Wolfsberg Principles, the bank illust merely deliver a signed 
commitment letter that incorporales tbe following statement: "We hereby cOllllnn that having read and 
understood the Wolfsberg AML Principles (Global Anti-Money-Laundering Guidelines for Private 
Banking), as snch principles appeal' on the Wolfsbcrg-Principles,com website as of October 30, 2000, 
We are committed to applying these principles in full and without conditions. Please add our name to 
the list ofbal1ks that wish to rellect their commitment to these principles on such website. Om lIallle for 
purpose of inclusion ill snch list should be (name of bank and internet link)." The commitment should 
be signed by at least two authorised signatories. Letters not ill strict conformity with the above will be 
rejected. Of note, the 11 ol'igillal authors of the Wolfsberg Principles reserve the right to change or 
atllend tbe Wolfsberg Principles at any tinle without the COIl sent of the other parties. As worded, banks 
who subsequently register a commitment may be excluded [j·om this process. 111is could hinder banks 
~10PtiJlg the principles although for practical reasolls this obscrvatiolllllay be more apparent than real. 
Peter Eigcn, (Opening Statement at a Press Conferencc on the Release of New Anti-Money 
Laundering Guidelines, 30 October 2000). 
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international standards to contl'ol money laundering and making references to the 
J:iorty Recommendations where appropriate, the Woll:~bel'g Principles were formed. 
Two years were required to draft the Wolfsberg Principles, which are named after the 
United Bank of Switzerland (UBS) training centre where the negotiations took place. 
Eleven banks took part in the process: ABN Anno Bank, Banco Santander Central 
Hispano, Barclays Banks, The Chase Manhattan Private Bank, Citibank, Credit Suisse 
Group, Deutsche Bank, Hongkong Shanghai Bank Corporation, JP Morgan, Societe 
del Gottardo and UBS.219 The inclnsion of UBS and the Credit Suisse Group are of 
particular note as they are two of Switzerland's most important financial institutions, 
while Switzerland itself continues to be one of the world's most important financial 
centres for private banking. However, notable by the absence of their signatures are 
Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs, and any South American banks. It is 
also of note that of the II banks that signed the Wolfuherg Principles, most have been 
associated with financial and money laundering scandals of one form or another 
within the past decade. 22o It is of little wonder then that on the signature of the 
Wolfsbcrg Principles, some private bankers dismissed them as a mere pnblic relations 
• 221 
exercIse. 
2.6.1 AIl!llysis of the Workings of the Wolfsberg Principles 
219 The Wollsberg Group, Woifobel'g Anti-Molley Laundering Principles Oll Private Ranking (2002) 
<http://www.wolfsberg-principles.com/privat-ballkillg.html> at 10 July 2004. See Appendix K for the 
fll11list of Ihe Wolfsberg Principles. 
220 There are 12 banks clllTently, with the inclusion ofB.nk of Tokyo-Milsubishi Ltd. 
'" Cary Kochberg, 'Getting Your Principles RJght - On New Regulations to Combat Money 
Laundering' (2000) Accountancy Age <ht1p:llwww.accoulltancyage.comlNewsIlI13604> at 30 
Ocloher 2003. 
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The following analysis of the Wolf,bcl'g Principles, is in greater detail than the 
previous analysis of the OECD and FATF recommendations, in that the Wolfsberg 
principles as agrced to by the participating banks, are more relevant to Singapore as a 
t 
Regional Financial Centre and ill regards to its aspirations to become a global wealth 
management ccntre. 
Wol!sherg Principle 1.1222 states that the primary purpose of the Wolfsberg Principles 
is to ensure that the private banking services offercd by the banks arc not abused for 
criminal purposes. Tbis is an extension of the existing international framework to 
control money lanndering promoted by the FATF based on the know-your-client 
(KYC) principle. It therefore means that banks should not keep anonymous accounts 
and should not enter into or maintain commercial relations with counter parties either 
whose true identity cannot be readily identified, or whose activities reveal a 
qnestionable pattern of activity. This principle also manifests the idea that money 
laundering is best fought at the placement stage of the process by instituting various 
checks and disclosure requirements in order to make it as difficult as possible for 
criminally tainted money to enter the financial system. It is of interest that it is the 
private banker who introduces the client to the firm who is charged with the primary 
responsibility for dischargillg the obligation to establish that the funds of the potential 
client derive fi'om a legitimate source. This is surprising. Placing an obligation on the 
private banker is to make him/her accOlmtuble to the bank in that if the client he/she 
introduces to the bank turns out to be engaged in nefarious activity, then he/she will 
be held accountable and probably lose his/her job. However, to a certain extent, the 
effect of this is to undu I)' shift the OIlUS of responsibility from the bank on to the 
122 -,-
The Wolfuberg Group, above n 219. 
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private banker. The temptation may exist on the part of somc private bankers or banks 
to redirect pro.utable, but questionable activities, to subsidiaries located in 
jurisdictions with relatively more flexible regulatory regimes. 
The Wolf.~berg Principles do not aim to address tlus situation as they are prenlised on 
an implicit assumption that the private bankers that work for the banks will not act ill 
a manner that would lead to their collusion in, or the promotion of, moncy laundering 
activity. The reality, however, is that several of the most significant J1nancial scandals 
recently involved the evasion of internal guidelines and policies that aimed to check 
questionable activity by individual bank employees. TIle Wolfsberg Principles 
obviously cannot accommodate situations where bank employees are dete!mined to 
follow a course of action that runs counter to a bank's compliance requirements. 
However, banks need to be aware of the potential for such activity and, just as the 
client activities need to be monitored, tile activities ofindividual privatc bankers may 
also need to be watched and reviewed. 
Wolfsberg Principle 1.2223 deals with identification and states that 'The bank will take 
reasonable measures to establish the identity of its client and beneficial owners and 
will only accept clicnts once this process has been completed.' Although Woitsberg 
Principle 1.1 places primary responsibility on the private banker, the effect of 
Wolfsberg Principle 1.2 is that at least secondary responsibility is assumed by the 
bank. In other words, the bank assumes secondary responsibility for ensuring that 
reasonable measures are taken to establish the clients and beneficial owners. This 
• 
requirement is consistent with F ATF Recommendation II. 
213 Ibid. 
86 
Wolfsberg Principle 1.2.1 focuses on the documentation required in respect of 
establishing a client's true identity. The required documents are in line with PATI' 
1 
Recommendation 10, which states that financial institutions' ... should be required ... 
to identify, on the basis of an official 01' other reliable identifying document, and 
record the identity of their clients, either occasionally or usual, when establishing 
business relations or conducting transactions .. .' For natural persons22,\ identity will 
be established to the banks satisfaction where official papers (like a passport, drivcrs 
licence, 01' government identification card) or other evidence appropriate for the 
circumstances is provided to the bank. For corporations, partnC1~hips, and foundations, 
documents concerning the due organisation and existence of'the relevant entity will 
suffice. 1"01' trusts, the banks will require the idcntity of the trustees and evidence to 
prove that the trust has not only bcen formed in the coneet and proper manner, but 
also that its existence l'Cmains valid. 
WolfSberg Principle 1.2.2 focllses on the nced to establish the benel1cial ownership of 
each account. Under this Wolfsberg Principle, 'Due diligence mllst be done on all 
principle Beneficial owners ... '. This Wolfsberg Principle is in line with FAT!' 
Recommendation 11. In re&pect of natural persons under Woltsbcrg Principle 1.2.2, 
' ... when an account is opened in the name of an individual, the private banker must 
establish whether the client is acting on hislher own behalf.' Tfthe private banker has 
doubts, then the bank will seek to cstablish the capacity in which, and on whose 
behalf, the aecountholder is acting. Given that the bank is willing to assume this 
--nt ----"."' . 
Natural persol1s means individuals, ,vhUe in contrast legal persons means corporations, charities, 
hllsts, and other organisations with legal pel~ollality. 
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responsibility, a statement of joint responsibility between the private banker and the 
bank would be more appropriate. 
Wolfsbcrg Principle 1.2.3 concems accounts held in the nallle of llloney managers and 
similar intermediaries. 'The private banker will perform due diligence on the 
intermediary and establish that the intermediary has due diligence process for its 
clients, or a regulatory obligation to conduct such due diligence, that is satisfactory to 
the bank.' A narrow reading of this Wolfsberg Principle would seem to impose an 
undnly onerous requirement. Given that the intermediary will invariably be a legal 
entity, the implication is that the private banker would have to develop an 
understanding of the operations ofthe entiiy in line with Wolfuberg Principle 1.2.2. 
In addiiion, the privatc banker would have to ensure that the intermediary has in place 
a due diligence programme concerning clients or at the very least is subject to a 
regulatory obligation to conduct due diligence on prospective clients. Presumably, the 
private banker need only to establish that the intermediary has a due diligence 
programme 01' is subject to sllch a regulatory obligation and is not obligated to 
develop an understanding of the intermediary's business. It is arguable that it would 
have been more appropriate for the bank to have assumed sale responsibility for 
conducting the necessary due diligcnce. The reason is that the money manager or 
other intermediary are most likely to be at an institution with which the bank regularly 
deals and as such the hank as an institution will have morc familiarity with the 
intermediary than that the individual private banker. 
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j i 
Wolfsberg Principle 1.2.4 concerns power of attorney and authorised signatories. This 
requirement is in line with Wolfsherg Principle 1.2.2 regarding natural persons. 
WoItsberg Principle 1.2.5 concerns walk-in clients and electronic banking 
t 
relationships. 'A bank will determine whether walk-in clients or relationships initiated 
through electronic channels require a higher degree of due diligence prior to account 
opening.' What this provision amounts to is a statement that in situations where a 
person who neither has a prior relationship with, nor is known to the bank (for 
example, through a course of prior dealing unrelated to private banking), approaches 
the bank in order to initiate a business relationship, the bank will determine if any 
higher level of due diligence is required with respect to this prospective client. In 
terms of the standard of due diligence required, the private banker will need 10 look 10 
the Woltsberg Principles 10 determine what, at a minimum, is required and then 
inquire about any additional requirements the bank may choose to mandate. To place 
the primary responsibility on the private banker to ensure that only clients whosc 
wealth can be proven to he legitimate are accepted may, in this situation, be criticised. 
Here, an individual seeking to initiate a private client relationship will have 
approached the bank. 
Consequently, it is not the private banker, but the bank that is in effect sponsoring the 
client for acceptance. As such, the bank should bear primary responsibility for 
conducting the due diligence especially if the bank seeks to impose additional due 
diligence requirements. This Wolfsberg Principles contemplates electronic banking 
relationships and its provisions arc in line with FATF Recommendation 13. This 
I'ccorrunendation slates that 'Countries should pay special attention 10 money 
laundedng threats inherent in new or developing technologies that might favour 
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anonymity, and take measures, if needed, to prevent their use in money laundering 
schemes. ' 
Woifsberg Principle 1.3 sets out what is required with respect to the due diligence 
process.225 Of note, this Wolfsberg Principle stales that it is only necessary to collect 
and record the information, but remains silent as 10 whether supporting documentation 
is required. Presumably, this is a matter for each bank to decide. Given the potential 
litigation and damage to reputation to which both the bank and private banker may be 
exposed, it would be helpful to bave supporting documentation. Inclusion of the word 
"reputation" is odd. Surely, what is relevant is not the reputation of the business, but 
the substantial activity it conducts. 
Consequently, requesting the last audited accounts or a business plan, where such 
documents exist and are available, would be more helpful than collection character 
references that are easy to fabricate. Meeting a prospective client is certainly hclpfi.ll, 
especially where the meeting is documented in order to demonstrate that all 
reasonable steps had been taken in conducting due diligence. TIle principle goes 011 to 
state that 'Unless other measures reasonably suJlice to do the due diligence on a client 
(e.g. favourable and reliable references), a client will be met prior to account opening'. 
However, accepting a client based solely on such a meeting should be resisted. TIle 
very fact that they cannot provide basis information should itself be a red flag 
indicating potential money laundering activity. Moreovcr, given that those engaged in 
225 Wol[,berg Principle 1.3: "[t i, ""elltial to collect alld record information covering the following 
categories: purpose and rca::;on for opcning the account, anticipated account activity, source of 'wealth 
(description of the economic activity which has generated the net worth), estimated Het wortll~ source 
of funds (description of tI,e origin and the means of trallsfel' for monies that are accepted for the 
aCCotUlt opennlg)} and referellce to other sources to corroborate reputation information where 
available." The Wolfsbcl'g Group, above n 223. 
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money laundering are individuals most likely to fabricate a story, a meeting without 
other evidence to demonstrate proof of identity and wealth may be of questionable 
value. 
I 
Wolfs berg Principle 1.4 states, 'There will be a requirement that all new clients and 
new accounts be approved by at least one person other than the private banker.'226 
Presumably, this person will be another employee of the barlle Given that the bank 
will be reviewing the due diligence conducted by the private banker, joint 
responsibility under Woltsbcrg Principle 1.1 would be a more appropriate standard. 
Moreover, this Wolt:~berg Principle would have been strengthen if a provision had 
been included that ran as follows: If the person who approves the new account 
believes that the due diligence con ducted by the private banker was unsatisfactory, 
then, as in Woltsbcrg Principlc 1.2.2 (natural persons), the bank will take the 
necessary reasonable measures to ensure that'the due diligence process is completed 
both in an acceptable manner, and to an acecptable standard. 
Wolf~bel'g Principle 2 concerns client acceptance and sets out situations that require 
additional due diligence and attention.m Under Woltsbel'g Principle 2.1, 'Numbered 
or alternate name accounts will only be accepted if the bank has established the 
identity of the client and thc beneficial owner.' This goes against FATF 
Reconllilcndatioll 10, which reads in pmt, 'Financial institutions should not keep 
anonymous accounts or accounts in obviously fictitious names.' 228 Debate as to 
whether numbered accounts and sim ilal' financial instmments that disguise beneficial 
OWnership, serve any usefiJl commercial function arc ongoing. Certainly numbered 
-----------------
226 Ibid. 
""lb'd 218 I. 
See Appendix G for a list oftlle FATF 40 Recollllllelldatiol1s, 
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accounts and accounts in alternate names have played a prominent role in i!lCiJ itating 
crime. However, the use of such accounts and similar financial instmments per se 
should not be prohibited so long as access to the relevant information can be gained 
when necessary by the appropriate authorities. 
To strenf,rthen this Wolfsberg Principle, and to bring it more in line with FATF 
Recommendation 10, adding a statement to the effect that such information \\~Il, 
subject to compliance with the relevant legal requirements, be made to thc relevant 
local law enforcemcnt and regulatory authorities as and when requires, would have 
been useful. In addition, the banks could have included a provision that states that 
they will monitor these accounts to ensure that a pattern of suspicious activity does 
not develop. In any event, the mere fact that a potential client requests that an account 
in an altemate name be opened and maintained may be enough, depending on the 
circumstances, to warrant the filing of a suspicious transaction fepmi ~th the relevant 
authorities. 
Wolfs berg Principle 2.2 states, 'The bank will apply heightened scnltiny to clients and 
beneficial owners resident in and funds sourced fi'om countries identified by credible 
sources as having inadequate anti-money laundering standards or representing high-
risk for crime and corruption.' This is in line with thc FATF's work and with FATF 
Recommendation 21. Again, one set of developments that banks will need to closely 
monitor concerns the expanding number of predicate offences that wiII givc rise to a 
money laundering charge. In the United States over 160 offences have been 
, 
designated as predicate offences and this number is set to increase. The work of the 
OECD and current consideration being given to the inclusion of fiscal ofli:mces as 
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predicate offences highlights this trend. Given the importance oftax considerations in 
shaping the business conducted within the private banking industry and the nne line 
that divides tax avoidance from lax evasion, banks will need 10 monitor Ihese 
! 
developments with extreme care. 
Wolfsberg Principle 2.3 states that 'Risks associated with entities organised in 
ofiS11o]'e jurisdictions are covered by due diligence procedures laid out in these 
guidelines.' To closely monitor and scrutinise the nature of the fmancial activities 
originating in and being conducted through offshore jurisdictions will therefore be 
important. Banks will need to ensure that financial flows that come from offshore 
jurisdictions, and which arc channelled through their organisations via the servicc 
they offer, are clean. In this respect, the FATF's work on non-compliant countries and 
territories should be taken into accoLint by banks. 
Wolfsberg Principle 2.4 concerns high-risk activities. 229 It states that 'Clients and 
beneficial owners whose source of wealth emanates from activities known to be 
susceptible to money laundering will be subject to heightened scrutiny.' Undoubtedly 
this will be important in order to protect the bank from potentially becoming involved 
in money laundering activity. In identifYing individuals whose wealth emanates li'Olll 
questionable sources, banks should be aware of designations made under the US 
Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act 1999,230 Under this act, the Department 
22, 
The Wolfsberg Group, ahove n 227. 
;no Measures can then be enforced against these individuals under the International Emergency 
Ecunomic POll'ers Act 1995 and Executive Order 12978. The office of Foreign Assets Control is 
responsible for implementing sanction against countries designated under the international Emergency 
Rcol/omic Powers Act as posing" threat to national security, economy, or foreign policy of the United 
States. In consultation with the Department of State, the Olllce of Foreign Assets Control develops" 
list of Specially Designated Narcotics Traffickers against which a Presidential Finding may be issued. 
In 1998, foJ' example, the Office of Foreign Assets Control had listed 451 companies and individuals 
against which prohibition and blocking order had been made. Tile list includes four "Kingpins" of the 
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of the Treasury, Department of Justice, Department of State and the Department of 
Defencc arc required to consult each year to develop a list of recommended 
"Kingpins" for Presidential designation on I June of each year. Once designated, the 
Secretary of State, the Attorney General and other relevant bodies will consult and 
impose appropriate sanctions on American companies and citizens to prohibit them 
ti'OlTI engaging in transactions with these "Kingpins" and their associates. The 
jurisdiction claimed by the United States in enforcing its money ialUldering laws is 
becoming ever more expansive. Banks, so long as they eondnct bnsiness either in or 
through United States, will need (0 be cognisant of developments such as these and 
adjust their internal compliance and training programmcs as appl'Opriate. 
Wolfsberg Principle 2.5 concerns high-risk activities.231 'Individuals who have 01' 
have had positions of public trust such as govemment officials, senior executives of 
government corporations, politicians impOltant political party officials etc and their 
families and close associates require heightened scrutiny.' This Wolf:~berg Principle is 
in line with the OEeD's work on COI'l'Uption?32 What this principle implies about the 
democratic process is of note. To a certain extent, it is a manifestation of the trend 
inherent in the expanding scope of money laundering laws that concerns how banks 
relate to their clients. 111e legal sanctions that can be imposed following a cOllviction 
for money laundering mean that banks must now approach client relations fi'Olll a 
position of suspicion in contrast to the past where clients were at least given the 
Cali Cmiel. The listing of Julio Cases"r Nasser David alolle affected 154 companies and 292 additional 
individuals involved in his organisation's legal activities, See United States Deparhnent ofthe Treasury, 
Treasury under Secretary (Enforcement) Rayrmmd TV Kelly. _House Committee on Banking and 
Financial Sen'ices, 11 June 1998. See also United States Department ufthe Treasury, 1i'ea,\'wy under 
Secretary (E'iforcemellt) Raymond IV [(elly. HOllse Judicial)' Commiltee 011 Crime, 24 July 1997. 
2" The Wol!sberg Group, above n 229. 
m See appendix L for a list of the initiatives put forward hy the OEeD related to cormptioll. See also 
Society for Advanccd Legal Studies Anti-Corruption Working Group, Banking on COl'l'IIplioll: The 
Legal Responsibilities of 1110se Who Handle the Proceed,' of Corruption (2000 Society for Advanced 
Legal Studies, 2000) 
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bel1elit of the doubt. The effect of this Wolfsberg Principle, however, is to state that 
public officials cannot be trusted. In fact it implies, precisely because they hold a 
position of public tmst, government officials should not be busted to be engaged in 
commercial activities that are entirely clean and legal in nature. When moving from 
the realm of theory and the idea that the mle of govemmcnts ought to be based solely 
on principles of justice into reality and the realisation that the interests of the latter 
may be sacrificed, it opens the possibility for cOfmption to spread. UnfOltunalely, this 
Wolfsberg Principle manifests a practical reality of public life. 
Wolfsberg Principle 3 concerns updating client files. 23) 'TIle private banker is 
responsible for updating a client's me on a defined basis and/or when there are major 
changes.' This WolfSherg Principle merely manifests prudent commercial practice, 
while the information such an exercise provides should be views as part of the 
ongoing competitive need to provide and tailor services to clients. Of note, the private 
banker's supervisor or an independent control person will review relevant portions of 
the client files on a regular basis 10 ensure consistency and completeness. This is 
important as it means that banks will takc some responsibility tor ensuring that their 
clients are not engaged in questionable activity. To ensure that the exercise is 
cenducted in an objective mamler, an independent person within Ihe bank should of 
course perform this function. As client files are updated, the requirements of FATF 
Recommendation 12 should be kept in mind. 
1)3 ""------
The Wolfsberg Group, above n 231. 
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Wolfsberg Principle 4 focuses on the practices associated with identifying unusual 01' 
suspicious activities.234 Wolfsberg Principle 4.1 states, 'The bank will have a written 
policy on the identification of and follow-up on unusual 01' suspicious activities. This 
policy will include a definition of what is considered to be suspicious 01' unusual and 
give examples thereof.' It goes on to states that unusual or suspicious activities may 
include account transaction 01' other activities that arc not consistent with the due 
diligence file, cash transactions over a celtain amount and pass-through/in-and-out 
transactions. 111e list is not exhaustive, which is necessary givcn the dynamic nature 
oflhe money laundering process. 
In brief, money laundering will only be successfully controlled where banks, 
rel,,'1Ilators and law enforcement agencies are able to work together in co-operativc 
mallller. A~ part of building a co-operative relationship, banks \I\~ll require feedback 
on the usefulness of the information they provide to regulatory and law enforcement 
agencies. Only through adequate feedback will it be possible for banks to maintain a 
comprehensive and up-to-date compliance progranllle. As part of the process it ~ll 
be important for regulatory lll1d law enforcement agencies to communicate the 
transactions and activities to the banks and they believe constitute suspicions activity. 
In this respect, the work of the FATF, in patticular its work on identifying money 
laundering typologies, methods, and trends, will be of use235, as well as the biannual 
report that the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network has begun to publish 011 the 
same matter.236 
234 Ibid. 
235 The FATF's work on money laundering typologies can be found at www.oecd.orglfatr. 
236 The biannual repOlt published hy the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network call be found at 
www,treas,govliillCCI1. 
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Wolfsberg Principle 4.2 deals with the identification of unusual or suspicious 
activities and states that unusual or SUSpICIOUS activities can be identified through 
monitoring transactions, contact with the client him/herself, third party information, 
, 
and the private banker's internal knowledge of the client's environment. 111is non-
exhaustive list is sensible. 
Wolfsberg Principle 4.3 focuses 011 how suspicious activities arc to be followed-up. It 
states that the private banker, management, or the "control Junction" will conduct an 
analysis of the background of the unusual or suspicious activity. If 110 plausible 
explanation for the suspicious activity can be identified, than a decision will be made 
that involves the "control function" concerning whether the business relationship is to 
be continued with increasing monitoring, or whether to be cancelled, or reported to 
the authorities. This principle goes on the state that' ... senior management may need 
to be notified'. In general, senior management should be appraised of all suspicious 
activity reports that are being made. At the very least, a summary of the reports should 
be reviewed at each hoard mceting so that senior management will be aware of the 
suspicious activity to which their bank may be exposed and how this exposure has 
changed over time. 
WoJ[sberg Principle 5 concerns monitoring and states that a sufficient monitoring 
programme must be in place.237 Like WolfSberg Principle 1.1, primary responsibility 
is placed with the private banker who must monitor the activity of the account. From 
Olle perspective this is inappropriate because, as Wolfsbcrg Principle 5 states (and in 
line with Wolfsberg Principle 4.3), lhe private banker will be familiar with the activity 
117 TI Ie Wolfsberg Group, above n 234. 
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of, and significant transactions conducted through, the account and will be especially 
aware of unusual or suspicious activities. However, the same critique made against 
the banks under Wolfsberg Principle l.l for not accepting joint responsibility along 
with the private banker can be made here. This critique is particularly relevant given 
that Wolfsbcrg Principlc 5 goes on to state that the bank will decide to whal extent 
[ul!lIment of this monitoring responsibility will need to be supPOlied through the use 
of automated systems or other means. 
'nlis is a variation of FATF Recommendation 22, 'Countries should consider 
implementing feasible measures to detect or monitor the physical cross-border 
transportation of cash and bearer negotiable instl'llments, subjcct to strict safeguards to 
ensure proper use of information and without impeding in any way the {i'eedom of 
capital movements:238 Although this recommendation applies to "countries", FATF 
Recommendations 8 statcs that Recommendations 10 to 29 should apply to banks as 
well. After all, to leave with the bank the decision of how much of its operating 
budget to allocate to technology with respect to compliance issues, is a commercial 
necessity. Given the desire to avoid the adverse publicity associated with a money 
laundering scandal, the bank is expected to allocate an acceptable portion of its budget 
to adopting and implementing the appropriate technology that would easily allow the 
private banker to meet llis/her responsibility. 
Wolfsberg Principle 6 concerns contl'Ol responsibilities. 239 It states that a written 
control policy will be put in place by each bank establishing standard contl'Ol 
, 
procedures to be undmiakcll by the various "control layers" meaning private banker, 
23& Financia' Action Task Fo!'ce, above n 177. 
239 The Woltsberg Group, above II 237. 
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independent operating unit, compliance, internal audit etc. The control policy will 
cover issues of timing, degree of control, areas to he controlled, rcsponsibilities and 
follow-up. In covering these matters, the control policy must delineate clear lines of 
, 
responsibility and pi'oville those designated as responsible with sufticient power and 
authority to implement the policy. Invariably the control policy will obviously he 
tailored to each bank's intel'l1al idiosyncrasies. In tailoring this policy, the role to be 
performed by regulatory and law enforcement agcncies in providing feedback is again 
worthy of note. Feedback will be important as it will help banks \0 be aware of both 
traditional and emerging money laundering threats and to adapt and tailor their control 
policies as appropriate. 
Wolfsbel'g Principle 7 concel'l1S reporting. 240 It states, 'There will he regular 
management rcporting established on money laundering issues' and then lists some of 
the items that will be included in the reports. A glance at Wolfsberg Principle 4.3 may 
lead to the conclusion that this requirement has already been covered. The diffurence 
is that in Wolfsbcrg Principle 4.3, the word "senior" is included, while in Wollsberg 
Principle 7, it is absent. Wolfsbcrg Principle 7 merely states that regular reports to 
managcmcnt will be made. It does not say how far up the managcment hierarchy that 
these reports should go. Any system of rcports will of course need to be tailored to the 
idiosyncrasies of thc individual bank. In addition, maintaining such gcneral working 
introduces flexibility and therefore helps to facilitate the objective of promoting the 
adoption of the Wolfsbcrg Principles by the widest number of banks as possible. 
Money laundering is a type of risk about which banks need to be aware. It is a form of 
market risk which cmI cause banks to lose considerable amounts of money. 
240 Ibid. 
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The problem is not easy an easy risk to quantify. Assessing the nature of the threat 
posed by money laundering to a bank is certainly more of an art than a science. In this 
respect, useful information can be taken from the suspicious transaction reports filed 
by the banks, and from the background information and circumstances that cause the 
report to be made. 'nlis information need to be repackaged and presented to senior 
managers in a form that will allow senior management to understand the potential 
tlu'eat to which their bank may be exposed. As such, stating, "There will be regular 
senior management reporting" could have strengthened tlus Wolfsberg Principle. 
Wolfsberg' Principle 8 concel'l1s education, training, and information. 241 'TIle bank 
will establish a training progranune on the identification and prevention of money 
laundering for employees who have client contact and for Compliance personne!.' 
Regular training, described as annual training, will include training on how to identify 
and follow-up on unusual or suspicious activities. In addition, employees will be 
informed about any major changes in anti-money laundering laws and regulations. 
However, with respect to the undertaking that' ... employees will be informed about 
any major changes in anti-money laundering laws and regulations', it would have 
been more appropriate for each bank to have undertaken in tlus principles to inform 
their private bankers of these changes in a timely manner. In addition, they should be 
provided with an adequate explanation ()I'what these changes entail. 
Given the wide scope that is characteristic of criminal money launderjng laws in the 
• 
United Kingdom and the United States, a private banker, when he/she transacts 
241 Ibid. 
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business either through London or New York, could be exposed to the money 
launde!1ng laws of these countries. Moreover, thc civil penalties associated with 
money laundcring are also onerous. As such, it is ill the intercsts of the banks to 
ensure that theu: private bankers are adequately educated with respect to their legal 
obligations. In general terms, the banks should ensure that all theu' employees have 
appropriate training concerning the risks posed by money laundering to the banks and 
the legal obligations they are under. 
Wolfuberg Principle 9 covers record retention requirements. 242 It states that each 
'banks will establish record retention requirements fol' all anti-money laundering 
related documents.' It goes on to state that 'The documents must be kept for a 
minimal of five years.' This Wolfsberg Principle is in line with FATF 
Recommendation 12 which is based on the idea that records kept by the bank must be 
sufficient to enable a client's course of dealing to be reconstructed so as to provide, if 
necessary, evidence of criminal behaviol11'. Presumably, this' Wolfsberg Principle will 
include within its scope all account opening information, and information related to 
transactions conducted though the accounts including the amounts and types of 
currency involved. One of the side effects of the know-your-client policy promoted to 
control money laundering activity is the amount of paper it generates in tenns of the 
documents that need to be stored. It will therefore be important that proper storage 
guidelines exist and that any data stored electronically can still be retrieved as the 
bank updates the technology it uses. 
Ibid. 
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Wolfsberg Principle 10 covers exceptions and deviations.243 It states, 'The bank will 
establish an exception and deviation procedure that requires risk assessment and 
approval by an independent uniL' Unfortunately, this Woll:~berg Principle states 
nothing further and appears to be a catch-all provision. it may have been more 
appropriate to state this Principal earlier on, both around Wolfsberg Principle 1.1 and 
possible reiterating it around Wolfsbel'g Principle 5. Placed in these two locations, this 
Wolfsbel'g Principle would have reinforced the idea that thc reality is that the private 
banker and the bank must both share responsibility for ensuring that clients arc not 
involved in questionable activity both at the time they are accepted as clients and 
throughout the time the banker-client relationship subsists. 
Wolfsberg Principle 11 concerns the creation of an anti-money laundering 
organisation. 1.44 It states, 'The bank will establish an adequately staffed and 
independent department responsible for the prevention of money laundering (e.g. 
compliance, independent control unit, legal).' The estahlishment of such as 
organisation will be important and its structure should conform to the characteristics 
of the organisation. Banks that have signed the Wolfsbel'g Principles should give 
consideration about how to institutionalise a process by which the lessons Ieamed 
through implementing the Wolfsberg Principles may be used to prevent future moncy 
laundering problems. In particular, the banks may consider creating an infonnal 
"Wolfsberg Forum" to discuss money laundering related matters as they affect the 
private banking industry on an ongoing basis. Certainly, there are lessons that could 
be shared t1l1'ough sanitised examples, contact to be made, and collective. best practice 
, 
guidelines to be discussed in pursuit of a level cOIIDnercial playing field. Given that 
143 Ibid. 
244 Ibid. 
102 
intra-govel'llmentallonlms such as FATF exist, a similar private sector hody would at 
least be useful in providing the industry with a united voice to deal with organisations 
like the FATF.245 
With the exception of Bance Santander Central Hispano, the other 11 banks which 
had signed the Wollsberg Principles (ABN AMRO Bank N.V., Bank of Tokyo-
Mitsubishi Ltd, Barclays Bank, Citigroup, Credit Suisse Group, Deutsche Bank AG, 
Goldman Sachs, HSBC, J.P. Morgan Private Bank, Societe Generale and UBS AG) 
have branches in Singapore. All banks in Singapore had their license approved by the 
Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS), and would be operating in the accordance 
of the Bank Association Guidelines of Singapore (ABS), guided by regulations and 
proper training to combat money laundering and conduct due diligence. 
2.7 Conclusion 
The growing concern which the rest of the non-OFCs have about the OFCs is 
represented by all the regulatory bodies' initiatives. The initiatives put forward by 
regulatory bodies and non-OFCs as analysed in this chapter arc: 
• OECD's work on harmful tax practices being used to identify how tax and money 
laundering issues are increasingly interlinked. 
• FATF's work on non-compliant countries and tCl'I'itories which reveals the money 
laundering threats posed by OFCs and how they can be dealt with. 
", H' mtorseer, above 11215, 266-80. 
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o FSF's focus on the operation of the global financial system which is being 
examined to identify how the specific issuc of lack of transparency with respect to 
the financial activity being conducted within and through OFCs is being addressed. 
o The Wolfsberg Anti-Money Laundering Principles (the "Wolfsberg Principles") 
on private banking being used to assess a private sector initiative to control mOlley 
laundering that is being pursued by certain banks. 
In addition to the earlier mentioned organisations, there are many others, both public 
and private, that are pursuing various money laundering control initiatives. Their 
activities have led to a number of agreements, memoranda of understanding, 
statements, codes and standards of conduct, all of which have legal significance. As 
such, their work may be characterised as what Pl'Ofessor Joseph Norton calls "soft 
law", which, adapting Professor Norton's definition246, may be understood as follows: 
legally significant international rules emanating from intel'llational bodies that are 
intended to be binding (notwithstanding their non-legal characterisation), and which 
subsequently come to be enforced 01' adhered to in some f0l1n?47 
What should be kept in mind throughout, is that each of these initiatives fOlms a kind 
of "soil law". None has resulted in the creation of legal international rules in the 
traditional sense in that these initiatives have not culminated in the signature of any 
formal treaties or the creation of legal customs. Tn fact, debate persists as to whether 
2,:6 Joseph Norton, Devisillg Inlemalional Balik Supen'isOiY Standards (1995) xxv. Professor Norton's 
discussion is focused aImmd the work of (he Basle Committee and the deflnition of soft law that 
Professor Norton actually llses is as follows: U ••• liberty is taken in using the tenn ~~intel1lational soft 
Ia\\" to depict (legally significant intcmational rules' of the Basle Committee emanating from national 
supervisory authorities that were intended by these "nthorWes to be binding (notwithstanding their non-
legal characterization) alllong the involved aulhorities and that subsequently became enacted into 
national laws or administrative nIles subseqnently in accord with the substance and intent of the Uasle 
COHllllittee pronouncement." 
241 Hintel'seer, above 11 245, 224. 
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ntel'llationalmles outside oftraditionally recognised sources of intemationallaw, like 
reaties and legal customs, exist. 'nre reason this debate is ongoing is that the 
rinciples of state sovereignty and equality of states means that neither a state nor the 
, 
itizens of a state can be made subject to the laws of another state in the absence of 
ome form of enabling legal mechanism, 
An important challenge that has confronted regulatory agencies in recent years is how 
o effectively monitor the operations of banks, their subsidiaries, and the financial 
ctivities in which they are engaged, The approach that has been adopted is to create a 
lexible supervisory structure by allowing banks to develop internal mechanism of 
isk control and management. As such, the Wolfuberg Principles represent an element 
f tbis flexible regulatory approach, These principles consiilute a series of measures 
dopted voluntarily by certain banks, 'nley focus 011 monitoring and collecting 
nfurmation on the activities of clients in order to be in a better position to identify 
uspicious activities. 
t is in recognising that the establishment of policies and procedures to adhere to these 
uidelines, is the responsibility of management. As a set of guidelines as to how 
management is to fulfil this responsibility, the WoH:sberg Principles provide the 
tarting point with respect to private banking activities, When analysing the 
Wollsberg Principles, it is important to remember that they are a voluntary code of 
est practice guidelines, As Dr, Eigen observes, 'The language is blunt 111e burden 
or monitoring the implementation and day-to-day operations of the guidelines rests 
quarely with the banks, Theil' reputations are at stake.,248 Although the Wolfsberg 
48 E' ~ Igen, above 11 218, 
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Principles may be dismissed as a mere public rclations exercise, if implemented with 
vigour, they have the potential to make a meaningful contribution to combating 
money laundering.249 
As seen by the analysis in this chapter, the supranational closely related directives of 
the OECD, FATF and FSF have focused on the four major areas of "harmful tax 
practices and money laundering" and "confideutiality and exchange of information" 
which will now be furlher analysed in the following two chapters. This will then allow 
consideration of the OFe's responses including that of Singapore. 
249 Hinterseer, above Il 247, 281-2. 
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Chapter 3: Harmful Tax Pl'actices and Money Laundering 
3,1 Introduction 
In the previous chapler, the analysis of the supranational approaches to OPCs showed 
that two of the foul' main concerns relate to harmful tax practices and money 
laundering. 
The increasing globalisation of the banking and securities businesses presents a whole 
new range of problems to the domestic regulators. It is clear that the traditional 
concept of jurisdiction limited by tel11tol'ial boundaries is wholly inadequate in the 
context of the developing global lllal'ket. Simultaneously, as demonstrated in the 
previous chapter, there has been an increasing recognition of and delenuination to 
tackle money laundering which is an inherent featnl'e of international and organised 
crime. There has been a growing Ilppreciation and acceptance, in the securities 
industry, of the principle of the 'integrity' of the market; ill other words, that 
confidence in financial mm'kets can only be preserved by the provision of 
simultaneous and, where possible, instantaneous access for all to all relevant 
infonnation?SO 
In this chapter, the issues of harmful tax practices and money laundering are analysed 
in the context of the supranational directives, thus laying the foundations for the 
subsequent responses of the OPCs. First, some definitions are required. 
;;--------------
Francis Neate and Rogel' McCormick (cds), Balik COIif/delltiality (1990) xix. 
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3.1.1 Tax Avoidance 
In the legal debate of tax avoidance, the primary focus is clearly on contrived and 
artificial schemes, which do not change the substantive character of an activity oj' 
transaction but may serve nevertheless to the activity within some tax-exempt or more 
tax-favoured legal category. Assuming a literal interpretation of the legislation by the 
courts, minor or essentially cosmetic changes may allow quite massive tax avoidance 
without significant cost to the taxpayer whether in legal fees, or, in economic terms, 
from the adoption of inferior business forms or commercial practices. 
Substitutability between taxable and non-taxable alternatives may accordingly be 
most perfect and, although revenue losses may be very large, the direct efficiency 
losses or excess burdens may be small. As Cooper asserts, thc lost revenue must, 
however, be made up by rate increases on a nan'ower base, thus increasing welfare 
cost, or public expenditure benefits must be reduced. The social costs of tax avoidance 
in this narrow legal sense may accordingly be very large and are not necessarily 
diminished by the absence of direct efficiency losses. In equity telms, tax 
progressivity may be greatly reduced Wit110ut offSetting cffects fl'om excess burden 
and, since celiain types of artii1cial schemes may not be widely available, horizontal 
inequities may be considerable.2s1 
Tax avoidance in the narrow legal sense remains therefore highly objectionable and 
there is a view that it !nust be dealt with if the tax system is to retain.credibility and if , 
251 Gracme S Cooper, Tax Avoidance and the Rule o/Law (1997) 25-7. 
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tax compliance and social acceptable of the democratic budgetary system is to be 
252 preserved. 
. 
3.1.2 Tax Evasion 
Tax evasion is an illegal activity. It is a criminal as well as a civil wrong. It will otten 
involve the taxpayer hiding assets; or, alternatively, failing to declare income and/or 
capital gains; or, in the fCHiher alternative, making a fraudulent return by deliberately 
under-declaring income/gains to the revenue authorities of the country where he 
resides for tax purposes. 
In England the approach of the revenue authorities to tax avoidance used to sum up in 
a decision of Lord Tomlin in IRe v Westminster and has been cited in comis 
throughout the common law system:253 
Every man is entitled, if he can, to order his affairs so that the tax attaching 
under the appropriate Taxes Acts is less than it othClwise would be. If he 
succeeds in ordering them so as to secure that result, then, however 
unappreciative the Commissioners of Inland Revenue (the IRS) or his fellow 
taxpayers may be oflus ingenuity, he canllot be compelled to pay an increased 
tax. 
252 Ib'd 1 ,25-7 71-2 253 ,. 
IRC v Westminster [1936] ACI. This speech may no longer represent the modem approach hl the 
UK which has now enacted a number of anti-avoidance provisions and which is now more hlclined [0 
sinke down sophisticated anti-avoidance structures without any commercial benefit (other than to avoid 
tax) as a 'sham' and collect tax on the basis Dflhe reality oflhc stmchlre oftransaclioll as a whole. See 
I(mnsay v IRe [1982] AC300. However, the quole sums up the traditional view of tax avoidance. 
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On the other hand, tax evasion involves a taxpayer cheating the revenue authorities. 
Dishonesty will generally be present. The scheme to cvade tax will include fraud, 
either 
• a deception - a deliberate dishonesty such as a misrepresentation of income, 
earnings, profits, assets etc. on the taxpayers' alilUal tax return, supporting 
statements and/or accounts, or 
8 a deceitful concealment of income and/or assets etc. 
The type of tax fi'uud illustrated above is a criminal of Ie nee. It is often an of Ie nee 
contrary to the relevant tax legislation in the jurisdiction where the taxpayer is deemed 
to reside for tax purposes. It may also be all offence contrary to the general criminal 
law, particularly if the taxpayer makes an actual misrepresentation to the revenue 
authorities, for instance, in his accounts or on his tax retu111. In such case the taxpayer 
could .lind himself criminally liable for offEmces of fraud, Lorgery, false accounting or 
deception. 25·1 
1n both the United Kingdom and the United States 'tax avoidance' is doing what you 
can within the law: it has always been regarded as entirely lawilll, albeit requiring or 
relying on expert advice. On the other hand, 'tax evasion' has always been (and 
remains) unlawful, and depending on its severity and extent, 'evasion' may also be 
criminal.2S5 In Australia, some forms of tax avoidance are illegal and this was made 
254 Cooper, above H 251, 84-5. 
255 Till! Bennett, 1hlley's International Initiatives Affecting Flitallcial Havens (2001) 28. 
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clear under the provisions of Pmt IVA of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 
(COlllmonwealth) and tax evasion is always against the law.z56 
3.1.3 Money Laundering 
According to Blum, clean money is worth more than dirty money. Clean monel57 can 
be invested in prol1table activities, or spent on consumption, more or less conspicuous, 
without risk of incrimination. Dirty money can generally only be invested or spent 
less prolitably, less visible, and at the risk of punishment. 1t also carries the risk of 
being used as evidence of the initial crime. Vhtually all income from criminal 
activities must be disguised to be of use to the criminal. Money laundering is that 
process of disguise.258 It has remaincd high on the law enfurcement agenda since the 
1990s,z59 1t has moved quickly from being marginal in the early 1980s, not even a 
ground jUi' conl1scation, let alone a crime, to a position at the centre of efforts for co-
operation in the 'war on drugs', the 'struggle against organised crime' and the 'war on 
ten'Ol'ism' ?60 These effOlts as have been previously noted, are international in scope 
and consequcntly require rcvision of the tl'aditionai view afthe relationships between 
national systems of criminal justice. 
3.2 OECD Measures to Combat Harmful Tax Practices 
'" 2 income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) pt IVA. 2:: Money untainted by criminal association. 
Por Jack Blum et aI, Financial Haven, Banking Secrecy and Money-Laundering UNDCO technical 
~erics issue 8 (1998 Ullited Nations) 6, the origin of the tenu is in the use of cash based retail service 
Industries like laundries to disguise the origins of cash acquired throngh rackets ill tbe United States. 
The object was to mix legally and illegally obtained cash to avoid the attention of conup! police 
officers:, competitors, and (fhUll the time that prosecution for tax evasion carne to be a potent weapon in 
the hauds oflhe authorities unable to being successful prosecutions for specific substantive offellces) 
~\\e tax ?uthorities, 
G RIchard StrafeI', 'Molley Laundering: the Crime oflhe '90s" (1989) 27 American Criminal Law 
ReView 149 
'60 . 
Peter Alldridge, MOlley Lallndering Law (2003) 1. 
III 
3.2.1 OECD’s Concepts of Unfair Tax Competition
It is argued that, the solution that is now being urged by OECD is that small or
developing countries with OFCs be pressed into se~Mce as subsidiary tax enforcers to
boost OECD coffers. The OECD approach is multifarious, involving the
criminalisation of tax avoidance and the elimination of various forms of tax
competition fi’om these OFCs in all geographically mobile service industries,
including financial, but also distribution services, s!fipping, service industries and
company headqum~tering.
But what could be more reasonable? That, in the interest of comity between nations
and the protection of their mutual sovereignty, nations should help each other catch
’tax cheats’ by insisting on transparent legal structures and exchange of tax
information on request or even spontaneously? Is this not a self-evident case of
collective interest in effective law enforcement?261
And if nations am successful in increasing revenue by deterring or catching tax cheats,
.~vill they not be able to lower tax rates, improve economic efficiency, expand output
and deliver rising living standards?
So stated, the cun’ent OECD campaign to eliminate tax havens seems to make both
legal and economic sense.
Antoine, above n t33,314.
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But, as with many apparently self-evident truths propounded in the popular press,
such propositions may not withstand closer examination.
The OECD m’gues that tax competition~62 may alter the structure of taxation (by
shifting pa~ of the tax burden fi’om mobile to relatively immobile factors and fi’om
income to consumption) and may hamper the application of progressive tax rates and
the achievement of redistribution goals.~63
But is the OECD cm~’eet to see tax competition as a problem to be solved by
enforcing residence (or pseudo-residence264) taxation of mobile capital income?265
If tax competition shifts the tax but’den fi’om mobile to relatively iumaobile factors, it
is doing the world a service. Economic theory has always held that, fi’om an efficient
point of view, taxes should be laid on things which are inelastic in supply (of wlfich
the prime example is land rents). As for progressive marginal income tax rates and
income redistribution, there are many economists who would argue that both are
economically inefficient. It is odd that a repo~t which complains266 that tax havens are
262 Indeed, the OECD seems to be Intent on eliminating what they regard as ’harmful’ fiscal cunlpetition
in vast segments of key global indnstries. However, on closer inspection, theh’ efforts seem to be
focused on Industries in which OECD countries are more competitive. Hence the rather telling
omission of agriculture, which has ’harmfid’ fiscal competition amomning to USA$360 billinn provided
by the OECD cotmtries to their farme~z at the expense of farmers iu many poor developing countries as
well as countries such as Australia and New Zealand. The agrieultrtral sector is never mentioned in all
the OECD exhortations for other countries to elhninate hamlfid fiscal practices. Ibid 315.
~6~ Organisatiun for Economic Co-operation and Development, above n 156, 14123].
~ In fact, tl~e operation of controlled foreign company or trust income attribution rules ~fien means
that OECD countries m’e asserting the right to tax foreign income of a foreign company or foreign trust
(even several thnes removed), even if their residents have no legal or" equitable right to that Income.
The residence ’principle’ is really becomiug in reality a merco~tilist export tax on capital in the fo~ of
perpetual taxation by tile country of resideuce of the orighlal sotn’ce of the mobile capital. Antohle,
above n 261,315-6.
~6s Ibid,      -
~ Orgauisation for Econonfic Co-operation and Development, above n 263, 15125].
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"flee riders" accepts as given the "fi’ee riding" implicit in redistributive taxation.267
Some "fi’ee riders" are more equal than others, it seems.26s
Rea!-wodd constraints mean that tax competition can be inefficient or harmful in the
sense that it distorts the delivery of public goods and se~Mces, as well as the allocation
of resources in the private market. Distortions in the level and pattern of the provision
of public goods and services arise in a non-cooperative enviromnent in which
governments compete for mobile individuals, capital, and consumption.269
The competitive process is reflected in differences in tax rates and structures that are
intended either (1) to reflect differences in preferences for pnblic goods and services
and differences in redistributive goals, or (2) to attract mobile tax bases. In either
instance, mobile individuals or capital may respond to the tax differences with
allocative effects. Consider the example described above. Inefficient tax competition
between jurisdictions A and B can arise in one of two simple ways. First, jurisdiction
A may wish to increase its tax rate above that in jurisdiction B in order to fund an
increase in desired public goods and services. If the relevant tax base is mobile,
jurisdiction A may perceive itself to be constrained in raising its rate, since the mobile
factors of production may migrate to jurisdiction B in order to avoid the increased
transfer payments. The migration is induced by the character of the taxes as transfers
267 Ibid 14123].
26s Terence Dwyer and Deborah Dwyer, ’Transparency versus Privacy: Reflections on OECD Concepts
of Unfah" Tax Competition’ (2002) 9 Journal of Financial Crime 330, 333.
2~9 The seminal statement of this proposition is fonnd ht Wallace E Oates and Robert M Schwab,
’Economic Competition Among Jurisdictions: Efficiency-Enhancing or Distm~ion-Inducing?’ (1988)
35 Journal of Public Economics 333-54. The tax competition literattu’e essentially explores the
fundamental issue posed by this p~x~position. See John D Wilson, ’Theories of Tax Competition’ (1999)
52 Nationol Tax Journal 269-304. See also Andreas Haufler, Taxation in a Global Economy (2001).
The basic models are described in George R Zodrow and Peter Mieszkowski, Pigou, Tiebout, ’Property
Taxation and the Underprovision of Local Pnbllc Goods’ (1986) 19 Journal of Urban Economics 356-
70; and Jolm D Wilson, ’A Theory of futen’egional Tax Competition’ (1986) 19 Journal of Urban
Economics, 296-315.
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and not as user charges for goods or services provided to the factors of production.
Alternatively, jurisdiction A or B may lower its tax rate in an effort to attract mobile
factors of production away fi’om the other jurisdiction. In either instance, the
competition betwe~en the two jurisdictions for a mobile tax base may induce them to
lower tax levels below those required to snpport public goods and services desired by
residents. In effect, the constraint imposed by other competing jurisdictious prevents
the provision of public goods and services to the point at wlfich marginal costs equal
marginal benefits.27°
The economic literattu’e attributes this inefficient allocation of public goods and
services to the "horizontal fiscal externality" or "horizontal spillover effect" arising
between two or more governments at the same level (that is, subnational or local
govermnents).271 These labels refer to the fact that, in setting tax levels to fund public
goods and services, policy makers in a particular jurisdiction consider-only the
welfare of their residents, and not that of the residents of a competing jurisdiction that
may benefit fi’om the migration of factors of production in response to increased taxes.
This externality may cause policy makers to forgo the tax increase and associated
public goods and services in order to avoid "tax base flight." In terms of the allocative
effects, it does not matter whether differences in tax rates and tax structures that
would othe~wise arise are attributable to differences ha preferences for public goods
and services and redistt’ibutive policies, or to an attempt to atta’act mobile tax bases
with "beggar-thy-neighbour" policies.~7~
~70 Thn Edgar, ’Corporate Income Tax Coordioatlon as a Response to International Tax Competition
~a~d International Tax ba’bitrage’ (2003) 51 Canadian T~cc Journal, 1079.David E Wildasin, ’lnterjur’isdictional Capital Mobility: Fiscal Externality and a CmTective
~S~bsidy, (1989) 25 Journal of Urban Economics 193-212.
For other views on this point, see Michael Keen, ’Preferential Reghnes Can Make Tax
Competition Less Harmfid’ (2001) 54 National Tc~ Journal 757-62 (suggestlog that
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3.2.2 The Effects of Globalisation and Liberalisation on Har.mful Tax Practices
Tax competition refers to the competition to attract investment or funds by providing
an attractive fiscal environment. It usually takes the form of offering special
incentives, in the form of tax exemptions or reductions, low rates of tax or by having
no tax at all.273
Earlier, it was discussed how, liberalisation and globalisation have led a number of
governments to introduce special tax structures. Today virtually ever3’ high tax
country has adopted some type of preferential tax regime. As noted previously, over
recent years, the number of tax havens has more than doubled, while the value of
investments into low tax jurisdictions has expanded exponentially.
Because these tax policies may result in the siphoning off of pa~s of countries’ tax
bases, this proliferation of what are considered hateful preferential tax regimes and
tax havens has become a growing concern for governments.
The position of the OECD is that, if the situation is not redressed, governments ma
increasingly be forced to engage in competitive tax bidding in order to attract or retai
targeted tax preferences are preferable to general rate reductions, because they cordSue the
efficiency-reducing effects of tax competition to mobile tax bases that are the targets’of the
preferences); and Ecldaard Janeba and Michael Smart, "Is Targeted Tax Competition Less
Harmful Than its Remedies?" International Tax and Public Fina~ce (fm~hcoming) (finding that
resta’ietions on tax competition are more likely to be desirable when tax bases are on average highly
responsive to a coordinated increase in tax rates by all govermnents, aud when tax bases with large
domestic elasticities are mobile hxtemationally).
~73 Alex Eassou, Taxation of Foreign Direct h~vestment: An h~o’oduction (1999) 162-3.
116
mobile activities, thus leading to a "race to the bottom", in which location and
financing decisions become primarily tax driven.274
3.2.3 Tax Harlnonisation & Withholding Tax
On 3 June 2003, the EU Council of Finance Ministers, ECOFIN, finally reached an
agreement on the EU Savings Tax Directive. The Dh’ective is to be implemented as of
1 Janua~T 2005.
The Say’rags Tax Directive is, not a stand alone issue but a vital part of the EU "code
of good conduct" package, which also includes the abolition of harmful corporate
taxation measures that disto~ fair competition between Member States and a directive
concerning tax on royalties.
One of the main issues in connection with the introduction of the Savings Tax
Directive is whether to introduce a witlfiaolding tax or exchange of information
between the Member States’ tax authorities. The strongest opponent against a
withholding tax has been the UK, taking into consideration the UK based Euro bond
market. The strongest opponent against an exchange of information has been
Luxembourg supported by Belgium and Austria, all protecting their bank secrecy and
financial infi’astructure. The final outcome of the negotiations is a compromise.
The tax effecL7
Spitz, above n 129, 235-6.
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Sta~ing fi’om 1 January 2005, 12 Member States275 are to automatically exchange
i~fformation concerning EU resident physical persons’ interest income. The exceptions
are Luxembourg, Austria and Belginm, which will keep their bank secrecy regulation
and these countries will instead impose a withholding tax as a main rule. Luxembourg
Austria and Belgium will, however, provide the individual account holder with a
option bet~veen the withholding tax and exchange of information. The withholding ta
will increase over time as follows: 15% fi’om 1 January 2005, 20% fi’om 2008 (three
years after the implementation), and finally 35% fi’om 2011.276
A Stttmbling Block
By insisting on retaining their banking secrecy laws, Lnxembourg, Austria an
Belgium are following Switzerland’s course. Switzerland has repeatedly refused t
comply with banking disclosure standm’ds and has offered to pay the EU 75 percent 
returns generated fi’om a withholding tax in exchange for not having to reveal th
identity of its customers.
Other non-EU member states in Europe, such as Liechtenstein, Aaadorra, Monaco an
San Marino, must also levy a tax on EU citizens’ savings and pay three-quarters o
to the home country. 277
275 Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Demnm’k, the Republic of Ireland, United Kingdom
Greece, Portagal, Spain, Finland, Sweden
~7~ Nordea Bank S.A. Luxembourg, The EUSavh~gs Tax" Directive (2003) <http://www.nordea.ch> at 3
November 2003.
277 Deutsche Welle, EU Agrees on Tc~’ing Foreign-Earned b~terest (2003) <http://w\vw.dw-world.de>
at 3 November 2003.
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The inclusion of Switzerland and other non-EU states in the EU finance ministers’
deal was a stipulation for securing the approval of Luxembom’g, Austria and Belgium.
The Swiss an’angement, however, is still awaiting a final approval fi’om the EU
.278
finance conunittee before being maplementea.
3.2.4 U.S. Opinion on OECD’s Initiative
Ia May 2001, under the Bush administration, Treasm’y Secretary Paul O~Neill made a
statement on "The OECD Tax Havens" report. An excerpt is as follows: 279
The United States does not support efforts to dictate to any country what its
own tax rates or tax system should be, and will not participate in any initiative
to harmonize world tax systems. The United States simply has no interest in
stilling the competition that forces governments - like businesses - to create
efficiencies. In fact, the Administration is actively working to lower tax rates
for all Americans. After reducing our tax burden, we will turn our attention
toward reforming our system to make it simpler and more efficient. On these
principles the United States remains firm. In its cun’ent fatal, file project is too
broad and it is not in line with this Administration’s tax and economic
priorities.
O~Neill made clear the U.S. would vigorously pro’sue genuine tax cheats and fight
criminal money-laundering effmls. But lie rightly saw the distinction between those
Paul O’Neill, ’Treasur~ Secretary Oq’,leill Statement on OECD Tax Havens’ (Press Release, 10 May
2001).
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laudable goals and the less-than-laudable efforts to force low-tax countries todmpose
more exactions on their citizens.28°
While the Clinton administration in the United States strongly supported the OECD’s
efforts, Bush is taking a different instance. In response to the US administration’s
objectives to the crackdown on tax havens, the OECD softened its position in late
June 2001 under a compromise with the US. First, the OECD had postponed the next
publication of uncooperative tax havens till the end of Ni~vember 2001. Second,
sanctions would not be imposed on "listed offenders" until at least April 2003. Third,
the OECD would no longer try to prevent countries fi’om keeping their low-tax
systems or prevent them fi’om offering tax breaks to foreign investors that were not
available to local residents. The compromise shifts the focus to achieving an effective
exchange of information with tax havens
3.3 Tax Evasion and Money Laundering
With the FATF spearheading the combat against money launderh~g, countries which
are concerned with maintaining themselves as lush territories for global wealth
management have anti-money laundering legislation in place.
An unedited version of the relevant section of the US Criminal Code provides the
following.
Ibid.
Szeto Allen, ’Is Tax Competition Harmfid?’ (2001) 134 CA Magazine 29.
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Whoever, knowing that the property involved in a financial transaction represents
the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity; conducts or attempts to conduct a
financial, transaction wlfieh in fact involves the proceeds of specified unlawful
activity:
(i)    with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful
activity; or
(ii) with intent to engage in conduct constituting a violation of section
7201 or 7206 of the Internal Revenue Code, 1986; or
(B) Knowing that the transaction is designed in wl~ole or in part
(i)
(ii)
to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the
ownership or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful
activity; or
to avoid a transaction repo~ing requirement under state or federal
law
[is guilty of the offence of money laundering].
The US Criminal Code, itself a codifying section, provides an illuminating example of
a statutory provision that illustrates how anti-money laundering legislation has
evolved.
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The original objective of the US Congress in enacting the first anti-money laundering
legislation was to assist prosecutors in securing a conviction of persons engaged in
transactions involving the proceeds of drug trafficking where there was no evidence to
tie them into the original (or predicate) dt~ags-related crime (such as production,
importation or distribution). Such persons would often, prior to specific money
laundering provisions, be (unsuccessfully) indicted for offences relating to the
predicate drugs-related crime itself, such as
aiding and abetting the original drugs-related offence, or
conspiracy with others to commit the original drugs-related offence.
It was, therefore, clearly desirable to create a separate criminal offence of laundering
the profits derived from drug ta’afficking, in order to catch and prosecute those persons
who were solely involved in the movement of money earned from the unlawful
production and distribution of illicit drags. 282
The original objective of the legislation was then extended to encompass not just the
laundering of drag-related money, but the laundering of money derived from all crime.
The US Criminal Code creates a specific offence of conducting a financial transaction
that involves the proceeds of "specified criminal activity". The criminal activity
specified in the Code includes not only drug-related crime, but a considerable number
of other serious criminal offences. This is sometimes called "all crimes" anti-money
laundering legislation, referring to the fact that the aim of the legislation is to
282 Parkinson and Howarth, Trust Creation: Lm~, and Practice (2000) 82.
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criminalise persons who launder the proceeds of all serious crinae, rather than just a
few offences or types of offence.~83
Eigen and Del Pom~ assel~ that the objective of modern (onshore) imernational anti-
money laundering legislation has thus been extended further to include the movement
of hot as wel! as of dirty money. Dirty money is basicallymoney that is derived fi’om
crime. Hot money is derived from a civil wrong which may or may not involve
traditional fraud or dishonesty but which involves conduct lacking in integrity. For
instance, the money may have been earned lawfully but becomes "hot" when the
owner tries to disguise or hide its provenance in order unlawfully to evade taxes or
exchange controls; or, alternatively, tries to disguise its provenance to fi’ustrate lawful
claims being made against those assets in, for instance, a lawsuit brought by creditors
or in divorce proceedings. Hot money can be a grey area. The money may have been
earned legally but it is mixed with dirty money as a result of the export methods or
investment. Tax evasion and political con’uption would fall in the categol3, of hot
money, which makes up a larger percentage than dirty money,a84
Accordingly, there is a modern extended role for anti-money laundering legislation -
to combat tax evasion and other "fiscal crime". Goverrmaents in the developed high
tax, industrialised (onshore) jurisdictions have realised that the same money
laundering strategies implemented against drag trafficking should apply to tax evasion
and fiscal crinae.~85
2s3 The two prhuary money launderhlg statutes are sections 1956 and 1957 of the U.S. Crimh~al Code,
Title 18.
2~ Carla Del Ponte and Peter Eigen, World Economic Forum Knowledge Navigator - Dit’iy or Hot
~M~soney or ’only’ tax evasion~ (2000) World Economic Forum <www weforum.org> at 10 May 2004.
arkmson and Howarth, above n 282, 83-4.
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3.3.1 Eroding Bank secrecy- Before and After September 11
The Inland Revenue Services (IRS) sent out a clear message to tax evaders. The IRS
Commissioner Charles O. Rossotti said,
"If people use these illegal offshore methods to hide their income, we will find out
who they are.
If taxpayers are involved in these schemes, it is time to make things right. We urge
these taxpayers to consult with a reputable, trusted tax professional for advice.’’286
For those Americans that abuse tax haven structures, the storm is just be~ianing.
Since September 11, it is becoming increasingly difficult for those non-compliant
taxpayers to hide. Indeed, the US government can rely on an arsenal of disclosure
initiatives, and in certain cases can compel American taxpayers to turn over foreign-
based documentation and information.
Lawfully, the IRS and the US Department of Justice (DOJ), as well as other US
governmental agencies, have substantial powers and authority to obtain foreign-based
evidence. This is true if the foreign-based evidence is located in a tax haven
jurisdiction. The US gove~amaent can initiate a variety of foreign-targeted discovery
requests, such as "compelled consents"287 and "letters rogatory’’288, as well as a
2s6 Barbara T Kaplan and PaMck T O’Brien, ’Secrecy Associated with Offshore Banking is
Evaporating’ (2002) 119 Banking Lmv Journal 741.
~87 Doe v United States, 487 U.S. 201 (1988).
~ss 28 U.S.C. 1781 et seq. (1999). "The letter rogato~3, is a ’medimn, in effect, whereby one eotmh’y,
speaking tin’ough one of its courts, requests anofl~er comal~3,, acting through its own courts and by
methods of court procedure peculiar thereto and enth’ely within fl~e latter’s control, to assist the
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myriad of other foreign discovery devices. As Conunissioner Rossotti stated, "simply
.... ill ~,289put, the guarantee of secrecy assoetated wtth offshore bankmg ~s evaporat g.
As a direct result of~the September tragedy 11, US law has been amended to enable
the DOJ to more readily obtain foreign-based records - even those kept in tax haven
countries. On 26 October 2001 the USA Pata’iot Act was signed by President Bush in
part to force foreign banks with US con’espondents to furnish evidence m~d
documents regarding foreign correspondent bank accounts in both eriminal and civil
proceedings.29° Further, the new law allows the DOJ to prosecute money laundering
charges for many foreign criminal offences, ineluding most foreign fisc!l offences.291
Additionally, since September 11, the US government has entered into tax
information exchange agreements (TIEAs) with the Bahamas, the Cayman Islands,
Antigua and Barbuda, Panama, and most recently the British Virgin Islands.292
Pursuant to the te~xns of these agreements, the IRS will be allowed access to bank
account information that was previously protected by bank secrecy laws, as well as
beneficial ownership info~anation relating to foreign corporations and trusts.293 These
administration of justice in the former conntry.’" Ma~ L Gyandoh, ’Foreign Evidence Gathering:
What Obstacles Stand in the Way of Justice’ (2001) 15 Temple h~ternational & Comparative Law
Journal 84-5.
~9 David Cay Jolmston, ’IRS Says Offshore T~x Evasion is Widespread’, The N.Y. Times (New Yod~)
26 March 2002, at A1.
~90 Patti Moin’, ’President Bush Signs Extensive Money Laundering, Anti-Ten’orism Bill’ (2001) 5
November Tax Notes International 582. See also Bruce Zagaris, ’TIEAs and the Case for Caribbean
Tax and Investment Incentives’ (2002) 4 March Tax Notes International 983.
~9~ USA Patriot Act of 2001, section 315.
9~ Kevin A Bell, ’U.S., British Virgin Islands Sign Tax information Exchange Agreement’ (2002) 15
~ril Tax Notes International 123.
See Artlele 5, Agreement between the Govermnent of the United States of America and the
GOvenuuent of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Including the Gove~aunent
of the Cayman Islands, for the Exchange of hffonnation Relating to Taxes (signed 27 November 2001)
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agreements will become effective beginning in 2004 for criminal tax matters and 2006
for civil tax matters .294
The IRS has targeted US citizens and residents with unreported foreign bank and
securities accounts held individually or tlu-ough trusts and companies organised in tax
haven jurisdictions. 295 The IRS also has tm’geted US and foreign business
organisations that promote and solicit US citizens and residents to operate offshore
structures, typically in tax havens. 296 These promoters usually advocate offshore
schemes that illegally avoid or evade taxes and simply do not legally achieve the
promised US tax savings.297
The USA PATRIO~98 Act
The ttmast of money laundering laws was directed to that of it being a tool to combat
terrorism when the "September 11 attacks" resulted in the collapse of the Twin
Towers in United States in 2001. On September 14, 2001, the Department of Treasury
created the Foreign Terrorist Asset Tracking Centre within the Office of Foreign
Assets Control299 to act as a focal point to track, trace, and seize terrorist funds. On
29~ See Article 12, Agreement between the Govet~mnent of the United States of America and the
Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Noiahern Ireland, Including the Govenunent
of the Britisb Virgin Islands, for the Exchange of Information Relating to Taxes (signed 3 April 2002)
295 See Bloomberg News, "IRS to Seek Visa Cards Data", The N.Y. Times, (New York) 30 March 2002,
at C2.
~96 See IRS Notice 97-24, 1997-1 C.B. 409, "Certain T~a~st Arrangements". See also "Summat3’ of
Abusive Trt st Schemes ’, www.us~reas.gov, United States Depat~nent of the Treastu’y.
297 William M Sharp, St, William T Hm’rison III, and Scott A Hat"U, ’Post-ll September Use of
Offshore Tax Havens: The Dos and Don’ts’ (2002) 26 Tm" Notes International 353~4.298 The fidl title of the act is "Uoiting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Requh’ed to Intercept and Obstract Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 200 .
~99 The fimction of the Office of Foreign Assets Control is to enforce economic and trade sanctions,
impose restrictions on the transactions, and fi’eeze assets based on the foreign policy initiatives and
foreign pulley goals of the United States against targeted foreign countries, terrorist organizations, and
those groups engaged in narcotics trafficking. Its authority derives fi’om Presidential wartinre and
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eptember 23, 2001, the President issued Executive Order 13224, which directed the
Secretary of the Treasury to fi’eeze all assets, and to take all steps necessary, to
prohibit financial transactions with individuals and organisations listed in the order
and this list has been updated several times. On September 28, 2001, the United
Nations Security Council unanimously passed a United States sponsored resolution
that called on all United Nations member states to fi’eeze the assets of suspected
tenorists in their respective countries and to take all steps necessary to disrupt the
financial suppo~ flowing to these suspected terrorists and their organisations. In broad
terms, Treasury Under Secretary Jimmy Gurule outlined the various lines of financial
attack being pursued by the United States as follows:3°°
1. Closer scrutiny of the financial activities of terrorist organisations and their
supporters;
2. The identification and blocking of assets of ten’orist organisations and their
supporters;
3. Detailed stady of the methods used by ten’orists to finance their activities;
4. The implementation of measures to give additional leverage to existing laws to
disrupt the financing of terrorism and to break apart terrorist organisafions;
5. The identification of gaps in existing laws that ten’orists may exploit and the
implementation of measures to remedy these deficiencies; and
6. The promotion of closer co-operation among law enforcement and regnlatory
agencies both wittfin the United States and with their counterpm~s in other
countries.
national emergency powers as well as the authority ga’anted to it by specific legislation. For more see
wWw.ustreas.gov/o fac.3~o Hinterseer, above n 249, 405.
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The USA Patriot Act, containing more than 300 pages of new laales for combating
money laundering and te~a’orist use of the U.S. financial system, was signed into la
October 26, 2001. Effective April 24, 2002, Section 352 of the law required all U.S.
financial institutions to implement a comprehensive anti-money laundering policies
and procedures program. While some of the new provisions have received a great deal
of media attention, many bankers remain unaware of the pl:ovisions relating to money
laundering. Anti-money laundering regulations, including compliance with the Bank
Secrecy Act (BSA) and Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) requirements, have
always been a high priority with regulators. However, in the wake of the ten’oris
attacks of September 11, 2001, enforcement of these regulations was increased,
changes to the OFAC lists eanae more rapidly, and new laws were enacted to increase
the responsibilities of financial institutions in preventing the use of the U.S. financial
system for money lanndering and terrorist funding. As a result, the risks of non-
compliance with the anti-money latmdering requirements and the risks of not having
an effective anti-money laundering program have increased dramatically.3°~
3.3.2 Foreign Tax Evasion and Money Laundering
Of particular interest to the offshore banking, trust and financial services indush3, is
the issue of international (or foreign) tax evasion and its relationship to all crimes
anti-money laundering legislation.
In the case of Planche v Fletcher, it was noted that "no country takes notice of the
revenue laws of another". In the leading English case of Govermnent of India v
30t Ke~meth W Proctor, USA Patriot Act and Anti-Money Laundering (2003) Brh~tech
<http://www.brh~tech.com> at 10 July 2004.
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Taylor3°z it was conftrmed that the English courts will not entertain any action
brought in England to collect taxes owed to a foreign state.
The principle that ~ common law jurisdiction will not allow an action to be brought in
the courts by a foreign state to collect taxes owed to that foreign state is based upon
the fact that each country or state is sovereign, i.e. independent. It is left to individual
governments to dete~aaine with whom they wish to enter into treaties in order to assist
each other in collecting taxes. 303
The above principle represents the starting point of this aualysis, as it illustrates the
extent of co-operation between nations in respect of the collection of foreign tax.
Basically there is no co-operation unless a specific tax treaty has been signed.
However, the criminal law in a number of jurisdictions as evidenced by the number of
Tax hfformation Exchange Agreements (TIEAs) signed, has moved a long way from
this rather parochial approach, towards a global responsibility. The rationale behind
this movement is clear fi’om the OECD point of view. The OECD members who
represent the industrial and developed high tax jurisdictions of the world are very
concerned about the anaount of revenue being lost thi’ough international tax
competition and arbitration. The argument calls for anti-money laundering systems to
be utilised in the fight against tax-related crime.
Hence, the USA’s "all crimes" anti-money laundering legislation requires the
financial sector to assist combat not only the suspected laundering of money derived
from criminal conduct per se, but also money derived from tax evasion. For instance:
302 GOVermnent h~dia v Taylor [1955] AC 491, [1955] 1 All ER 292
J0~ Parkh~son and Howa~’th, above n 285, 85-9.
129
Know Your Client ("KYC") procedures involve institutions obtaining
basic information concerning each customer’s tax position
transactions that appear unusual or that, by their very nature, appear to
facilitate an unlawful evasion of tax should be investigated by the
institution
suspicion of domestic tax evasion should be repo~ed to the appropriate
money laundering investigative body (the statutory duty imposed upon an
institution to repot~ suspected tax evasion overrides the contractual duty of
confidentiality)
the money laundering authority will generally have power to share the
information it receives with other agencies, such as the revenue authorities.
304
3.3.3 OFCs nnder No Obligation to Assist in Fiscal Matters
The legality or otherwise of tax plamfing, though important, is of itself insufficient to
demand that confidentiality be preserved in relation to tax information. While some
may be uncomfol~able ~vith the argument that offshore states are under no obligation
to assist onshore states in increasing onshore coffers though tax collection offshore,
there is finn legal precedent for this. Even without the particular context of offshore
business, the international law has always recognised that the fiscal and penal matters
of one state ~vith respect to enforcement of foreign judgements and other types of
Ibid.
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international assistance should be outside the realm of another.3°5 This rule has been
followed rigorously in OFC8.306 It is also consistent with the rule on the legality of tax
avoidance measures which refrain from imposing a duty on individual voluntarily to
assist tax authorities in gaining revenue.
For example, in Stutts v Premier Benefit Capital Trust,3°7 a receiver appointed in the
United States applied for recognition in the Cayman Islands. The applicant was the
receiver of the respondent t~,ast which was registered in the Cayman Islands but
conducted its business primarily in Florida. The complaint against the trust was that it
had made sales of um’egistered securities and had engaged in a scheme to defraud
investors. The court followed the role closely:30s
The rule that the com~s of no country execute the law of another applies not
only to ... crimes ... but to all suits in favour of the State for the reeovet~ of
pecuniary penalties for any violation of statutes for the protection of its
revenue.., and to all judgements for such penalties.
Consequently, the application failed. Again, in Re Lambert and Pinto309, the rule of
non-enforcement was considered by the Supreme Court of The Bahamas, applying to
what it described as a ’principle of international acceptance’ in the interest of ’public
s05 This is illustrated itl the cases of Government btdia v Taylor [1955] AC 491, [1955] 1 All ER 292
and A-G (New Zealand) v Ortiz [1984] AC 1, [1983] 2 All ER 93, ’We do not sit to collect taxes for
another counla’y or to inflict puuislunents for it.’, Ortiz [1984] AC 1, 20, per Lord Denning
a06 According to the Articles of the Draft Declaration on Rights and Duties of States (1949) by The
international Law Commission of the UN. Article 3: Every State has the duty to refi’ain fi’om
intervention in the internal or external affairs ofauy other State.3o~ [1992-93] CILR 605. See also Clapham v Mesurier [1990-91] JLR 5., where the Jersey courts found
it had no power to enforce hi Jersey a claim by the Inland Revenue for taxes in respect of UK
legislation, even if such constituted an indh’ect clahn.
°~Stutts, 610. Relying on Wisconsin v Pelican h~surance Co [1893] AC 157
s~9 Sup Ct, Bahamas, Case No. 962 of 1986, per Strachan J.
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policy’ .310 The court rejected the narrow view of the rule that it only applies where
there is an attempt to enforce revenue or penal laws directly. It held that the rule
applies equally to attempts at indirect enforcement: in this case, a reqnest for
information to assist in the collection of taxes.31~
In fact, the enforcement of such laws may require the offshore jurisdiction to assist in
the administration of justice and to that extent it is an irrfi’ingement of sovereignty.3~a
On the same principles, offshore com~s may refuse to enforce revenne laws which
seek to expand the ten’itofial jurisdiction of a country to tax its residents and citizens
where the relevant assets are located offshore)~3
3.4 Mentality towards Money Laundering
The success of the cmnpaign against money laundering hinges on changing the social
attitudes that tend to diminish or neutralise the stigma associated with white-collar
crime. In particular, two social norms are in a state of flnx. The first of these concerns
changing ~noral perceptions about what constitutes immoral conduct within the
financial markets. This point of view by Stanley, argues that this transformation has
been dramatic. ’[It] is a critique suggesting that the temlinology associated wit
regulatory discourse nentralises "fundamental" values and suggests a version o
ethical indeterminacy.’3~4 Within the financial markets, the rise of the so called "greed
is good" mentality has narrowed the range of activities considered to be illegal.
s~o Re Lambert and Pinto, p. 16, borrowh~g the ~vords of Lord Somervell h~ Governmeut ofhtdia v
Tro,lor [1955] 1 AC 491.
~ Re Lambert and Pinto, p. 17
~ Re the Matter of H [1996] CILR 237 at 243.
~ Such as those from the US.
3~ Clu’istopher Stanley, ’Speculatiou on the Conflict of Discourse: Finance, CMme and Regulation’
(1996) 4 Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance 242.
132
Meanwlfile, changes in market operations, catalysed by changes in information
teclmology, have meant that money as a concept has become a "free-floating
signifier" devoid of real value: money emerges out of, and disappears into, thin air as
numbers appea~" and disappear on a computer screen. What has not changed, however,
has been attempts to control how the markets operate through highly complex and
technica! regulations. By their very nature, these regulations mean that violations tend
to be viewed as mere infi’actions and not as serious anti-social behaviour worthy of
condemnation through the criminal law. Four factors have reinforced tiffs trend:315
l) Practices that society would label "criminal", escape this label in financial markets
because they either represent customat2 practice or they have not yet been
subjected to regulation;
2) Criminal aetivity usually requires the identification of a victim, which is often
difficult in respect of crimes committed v~ithin the financial markets;
3) Policing teclmiques and methodologies, while improving, tend to be inadequate so
that the prosecution of an offence remains relatively rare; and
4) The transgression or circumvention of regulations may become a pleasure or
desire in itself.
Hence it is argued by Stanley that, ’The investigation of criminality in fmancial
markets travels Under a number of asinine labels and the activity of the criminal
becomes sanitised and neutralised because of this labelling.’3~6 Concepts such as
client, consumer, and victim, the ta’aditional reference points used to define the
concepts of good and bad, right and wrong, have dropped out of popular discourse to
Hi~terseer, above n 300, 28-9.
Stanley, above n 314, 250.
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be replaced by the temas risk, enterprise, and profit. The net effect has been for the
rules and regulations that operate within the financial markets to now been seen a
obstacles to be evaded as opposed to safeguards that require compliance. Therefor
the argument maintains that, ’Penalty for a transgression becomes an occnpation
risk and not subject to the discourse of criminality.’3~7 This point of view thus accept
that, to transgress and circumvent regulations is therefore increasingly acceptable.
Secondly, in the context of money lanndering, ethical indeterminacy has contribute
to the emergence among white-collar workers of a professional class of workers
specialising in the financing of unlawful activity thi’ough the intermediation of mone
laundering services.318 This class comprises bankers, lawyers, accountants, and oth
professionals who help facilitate crime by assisting in the development
implementation, and the execution of money laundering strategies. Their work h
been made easier by the very way in which money operates as a medium of exchan
money eliminates the need for bat~er by acting as a common commodity into ~vhi
goods and services can be transformed in order to purchase other goods and service
What this transposition serves to accomplish in the money laundering context is t
obscure the nefarious activity associated with the underlying crime, as the money 
"visible" but not the violence or other activity with which the criminally derived fu
are associated. Meanwhile, the same financial, legal and accounting instruments us
to lannder money are also used for legal and legitimate proposes in the form
economy. What this means is that white-collea’ professionals may find it relative
easy to create and use instruments that they regularly use in a legal find legitima
context, but in the occasional illegal and illegitimate context. This transition fi’om t
3~7 Ibid 249.
3~8 Rowan Bosworth-Davies, ’Deviant Legithnacy - A Theory of Fhmncial Crhne’ (1996) 4 Joto’nal o
Financial Crime 139.
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formal to the informal economy is made all the easier by the fact that the practical
context in which such instruments are being used may be neither clearly legal nor
illegal.3~9
3.5 The Influence of Soft La~v
The term ’soft law’, as cited previously, refers to the lack of justiciability of the
instruments in which the rules are ensln’ined, rather than to the content of the rules
themselves. An important factor which explains the role of soft law in the fight
against money laundering is the aversion to government interference that fmancial
institutions have often displayed. In some countries, money laundering was initially
fought, not tht’ough legislative meastu’es, but via codes of conduct or by regulatory
measures issued by banking supervisors. The content of a number of initiatives to
curb money laundering was thus highly influenced by the financial sector itself.320
Given the absence of a formal international legislator, it is not surprising that the
influence of soft law has been especially notable on the international level.TM The
contribution of international soft law instruments to the fight against money
laundering is impressive. One of the earliest international initiatives undertaken in the
field of money laundering was the Recommendation No.R(80)10 adopted by the
Cornn~ittee of Ministers of the Counci! of Europe on 27 June 1980 entitled Measures
against the transfer and safeguarding of the fimds of criminal origin.3~2
3~9 Hinterseer, above n 315, 28-9.
320 Stessens, above n 25, 1.5.
~ UN Economic a]td Socml Council, Colmnissio~ on Crime Prevention a~d Crhninal Justice, "Review
of Priority Themes, Control of Proceeds of Crime - Report of the Secretary-General, E/CN. 15/1993,
~enna, 13-23 April 1993, p. 14".
Stessens, above n 320, 16-7.
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The crown jewel of soft law, however, is the set of the forty recommendations issued
by the FATF on money laundering in 1990. The recommendations are no more and no
less than recormnendations: non-binding soft law. It was a deliberate choice not to
east the recommendations into the mould of a treaty. This was to avoid elaborate
ratification procedures and to allow the flexible adaptation of the recommendations,
as was donein 1996. Flexibility was also the motive behind the loose structure of the
FATF. 3~3
3.6 Broad Application Field of Anti-Money Laundering Legislation versus
the Legality Principle
According to Dressier, there are thi’ee doctrines that balance the roles of the com~s and
legislatures in making criminal law:TM
1. The principle of legality says that courts should not create new crimes.
2. The doctrine of void-for-vagueness says that legislatures have to explain what
they mean and not leave all the work up to the courts.
3. The rule of strict construction says that if a criminal law is uncertain, it shonld be
decided with a slant toward the defendant.
323 ][bid 17-8.
32~ Joshua Dressier, Cases and Materials on Crhnhtal Lmv, (3rd ed, 2003)
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From a law enforcement point of view, the broad character of anti-money laundering
legislation is necessary in order to be able to respond to the vm’ied and shifting nature
of the phenomenon of money laundering. From the defendant’s viewpoint, however,
the broad character of the legislation may be viewed as problematic in that the type of
conduct that is prohibited may be unclear or vague. This allegedly vague character
could be invoked to challenge anti-money laualdering legislation as violating the
legality principle. The principle not only imposes a ban on the retroactive introduction
of legislation but also implies a qnalitative requirement: the law should be sufficiently
clear and precise that citizens can know beforehand what type of conduct is
considered criminal.
This requirement of foreseeability can be found in the case law of the European Court
of Human Rights relating to Article 7 of the European Convention on Human
Rights.32s Although any judgement in this matter always depends of course on the
wording of the domestie law, it is questionable whether the anti-money lanndering
legislation can be held to violate the legality principle on the ground that it does not
’provide effective safeguards against arbitrary prosecution, conviction and
punishment’.326 As an example, the Swiss Supreme Court has ruled that Swiss anti-
money laundering legislation does not violate the legality principle, as it allows
citizens to assess the consequences of their actions.327 The mere fact that a very
substantial number of economic activities may be construed as transgressing the law
does in itself not constitute a breach of the legality prineiple: the clarity of a definition
of an offence should not be confused with nan’owness. The same can be said in
European Court of Human Rights, judgment of 22 November 1995, SW v. United Kingdom, Series-
No. 335-A, para 34-6.
’,’~Ibid, para 34.
ATF 119 IV 242.
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respect of the fact that - at least under some domestic legislation - the laundering of
the proceeds of any criminal activity is regarded as criminal, which considerably
widens the application field of a law which is in the first place directed towards third
persons not involved in the predicate offence.328
3.7 The Regulatory Challenge
It has been observed by Kapstein that, ’In some respects it is ironic that banking is
characterised as a global industry, for no sector of the economy is so heavily regulated
by domestic authorities.’ 329 Money launderers have the ability to simultaneously
operate in several different markets and countries. Regulators, meanwhile, have
jurisdiction over a set number of markets within a defined geographical area or state
Criminal entrepreneurs can wire money by taking advantage of OFCs secrecy laws 
speeds limited only by the ability to communicate info~xnation fi’om one place to
another. Regulators, however, can move only as fast as pe~xnitted by their bureaucrati
and administrative maclfinery and may therefore not be able to breach these countries
secrecy laws for years.
Technological innovation has created new opportunities for not only entrepreneurs33°,
but also money launderers as it has helped to catalyse the globalisation and financi
markets integration processes and consequently has expanded the scope, complexity
32~ Stessens, above n 322, 126-8.
329 Ethan Kapstein, Governing the Global Economy: htternational Finance and the State (1996) 17.
330 Part of the regulatmy challenge is illush’ated by the minor financial crisis that involves Susse
Futures, a derivatives trading specialist. On August 10, 1999, fl~e Financial Se~wices Authority in
London had to intervene in the company’s affahz because on Augnst 6, 1999, one of the company’s
traders incma~d losses of £750,000 in less titan 30 milmtes of trading. The incident i!lush’ates th
liquidity in the contemporary financial markets and how fast h’aders can get into both positive an
negative trading positions. Vincent Boland, "Trading in UK Gilts under Scrt~tiny", Financial Times, 1
Augnst 1999.
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aud rate at which finaneial transactions can be condueted. For money launderers,
improvements in technology have made it easier for them to qniekly and cheaply
move financial assets around regulatory obstaeles, to divert their movement through
various secreey jurisdictions, and to shuffle legal title among a number of different
legal entities. The net effect has been to make it more difficult to for regulators not
only to track the flow of laundered money, but also to identify when, in the first place,
a crime has been committed. Of course, the problems for regulators, reach fat" beyond
the unlawful activities of individuals, as teelmological imrovation has fundmnentally
transformed the very nature of the financial markets.
Associated with the processes of globalisation and integration wit!fin the financial
markets has been the process of deregnlation. As a process, deregulation has broken
down the barriers that have traditionally separated commereial from investment
banking activities and led to the formation df financial conglomerates that engage in
both. As a side effect to the deregulatory process the intemaediation function
traditionally performed by banks is now being performed by a broader range of
financial institutions like pension funds, mutual funds, and insurance companies. In
turn, each sueh institution has its own unique characteristics to which regulators must
respond. 33~
As in the case of international tax competition, the allocative effects of international
tax arbitrage depend on the degree of substitutability--specifically, in the latter
context, the substitutability of transactional forms (tax considerations aside). Some of
33~ Hh~terseer, above n 319, 332-5.
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the tax-avoidance literature 332 identifies two broad categories of substitutable
transactions noted earlier in the context of tax competition. Again, the policy
relevance of the distinction between the categories lies principally in the different
efficiency effects. The first category consists of those transactions that are perfect or
nearly perfect substitutes in the sense that any differences in non-tax considerations
are non-existent or minimal. More particularly, instances of perfect substitutability
arise where equivalent cash flows associated with substitutable transactional forms are
taxed inconsistently, so that repackaging lowers the associated tax burden without
sacrificing the desired pattern of cash flows. Where two transactions of this type are
taxed differently, the lower-taxed form may be chosen over the higher-taxed foma
with little or no sacrifice of non-tax attributes. These instances of "pure" tax
avoidance typically involve "purely paper transactions’’333 that attempt to arbitrage
differences in tax treatment without altering the desired pattern of cash flows
associated with a particular transaction.334
Thus the number of participants within the financial markets increases, competition
among participants has intensified. Financial institutions have expanded overseas to
diversify theh’ sources of income and to increase the scale and efficiency of their
operations. In pm~icular, financial institutions have sought to develop value-added
products and services on which greater fees and commissions can be earned. They
have also sought to offer these products and services within a greater range of
countries and to a ~vider range of clients in order to create a more robust revenue
~3z See, for example, Michael Brooks and John Head, "Tax Avoidance: In Economics, La\v and
Pnblic Choice," in Graeme S. Coope~3 ed., Tea" Avoidance andtheRule of Law (1997), 53-9t. See also
Joseph E Stiglitz, "The General Theory of Tax Avoidance" (1985) 38 National Tax Journal 325-37;
and Myron S Scholes, Mark A Wolfson, Merle Erickson, Edward L Maydew, and Ten’y Shevlh~, Tares
and Bush~ess Strategy: A Plamth~g Approach, (2"a ed, 2002).
33~ Brooks and Head, above n 332, 65.3~ Edgar, above n 270, 1103.
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streams. At the same time, regulatory arbitrage, especially tin’ough OFCs, has been
used to mi~ffmise capital costs by structuring and executing transactions through
jurisdictions that have more relaxed reserve and regulatory requirements. Invariably,
however, these flexible regulatory jurisdictions also have domestic laws that support
financial secrecy, which complicates supe~wision of financial institutions. 335
3.8 Tax Competition and Money Laundering
Tax systems need to cope with increasingly mobile tax bases internationally.
Advances in communication techilologies, ongoing developments in complex,
im~ovative financial instruments, and the expansion of tax havens and preferential
"niche" regimes designed to attract mobile capital, particularly financial capital, are
creating horizontal ineqflities between taxpayers and producing a misallocation of
capital. Governments may find themselves competing for these mobile activities, but
this is different from the sort of tax competition over generally applied tax rates that
has been the subject of the economics literature.336 One point of view is that, tax
competition can be beneficial, both by restricting tendencies towards excessive
goverrmaent spending and by providing individuals with a choice between locations
according to their desired level of public provision. In the absence of tax competition,
tax levels would be set optimally.337 In effect, tiffs model challenges the proposition
that tax levels would necessarily be calibrated to maximize the welfare of residents or
factors of production in tire presence of an incentive for public officials to increase the
~s Hh~terseer, above n 331, 335.
~3s Alexander Haupt and Wolfgang Peters, ResO’icting Preferential Too: Regimes to Avoid Harn~d Ta,;
Competition (2004) Institutional Design of Federal Systems: Theo~3’ and Emph’ical Evidence (SPP
~ 142) <htrp’//www zei de/federalism/index.htnfl> at 10 July 2004.
M~chael Keen, ’Preferential Reghnes Can Make Tax Competition Less Harmful (2001) 54 National
Tax Journal 757-62.
size of the public sector. Tax competition is considered to act as a constraint on such
self-interested behaviour and thus is seen as efficiency e~hancing. Ideally, tax levels
should be driven down to the point at which the marginal cost equals the marginal
benefit to taxpayers.338 However, this reasoning does not hold for tax competition that
is non-transparent or discriminatory, or where it facilitates illegal tax abuses that
enable companies or individuals to reduce .their tax liability without actually moving
their residence away fi’om a jurisdiction with high pnblic provision.339
The OECD makes a usefid distinction between tax competition in the form o
generally applicable lower tax rates and tax regimes designed to attract foreign
investors. Restricting tax competition should not and catmot mean that voters in
democratic countries lose their right to determine the size of the public sector tin’ough
general tax increases or reductions. But it does mean that countries should not provide
windfalls for foreign investors at the expense of the ability of other countries to
provide those pnblic services wlfich their residents desire. Such limitations are
particularly appropriate because those foreign investors themselves often reside i
countries providing a high level of public services and yet refnse to pay the tax pric
that providing such services entails.
The view that depending on the OECD for solving the tax competition probl
suffers fi’om one major drawback: Developing countries are left out and may percei
the OECD as a cartel of rich countries operating at their expense. But it is unlike
that general tax competition benefits developing countries, who need the tax reven
they give up to attract foreign investors. If all developing countries could be prevent
33~ Edgar, above n 334, 1107.
339 "Tax m~d the Economy: A Comparative Assessment of OECD Countries", Tax Policy Studies No. 
Organisation for Economic Co-operatlon and DevelopmenL 2001, p.21
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fi-om competing in this fashion, they all could gain¯ In the longer run, it is considered
that, the need for global standm’ds and the fight against harmful tax competition could
become part of the World Trade Organization’s agenda, or even requh’e a new "world
tax organization," in which developing countries are adequately represented.34° It is
believed that this would also solve the problem of what to do about the 15 percent of
multinationals who are not headquartered in OECD member countries, a percentage
that can be expected to grow if the OECD indeed moves to restrict tax competition for
341its multmatmnals.
The facilitating role played by OFCs in money laundering may be overstated. Blum,
Levi, Naylor and Williams make the point in their study on OFCs prepared for the
United Nations that "Money laundering can proceed very easily without bank secrecy;
in fact, it may well be that launderers avoid it precisely because it acts as a red
flag.’’342 In fact what may be more problematic are corporate secrecy laws and other
obstacles that exist alongside bank secrecy laws, as these act as an associated set of
confidentiality provisions. After all, to pierce bank secrecy laws in order to identify a
company based in an OFC being used to launder money is of little help if the
individuals who stand betfind that company cannot be identified.343 In their words:344
It is not that most haven countries seek drag money or any other type of assets
derived from serious crime. Rather they literally cannot afford to co-operate
~-~Vito Tanzi, ’Is There a Need for a World Tax Orgimization?’ in A Razin and E Sadka (eds), The
Economics of Globalization: Policy Perspectives From Public Economist (1999)3,~ Reuven S Avi-Yonab, ’World-Class Tax Evasion’ (2000) 11 The American Prospect.
3~ Jack Blum, Michael Levi, Thomas Naylor, and Phil Williams, "Financial Havens, Banking Secrecy
and Money Laundering", A Study Prepared on Behalf of fl~e United Nations Office for Drag Control
and Crhne Prevention Under the Auspices of fl~e Global Programme Against Money Laundering,
WWw.imoliu.org, 1998, p. 27.
3~3 Ibid.
~" lbid 28.
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too closely .... It is popular to decry the operation of such financial havens,
and it is certainly true that they can have a harmful effect, particularly in terms
of facilitating tax evasion and secondarily as places that foster money
laundering. It is however necessary to show some understanding of their
positions, their economic vulnerability and their lack of alteruafive resources.
In the field of drug control, the major consuming countries are willing to
research and finance alternative development programmes for producing
countries. Therefore, it should be possible to imagine alternative economic
development solutions for such financial havens, developed in conjunction
with tire world business community.
Certainly, the developed countries, along with all other countries that are keen to
ensure that the global economic system operates in a manner whereby abusive
financial practices are minlmised, have legitimate concerns about the questionable
activities facilitated by OFCs. These concerns are all the more important to address
given the contemporary interconnectedness of the financial markets and the problem
can be spread quickly throughout the financial system. Cm~ainly, withou
international organisations like the FATF, OECD, and FSF to push reform, th
policies facilitated by OFCs ~vould tend to proliferate rather than be curtailed. From
an OFC perspective, hmvever, the crux of the problem is that the financial services
indust~3, is an industry that can be mobilised in support of sustainable development. In
particular, financial services are a gro~vth industry, a skilled industry, an industry tha
suppress the transfer of s~ills and teelmology, and an industry that is not premised on
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tl~e exploitation of the environment. In this respect, further comments by Oxfam are of
note’. 345
Widespread conce~aa about the offshore problem has given rise to a number of
international iuitiatives .... These initiatives are useful up to a point, but they
primarily reflect the concerns of Northern governments. They lack a
developlnent perspective and can also be accused of being unbalal~ced. The
issue of financial havens goes beyond tile ’offshore’ activity of small island
states to ’onshore’ activity in major economics such as the City of London and
New York.
Consequently, Oxfam advocates an integrated global approach. Such an approach
would help to address the "unfi’eedoms" discussed.by Amartya Sen346 and would
involve the provision of technical and other assistance to help OFCs diversify away
from dependence on financial se~wices, especially secrecy se~wices. The FATF, FSF,
and OECD have recog~fsed the need for such assistance. The important point is that
to address the issues posed by OFCs, development issues such as training, resourcing
and tectmology, need to be taken into account.347
Alldridge asserts that the events of 11 September 2001 provided the impetus for a
further shift in the focus of money laundering control to consider the means by which
te~Torism is financed. The expression ’laundering’ was continually applied to the
346~naltya Se ,
re~noval of"unfreedoms", which includes the unfi’eedoms associated with tyramly, pove~, CO~TUption,
and other obstacles that contribute to social deprivation. Amm~ya Sen, Development as Freedom (2001)
3.347 flinterseer, above n 335,232-3.
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means by which terrorist organisations were financed. The use of the pejorative
expression was doubtless deliberate. The analytical truth is that funding for ten’~rism
is either itself f~om the prt)fits of crime, in which case it is c6vered already, or it is not,
in which case the seizure of money intended for te~a’orist use, when no action has been
taken towards its deploymeut, smacks of ’thought-crime’ and does not fall withi
traditionally accepted notions of laundering, becanse the ~noney is clear in the first
place. Similarly, the introduction of closer molfitoring of suspected bank accounts by
financial information orders had already been put in place, so far as concerns the
accounts of persons suspected of involvement in terrorism. Somehow, however, the
more widespread introduction of these laws was presented as being a necessary
response to the attacks.348 In tiffs case the legislation probably would have occurre
anyway, and the attacks simply provided a convenient issue by reference to wlfich t
overcome any oppogition on civil liberties grounds.349
3.9 Conclusion
In this chapter, the issues of tax competition, tax arbitrage aud money laundering wer
examined as two of the policy drivers of the OECD, FATF and FSF. Tax evasion a
money laundering law as a problematic issue, is a creature and has become the moto
of international co-operation in financial surveillance. The development of mone
laundering law has been driven by international organisations, and it has blun’ed 
removed many distinctions that previously were considered sacred. Banking secrec
has been broken down and far greater international co-operation put in place. The U
has been one of the driving forces behind many of the initiatives in th
~ ’G7 approves plan to choke ten’or fimds’, The G~¢ardian, 26 September 2001349 Alldridge, above n 260, 23.
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internationalisation of criminal law.35° The denial of certification involves foreign
assistance sanctions and a mandatory US vote against multilateral development bank
351 The US holds greater sway at the OECD, the World Bank anti the IMF thanleans.
at the United Nations: developments ha international effm~s against laundering which
come fi’om the former are more likely to bear a US imprimatur than those from the
latter. The principal moving forces have been the IMF, the World Bank, and, in
particular, the FATF. Because of its jurisdiction over mm’kets, the European Union
has been a central player. Money Laundering law is a microcosm within which the
recomqguration of national sovereignty and criminal justice is taking place.3~2
On a legislative level, international ha~waonisation of anti-money laundering
legislation is an absolute prerequisite for success in the fight against money
laundering. This holds not only for criminal legislation, but also in the context of
preventive legislation, where the argument for effectiveness is reinforced by an
economic argument, namely the desirability of imposing the same type of anti-money
laundering measures on financial institutions in different countries with a view to an
international levelling of the playing field. 353 On an operational level, the
globalisation of money laundering makes it necessary to establish effective
international co-operation mechanisms which allow national authorities to co-operate
in the prevention and prosecution of money laundering and in international ’proceeds-
3s0 For example, coreaptinn, as to wlfich see Peter Alldridge, ’Reforming the Crinlinal Law of
Con’uption’ (2001) 11 Criminal Law Forum 287.
~51 Jhmuy Gm’ul6, ’The 1988 UN Convention against illicit traffic in narcotic drugs nnd psychotropie
substances - a ten year perspective: is international co-operation merely illusm~’ (1988) 22(74)
Fordham International Lcav Journal 87
~ United Nations Economic and Social Council, Conunission on Crime Prevention and Crhninal
Justice, Review of Priority Themes, Control of Proceeds of Crhne-Report of the Secretary-General,
Vienna, E/CN.1511993, 13-23 April 1993, p. 18.
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hunting’.354 At the heart of the matter lies the issue of sovereignty. While this concept
undeniably allows every state to draft its legislation according to its own will, it might
also be argued that a corollat3~ of this concept is that no state should assist citizens of
another state in the violation of the laws of their home countries.355
On the asstanption that broad international coordination of corporate income tax
systems is not feasible, or even desirable, in the short to the medium term, the obvious
policy inquiry is the consideration of more limited forms of coordination that could be
adopted as a response to inten~ational tax competition and international tax arbitrage.
Such responses should be target-efficient in the sense that they address the defined
policy problem presented by these two processes. It is argued in this section that the
OECD and EU proposals to address international tax competition, as well as some
proposals in the literature, can be criticised as over-inclusive, both in their definition
of the policy problem presented by tiffs process and in the proposed responses to the
perceived problem. In contrast, the limited responses to inte~aational tax arbitrage that
have been adopted to date are generally under-inclusive in each of these two respects.
In suggesting possible responses to international tax competition and international tax
arbitrage, it is accepted that the conditions do not exist for radical reform of the
current allocation of taxing jurisdiction and the division of revenue from ct’oss-border
transactions. Indeed, it is not clear that the status quo needs to be disturbed to any
354 M. Ctierif Bassiouni and David S. Guattieri, "International and National Responses to the
Gtobalisation of Money Launderh~g", Responding to Money Laundering: htternational Perspectives, ed.
Ernesto U. Savona, (1997) 109.355 Stessel~s, above n 328, 94-5.
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significant extent, at least in the development of an effective response to international
356
tax competlt~on and international tax arblt~age.
!~a element of the status quo is the role of low-tax jurisdictions as facilitators of tax-
driven choices of investment location and the transactional fo~an for such investment.
As described in the existing literature, these jurisdictions may be either tax havens
offering a general low-tax environment or jurisdictions that have a lfigh-tax
e~wiro~maent but offer low-tax treatment for selected investments. Commentators have
consistently recognized the need to block access to these low-tax jurisdictions. To
date, that goal has been pursued tba’ough a combination of the application of CFC
regimes, thin capitalization regimes, and anti-avoidance rules and doctrines found in
domestic law and tax treaties.357
The challenges brought about by the supranational directives in regards to tax
competition and money laundering have been analysed fi~ this chapter in the global
perspective mad which now lead on to the shift in focus to the current issues of
confidentiality and exchange of iufo~aation between independent sovereign states
including the OFCs.
ee, generally, International Fiscal Association, Limits on the Use of Lon,-Tax Regtmes by
~hdtinational Businesses: Current Measures and Emergfl~g Trends, Cahiers de droit fiscal
mternatlonal, vol. 86b (2001).
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Chapter 4: Offshore Confidentiality and Exchange of Information
4.l Introduction
Chapter 3 analysed the regulatory and soft law response to the increase in harmful tax
competition and money laundering. It addressed harmful tax practices and money
laundering. This chapter focuses on the corollary issues of confidentiality and exchange
of information and how OFCs are expected to respond.
Confidentiality is an important common denominator in all of the various subjects of
offshore law. Yet it has become an important subject of its own, grounded in a body of
uniqae legal prineiples. Indeed, so frequent has been litigation on confidentiality in
offshore law, that a definable body of jurisprudence now exists. Its intricate parameters
and limits may be identified through case law, legislation, treaties, and statements of
public policy.
This chapter analyses the challenges to confidentiality which reflect the transnational
nature of offshore banking. Accordingly, mutual legal assistance, worldwide restraint
orders and the tensions posed by conflicting national interests, particularly when assessed
in the light of comity. Not far fi’om that, is the issue of sovereignty and issues of private
international law.
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Confidentiality in OFCs operates within a new paradigm. Disclosure initiatives, anti-
money laundering regnlations, emerging rules on the enforcement of foreign tax la~vs,
tax-avoidance and now issues of terrorism have forced reforms to the law of
confidentiality. Thus, the international and public policy issues which seek to erode and
undermine confidentiality in offshore jurisdictions are analysed. So too are the areas of
the FATF’s concerns on money laundering and the OECD’s allegation of ’unfair tax
competition’ raised in Chapter Two.358
Both organisations have produced ’blacklists’359 of uncooperative jurisdictions in their
efforts to secare commitments. A raft of anti-money laundering statutes and practitioner
guidance regulations have come into force. This reqnires clients purchasing offshore
companies to provide sufficient information for verification of the identity, source of
fumts and nature of business to satisfy due diligence and know your client (KYC)
requirements .360
Onshore courts such as that of US and UK, often display hostility to the efforts of
offshore courts (such as the Bahamas and Cook Islands) to protect confidentiality.36~ On
358 Autoine, above n 265, vii.
359 Tile blacklists cau be found in FATF’s Annual Review of Non-Cooperative Countries or Territories
(Paris: FATF, 2003) between 2001 and 2003, four reviews hra,e been produced thus fat’. OECD’s ’Harmfi
Tax Practice’ project began with the report Hartl~d Tax Competition: An Emerging Global lssue (1998
OECD) wbere recommendations were made to reduce harmful tax corapetiliolt. In the years 2000, 2001 and
2004, progress reports \vere made, listiug couutries which did not coraply to tile recoramendations raade in
the 1998 report, updatiug tbeir efforts and status (by dropping tbera from tile list shralld tile cramta’ies and
territories have taken steps towards eliutinating harmful tax corapetitlon). The latest is the review report in
2004, The OECD’s Project on Harn~d T(a" Practices: The 2004 Progress Report (2004 OECD). All
reports can be found on tile websites of FATF and OECD.
3NOffshore Incorporations Liraited, ’Due Diligence, Kuow Your Client Requiremeuts and the Changin
Face of Corapliauce’ (2002) Offshore Feature <http://~wv.offshol’e-inc.com> at 3 Noveraber 2003.
36t Referriug to Federal Trade Colranission v. Affordable Media, CV-S-98-669-LDG(RLH) (D. Nev.
1998)(ofteu referred to as tile "Anderso~l" case), tile Andersons \vel’e named as civil defendauts by tile F
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the other hand, offshore cou~s seem preoccupied in protecting confidentiality save in
blatant cases of criminal wrongdoing. Indeed, it would appear that onshore courts are
prepared to jettison ~vell-established principles in conflict of laws to extend their reach
ilato offshore jurisdictions. Consequently, the sovereignty of nations and their legal
systems is becoming increasingly insecure.
There is concelal that onshore courts and international bodies are attempting to disto~t the
application of well-k!xown legal rules in offshore jurisdictions in order to defeat
confidentiality. For exmnple, questions of tax, trust law and huma~a rights are approached
differently where offshore jurisdictions are involved in order to effect disclosure of
financial information. Further, the respect paid to confidentiality in onshore jurisdictions
as evident in blocking laws and informational privacy law contrasts greatly with the
approach to confidentiality in offshore jurisdictions. Antoine asserts that it is tempting to
conclude that these differences have more to do with public policy concerus rather than
strict legal logic.362
Despite the judicial and other assaults, confidentiality in offshore la~v continues to be
instrumental in shaping offshore finance. The claim that crime is generally protected or
even dominant in offshore centres is analysed and exposed as erroneous although it is
conceded that confidentiality can be abused and the limits must be set for it. Indeed, it is
argued that if the integrity of confidentiality is to be maintained, it will be necessary to
claiming the Andersons were connected with an alleged $50 millio~ ffaudute~t investment scheme. In the
Coarse of the proceediogs the existe~ce of the t~’ust surfaced a~d the judge ordered the Andersous to
~6epatriate $1.3 nfillion of trust funds to the U.S.
2 Antoiue, above u 358, viii.
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define more clearly the boundary between criminal activity and merely undesirable
activity (fi’om the perspective of onshore jurisdictions), such as tax avoidance and privacy
interests.363
What differentiated legal fi’om illegal activity is the intention with which an act is
committed. This concept lies at the heart of the actus tea and mens t’ea distinction made
by the criminal law, and is useful to higblight a dichotomy that concerns the use of
financial secrecy services. Although secrecy may be the badge of fraud and financial
secrecy services may be used to sbelter unlawful activity, such services are also used by
businesses for legal and legitimate purposes. In other words, the same legal, financial,
and accounting instruments that shield informal economic activity also contribute to the
growth and evolution of the formal economy. When the use of financial secrecy services
supports the pursuit of questionable business practices, when the abuse of such services
creates economic hardship, and when such services support graft and corrnption, in other
~vords, when secrecy is used as a badge of fraud, action needs to be taken. However, it is
argued that the regulatory apparatus imposed by the state must be able to differentiate
legal use fi’om illegal abuse of financial secrecy services in a mam~er that does not
impose significant compliance costs and competitive disadvantage on those who provide
and use such services in a legal and legitimate manner.364
363 Ibid.
3~ A view also expressed by the Interl3atio~3al Orga~iisatio~3 of Securities Cot3maissions. See International
Organisation of Securities Conunissions, Report on Money La~tndering, ~vww.oecd.org/fatfflOSCO, 7 July
1998.
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There is a plethora of compliance requirements being imposed by govermnents to control
~noney lanndering and the concern expressed by the private sector regarding the
associated compliance costs.365 These compliance requirements are considerable and
have been imposed in an expanding manner on financial institutions and service
providers in related industries because tbey are seen to be in the optimal position to
ascertain whether money launderers and criminals are abusing the economic system.
Financial institutions certainly recognise the need to prevent abusive financial practices.
The cballeuge for the regulators, however, is to implement an effective, but economical
prevention and detection system. In particular, Hinterseer argues that this system ought to
be able to differentiate suspicions fi’om legitimate transactions without unduly burdening
fiaancial institutions with regulatory requirements aad compliaace costs, and without
alienating clients fi’om their relationships with the financial institutions with whom they
do business. The counterpart to this challenge is, namely the challenges associated with
regulating the development and implementation of such a system from the perspective of
regulatory agencies.366
Certain countries attach particularly great importance to the exchange of information.
That is the case iu particular with the United States and Canada, but also of European
Countries, which may base this administrative co-operation, not only on bilateral
conventions, but also on directives under European Commnnity la~v, or even on a
multilateral convention signed within the framework of the Council of Europe. Germany,
~s Donato Masciandro and Umbe~o Filotto, ’Money Lanndering Regnlation and Bank Compliance Costs.
What Do Yonr Customers I~aow? Economics and Italian Experience’ (2001) 5 Jonrnal of Money
Laundetqt~z Cot11~’o1133-145.
J~ Hinters~er, above n 347, 283-284.
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Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France and the Netherlands in particular have agreed wi
each other on autolnatic exchange of information.367
On the other hand, Switzerland maintains a reserved attitude vis-~.-vis the exchange of
information on the basis of taxation conventions, limiting this to the information required
for application of the conventions, except in the convention it concluded in 1996 with the
United States, which allows the transmission of information needed for prevention of tax
fi’aud offences and similar acts, without being limited by banking secrecy. However, by
virtue of the domestic law authorising international legal aid, the Swiss police authorities
may forward information, without being limited by professional secrecy rules, when the
object of the foreiga proceedings giving rise to the request for information has been
characterised as tax fi’aud.368
4.2 Swiss Concept of Offshore Confidentiality
The statutory model, being the model of offshore confidentiality familiar worldwide
today, was conceptualised by the Swiss. They are also responsible for the birth of the
OFCs. As the Swiss model remains the archetype of the offshore financial centre, its laws
will be outlined in order to examine the main features of offshore confidentiality.369
Although Switzerland is more closely identified with banking confidentiality laws, th
367 Brian J Aruold and Patrick Dibout, "General Report" Cashiers De Droit Fiscal h~ternational, l"olmne
LXXXIqb, Limits on the use of lon,-tax regimes by multinational businesses: era’rent meas~n’es and
emerging trends (2001) 80.
36s Ibid.
~69 Switzerland is still a world leader in offshore business. Europe accounts for 60% of offshore banking
business, while Switzerlaud claims 35% of the share of offshore busiuess on its own. Further,
approximately one third of the world’s private wealth is invested offshore; ’The Race for Riches’ (1993) 3
The Banker 42.
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duty of confidentiality is not confined to the banking sector. Rather, it is but one aspect of
a general right to financial privacy under the Swiss Civil Code (1907 Switzerland).
Specifically, the obligation of banking confidentiality arises from three legal principles:
1. the right to personal privacy;
2. the contractual relationship between customer and banks;37° and
3. specific statutory provisions governing banking confidentiality.37t
In addition, penal and administrative sanctions apply to breaches of banking
confidentiality. Most notably, the Swiss Banking Law, article 47 makes breach of
banking confidentiality a crime.372
The Swiss concept of confidentiality has been imported into offshore countries. In tire
majority of offshore jurisdictions, the confidentiality obligation has been codified.373 The
enactmeut of such legislation se~wes to extend the obligation of confidentiality from being
merely contractual to being statutory and may be enforced by both criminal and civil
sanctions. In addition, third pa~ties outside the relationship of banker and client may be
liable for breaches of tiffs dnty of confidentiality. In the few offshore countries where
37~ Swiss Civil Code, Art 398. The agent is obligated, in general, to use the same care as tire employee
under an employment tonga’act. Affirmed by the S~viss Federal Tribunal in 1937:63 Arr~ts du Tribunal
F~d~ral Swiss II 242, 16 September 1937.
~7~ Federal Law Relating to Banks and Saving Banks, Recueil Syst6matique du Droit F~d6ral (amended
1934, 1991), 952 (the Swiss Ba~fldng Law), Art 47 (Official Collection of Federal Laws and Regulations
1971 at 808).
3~ lbid, Breaches of privacy under art 28 also qualify as a tort.
~ By statures as the Confidential Relationships (Preservation) Law 1979, rev’d 1999 (Cayman Islands)
(~R(P)L), the Confide ~t al Relationsh ps Act 1985 (St Kitts), the Ba~tk aud Financial Institutions Act 1995(elize), Offshore Baoldng Act 1996 (Belize) and the International Business Companies Act t996 (Belize),
the Confidential Relationships Preservation (I~dernational Finance) Act 1996, No 17 of St Viucent and the
Grenadines and the Banks and Trust Conrpanies Regulation Act 2000 (Bahamas), recently revised from tire
1980 stature.
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confidentiality has not been upgraded by codification under separate confidentiality
statues, such as in the British Virgin Islands, St Lucia and Barbados, it should still b
viewed differently fi’om its pedigree. This is because in an offshore financial context, as a
legal principle or policy, confidentiality, ~vhatever its trappings, assumes a peculiar and
more important focus and thrust which is clqarly lacking elsewhere.374
Thus, typically, when it concerns a duty of confidentiality in offshore matters, it is this
extended concept which is being addressed. As the majority of offshore countries have
also inherited common law principles on bank confidentiality, the offshore confidentiality
concept is a good example of the hybrid nature of offshore legal concepts. The common
law and civil law foundations of the confidentiality principle have been merged to creat
a strong statutory model with an important policy focus. This is a unique lega
phenomenon.
The term ’offshore’ has become synonymous with jurisdictions enforcing such rigi
confidentiality laws. The increased demand for financial confidentiality laws ha
374 Indeed, the Confidential Relatim~ships Preservafion (laLternational Finance) Act 1996, s 3(1) of 
Vincent and tbe Grenadines specifically states that file ’public policy of tile state is to protect and prese~’
... confidentiality’. Although hL these countries there are no separate confidentiality statures there are
confidenfiality provisions in individual legislation snch as tl~e Banks and trust Companies Act 1990, am’
(BV1), tile International Trusts Act 1999 (St Lucia), s 61, the Registered agellts and trustee Licensees Ac
1999 (St Lucia), s 25 (ho\vever, the duty here is not general but is directed at the Director, his agent or aa
ageut of the Financial Centre Corporation - the regnlatory authority) and the Banks Act 1999 (St Lucia), 
19. The orighmt s 24 of the Ba~tks and Trust Companies Act 1990 (BVI) had a provision stipulating tbat a
hfformation disclosed to tbe Inspector, Registrar or Director of FinmLcial Services was ’absolutel
privileged’. The new s 24, ho~vever, provides for ’gateways’ to disclosure enable foreign regntator
autborifies to obtain information in strictly defined circumstances.
157
corresponded to the marked expansion in the number of foreign owned banks operating
in such secrecy havens.37s
.3 Three Arguments about the Financial Secrecy Laws
Given the scrutiny financial secrecy laws and selwices have recently come under, both
those commercial participants who trade in, and those governments that use such services
to promote economic development, have drawn on various arguments that support the
existence of such laws. Here, tln’ee arguments are noted. First financial secrecy laws are
said to protect private assets from wrongfal expropriation by public authorities.376
Wherever a minority is subject to persecution by the majority, as exemplified by the Jews
in Nazi Germany, this rationale finds justification. In fact, this type of argument was
~ecently advanced by USA House Representative Ron Paal in his criticism of the
hlternational Counter Money Laundering and Foreign Anticorruption Act 2000.377 This
act gives significant discretionary powers to the Secretary of the Treasury to take action
against other countries, foreign financial institutions, and classes of financial transaction
that are identified to be a "primary money laundering concern". As Representative Paul
obsetn,es in criticism of the act:37s
Antoine, above 363, 23-25.
Dennis Campbell, h~ternational BankSecreey (1992) viii.
The Office of U.S. Representative Ron Paul, ’Paul Rene\vs Fight for Banking Privacy: Proposed
" ’ ’ (Press Release, Jnly 19, 2000).eg~slatton Grants Dangerous Power to Federal Regulators
Ron Paul, Opening Statemeut HR 3886 International Counter Money Laundering Act and Foreign
Aa~tieorn~ption Act of 2000 (2000) House Committee on Fhmncial Services (Speech delivered at the
Dornestie and International Monetary Policy Subconunittee Markup).
<http:llfinanclalse~vices.house.govlbankiug16800pan.htm> at 24 October 2003.
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Bank secrecy itself is not necessarily indicative of a crime ... Bank secrecy is an
important way for individuals to protect themselves - and possibly have the
resources to save themselves and their loved ones. Enacting this bill into law in
the 1930s would have been the equivaleut of a death sentence to Jews in the Nazi
era just as it ~vould threaten those persecuted individuals now relying on bank
secrecy.
The treatment of a minority within a given geo-political area is a domestic political issue
upon which most internatioual participants are encouraged to remain silent. Northern
h’eland and the activities of the Irish Republican Army are an example. Depending on the
individual’s position, money laundering secvices either help to support a legitimate
partisan struggle against a foreign oppressor, or to finance a terrorist organisation that
relies on various criminal activities to support its operations. Similarly, take the example
of tax avoidance and evasion. Many claim that financial secrecy laws provide a usefid
and important means by which financial assets may be sheltered fi’om unfair taxation.
The tax-evader is merely a "revolution for free enterprise" who refuses to abide by
inefficient government regulation. Contemporary international consensus that harmful tax
practices need to be addresses has created fi~rther pressure to do away with "bank secrecy
statutes as a factor in international finance". This consensus is typified by the fact that in
the USA consideration is being given to classifijing tax offences as money laundering
predicate offences.379 The point remaius, however, that financial secrecy laws have fi’om
379 United States Department of the Treasnry a~d United State~ Department of Jnstice, The National Money
Lattndering Si~’ategyfor 2000 (2000) <http://\wwv.treas.gov> at 3 November 2003.
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time to time helped individuals protect their wealth and assets fi’o~n unjust expropriation
by repressive regimes.
Second, financial confidentiality merely forms part of the professional relationship
between a banker and his/her client and should be accorded the same rights and privileges
associated with other professional relationships like doctor-patient and lawyer-client.38°
The traditional rationale used to justify the existence of privacy rights that attach to these
~lationships concerns the need to protect the private affairs of the individual fi’om
unwarranted third party scrutiny.
Medical privacy is a manifestation of the highly personal nature of health related issues.
Legal privilege, meanwhile, is not only a corollary of the rights of counsel and protection
against self-incrimination, but also a reflection of the adversarial nature of the jndicial
system. Similarly, banker-client confidentiality is premised on the highly personal nature
of each individual’s finaucial affairs and the right of the individual to use his/her financial
~esources in a manner he/she deems to be appropriate.
It is of note, however, that the sanctity of each of these relationships is subject to
exceptions. The relationship of lawyer-client is subject to a requirement that the
relationship should not be used to shield unlawful activity; a requirement which certainly
should also be applied to the banker-client relationship. The purpose of such confidential
relationships after all is to protect the intimate details of the individual’s activities from
Campbell, above n 376, vii.
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unwan’anted examination and not to enable an individual to pursued activities that will
deliberately cause harm to others.
A balance needs to be struck between the right of the individual to pursue his / her affairs
in private and the right of the state to investigate suspected criminal activity.
Conseqnently, the individual’s right to deploy his / her financial resources as he / she
deems appropriate should be protected fi’om unwarranted third patty scrutiny so long as
the particular activity pursue is legal. The basis of the relationship between a banl~er and
his / her client is one of contractual confidentiality, but there are exceptions, as overriding
legal obligation and express or implied consent by the client.381 The money launderin
provisions that have been put in place over recent years have radically altered the
relationship between banker and client because they do represent such an overriding
obligation. The reporting provisions have the effect, under certain conditions, of creating
for the banker an entirely different relationship with his / her client, no longer as
confidant, bnt as police informant.382
Third, financial secrecy can be regarded as a fundamental right. Civil libertarians might
argue that just as an individual’s sexnal preferences and religion orientations should be
protected from discrimination, an individual’s financial affairs ought to be protected fi’om
unwarranted third party scrutiny. Hinterseer argues that according to the principle of self-
determination, an individual ought to be fi’ee to exercise his/her fi’ee will to pursue his/her
own conception of the "good life" fi’ee fi’om intrusion by tbird parties on the condition
38~ A~d compare Peter W Schrotl~, ’Bank confidentiality aod the \var o~a money launderh~g in tlte Uoited
States’ (1994) 42 American Journal of Comparative Law 369-91.
382 Alldridge, above n 352, 270.
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that the individual’s actions do not cause harm to others. Moreover, the nature of tire
"good life" pursued by an individual is a highly personal and unique conception, about
which third parties ought not to comment. To pursue the "good life", however, takes
more tbao fi’ee will; resources and money are also required. The right of the individual to
coadact his/her f’mancial affairs in private is therefore fundamental. Pursuit of the "good
life", does not entitle an individual to engage in activities that will cause harm to others.
The right to the state to monitor various activities pursued by the individual is therefore
theoretically acceptable. Financial secrecy is neither a fundamental, nor absolute, right.
However, the balance that is struck between the need of the majority and the needs of the
individual ought to be struck in a manner such that unwarranted intrusion by third pa~ies
is prevented or at least minimised. At the same time, where such intrusion does occur,
safeguards need to be implemented to ensore that individual rights are adequately
protected.383
Privacy is a basic human right and civilised society - as well as commerce - would be
rendered impossible without it. The word ’privacy’ like ’property’ connotes what is
peculiarly an individual’s own. The common law utterly rejects the idea that the citizen
belougs to the state. No clearer expression of that rejection was even seen than when
Britain and the Commomvealth stood against what Winston Churchill described as a
’~nonstrous tyranny’ founded upon the opposite principle. The Germau Socialist
dictatorship completely subordinated the individual mad the private to the demands of the
~s3 blinterseer, above n 366, 286-8.
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state and its state police, had neither restraint from warrants not’ any respect for business
bankers’, lawyers’ or family confidences. 384
Seen fi’om this legal and historical perspective, demands that foreign governments shoul
be able to invade the privacy of the subject in Commonwealth countries become
troublesome indeed. It is a serious concern that basic legal protections and fights hav
already been eroded by tax collection imperatives in OECD countries. It is a troublin
notion to both offshore financial centres and their investors that foreign governmen
officials should be able to extract information concerning the private financial affairs o
families or companies without a local warrant showing good cause and without notice 
persons affected.385
According to Wheelwright, in Australia, a taxpayer’s right to privacy is more proper
described as a statutory duty on government officers not to disclose information about
taxpayers except in very limited circumstances. This is described in the Charter386 as 
commitment by the ATO to respect a taxpayer’s privacy and to keep a taxpaye
information confidential in accordance with the law. The need to assure privacy 
important for taxpayers, given the increased use of modern technology in tax assessmen
384 Terence & Deborah Dwyer, above n 268, 336.
sss Ibid.
386 The Taxpayers’ Charter is a docemeut developed by the Aostraliao Taxation Office (ATO) iu
cousultation with tax professionals aud the emmnuuity over more thau two years. It lists taxpayers’ rights
aud obligations, aad staodards of service which can be expected fi’om the ATO. Detailed information oo the
matters covered by the Charter is provided in 15 explauatory booklets available fi’om all ATO offices (or
through the ATO website at http://www.ato.gov.ao) eg, "Treating you fairly and reasouably", "Your
prlvaey and the coofideutiality of your tax affairs", ’~(our honesty and the tax system".
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aad collection, although taxpayers are not protected from the Commissioner’s access to
premises and information under ss263 and 264.387
The British document called the "taxpayer’s charter" is not a charter of rights. Indeed,
nowhere in the document is any statement of rights (in the legal sense) ~nentioned. This is
despite the emotive content of the term "rigbts" in this context, especially when linked
with the term "cha~er". It is central to the understanding of the operation of tax laws in
the United Kingdom that there appear to be no such things as "taxpayer’ rights". This
phrase will not be foond in any Act of Parliament or other formal docament. The Bill of
Rights, like Magna Carta and the Petition of Right were concerned about the status of
Parliament against the king.3ss When Parliament became, in this sense, king,389 it adopted
the same approach as kings did - the assumption of an untrammelled power to choose
how to tax. The taxpayer’s only rights were the rights of property affected by a tax
charge, and the right to appeal against or secure a review of any tax charge.
At the present, there is no right of individual privacy - rather a right, and duty, of
governmental privacy. The taxpayer cannot demand to see any records held by
government about her or him, but the government can demand information fi’om a
taxpayer. The taxpayer has no reserved rights at the legal level of family life or property,
nor any protection against retrospective, disproportionate, discriminatory or taxes
~17 Karen \Vheelwright, ’Taxpayers’ Rigbts in Australia’ iu Duncao Bentley (ed), Ta.\7~ayers" Rights: An
chnieally, the sovereign authority is not the Queen iu Parliament. However, as ~vas illustrated ~vith the
1996 Queen’s Speech, the royal element is purely nominal. Traditionally, the Queen opens the aimual
Session ofparllament by readiog out a speech laying down tbe ~vorkload for the session, h~ 1996, the Queen
did so in the customary maturer, but the Prime Minister changed some of the items later that day in debate
in Parliament.
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otherwise perceived by a taxpayer as nnfair taxes.39° Such remedies as there are at the
political or administrative levels only: those of the revenue adjudicator, the ombudsman,
and the member of Parliament.39~
4.4 Benefits of the Financial Secrecy Laws
Financial secrecy laws and services also provide certain beneficial, essential and, lnost
importantly, legal economic benefits. The first benefit is that financial secrecy services
like privacy laws enable economic actors to conduct their activities free from
unwarranted scrutiny. According to Schneider, this has several advantages.392 First,
transactions can be structured in a manner that avoids unwan’anted scrutiny b
competitors and other interested third parties. Second, sensitive information can be stored
in a place where third party requests for release of the information will be difficnlt, if not
impossible, to achieve. Third, transactions can be arranged that might otherwise be
extremely difficult or considerably more expensive to complete. Thus, a company is able
to pursue its affairs in private, fi’ee from unwarranted third party scrntiny.
A second benefit derived by economic actors concerns tax planning. Taxes are popnlar to
no one, and individuals and corporations are willing to go to great lengths to minimise
their tax liabilities.
390 The Human Rights Bill will grant some of these rights formally for the first time in United Kingdom
law.
391 David Williams, ’United Kingdom Tax Collection: Rights of and Against Taxpayers’ in Dnncan Bentle
(ed’~ Tax’ravers" Rights" An International Perspective (1998) 331, 335.)’ ~ " " Havens 1996 96-10039z Jerome Schne der, The Complete Gt de to Offshote Money (    )
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To minimise tax burdens, the use of offshore financial centres is useful. Their use has
ce~ait~ly given rise to aggressive practices, and contemporary concern about the financial
activities being conducted within and through these jurisdictions as noted earlier, can be
justified. Offshore financial centres enable companies to structure transactions to reduce
and defer taxes, which therefore fi’ees up capital to grow their business, improve
efficiency, and create employment. Of course, offshore financial centres can be used to
shelter financial structures that are abusive. As Levi notes, however, "The bulk of the
financial transactions undertaken in offshore financial centres arises from the la~vful
activities of multinationals seeking to minimise taxatio~ worldwide and to optimise the
distribution of tl~eir profits.’’393
The use of money laundering type instruments and services is not illegal per se, but can
be used either for legitimate legal business purposes or for illegal money laundering
ptaposes; the difference depends on the intentions with which such instruments and
se~wices are used. The danger of course is that money laundering type services used in a
legitimate manner may come to be abused and used to facilitate economic activity
associated with money gained fi’om illegal sources.
The financial industry, like any industry, seeks to create a safe economic enviromnent, to
act in a lawfid manner, and to create a strong public reputation for service, trust and
accountability. Undoubtedly financial secrecy services have performed an important role
in most financial atrocities and criminal endeavours perpetrated since World War Two
Michael Levi, Customer Cot~dentiality, Money-Laundering, and Police-Bank Relationships: English
La3v and Practice h~ a Global Envh’onment ( 1991 ) 7.
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and contimle to shelter a nnmber of abusive practices. Financial secrecy laws have a long
and legitimate history and the three earlier discussed rationales all have merit to a greater
or lesser degree.
According to Hinterseer, two important qnestions therefore arise. First, how to define the
caveats that qualify the individual’s right to privacy in financial matters. Second, how 
construct the various legal requirements that will help to ensure that unlawfid activity can
be detected, investigated, and prosecuted in a maturer that is efficient and economical, but
which does not unduly compromise individual rights and fi’eedoms. These question
concern how to strike an appropriate balance between the individual’s interest in usin
his!her financial resources pursuant to the principle of self-determination, and society’s
interest in preventing abusive financial practices pursuant to the principle of socia
welfare. To strike this balance, goverlmaents do not necessarily need to implemen
onerous laws. Financial institofions and other economic actors have a legitimate concern
to minimise costs and compliance burdens associated with regulation. It is expected of
financial institutions and others to be supportive of money lanndering legislation to the
extent that it promotes transparency, stability, and a level playing field within financia
markets, h~ this respect, the Wolfsberg Anti-Money Laundering Principles are pertinent.
However, resistance would naturally rise to transforming into a criminal offence activity
that was previously considered both profitable and legal.
The challenge for the legislator is therefore to control the abuse of financial services
without penalising those who would use the same services in a legitimate and legal
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rammer. However, legislators have created a situation whereby financial institutions may
be unduly penalised precisely because tbey have complied with their legal obligations
mandated by the criminal law. This situation has arisen because h~adequate consideration
has been given to how the criminal and civil law currently interface.394
Accordingly to Bentley, for the taxpayer, it is important to determine the limits on the
powers of the tax authorities to gather information. Due process demands that taxpayers
should be aware of the requirement to provide information, that they should have the
capacity to provide the information, that they should be given a reasonable time to do so,
and that there should be a presumption that they are acting honestly uuless they act
othenvise. It is often a requirement that the taxpayer must be informed before a tax
authority can request information about the taxpayer fi’~m a third party. Taxpayers should
also have the right of access to information held about them by tbe tax authorities. Under
the basic right to privacy there should be limits on the scope of the tax authorities’
information gathering powers. Collection of tax does ~mt require the provision of
unlimited information. Even where there is possible tax evasion, the tax authority should
restrict the information it gathers to what is relevant to tbe boua fide assessment to tax. It
is not a valid argument to say that tax collection outweighs all rights to privacy as a
matter of public interest. 395
The gathering of information from taxpayers is predicated upon the tax authorities
treating the information as confidential. Bentley asset, s that, it is a question of balancing
39~Hinterseer’ab°ven383’288-290’                             nl "ed Tax a ets Ri hts A39~ Duncan Bentley, ’A ~ Overview of Taxpayers’ Rights’ i ~ Duncan Be t ey t. ), .’p y ’ g : n
h~ternationaI Perspective (1998) 35, 45.
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the competing interests of the tax anfl~orities to gather the information necessary for them
to collect the right amount of tax, with the interest of individuals in maintaining thei
right to privacy. Tax systems should contain stringent secrecy provisions to ensure tha
basic privacy requirements are observed. The right to confidentiality of information
should be supported by rules governing precisely how, when and where informatio
relating to a taxpayer can be used, for example, in criminal proceedings. The ~ales shoul
cover the passing of information within the tax authority, to and fi’om other governme
and quasi-government departments, and to the courts and other judicial or quasi-jndicia
bodies. The rules should be particularly clear on levels of authorisation and the reason
required before confidential information is released to third parties.396
4.5 Political and Econo;nic Motives for Attacking Offshore Laws
If criminal activity is not the true focus of offshore activity, and if it is demonstrable tha
offshore laws do not exist either to promote or conceal such activity, then why such an
offensive has been launched against the offshore sector? The argument as previousl
discussed by Antoine, is that the real issue, concel~as the loss of revenue, pat~icnlarly bu
not solely, fiscal revenne fiowing fi’om onshore economies and filtering offshore. The
revenue, albeit in savings which filters fi’om onshore countries, results in the economic
developing of many offshore countries, several of which can be labelled as developin
countries.397 The fear on the part of onshore countries of the loss of revenue as a direct
result of offshore activity is not one to be dismissed. Already, non-offshore jurisdictions
396 Ibid.
397 This can be vie\ved as a kind of’bataneh~g effect’.
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within tile European Union ate beginning to experience an increase in loss of revenue as
a result of offshore business, as noted in tile recent Boston Consulting Report 2003.398
European unification has improved European citizens’ ability to relocate their assets to
other European countries and many investors are choosing to iuvest in European offshore
jurisdictions such as h’eland399 and in Asia such as Singapore4°° and Hong Kong.4°~ The
enrichment of offshore coffers at the expense of those onshore provides a powerful
economic and politica! motive for the legal offensive aimed at the offshore sector. This
factor cannot be ignored when the question of tile acceptable limits of offshore activity
and law are to be addressed.
The above point of view is underscored by a discussion on tax reform by the UK
Revenue in 1982. It was pointed out by the UK Revenue Board that the UK was losing
£100 million annually in revenue due to the growing use of tax havens for tax avoidance
purposes and the problems associated with the accumulatiou therein of profits and
investment income.4°2 This prompted tile then Secretary of the Institute of Directors’
Taxation Committee to respond:4°3
398 "Winuiug in a Challengiug Market: Global Wealth 2003", The Boston Consulting Group, July 2003.
~ ’Greengrocers Flight’, The FinancialMail (South Aft’tea), 16 April 1996, 6.40o Singapore is managing about US$2.2 trillion offshore assets. Figure provided by Pulses, a moutbly
~ublieatiou of St ~gapore Exeha ~ge Limited, dated November 2003.0~ The total trade value of I-Iong Kong’s offshore trade was HK$1,425 billion in 2000. Figure provided by
Hong Kong Trade Development Council (2000)
~htlp://www.tdctrade.con’decoaforun~/boc/boc021101.htm> at 28 April 2004.
~8 Taxaiion ofbtter#tational Business, UK Revenue Board, 1982, p. 16. In the USA the tax gap is close to
150 billion dollars a year. C. Greene, ’la~teruational Securities Law Enforcement: Recent Advances in
Assistauce aud Co-operatiou’ (1994) 27 VanderbiltJom’nal of TransnaiionalLaw 635, 664.
~0~ Sandy Aa~derson, Press Release of the Iustitute of Directors’ Taxation Comrnit~ee, 28 Jnne 1981, p. 1.
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The UK tax authorities have no business to set themselves up as the ’fisca
policeman’ of the ~vorld. Such fiscal imperialism can only provoke retaliation b
other govermnents jealous of their sovereignty. The proposal is unacceptable on
groonds of both economic and constitutional principle and is impracticable.
The real concern of onshore countries in relation to offshore activity is often actual
financial loss rather than high or moral principle. While it is clearly within the right 
any country to safeguard economic and political interests, this element mnst b
recognised for what it is and should not be allowed to cloud the relevant legal issues
such as the validity of the offshore interests by attacking offshore law and policy. Th
argument thus follows, that all things being equal, offshore states have a similar right t
safeguard their economic and political interests by upholding them. This is an impo~ta
argument in the difficult issues relating to comity, taxation and the confidentiali
principle. It is central to the qnestion of legitimacy.
4.6 Offshore Responses to Erosion of the Confidentialily Principle
Developments restricting the application of the confidentiality principle have occurre
under offshore law largely as a result of onshore influences. This includes statuto
developments as well as the increasing recognition by the offshore courts that it is bot
desirable and appropriate to restrict the principle in ce~tain circumstances. This mea
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that the extent of the duty of offshore confidentiality, notwithstanding its pretence at a
statutory certainty, is constantly being redefined, even by offshore courts.4°4
However, it can be seen that OFCs come to fue international arena at great risk. It is
argued that the erosion of the confidentiality principle has the potential to prejudice their
economic interest. The cost of co-operation in such efforts may be increased competition
its the offshore marketplace, where the stakes are already high. OFCs are painfully aware
that any moves against confidentiality could trigger an exodus from their offshore
industry to other more secretive, and consequently snore attractive, jurisdictions. Hence,
this is a serious obstacle to mutual assistance efforts. In recent times, a refusal to
cooperate has invited ’blacklisting’ or even sanctions from the OECD.4°5 Thus, a fine
balance must be struck between co-operation and competition. That balance swings in
favour of disclosure where criminal, but not civil matters are involved, fi~deed, at an
emergency meeting of the CARICOM Heads of Govermnent held in The Bahamas in
October 2001, the Finance Minister of The Bahamas had occasion to underline that while
The Bahamas had co-operated extensively in the fight against crime aud, more recently,
against terrorism, they had to be careful to preset~ve confidentiality for non-criminal and
civil mattersJ°6
The highly competitive nature of OFCs points to the unlikelihood of the repeal of their
~nuch prized and guarded confidentiality laws. In fact, since anti-secrecy initiatives by the
Antoine, above o 375, 81.
This is a contentious issue.
CARICOM is the Caribbean Conunueity - a regioeal eutity. The remarks were made oo October 2001;
BBC Caribbean News.
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international community initially targeted the major offshore jurisdictions, for exainple,
Switzerland and the Cayman Islands, other OFCs perhaps saw this intervention as 
golden opportunity to gain a larger share of the industry.4°7 Consequently, the larg
majority of OFCs have been less enthnsiastic about far-reaching im’oads into
confidentiality. The threat of sanctions by the OECD has undoubtedly tempered this
reluctance. However, despite the fact that the OECD seems to seek to generalise all
aspects of offshore confidentiality with a broad brush of tax arbitraging, its mandate i
essentially confined to taxation harmonisation.4°8
The advent of greater harmonisation of taxation laws in the European Union ha
catapulted this issue forward. The extent to which harmonisation will affec
competitiveness to the benefit of non-European Union offshore financial jurisdictions at
the expense of European offshore countries, such as Ireland and Luxembourg, is yet to be
seen. Already, the UK is showing signs of capital flight as a direct result of the Europea
Union.4°9 As the world of business becomes even more transnafional, movements of
finance becomes swifter. Investors are always willing to relocate to get a better deal and,
given the inherent mobility of offshore finance, the threat to offshore industries as a result
of \vhat may be viewed, fi’om the perspective of i~westors, as unfavourable changes i
both imminent and real.
407 Aotoine, above n 404, 82.
40s lbid 82.
409 See ’Greengrocers Flight’, The Financial Mail (South Africa), 16 April 1996, 6, which reports th
British investors are choosing to put their assets in low tax jurisdictions \vithiu the European Union, such as
Dublin and Luxembourg.
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OFCs are ever mindful of the tensions between confidentiality and disclosure in the
interest of cooperating with iuternational efforts at disclosure. Their position is that the
stm~nder of financial information must be within clearly defined boundaries. The laws
and policies on disclosure and the compromises toward disclosure made in international
legal assistance agreements reflect this. Courts too must be a~vare of sach policy
coosiderations. Nevertheless, the very existence of such disclosure mechanisms is further
evidence of the realisation by offshore countries that appropriate limits must be set for the
coafidentiality principle.
4.7 Methods to Obtain Inforlnation under International Cooperative Efforts
There are three main methods by which an onshore country may attempt to obtain
information fi’om offshore countries for use in trials or legal investigations. These are:
1) letters rogatory or letters of requests;
2) unilateral methods, such as the subpoena or summons; and
3) international treaties and other statutory instruments on legal assistance.41°
Of these, the first two ~nay be viewed as more traditional methods.
Of the three methods, it is the use of unilateral methods which is lnost likely to raise
controversial legal issues. Further, conflicts of laws nmy arise. The use of unilateral
4t0 Antoine, above n 408, 85.
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methods, for example, is likely to raise contentious legal issues relating to comity4~, i.e.
the respect by one country for the laws of another and sovereignty. This was the problem
which arose in the Cayman Islauds and The Bahamas.4~2 The USA snbpoenaed 
threatened ba~tks which had branches in these jurisdictions with contempt for their refusal
to surrender bank information. These refusals were a result of the banks’ compliance with
offshore confidentiality laws. This expanded territorial jurisdiction was seen as a
violation of sovereignty.4~3
In relation to the summons process, a major problem may be that there is no basis for
jurisdiction over persons or corporations domiciled outside the onshore country.
Consequently, if a person refuses to appear, he or she cannot be sanctioned unless he or
she enters the onshore jurisdiction or is a citizen of that state.
While the use of letters rogatory is less controversial, it is likely to be difficult in
application4~4 as they can be time-consuming and complicated. Also, the success may
depend on offshore legislation which is too limited in scope to be of any real assistance.
Mutual legal assistance instruments are less invasive than unilateral mechanisms. They
balance the needs of law enforcement with those of sovereignty and the national interests
411 Gilbert N M O Morris, ’The Loss of Sovereignty, the Uuited Nations, aad Offshm~ Fina~cial Ceutres’
2001) Tct~’Notes htternational Sept 10 2001, 1297.
See extraction from dissertation of Job ~ S Baln, Money Laundering: A Practical Aualysis With
Particular Reference To Bahamiau And Caribbeau Offshore Institutions (MBA, Uuiversity of Wates and
tbe Man,chester Business School, 1998) at <bttp://www.spgi.org/artieles/bain_APraeticalAnalysis.sbtufl>.
4~ Autoine, above n 410, 86.
~4 A letter rogatory is a p~x~cess ~vbich invokes the legal process by means of a formal request issued by a
judge iu one country to the judicial3, in a foreig~ cmmtt3’. The request ~quires the sanctiou of the foreign
court in order to prevent the violation of that country’s sovereignty. Letters rogato~2 may furlher involve
the diplomatic process.
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of the requested country. Indeed, this was the very reason why the Cayman Islands
moved toward such treaties.
Mutual assistance in criminal matters is the process by which states, through designated
regulatory and judicial bodies, seek and provide assistance for use in criminal
prosecutions fi’om the other states. Mutual legal assistance often has two components:
first, assistance in the provision of evidence and, secondly, assistance in the tracing and
restraining of the proceeds of crime.4is More recently, a third element, that of
coafiscating the proceeds of a crime, has been introduced in offshore jurisdictions.
International legal assistance has a greater reach than mutual legal assistance in that it is
not confined to criminal matters and need not depend on reciprocity.4~6
The reach of international legal assistance vehicles, both in form and substance, may be
much greater than the traditional methods such as the letter rogatory. First, they go well
beyond the judicial process. For example, such instruments may permit disclosure in
relation to requests in investigatory proceedings such as the grand jury proceeding, as
opposed to limiting it to judicial proceedings. Mutnal legal assistance mechanism may
also encompass more varied matters of substance, when they are in treaty form.
Nevertheless, it is possible to broaden the range of possible offences under letters
mgatory by dispensing with dual criminality requirements and allowing the process to be
used for unfamiliar forms of crime.
Note that internatioual legal assistauce is used here to deuote a process which can encompass both
mutual legal assistance and other forms of assistance such as letters rogato~3’.
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Jurisdictional problems also plague the letters rogatory and mutual legal assistance
processes. For example, while it is probable tlmt an English court will now orde
disclosure where documents located in England are sought, it is less likely to heed
requests for assistance where an English branch or parent of a bank is targeted fo
documents located offshore. The rule in Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v Bankers Tt’ust Co417
that the proper law is the situs of the bank account, still obtains, and should continue t
protect offshore banks with onshore associations. Continuing jurisdictional and
procedural difficulties lead to increased efforts at treaty formation through which
offshore countries are obliged to heed the terms of the instrument and ignore traditional
and legalistic hnrdles. Mutual legal assistance treaties represent:41s
A step for~vard in intenmtional relations in that they offer rules and procedure
that greatly simplify previous practices and offer an alternative to questionabl
techniques such as the kidnapping of information in foreign countries an
attemptiug to enforce USA subpoenas in foreign jurisdictions.
Nevertheless, even treaties may have difficulty overco~ning procedural and jurisdictiona
obstacles in order to defeat the offshore confidentiality principle.4~9
4.8 The FATF Challenge - Meeting the Standards
~17 [1988] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 259.
4~8 Ellis and Pisani, ’The U.S. Treaties on Mutual Assistance in Crimhml Matters: A Comparative Analysis
(1985) b~ternaiional Lawyer 189, 222.
~t9 Antoine, above n 415, 85-7.
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According to Antoine, no single entity has been as instrumental in defining the way
fox,yard in the fight against money lanndering and international financial crime than the
FATF. The work of the FATF has pointed several deficiencies in the ~vorld’s financial
iastitutions which exacerbated and even enconraged money laundering. This has led to
the formulation of strict new standards. They are the standards which offshore financial
centres are required to meet. Not surprisiugly, many of tilese involve offshore
confidentiality.42°
Math progress has been made by OFCs in bringing their laws up to FATF standard,
heace the relatively young statutes which exist.42~ Many jurisdictions have been removed
fi’om the list of ’non-cooperative’ countries such as the Cayman Islands, The Bahamas
and Panama.422
The FATF’s primary emphasis as has been seen, is on adequate control, regulation and
supervision. Both the prevention and detection of money laundering are to be targeted as
well as appropriate punishment. In these objectives, legal as well as practical
impediments to efficient anti-money laundering regimes are to be examined. The latter
iaclades, for example, obstacles which restrict supetwisory and investigatory powers of
judicial and administrative attfl~orities, or the absence of such powers. Thus, the concern
~lbd 151.
~2~ ’We are pleased to have the good name of Tl~e Bahamas restored, Bnt we will continue to pay close
attentioo to evolving internatio~al staadards to eosure continaed compliaoce’ said Wend Warren, CEO and
EXecutive Director of The Bahamas Fi~ancial Securitles Board, "Bahamas Special Report - The Third
Pillar" qeren
~ ~    ay Hetherington-Gore, Bahamas, 2001).
See Appendix U for the 2004 list of NCCTs.
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of the FATF too includes the presence of a satisfactory environment to prevent mone
laundering.423
4.8.1 Loopholes in Financial Regulation
Inadequate or ineffective regulation and supervision of financial institutions involve la
requirements for the licensing of offshore companies and other entities. Uusatisfactory
conditions begin with few or no requirements for assessing the backgrounds or identity o
managers and beneficial owners. This is exacerbated by secrecy or confidentiality rule
thereafter, including the existence of anonymous accounts. These perceived deficiencie
create a danger that such entities can be operated by criminals.424
In addition, requiremeuts to keep (for a reasonable time, such as five years) record
verifying the identity of clients and beneficial owners, are often lacking. This 
worsened, iu most OFCs by the lack of information about transactions made and the ofte
deliberate legal or practical obstacles to the means of obtaining such information.
Significantly, the FATF singled out the rules for professional secrecy and bankin
secrecy for negative comment. While noting that such rules can be based on vali
grounds, they should not pre-empt snpervisory responsibilities and investigative power
of the administrative and judicial authorities in tile fight against money laundering. Mo
particular was tile concern that such secrecy or confidentiality obligations could not b
423 Aa~toine, above n 420, 151-2.
4~ Ibid 152.
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lifted by authorities in criininal investigations relating to money lanndering, a concern
which is not justified, according to Antoine.
The lack of roatine confidential repol~ing requh’ements based on a standard of suspicious
reporting was also noted. Such requirements should be supplemented by adequate
provisiou for competent authorities to receive repol~s and sbould be mandatol3’.425
Other regulatory issues identified by tile FATF inclnde the impediments posed by
commercial law. Such laws, in particular, laws on company formation and trust laws,
have the ability to hinder the prevention, detection and punishment of criminal activities.
Shell corporations and nominees, for example, may be used to launder the proceeds fi’om
crime.426 These problems are compouuded by confiden!iality obligations and the inability
to identity beneficial owners and beneficiaries.427
4.8.2 Obstacles to International Co-operation
The several restrictions on tile transmission of information to foreign authorities seeking
legal assistance is perhaps the main concern of the FATF in the area of iaternational co-
operation. Identified as legitimate restrictions are the following: reciprocity in exchanges,
coafidentiality requirements on the pa(t of the requesting authority, tile need for clem"
rationales for the information requested and the status of the requesting authority. The
need for administrative authorities with efficient powers for exchanges of information
+4~+, See Appendix G, FATF 40 Recommendations, particularly Reconunendations 14-19.
42~ See Appendix G FATF 40 Reconmlendations, particularly Recommendations 10-13.
Antoine, above n 424, 151-2.
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with foreign authorities is also an important concern of the FATF.4~8 Other restriction
may be considered ’abusive’. In particular, tbe refusal of co-operation on the ground onl
that the substance of the request relates to tax matters, espeeially where tax evasion is
involved, is viewed as a ’detrimental practice’ for international co-operation again
money laundering.
Significantly, the FATF also highlighted administrative and practical hurdles in i
discourse on international co-operation. Long delays and ’obvious unwillingness t
respond constructively to mutnal legal assistance requests’, for example, were viewed a
detrimental practices.429 So, too, was the failure to provide administrative and judicial
authorities with the necessary resources to conduct investigations, not only for mutual
legal assistance, bnt in all anti-money laundering proceedings.43°
4.9 Comity Principle and Confidentiality
According to Antoine, efforts toward disclosure at the expense of offshore confidentiality
laws may involve conflict of laws. The question of sovereignty with respect t
confidentiality is paramount, and has been highligbted by offshore com~s in respondin
to the OECD challenges to the OFC.
42s See Al~peodix G, FATF 40 Recormnendations, particularly Reconunendations 30-40.
4~9 h~donesia and Myanmar were highlighted as countries which bare not made adequate pro~ess in
elinfinating money launderiag. Fiuancial Action Task Fo~e, Annual Review of Non-Cooperative CounM~
or TetT"itories (Paris: FATF, 2003).
430 ~toh~e, above n 427, 151-3.
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It is argued by Antoine that the OECD and its member states are violating international
taw, according to the Articles of the Draft Declaration on Rights and Duties of States
(1949) by The h~temational La~v Commission of the UN.43~
1. A~icle 1: Every State has the right to independeuce and hence to exercise freely,
without dictation by any other State, all its legal powers, including the choice of
its o~vn form of gover~unent.
2. A~icle 2: Every State has the right to exercise jurisdiction over its territory and
over all persons and things therein, subject to the immunities recognised by
international law.
3. Article 3: Every State has the duty to refi’ain from intervention in the internal or
external affairs of any other State.
4. Article 14: Every State lms the duty to conduct its relations with other States in
accordance with international law and with the principle that the sovereignty of
each State is subject to the supremacy of international law.
Under Article 1 of the Statute of The I~ternational Court of Justice, the International
Court of Justice has jurisdiction to hear a complaint fi’om one or more of the 35 nations
under attack from the OECD and its member states. The Articles of the Draft Declaration
on Rights and Duties of States have effect in international law, under Article 38 of The
International Court of Jnstice Statute.432
~ Draft Declaration on Rigl ts and Duties of States (1949) art 1-3, 14.
4~ Paul Baxeudale-Walker, ’OECD Demands aud laUernatioual Law’, The OFC Report 2004 (2004) 22.
See also Paul Baxendale-Walker, ’Defending Gibraltar Aud Devetopiug Britain’s Offshore Territories: I~
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The comity principle is an extension of the principle on territorial sovereignty. It sets the
standard for resolving conflicting jurisdictional issnes which may arise. In its legal sense,
comity is: 433
the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative,
executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to
iuteruational duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or other
persons who are under the protection of its laws.
It is ’the degree of deference that a domestic forum must pay to the act of a foreign
government not otherwise binding on the forum’.434
The key principle underlined in the comity rule is the recognition that states have
sovereign interests which need to be reconciled. The principle recognises each of these
conflicting interests as legiti~nate but acknowledges the necessity for one state to
succumb to the other’s interest if their interest is recognised as gn’eater. Where a potential
jurisdictional conflict exists, a court should look beyond the lex fori and consider a
Defence of State Sovereignty’ (Speech delivered at the Conse~,ative Pa~y Conference Fringe Event,
Bonmemoutb, 9 October 2002.433 Hilton v Guyot 159 USA 113 163-164 (1894), Its English expression is found in F Mano, "Tbe Doctrine
of Inten~atiooal Jurisdiction Revisited Alter Twenty Years", Studies it~ It~ternalional Law, Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1973 (~printed i~3 CA Mano, Further Studies h~ h~ternationalLaw (1990), p. 31)
43~ Laker Ah’~vays v Sabena 791 F 2d 909, 937 (DC Cir, 1984), h~ the USA the comity principle 
strengthened by the act of state doctrine originating fi’om Underhill v Hernandez 168 USA 250, 252 (1897
Sup Ct that states: ’Eve~3’ sovereigo state is bouud to respect the independence of every other sovereign
state, and the courts of the country will not sit in judgement on fl~e acts of [foreign] goveroment done
within its o~w~ coontry.’
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foreign state’s interest.43s Comity is seen as essential in preserving international harmony
and good relations between states.436
As the confidentiality principle is grounded in the national interest of the offshore state,
conflicts arise in areas where both onshore and offshore states assert jurisdiction to
proscribe and enforce rules of la~v. Offshore states have an interest both in the
sovereignty of their legal systems and the stability of their economies which are
threatened by attempts to undermine confidentiality laws. The contrasting attitndes
toward confidentiality between offshore jurisdictions and the major onshore countries
may lead not only to political conflict, but to conflict of laws. It is argned that there is a
delicate balance to be struck between the utility of confidentiality laws in an offshore
state which uniformly denies access to information in favour of preset~ving that country’s
economy, and the requests for information from onshore jurisdictions in an attempt to
detect and prevent undesirable activity facilitated by spch confidentiality practices.437
In 1967 the Social and Economic Council of the United Nations founded what is today its
Ad Hoe Group of Experts. The group is composed of 25 members, experts, and tax
administrators fi’om 15 developing and 10 developed countries. As the UN group
evolved, it was given various tasks such as guidelines for tax treaties, proposals for
 ,it, o,, v G,,yo, 159 USA .3 o895 .
Oetzen v CenO’al Leather Co 246 USA 297, 304 (1918).4~ A~Roine, above n 430, 273-8.
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international cooperation to combat tax evasion and avoidance, and internation
cooperation to reduce incompatibilities between tax systems.438
The United Nations, like the International Monetary Fund, has criticized the workings 
the OECD and FATF, arguing -- in the spirit of national sovereignty -- as an appar
defence of members of the UN General Assembly against intrnsions by external agencies
that have no jurisdiction in law. The Ad Hoe Group recognized the need for leg
legitimacy in all state-to-state and agency-to-state relations in the international arena
Morris asserts that, however, such rhetoric may provide little solace to the OFCs since i
appears to be public relations "spin". The intent of the Ad Hoe Group is apparent:
states "the inability to obtain information from tax haven countries and tax informatio
not available within its jurisdiction impedes the efforts of many tax administrations t
deal effectively with the cases of tax avoidance and tax evasion." It has opted for a seri
of bilateral treaties which link the developing world with the developed world; with t
former giving up its tax information, whilst the latter developed countries offer assistance
to developing countries to enable them to carry out exchanges of information procedures
to control harmful tax competition. This is apparently taken to be a fair exchange.439
According to Antoine, the conflict of laws typically arises where banks, companies o
individnals are called upon by onshore states to produce documents or other informatio
concerning offshore business.44° This is in situations where compliance may inv
,3~ United Nations: Depal’iment of Economic and Social Affairs, AdHoc Group of Experts on h~ternalion
Cooperation in Tax Matters <http://www.on.org/esa/ffd/ffdtaxationmandate.htm> at 10 July 2004.
~9 Morris, above n 411.
4a0 Antoine, above n 437, 275-8.
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criminal or civil sanctions under strict offshore confidentiality laws. Where,
simultaneously, offshore states seek to protect their confidentiality laws and onshore
states, their legal interests in disclosure, the result is a ’jurisdictional deadlock’. The
subject of disclosure proceedings must then make a choice whether to obey the offshore
or onshore law forum. The dilemma is made even more acute as such entities or
individuals also face potential legal sanctions such as contempt actions from onshore
coul~s for failure to produce compelled information.
The question to be resolved, therefore, is which law is to be followed, that of the offshore
jurisdiction protecting confidentiality, or the onshore country compelling disclosure? This
is the fundameutal issue posed in the following analysis, a challenge which has raised
complex issues of international law m~d political sovere!gnty. The subject involves both a
jurisdictional issue based on geographical territorial limits and one of conflict of laws in
~lation to the substantive content of such laws. These two questions are inextricably
linked. Au artificial separation of the two issues is made here merely for purposes of
clarity.
The dilemma posed by the comity question has been caused mainly by the deliberate
extraterritoriality initiatives of onshore states. Equally problematic is the conflict which
arises from the polarisation of offshore and onshore attitudes toward disclosure and the
limits of confidentiality la~vs. This goes beyond matters of mere jurisdiction, tending
toward a dichotomy in philosophical attitudes on the nature and importance of financial
confidentiality and, by implication, the sovereignty and legitimacy of laws which uphold
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it. This polarisation is most evident in relation to tax matters. Offshore and onshore states
do not always share the same views on the matter of classification of criminal offences or
litigation techniques. Consequently, offshore states are unlikely to view as appropriate
onshore countries’ unilateral attempts to thwart confidentiality for such purposes.
Disclosure initiatives raise questions as to the extent to which a jurisdiction can compel
openness about banking information in another country where confidentiality laws are i
effect. The outcome of this question, centred around comity, hinges on the legitimacy of
offshore confidentiality. Some countries, particularly the USA, follow a ’wide approac
to confidentiality. They pursue disclosure aggressively, even where conflicts of law ar
apparent. While offshore jurisdictions do not deny that there are circumstances where
confidentiality in inappropriate, typically they adopt a ’narrow approach’. The
differences in perspective have evolved into a situation where those onshore countrie
pursue a unilateral solution to perceived problems.44~
It is not apparent that onshore com~s have properly considered offshore interests in thei
determinations under the comity principle. The facts that confidentiality is one of the
pillars office offshore industry, and that the offshore industry is essential to the economic
and political su~wiva! of such nations, is largely ignored. As have been previously note
offshore antions which make breaches of bank confidentiality statutory and/or crimina
offences, are typically countries with limited natural resources, dependent on finance and
Ibid.
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banking.442 Their domestic law has been tailored aggressively to encourage the formation
at~d operation of bnsinesses within their territories, it is therefore logical that they should
protect their economic well-beiug in the same way that other countries, inch|ding the
USA, protect their economies.
Onshore courts, primarily USA com~s, explicitly mcoguise their objective in undermining
confidentiality as part of their wider economic and political interest in obtaining tax
revenue and la~v enforcement. Yet, mention, in the literature is hardly even made of
offshore states’ equally important, or perhaps greater, interest in upholding
confidentiality as a means of protecting the offshore fiuancial sector, the primary means
of economic development. This is the major difficulty with the comity principle applied
ia offshore law.4~3
Neve~’theless, there is no common fi’ont on the part of the major onshore countries on the
question of anti-confidentiality policy, for as yet there is no consensus as to the degree of
iatervention which is permissible by the country desiring information. The wide USA
approach is not in line with other onshore countries, ’such as the UK’. The difference can
be traced in part, perhaps, to the economic and political losses which the USA suffered as
a result of offshore investment.4~4 This has been reflected in legal policy which often
4~2 I Paget-Bro~vn, ’Bank Confidentiality and Criminal Matters: Cayman Islands and United States:
COoperative Develo,~me R’ "1988~ 20 Case Western Reserve Journal htternational Law 369 374
ntoh~e, above n 440 273 -5.
-u4 US oses an estimated $70 billion i ~ tax ~evenae each year due to assets being bidden m offshore tax
.havens. The Bnsb administration has shifted the US focus in dealing xvitb tax haven countries away fi’onr an
~nternational effort to overhaul tax stractnres and toward negotiated treaties that allow easier US pnrsait of
SUspected cheaters. See J Richard Dnke, Cayman Exchange of Information Agt’eement (2002) Trusts &
Trustees <bttp://www.trnsts-and-trnstees.com/trends!td v8 iss2.btml> at 28 April 2004.
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appears to be self-centred in terms of the comity question.44s Consequently, there is no
uniform standard on the extent to which the confidentiality principle should be protected
where conflicts of laws issues are at stake. 446
The UK, by its lack of TIEAs, has not been an interventionist as the USA in challengin
foreign confidentiality laws, preferring to preserve principles of comity between nations
and adhering to a restrictive view with regard to territorial jurisdiction. To some extent,
the UK is compromised by the involvement of many of its dependencies in the offshore
business. FreSher, in the UK, there has been opposition from within to proposed
expansion of powers of inspection in relation to banking documents for purposes of fiscal
offences. This is even in tire pursuance of international measures against crime.447 In
contrast, the policy of the USA to utilise unilateral measures, such as the subpoena and
grand jury proceedings against confidentiality, constantly to extend its jurisdiction and to
assert the supremacy of its domestic interests beyond its shores has engendered much
resentment, even fi’om other onshore countries. This has resulted in a position of’extreme
isolation ... fi’om most other countries’.448
It is argued that offshore states are tinder no moral or legal obligation to assist onshore
states in their law enforcement efforts in fiscal matters. The conntetwiew that tile fact that
445 Walter and Dorothy Diatnond, The United States as an Offshore Centre? (2002) T~a~sts & Trastees
<bt~p://www.trt~sts-and-trustees.col~/tt~uds/td v8 iss2.htn~l> at 28 April 2004:
44s Antoit~e, above n 443,274-7.
447 The Baukers Assoclatlou argued that the exte~sioo of the Crimiual Justice (International Co-operation)
Act 1990 (UK) to fiscal matters ~fight have adverse cousequenees for Londou. See Note [1990] British Tax
Review 1.
44~ Francis Neate aud Roger McCo~anick, (eds), The Lm*, of Confidentiality (1990) Introduction
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fiscal matters form the bulk of the subject matter of disclosure requests is not helpful to
o~lshore cases.
Hence it is one vie~v that the confidentiality principle must sometimes be sacrificed to a
greater interest in disclosure when competing interests are balanced. This is so, for
example, where serious international crimiual matters are an issue, an opinion shared by
offsbore coul*ts,449 However on the other hand, seeking an appropriate balance does not
mean a carte blauche denial of the confidentiality interest in all circumstances where
there are coaflicts of laws, as sometimes appears to be the present judicial practice.
Rather, offshore jurisdictions must be given the opportunity to define the limits of their
confidentiality laws fairly. It is therefore argued that they should not be forced into
surrendering to greater political and economic powers disguised as legal interests. A just
appreciation of the comity principle allows such an exercise by ensuring the
consideration of the interests of both onshore and offshore states. It is only within such a
construct that the extent to which the offshore confidentiality principle is justifiable, can
be truly appraised.45°
4.10 OECD’s Attitude Towards Bank Secrecy
~9 British Virgin Islands’ Motual Legal Assistance (USA) Act 1990 (No. 5 of 1990) and Crimioal Jostice
(h~tematlonal Co-operation) Act 1993 (No. 8 of 1993). The Bahamas’ The Motual Legal Assistance
(Criminal Matters) Act, 19884n Antoiae, above n 446, 273-8.
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The OECD Report on hnproving Access to Bank Information for Tax Purposes45~ ("The
Bank Information Report") was prepared by the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs 
unanimously approved by all 29 OECD member countries. The Bank.Information Rep
noted a perceived imbalance between the ability of taxpayers (individuals 
companies) to operate in the increasingly borderless world of globalisation, an
contrasting inability of tax collectors who are still required to operate along strict nat
boundaries. Accordingly, The Bank of Information Repol~ suggested that tbis imbal
should be addressed by "enhanced international co-operation for the effective applica
of tax laws." To that end it established an ideal, namely that all OECD member coun
should permit access to bank information, directly or indirectly, for all tax purpose
tbat tax anthorities could discharge their revenue-raising responsibilities and enga
"effective exchange of information" with their partners. 452
The OECD argument is invidious: it is essentially "why should you object to anybod
accessing your personal information unless you have something to hide?". The hidde
danger in this argument is that it entirely ignores that privacy is a ’right’; that it has be
painstakingly evolved, fought for, and preserved for centuries, often in the face of quit
intrusive forces; and that there is nothing to be ashamed of in simply wanting to remai
’private’ .453
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, lmprovhtg~lceess to Banklnformalionfor
T~cc Proposes (2000 OECD)
Bennett, above n 255, 25.
Ibid.
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post the September 11 attacks, both the USA (Kerry & Levin / Grassley Bills) and the G-
7 (06.10.01) have moved to further tighten AML (Anti-money laundering) legislation to
undermine the financial suppo~s of international terrorism.454
The USA has consistently maintained the position that it is not prepared to agree to the
atttomatic exchange of information. Whilst the USA is not prepared to countenance
automatic information exchange they are prepared to have "on request" tax information
exchange ago’cements with the whole of the EU, negotiated on a bilateral basis.
hnportantly the USA will agree to exchange information in relation to alleged non-
disclosure of income or tax fi’aud.455
4.11 OECD and the Confidentiality Principle
The OECD ’Harmfid Tax Practices’ report claims that harmfid tax competition is
achieved by the operation of tax regimes which facilitate and even encourage the
reduction of tax burdens hnposed by high tax countries. This ’tax competition’ it is
alleged, distorts trade and investment and erodes national tax bases. There is, therefore, a
ueed for greater convergences in tax systems to enable a more ’level playing field’. The
repo~ explored three themes; transparency, exchange of information and non-
discrimination. Two of these relate directly to offshore confidentiality.456
lbid 30.
David Lawless, The Savings Directive Miracle! (2003) PricewaterhouseCoopers, Republic of Irelaud
<http:~Aw~v.pw~g~ba~.c~m~Extweb/service.ns~d~eid~8B~B6AC49D9ABD3B8~256CDF~3F7AE7> at 3
~Ovealber 2003.
Antoine, above n 450, 314-6.
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The OECD complained that mobile capital and labour were being attracted a~vay fi’on
countries with high taxes to those with low taxes.457 This, in turn, undermined the proc
of tax collection in such high tax countries. The report did not ostensibly eriticise the
concept of competition in fiscal affah’s itself and even acknowledged that some tax
competition could be beneficial. However, the question of ’harM’ is raised in relation to
what OECD regards as ’poacbing’ the tax base that ’rightly’ belongs to another count
in the context where a preferential tax regime is being offered to overseas individuals and
businesses by the ’poacher’, the offshore financial jurisdiction.458
The OECD asserts that money laundering is encouraged by OFCs and, therefore, cross
border information on tax and other activities should be exchanged. Offshore
jurisdictions bave no natural inclination to exchange information with high tax countries
in order to improve compliance. Accordingly, it is argued that money laundering is 
more compelling rationale for such an objective. The initial justification for the attack on
OFCs was, therefore, on this ground. As offshore jurisdictions have continually complied
with demands for better money laundering controls, the focus has shifted to extending
information flows459 and to the construction of a legislative arcbitecture, for the purpose
of enforcing tax laws, this clearly has important implications for confidentiality
generally.46°
457 ~1 the OECD Report 2000, the OECD retracted on its challeuge to tax neutral or tax-flee ~gimes. Th
OECD Report 2000 states that the OECD project is uot inteuded to promote the ’hannoulsation’ of income
taxes or structures, uor is it about ’dictating to any couutry what should be the app~v~priate level of tax
45~ Antoh~e, above u 456, 314-6..
459 For example, under mntnal legal assistance treaties.
~o Antoine, above n 458,314-6.
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Excessive bank secrecy is viewed as not only encouraging money laundering but also
contributing to a lack of transparency in financial information, undermining onshore tax
co~npliance and law enforcement efforts. The offshore trust and international business
company, catne in for particular criticism because of their capacity to hide the identity of
the beneficial owner of assets. The OECD urges the maintenance of records of such
beneficial owners and the exchange of relevant information and other data reqnested by
onshore countries in tbe enforcement of their laws and tax policies, initially for criminal
tax matters only. This includes provisions for the routine exchange of information by way
of treaties.46~
4.12 Conclusion
The analysis in this chapter has demonstrated that if current trends continue, the OFCs
will have little choice, in the face of such focused and antagonistic display of global
hegemony, but, as appears to be happenh~g, to realign their legal regimes toward the
model suggested by the OECD.462 hi patlicular, this means broadening the avenues of
disclosure. The policy objectives articulated in these initiatives have already begun to
shape the direction of new fiscal policies, both in offshore jurisdictions and high tax
4~1 Ibid.
462 The Model Agreement on Excbauge of Iofornration on Tax Matters (the Model Agreement) was
developed withio a specially created worklug group, the "Global Forum Workiug Group on Effective
Exchange of Information." This group, which was co-chaired by Malta aod tire Netberlaods, consisted of
representatives from Araba, Australia, Benmlda, Kbrgdom of Balu’ain, Cauada, Cayman Islands, Cypnm,
France, h’eland, Isle of Mau, Italy, Japan, Malta, Mauritius, Norway, Netherlands, Netherlands Autiltes, the
Republic of the Seychelles, the Slovak Republic, Sau Marino, the United Kingdonr, and the Uoited States.
The Model Agreement is available on the OECD website at bttp://www.oecd.org/ctp. Tire Model
Agreement seeks to prx3mote iutemational co-operatiou in tax matters through exchange ofinformatioo, hr
its iatroduetion, the Model Agreement notes flrat it is importaot for as many fioa~cial centres as possible
throughout the world to meet tire standard of tax information exchange and it encourages all econonfies to
CO-Operate h~ this eodeavour.
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onshore countries. This does not mean, however, a capitulation to all of the deman
made by the OECD. Rather, a more balanced approach is needed to work out ration
principles of fairness in what is today a chauged commercial law environment heavi
reliant on globalisation.
In the following chapter, an analysis of the initial hostile and dictatorial tone of t
OECD has been tempered some~vhat because of the responses by offshore jurisdiction
themselves and certain commentators from USA, UK, and Australia.463 
Commonwealth Secretariat, aud even the British Press, in its role of exposing some of th
hypocrisies relating to the money-laundering accusations, have also helped to balance t
discussion.
The commitment required by OFC’s in regards to "transparency" has also highlig
many examples of stifling hypocrisies:464
1. beneficial ownership of companies and partnerships to be registered with t
govermnent, but UK company law prohibits the disclosure on share registers
beneficial ownership;
2. settlers and beneficiaries of trusts to be registered with the government, but t
creation of trusts is completely secret in the UK;
463 Easson, Alex, ’Harmfid Tax Competition: An Evaluation of the OECD l~fitiative’ (2004) 34 Tax 
btternationa11037, 1051-2.
4~ Baxe~dale-Walker, above n 432 ’OECD Dema~ds and Intel:~mtional Law’.
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3. trusts to dra~v up accounts in accordance with internationally accepted accounting
standards and publicly filed, but not in the UK where there is no legislation
governing trust accounts;
4. free governmeut access to bank information of enterprises, individuals and trusts,
bnt this is denied in the UK by the Data Protection Act and banking
confidentiality laws, which can only be overridden by a Court order;
5. abolition of the ability for investors to negotiate the tax rate to be applied, but
thousands living in the UK benefit from negotiated "forward tax agreement";
6. abolition of share warrants to bearer, but not if issued by an English incorporated
company under section 188 Companies Act 1985.
Hence, the High Consultations on OECD Harmftd Tax Competition Initiative paved a
way forward, relying more on co-operation and dialogue. A working pal~y was
established comprising members of offshore jurisdictions, the Commonwealth
Secretariat, international financial institutions, and tile OECD to work out some of these
tllore contentious issues.
Even so, the appetite for offshore financial services and, in particular, tax migration
structures continues to steadily increase. Offshore clients are often sophisticated and
determined and are unlikely to surrender their right to more efficient investment
opportuuities easily. The road points to compromise and accommodation of tile several
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conflicting interests between such investors, their host countries aud powerfid onshore
nations.465
It has been argued in this Chapter that tire power of national legislators is eroding, even 
the field of criminal law, which most of them still regard as their chasse gard6e. Give
the fact that the territorial range of domestic criminal law is by definition limited, the
clout of municipal legislators is also limited. An effective response to transnational crime
phenomena such as money laundering therefore requires that legislation regarding la
enforcement is, at least in pa~, taken over on a higher, international level. The tradition
approach to this is has been by the negotiation of bilateral or multilateral treaties. This i
however, a cumbersome way of ~vorking ~vhich often involves lengthy negotiations a
difficult ratification procedures. Its effectiveness is especially doubtful in view of the fac
that the actual implementation of what states agree on an international level, still depen
on the willingness of those states to implement it domestically.
It is not surprisi~gly therefore that international law enforce~nent is increasingly based o
other types of international instruments such as non-binding recommendations (e.g. t
FATF reco~rtmendations) or by supranational binding instraments (e.g. the Europ
Money Laundering Directive). Although resorting to this type of international instrum
sometimes obfoscates the penal aspects of the law, these aspects are nevertheless presen
From the analysis in this chapter, it is to be expected that the future development
international law enforcement will move increasingly away fi’om the traditional in
465 Antoh~e, above n 461.
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government type of conventions and will use other types of international soft law
i~lstrulnents.466
~6 Stessens, above 11355, 27-8.
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Chapter 5: Responses of Offshore Financial Centres
5.1 Introduction
The previous ehapters have examined the directives of the supranational organisations
and the four major issues which lead to the analysis in this chapter of the responses of
the OFCs. Throughout this ehapter, it will be demonstrated that the basis for the
assel~ions made by the OFCs towards the OECD are balanced and supportive. The
OECD 2001 Behind the Corporate Veil: Using Corporate Entities for Illicit
Purposes467 repm~t was not well received by the OFCs and their displeasure was first
made appa~ient at the January 2001 forum, at the High Level Consultations on OECD
Harmfid Tax Competition Initiative. The OFCs asserted that the dialogue with the
OECD was not carried out on equal terms.468 Serious-ideologieal differences emerged
between offshore and onshore nations on the question of tax policy and the use of
offshore confidentiality in upholding such policies. But, the voices of offshore nations,
most of which are SDEs, can hardly be equated with those of the OECD countries.
Indeed:469
there is significant inequality of negotiating power. The OECD Member
countries are the most powerfid countries in the world, who, through the
OECD are now acting in unison. By contrast, the ’tax haven’ countries are
46~ Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Behind the Corporate Veil: Using
~rporate Entities for lllicit Purposes (2001 OECD).                     . ....
8tikeman Elliot, ’Towards a Level Playing Field - Regulating Corporate Velncles m ~ross-t~or~er
Transactions,, (2002) A Review Co~mnissioned by the h~ternational Tax m~d Investment Organisation
~[~TIo) and The Society of Trust and Estate Practitioners.
Gaffi~ey, above n 125, 307.
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small jurisdictions with little or no political co-ordination who are often the
subject of vilification in the international media.
The evident irony is that whereas offshore investnrent arises out of purely voluntary
conduct of individuals and businesses internationally, responding to the ath’active
fiscal and legal environments of offshore countries, the OECD’s challenge is
’essentially coercive action’ .470
In practice, this ~neans applying political pressure and seeking to intervene in
the international affairs of other jurisdictions, wlfich normally calls for some
form of justification or defence on the grounds of public international law.
The analysis in this chapter will show the shortcomings of the OECD arguments of
harmful tax practices as presented in Chapters 2 and 3, and will highlight at least one
major issue in the apparent bias of the OECD report in favour of developed countries
and more developed offshore jurisdictions, in particular, those associated with
developed countries such as the UK dependencies¯ For example, although financial
centres in London or New York offer tax incentives to, or accept investments from
non-residents wishing to avoid taxes in a similar manner to offshore jurisdictions, they
have neither been admonished nor tln’eatened with sanctions. It is the small
developing offshore centres, particularly in the Caribbean, which have been the main
target of the OECD by being named in the various ’blacklists’, despite the fact tha
¯ such countries (Cayman Islands, Bahamas, British Virgin Islands) have similar o
470 Ibid.
2O0
even identical la~vs and legal policies to other ’better protected’ offshore jurisdictions
and even some onshore ones.
As previously noted, the proposals required that low-tax regimes make many
concessions or face penalties for being ’non-cooperative’. Although, the same harsh
standard was not reconunended for OECD member states.
"They are being asked to make changes, ... but there are no specific
penalties ... Sinfilarly, the OECD is using a double standard in its campaign
against privacy ... Switzerland, for instance, has refused several times to
abolish financial privacy ... Luxembourg, Belgium and Greece, ... also have
indicated a reluctance to phase out financial privacy. Yet none of these nations
are being tlu’eatened with financial protectionism fi’om other countries.’’47~
Fullher, many OFCs complained that the OECD had not bothered to find out about
the actual workings of theh’ offshore systems. Some of the demands being made by
the OECD would inevitably result in the demise of the offshore financial sector. Many
offshore nations feel fl~at this is simply too high a price to pay, pm~icularly as their
economies are being thi’eatened by other forces of globalisation such as liberalisation
and unhindered free trade.472 The incompatibility of the OECD initiative to such free
trade policies has not been overlooked by the OFCs.
4n Nor accused of money latmdering. See Daniel J. Mitchell, Low-Tax Jurisdietious Are Not Money
Laundering Havens - Center for Freedom and Prosperity (2002) Cayman Net Ne~vs Ooline <
ht~:~www.caymannetne~vs.~n~/Ar~hive~A~.chive%2~Arti~es~January%2~2~2/Issue%2~ 143/LowTa
x.html> at 7 November 2003.
~ A good example is file banana issue where the US challenged the preferential quota system between
UK and tile Windward islands in tile Caribbean in the World Trade O~gauisation forum between 1995
and 2001,
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OFCs were particnlarly conce~aaed about reciprocity in the several areas in which
demands for reform are being made. Whether it related to money laundering,
identities of beneficial owners in companies and trusts, reporting requirements, offer
of tax incentives to non-resident account holders, and similar matters, they insist that
onshore financial systems also have similar demands placed upon them.473
5.2 Momentum Gathers
OECD membership, as previously noted, is seemingly dominated by wealthy
developed nations. The dominant states in that group are the principal participants in
the market for cross-border financial services. At the same time, these states control
the process for regulatory reform. The OECD claims to seek a level playing field for
the regulation of all jurisdictions. However, it is argued by the OFCs that, the OEC
is unlikely to be an impartial referee in regnlating a market where its Member
countries have a significant commercial interest.474 The US Government’s positi
for example, is articulated in a 2002 US Treasury report on corporate inversions as
follows:
Our overarching goal mnst be to maintain the position of the United States a
the most desirable location in the world for place of incorporation, location o
headquarters, and transaction of business.475
a73 Antoine, above n 465,320-2.
474 Stikeman Elliot, above n 468.
nsactJons TaxPohe Imphcations, May2002, p 30Corporate Inversion Tra    ’ :       " Y    ’                  ’ "
202
ttence any jurisdiction, quite understandably, will seek to protect its co~mnercial
interests in redrawing the tales. Hence there is unease with a process for change
controlled by a subset of market participants.
5,3 Background
The non-OECD OFCs, financial selwices professionals, and SDEs support the OECD
call for suppressing the misuse of corporate vehicles such as International Business
Cornpa~fies (IBCs). Non-OECD OFCs agree with the OECD that all counhqes offering
platforms for the conduct of cross-border financial services carry an obligatiou to
adopt effective regulation to interdict financial crimes and other illicit activities
including money laundering and the financing of terrorism.476
It is argued that the need to provide information to support cross-border enforcement
of tax liabilities is less self-evident, even though there is no precedent in international
la~v for the imposition of unilateral obligations on one country to assist another in its
effo~ls to collect tax. Proposals for changing practices in the tax information exchange
area are accordingly sensitive, and require careful consideration. Non-OECD OFCs
aekJ~owledge that conventional rules for information exchange for tax purposes are
evolving and small and developing countries seek to participate in the process of
setting new policy and standards.477
476 The OECD purports to ahn to combat the use of corporate vehicles for illicit pt~oses which
includes "money laundering, bribery/corxnption, hidhig and shielding assets fi’om creditors, illicit tax
practices, self-dealh~g/defizudlng assets/diversion of agsets, market fi’aud and circumvention of
disclosure requirements, and other forms of illicit behaviour". See Organisation for Economic
~OOperation and Development, above n 467, 7.
Stikeman Elliot, above n 474.
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Non-OECD OFCs agree that in order to effectively combat ~ansnational crime
information on beneficial ownership and control must be obtainable by authoritie
within the jtu’isdiction in which corporate vehicles are established, tin’ough mea
appropriate within the particular jurisdictional context. Non-OECD OFCs concur tha
this information must be subject to exchange in agreed circumstances. However, th
design of new rules to facilitate cross-border exchange of information mnst evolve
thi’ough a consensual process including the following elements:47s
establislunent of a level playing field (i.e. all countries must be subject to the sam
rules for the same activities, implemented on the same timetable and with th
same consequences for non-cooperation);
discussion of issues in a universal forum which includes al! jurisdictions offerin
facilities that may be affected by the outcome;
appropriate regard to competing considerations, such as reasonable financia
privacy; and
the adoption of regnlations which are proportionate and risk-based so that th
restrictions on legitimate commerce are appropriately balanced against the har
sought to be cm~ailed.
5.3.1 Methodology Adopted
The OFCs responded with the report entitled, Towards a Level Playing Field 
Regulating Corporate I"ehicles in Cross-Border Transactions’ (’Level Playing Field’)
A Review Commissioned by the International Tax and Investment Organisati
Ibid.
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(1TIO)479 and The Society of Trust and Estate Practitioners, it was based on a survey
of the existing legislation and regulatory framework in a broad cross section of fifteen
countries representative of the jurisdictional participants in the provision of cross-
border financial services, including both so called "onshore" and "offshore", civil and
corrmaon law, large and small, OECD member and non-OECD member countries. The
fifteen jurisdictions reviewed ~vere The Bahamas, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands,
Canada, Cayman Islands, Hong Kong, Ireland, Isle of Man, Jersey, Luxembourg, New
Zealand, Singapore, Switzerland, the United Kingdom (or England and Wales, as
appropriate) and the United States (focush~g on the state of Delaware).
This "Level Playing Field" repm~t also draws upon existing analytical and statistical
work on the formation and regulation of corporate vehicles, includh~g work conducted
by the EU, the United States General Accounting Office (GAO), the US Senate and
Treasury, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), the FATF and the OECD. It
was in reply to OECD’s "Behind the Corporate Veil: Using Corporate Entities for
Illicit Purposes" report48° (’The OECD Report’).
5.4 Key Concerns with the OECD Report
5.4.1 Summary of Issues
The main concerns that Non-OECD OFCs have with the OECD Repm~ are:48~
(i) the OECD Report focuses on Non-OECD OFCs to the exclusion of the OECD’s
own members, which account for 80 per cent of the global trade in financial services;
~4~9 See Appendix T for a list of the ITIO members.
~80 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, above n 476.
~ Sfikeman Elliot, above n 478.
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(ii) the proposals in the OECD Report were developed in a process controlled by a
subset of market participants; and (iii) the dangers of compromising individuals’
privacy were not sufficiently considered.
(a) Primary Focus on Non-OECD OFCs
The OECD adopted an express focus on vehicles established in "offshore
jurisdictions which were not OECD Member States. This limits the utility of the
report as OECD Member countries already control 80 per cent of the global
"offshore" market - i.e., the trade by jurisdictions in financial services provided to
non-residents.482 The restricted focus is curious, particularly as the initial report of the
FSF aeNtowledged difficulty in distinguishing so-called "offshore activity" within th
major developed states fi’om that in smaller and developing states.483 There are we
documented concerns relating to vehicles established or administered in OECD
Member States, as discussed below;
482 See the following for discussion of the dlsta’ibutlon of the provision of cross-border fmaneial
services in both OECD and non-OECD Member States: R Biswas, ’Introduction: Globalisation, Tax
Competition and Economic Development’ in R Biswas (ed), b~ternational Tax Competition:
Globalisation and Fiscal Sovereignty (2002).
48~ The FSF defmed "offshore" in theh" Report of the Working Group on Offshore Centres, 5 April
2000, as follows:
A~ OFC is not easily defined. Any jurisdiction can be considered "offsho~" to the extent that
it is perceived as having a more favourable economic regime than another, e.g., low corporate
tax rates, light regnlatlon, special facilities for company incorporation, or highly protectiv
secrecy laws. While OFCs are conunmfly perceived to be small island states, a number of
advanced counla’ies have succeeded in attracth~g very large coucentratinns of non-~sident
business by offering economic incentives either thronghout their jurisdiction or in speci
economic zones.
Switzerland, which is an OECD and FATF Member, crlticised the final outcome of the FSF process on
the basis fl~at:
the (FSF) list was drawn up in a non-transparent maturer and does not list several financial
centres with a high proportion of international financial business (e.g. New York, London) as
Offshore Financial Centres. (Swiss Federal Department of Finatrce, Swiss Financial Cenla’e: A
Documentation, Jnly 2001 at page 8).
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The OECD justified the focus on non-OECD OFCs, as follows:484
some OFCs are perceived to provide "excessive secrecy" and "create a favourable
envirolmaent" for the misuse of such vehicles;
a disproportionate share of companies in the "offshore" world are shell companies;
and
recent improvements in some non-OECD OFC regimes may provide models for
other non-OECD OFCs.
As the analysis which follows shows, the first two conce~aas are clearly not confined to
structures established in non-OECD Member States and the third rationale could also
apply to non-OECD OFC regimes providing nrore rigorous models for some OECD
OFC regimes.
The ITIO argues that the adoption of a perspective limited to offshore ceutres mars
the OECD Repo~, undermining its objectivity and limiting the value of its
conclusions. Non-OECD OFCs perceive mixed motives in the OECD’s process and
proposals.485
(b) Disproportionate Regulatory Burdens
Regulation consumes resources in the foma of direct financial costs and the
transaction friction occasioned by satisfaction of compliance obligations. Appropriate
regulation is generally accepted to be proportionate to the risks and benefits
associated with the activity being regulated. Disproportionate and excessive
Stikeman Elliot, above n 48 l.
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regulation applied selectively to particular market patlicipants burdens those
pal~icipants with a competitive disadvantage. In an efficient market, unevenly applie
regulatory burdens shift demand fi’om one service provider (or jurisdiction) to another
as users search for a cost-efficient, low friction service. Regulatory limitations on
services offered (i.e. financial privacy) also shift demand.
States controlling the design process have the opportunity to assert their objections to
pal"titular forms of increased regulation at the design stage, in the non-transparent
policy formulation process, and work out a rationale for self-exemption (or "outsider-
burdening") before proposals are formally tabled. Non-OECD jurisdictions find
themselves portrayed as unto-operative by those controlling the process whe
excluded jurisdictions object to an opaque process.486
(c) Erosion of Privacy
The collection and sharing of the complete record of an individual’s financi
transactions, and the linkage of databases tln’ough the use of electronic tools, pose
many concerns for the privacy of individuals and vehicles treated as corporate by t
OECD Repm~.
The UN Declaration of Human Rights recognises and protects privacy as a bas
human right.487 The OECD also accepts that individuals and vehicles treated 
corporate by the OECD Report have legitimate expectations of privacy and busine
~s6 Ibid.
487 ¯The UN Declaration of Human Rights 1948 provides as follows h~ A~licle t2:
No one shall be subjected to arbilrat3’ interference with his privacy, family, home 
con’espol~dence, nor to attacks upon his ho~ouc at~d reputation. Everyo~e has the right to the
protection of the law against such interference and attacks.
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confidentiality in their affairs. The OECD notes that "corporate entities, in particular,
have a valid right not to have their affairs disclosed to competitors, cnstomers, and
suppliers among other tlfings".488
The OECD report on "Improving Access to Bank Information for Tax Purposes",489
contains informative insights into the scope of existing financial disclosure in OECD
Member States. France, for example, requires financial institutions managing stocks,
bonds or cash to repoi~t to the Gover~mlent on a monthly basis regarding the opening,
modifications and closings of accounts of all kinds. This information is stored in a
central computerised database which is used by French authorities for research,
control and collection purposes. Four other OECD countries also maintain centralised
databases, namely Hungary, Korea, Norway and Spain.49°
The public is doubtful of the ability of governments to maintain data security491 or to
resist the temptation to access information for political, economic or other purposes,
padicularly as there is, by definition, no opportunity to monitor unauthorised access,
~ss Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, above n 484, 47.
~90rgaaisatinn for Ecnnnnlic Cooperation and Development, above n 451.
~9~ The UK Inland Revenue intemet self-assessment service was suspeaded in May 2002 following
security breaches. Users foand they could examine other people’s tax data on the UK Inland
Revenue website. ("Revenue Offiine" Financial Times, 1 t June 2002 and "No Date for Rettua~ at
Online Revenue Service", Financial Times, 6 Jnne 2002).
~91 Ibid. The US IRS has also been admonished for its failure to adequately secure access to its
electrouic filing systems and the elec~onically transmitted tax return data those systems contain. In a
report dated February 2001 titled Information Security: IRS Electronin Filing Systems th~ US
General Accounting Office states at page 2:
We demonsh’ated that unauthorised indlvidnals, both internal and extenml to IRS, could have
gained access to IRS’ electronic filing systems and viewed and modified taxpayer data
contained in those systems during the 2000 tax filing season. We were able to gain such access
because tile IRS at that thue had not (1) effectively restricted external access to comlmters
supporting the e-file program, (2) securely configured the operating systems of its electronic
filing systems, (3) implemented adequate password management and user account practices,
(4) sufficiently restricted access to computer files and dh’ectories containing tax rettu’n and
other system data, or (5) used encryption to protect tax l~tm’n on e-file systems. Further, these
weaknesses j eopardised file secm’ity of sensitive business, f’mancial and taxpayer data on other
critical IRS systems that were connected to e-file computers through its service-wide net~vork.
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Affluent taxpayers in at least one major OECD member country also fear that tax dat
is routinely sold to criminal gangs seeking targets for kidnapping, common in th
state.49~
It can be argued that global sharing of information means that criminal access ca
occur at the weakest point of entE¢, multiplying the risks associated with nnauthorise
disclosure.493
The risks to personal privacy m’ising from the collection of financial information ar
disconcerting. The prospect of abuse where these vast and globally converged pool
of information fall into the wrong hands en masse or tln’ough ad hoe unauthofis
access is a major concern. This is particularly so for the many families with direc
experience of repressive or corrapt governments.
Flaws in existing information exchange programs and those proposed ha
insufficient safeguards to ensure tl~at information obtained and shared is safeguarde
against inappropriate use, including human rights violations. A repo~ by the US bas
Task Force on Info~a’nation Exchange and Financial Privacy identifies the danger t
information may be provided to countries which have one or more of the followin
49~ The US State Depal~ment warns of widespread kidnapping ha Mexico in the following terms:
Kidnapping, including the kidnapping of non-Mexicans, continues at alarming rates. So-call
"express" "kidnappings, an attempt to get quick cash in exchange for the release of an
individual, have occurred in almost all the large cities in Mexico and appear to target not onl
the wealthy, I~ut also middle class persons.
US Department of State, Bureau of Consnlar Affairs, Mexico (2004)
<http://ia’avel.state.gov/mexico.html> at 10 July 2004.49~ A UN Report published in 1998 notes, alarmingly, that ha a part of the former Soviet Union 0rot a
OECD member), criminal gangs bought batiks in order to determine which families had batik account
large enough to make kidnapping worthwhile. United Nations Office for Drug Conta’ol and Crim
Prevention (UNODCCP), Financial Havens, Bm~king Secrecy and Money Laundering, Donble issue 34
and 35 of the Crime P~vention and Crinainal Jnstice Newsletter, and Issue 8 of the UNDCP Technical
Selwices, 1998 at page 68.
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haracteristics: major corruption problems; hostility to the West; or past sponsorship
494
Of terrorism,
According to Tanzi and Zee, information exchange agreements cannot be left self-
enforcing as the national hiterest would seem to lie in not sharing information, so
strengthening its location for investors.495 This is simply to secure national advaotage,
whether it is in terms of tax revenue, banking business, tourism or others. Even if
there are agreements in place, there is under-supply of information as the incentive of
aational advantage and foreign investment will outweigh and defeat the purpose of the
iafonnation exchange agreements.496
It is essential to ensure that the countries receiving information have safeguards in
place in order to protect human fights and to ensure that information is not used for
purposes (e.g. political or conunercial gain) other than that which the information was
originally provided for.
Legal systems thi’oughout the world have different penalties for tax evasion, money
taandering and other financial crimes. China, for example, is known to have sentenced
aa individual to death for tax evasion.497 Information exchange programmes must take
494 Task Force on Information Exchange and Financial Privacy, Report ou Financial Privacy, Law
Eaforcement and Ten’orism, 25 March 2002.
~s Vito Tanzi and H H Zee, ’Can Information Exchange be Effective in Taxing Cross-Border Income
Flows?’ in K Andersson, P Melz and C Silfve~q~erg (eds), Modern Igslles it~ the Lain of International
To-ration (2001).
~ga in contrast, Eggert and Kolmar (2002) fred that conntries may vohmtarily choose to share
information fidly, bnt in their context there is no particular benefit to any conntry, whether in terms of
tax revenue or banking business from attracting inward investment, so that the basic problem
essentially vanishes. W Eggert and M,K, ohnar, ’Information Sharing, Mnltiple Nash Equilibria, and
Asy~mnetric Capital-Tax Competition (EPRU Working Paper Series No 02-01 (Economic Policy
~eSearch Unit, 2002).
Www.arm~esty.org.il/m.gen~/5201PRC.hlml, Aagost 2001.
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such differences into account to permit countries to choose whether they will provide
a jurisdiction with information that may lead to a cruel and unusual punishment.
5.4.2 Weaknesses in OECD Process
(a) Lack of Universal Forum
The ITIO argues that the basic equity and effective long-term implementation requir
that the concerns and interests of all stakeholders should be taken into consideration i
the development of standards. Whilst the OECD maintains to seek, in principle,
more inclusive forum. Jeffrey Owens, ~)ECD Head of Fiscal Affairs puts the positio
as follows:498
The important thing is that as many people as possible have a seat at the tab
in setting what the rules would be. I see that as a general h’end in a lot of o
work. We must be openhag up; we mnst become more inclusive; we mnst n
just be inviting the countries to come and listen to ~vhat we have to say, b
we’ve got to be inviting them and saying, "You are here as partners. We
interested in ~vhat your views are, and your views will shape things that co
out of the OECD".
Many small and developing jurisdictions, including non-OECD OFCs, w
welcome such a universally accessible process for policy formulation. Howeve
perceive that the current reality does not reflect this proposed change in directio
498 Cordia Scott’s conversation with OECD’s Jeffi’ey Owens on the envh’onment, e-conuner
falling tax rates. Maryam Enayat, Tea" Bits btternational: Free Bulletins (2001) Tax A
<http:#www.tax.org> at 10 July 2004.
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exclusive use of expert representatives fi’om OECD Member States to assess the rules
of non-nrember states, discussed below, illustrates their concerns.499
(b) Lack of Expert Advice Outside OECD
In drafting the OECD Report, the OECD Steering Group on Corporate Governance
established an ad hoe group consisting of persons fi’om twelve OECD Member
countries,s°° Despite this expertise, the OECD focused their attention on non-OECD
jurisdictions with supposedly only cursory comments on their own members’ regimes.
The provision of cross-border financial services is a highly competitive and lucrative
business. It is important to the OECD Member States and vital to the development
plans of many small and developing countries which lack natural resom’ces and other
opportunities. In such a competitive enviromnent, policy fommlation must be
premised on transparent comparison of the regular013, systems in market participants.
In the OECD Report, this was not done according to the non-OECD OFC’s.s°1
(e) Uneven Playing FieM
Without the goal of a level playing field, it might be argued that business will simply
afigrate to those jurisdictions overlooked or excused from compliance with the new
~9 For example with regards to the OECD Harmfid "Fax Practices initiative, tbe classification of
jurisdictions as tax havens was effected by the OECD without 1~ference to those targeted. Subsequently,
the acceptability or otherwise of a commitment demanded by the OECD and given by any of those
jurisdictions was determined exclusively by the OECD. Only after such a commitment is deemed
acceptable is that jurisdiction invited to join the Global Forum which will deternfine the
i~nplementation plans and the fm’m of exchange of information agreements to be utilised by all those
jurisdictions going forward,
eu488 16~5~ Orgauisatinn for Economic Cooperation and Development, abov , .
~ Ibid. The methodology used in the repm~ did not include explicit co-operation and participation of
the non-OECD OFCs.
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laales,s°2 In such circumstances, it will also be difficult to secure the trust and c
operation of the many jurisdictions which need to work together to refoma t
regulation of the international fmancial system. The OECD had expressed
commitment to a level playing field in the context of its Harmful Tax Practic
project,5°3 though tiffs commitment does not appear to have yet translated into 
process which is likely to realise this goal. Some member states of the OECD hav
acknowledged that non-OECD jurisdictions should not be required to impleme
access to information processes which one or more of the OECD member states ar
not willing to implement.5°4
In the context of the Harmful Tax Practices hfitiative the OECD showed inappropri
reluctance to permit the implementation of commitments by non-OECD Membe
States to be conditioned on the implementation of equivalent commitments by a
OECD Member States, including Switzerland and Lnxembourg. The OEC
response that their repiners on that i~fitiative were already endorsed by memb
countries was unconvincing whilst Switzerland and Luxembourg continued to abs
from the 1998 Repm~ on Harmful Tax Practices.5°s In the OECD 2001 Progres
502 Edgar, above n 356, t092.
503 In Towards World Tax Cooperation, OECD Observer, 27 Jnne 2000, Jeffi’ey Owens, OECD Head
of Fiscal Affah’s reviewed the OECD’s demands for transparency in the Hatanfnl Tax Competition
htitiative and stated:
And let me emphasise that the same standards will apply to all [OECD] Member countries and
non-Member countries.5c4 UK Treasm~, Exchange of Information and the Draft Dh’ective on Taxation of Savings, Febrtmry
2000 states at 4.7:
Countries identified by the OECD as tax havens will quite properly expect EU and other
OECD Member counh’ies to meet at least the same standards of effective exchange of
information h~ctuding access to, and exchange of bank information for, tax purposes, as they
~hemselves are expected to meet trader the HatTnfut Tax Practices Initiative.5a5 Otlgaaisatlon for Economic Cooperation and Development, above n 267.
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Report on the project, Switzerland and Luxembourg were joined in their abstentions
by Portugal and Belgium.5°6
The OECD’s choice to focus on non-OECD OFCs or non-Member countries in the
OECD Repm~ undermined the confidence of objective obse~cers that the OECD
genuinely sought a level playing field. For the OECD to effectively achieve their
goals relating to transparency and information exchange it was essential that all
countries, both "onshore" and "offshore", OECD Member states and non-OECD
Member states were part of the process and "buy in" at the same time, and so
supported the woject fln’ough co-operation and co-ordinated effort. Without this,
SDEs continue to perceive the OECD as intending to use the camouflage of a
regulatory thi’ust to implement non-tariff barriers to the trade in services and so
undermine their competitive position.
5.5 Benchmarking the OECD’s Conclusions
5.5.1 Corporations
The OECD stated that the corporation is open to misuse due to its separate legal
personality and the ability to obscure the identity of the beneficial owner.
International Business Companies 0BCs) and exempt companies are correctly singled
out for attack on the alleged basis that their combination of effective anonymity and
little or no supervision makes them more susceptible to misuse. 507 Only passing
~nention is given to functionally equivalent conmaercial vehicles in OECD Member
5~ Organisation for Eannomic Cooperation and Development, The OECD’s Project on Harn~d Tax
~aetices: The 2001 Progress Report (Paris: OECD, 2001).
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, above n 501, 22.
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countries raising similar concerns. For example, the OECD notes without comment, a
study conducted by the Performance and Innovation Unit of the UK Cabinet Office
which indicated that UK shell compa~ties have been involved in almost all comple
UK money laundering schemes.5°8
(a) Bearer Shares
Again, the OECD notes that "the ability to obscure identity is crucial for perpetrators
desiring to commit illicit activity through the use of co110orate vehicles". 509 The
OECD indicates that the primary instrtnnents used to achieve anonymity are beare
shares, "corporate" directors and chains of corporate vehicles.51°
In the fifteen OECD Member States and OECD non-Member States surveyed in th
Level Playing Field report, bearer shares and "corporate" directors were permitted i
more OECD countries than non-OECD countries studied. Bearer shares wer
permitted in six out of seven OECD countries but only four out of eight non-OEC
eonntries (Hong Kong and Singapore which are FATF Members included),s~l
Although the .issuance of what are styled as "bearer shares" is technically permitted 
several non-OECD OFC jurisdictions, in the Cayman Islands bearer shares are n
permitted unless they are subject to custodial arrangements with a recognise
sos United Kingdom Cabinet Office Performance and Innovation Unit, Recovering the Proceeds o
Crime, June 2000.
~0~ Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, above n 507, 29.
~o Ibid 29-32.
~ Stikeman Elliot, above n 485, 18.
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i~temational custodian or licensed Cayman Island entity.512 In the British Virgin
Islands the government has made a public cormnitment to amend the International
Business Companies Act to "immobilise" bearer shares.513 Such immobilised shares
are not transferable by delivery and the owner is ceutrally tracked by the custodian.
For owner identification purposes this puts such shares on a similar footing as
~egistered securities.
(b) Disclosure of Beneficial Ownership
Disclosure of beneficial ownership information refers to those txdes which are aimed
at identifying the physical persons who are either entitled to the assets of the vehicle
or are actually in control of the structure and its activities.
Oace again, the OECD’s focus on non-OECD OFCs was not helpful in the context of
the availability of information on beneficial ownership. An October 2001 report
financed by the European Conmaission conce~Taing transparency and nmney
laut~dering in EU member states ("the Transcrime Report") identified corporations in
EU Member States as structures susceptible to being used in money laundering
operations. The report noted:5~4
~ ’Trident Trust Cayman Islands: Custody of Bearer Shares’ Trident Trust <http://
~w~ iW~tridenth’ust.cond PDFs/Cayman_Beare~_Shares_Memo,pdf> at 28 April 2004.
International Business Formation Ine, ’Changes in the British Vh’gin Islands Concerning Bearer
Shares and Director Requh’ements’ (2003) <htlp://www.ibcf.condnews/news050503-BVI-bearer-
~Shares~html> at 28 April 2004.
~ Researclt Centre on Transnational Crime - University of Trento, Transparency and Money
Lau~dering: Study of the Regulation and its Implementation in the EU Member States, that obstruct
~t!t’Money Laundering h~ternational Co-operation (200t Research Centre on Transnational Crime -
nWarsity of Trento) 8.
217
The main obstacle [to anti-money laundering co-operation in EU membe
states] is the lack of regulation requiring fifll information on the rea! beneficial
owner of a public or private limited company, especially when a lega
structure is a shareholder or director, or the issuance of bearer shares is
permitted. Furthemmre, some problems seem to arise fi’om the fact that, in
some EU Member countries, the regulation allows for nominee shareholders
and directors.
While some basic shareholder information was available in most OECD Membe
countries benchmarked, the wide availability of bearer shares in most of the OEC
Member States surveyed made discovery of the real beneficial owner next to
i~npossible in these states. In the US state of Delaware, basic records of shareholders
in private companies and related vehicles are not required to be kept by the state.515
(c) Filing/Auditing of Accounts
Public companies, in both OECD and non-OECD Member States, are generall
required to file accounts with a regulator or the company registry and to have thei
accounts audited. Private companies are fi’equently exempt fi’om requirements to fil
accounts with the corporate registry or fi’om having accounts audited. Where a filin
requirement does exist for a private company it may require the lodging o
abbreviated accounts only. For example, in England and Wales both "small" 
"medium sized" private companies are exempt fi’om the requirement to file
accounts and unless a company’s turuover exceeds £350,000 there is no requiremen
515 The Delaware Company <www.thedelawarecompany.com> at 3 November 2003.
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to appoint an auditor516. In Ireland small private companies are required to provide an
abridged balauce sheet. New Zealand compa~fies are not required to file accounts with
the corporate registry, unless they qualify as a "non-exempt" company,s~7
(d) Regulation of Service Providers
One of the reasons advanced for the focus in the OECD Report on non-OECD OFCs
was that such countries allegedly have weak supervisory and regulatory regimes,s~8 In
order to test tiffs view the financial service providers were reviewed by ITIO to verify
i f they were regulated in each of the 15 jurisdictions surveyed,s19
In general, the OFCs examined had a body or bodies responsible for regulating
corporate service providers while the "onshore" jurisdictions surveyed (including
Hong Kong and Singapore) do not generally regulate such service providers.52° This
was also noted by the IMF in its Progress Report on the offshore financial centre
program as follows:s2~
It should, however, be emphasised that the oversight of company service
providers does not occur outside of OFCs, and there are no accepted standards
on whether and, if so, how, they should be regulated.
~ Section 242 of the Companies Act 1985 and Part VII of the Companies Act 1985.
~ Counia’ies w ~ ch have 25% or more foreign shareholdlng.
~80rgatfisation for Econo ~ic Cooperation and Development, above n 510, 17.
~9 The fil~een jm’isdictions reviewed were The Bahamas, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Canada,
Cay~nan Islands, Hong Kong, h’eland, Isle of Man, Jersey, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Singapore,
SWitzerland, the United Kingdom (or England and Wales, as appropriate) and the United States
!~f0°cusing on the state of Delaware).     . .....
~ Heritage Trust Group <ht~p//www.herltagetg.com> at 3 Novemeer zo~-~.
h~ternatlonal Monetary Fund, Offshore Financial Ceni~’e Progt’am: Progress Report, (2002)
footnote 10.
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Sig~ffficant recent advances are evidenced in the regulation of service providers in
most of the non-OECD OFCs, wlffch now have expansive reginaes for such regulation
For example, the Cayman Islands Monetary Authority522 and the Financial Services
Commission in the British Virgin Islands523 are responsible for the supervision o
financial services and regulate and supervise banking, collective investment
insurance business, investment business and trust and company service providers, a
is also the case with the Jersey Financial Services Commission.5z4
The benclnnarking process reproved hem demonstrated that the examined financia
services sectors within OECD countries were often relatively unregulated or poorly
controlled when compared to those now extant in the principal non-OECD OFCs.5~S
The UK Treasury apparently shares tiffs conclusion following recent comparisons o
co~porate regulation in certain offshore centres with that in the UK.526
(e) Case Study: Delaware LLCs and Corporations
The United States of America is home to the largest financial se~wices markets in th
world. It is a well regulated jurisdiction with a long lffstory of leadership in th
522 Cayman Islands Monetat2 Authority <http://www.cimoney.com.ky> at 3 November 2003.
5~ ’Financial Services Cormnission Holds First Board Meeth~g’, lslands Szm Newspaper (British
Virgin Islands), 7 Jnue 2002.
s2a Jersey Financial Services Com~nission <htlp://www.jerseyfse.org> at 3 November 2003.
s~5 Stikeman Elliot, above n 511.
5~6 The UK Treasury paper entitled Regulatory Impact Analysis Disclosure of Beneficial Ownersblp of
Unlisted Companies, July 2002 at 3.11.9. notes as follows:
Whilst the UK regime has been praised for its business friendliness and pragmatism in
attracting foreign companies to establish themselves here, it also has its critics at home and
abroad. Indeed, centres once considered disreputable by UK standa~xls now have stricter
company regulation, in certain respects, than the UK (see, e.g. the Jersey and Bermudan laws
on beneficial ownership). Thus the cta’reut system raises issues of how to balance file hiterests
of the national economy aud intematlonal leadership.
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regulation of financial services, and is a model for other jurisdictions.527 However,
state govenm~ents within the US are not pa~ies to agreements struck by the federal
goverrmaent with the OECD and other supranational agencies. States within the US
facilitate establishment of corporate entities which do not meet regulatory standards
established by these agencies.
The potential for non-tariff trade barriers has promoted unease among clients of
financial centres established in SDEs. Some states within the OECD, including the US,
have created and then exploited this uncex~ainty in promoting their own anonymous
tax-free facilities which compete directly with those in non-OECD "offshore
centres,,.528
The single member Delaware LLC competes directly with an International Business
Company (IBC) and is ubiquitous in the "offshore" world. There are more than
300,000 corporations established in Delaware.529 Where the LLC is established by a
non-US person for non-US activity, it is fi’ee fi’om any US tax reporting, exposures or
filing requirements. No ch~ulges increasing the regnlation applicable to this vehicle
paralleling those now applicable and proposed for IBCs are in prospect for Delaware
corporations. Delaware law does not require the local corporate service provider to
obtain beneficial ownership i~fformation on establishment of the company; only the
name of the person requesting the company is required. In many cases, the "customer"
527 The Uniting and S~rengthening America by Proving Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
Obsh’uct Te~a’orism enacted on October 26 2001, the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, the Bank
Secrecy Act (BSA) of 1970 which covered the Cun’ency Transaction Report, and the Suspicious
~Ctivity Report was included in the BSA in April 1996.
For example, in an article promoting tax-fi’ee trusts established in the US entitled "Trust US"
appearing in the FT Expat the author states that:
The US has considerable advantages over traditional offshore financial centres as a haast
jm’isdiction. Unlike traditional "tax havens" and offshore financial centres, the US is above
saspicion by Em’opean tax authorities.                         >
State of                      ~ orations <h //www state de us/cor at 3 November 2003Delaware, Division of Co ’p "     ip:     .    . .     p                  .
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requesting the company will be a wholesaler of corporate shell companies located 
another country so no data will be collected on the beneficial owners,
Delaware LLCs can be formed in two hours for US$500.53o The Delawa
Government staffs its corporate registry until midnight, The anonymity confen’ed b
Delaware LLC is widely touted by the private sector, including to non-US clients,5
The ~vebsite for the Secretary of State for Delaware describes the jurisdiction as T
Incorporating Capital of the V~ot’ld.532
Concerns arising from the use of Delaware corporations in the offshore market we
authoritatively documented by the US General Accounting Office in a repol~ tabled 
October 2000 entitled Suspicious Banking Activities: Possible Money Laundering by
U.S. Corporations Formed for Russian Entities (the "GAO Report"). The report wa
conm~issioned by Senator Carl Levin as background research for the US Sen
Commission on Suspicious Banking Activity. That Commission published a Rep
on Correspondent Banking in February 2001 to focus public concern on the dange
posed by poorly regulated offshore companies and banks.533
530 State of Delaware, Fee Schedule (2004) Division of Cm’porations - Filing and Certification Fees
<http://www.state.de.us/corp/fee.shtmt> at 13 Jnly 2004.
~3~ Delaware Corporate Agents Inc, [l’hy h~co~7~orate or Yol’ltt a Limited Liability Company hi
Delcni,are? <http://www.delcorp.com/ydeco~p.ht~n> at 3 November 2003 and Harvard Business
Services Ine, Delmvare htcorporation hfot’mation <http://www.delawa~inc.com/llcintro.hlml> at 3
November 2003.53~ Delaware also has considerable appeal to US and other OECD based incorporators as well. Era’on,
for example, established 675 of its 2000 corporate vehieles in the state (see "Delaware aud Era’on" b
Brian Naylo~,, National Public Radio, 7 March, 2002.) Em’on’s use of non-US companies has ath’act
much adverse media conunent, thoagh its nmnerous incmporations in Delaware appear to have la~ely
escaped notice or comment.
533 Minority Staffofthe Permanent Subconunittee on Investigations, Report on Con’espondent Banking
A Gateway for Money Laundering, 5 Feb~uary 2001.
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Tl~e GAO Report detailed the establishment of Delaware corporations for thirty to
fifty Moscow-based brokers of corporate shells. The service provider, Euro-American
Corporate Services Inc., sourced its business tln’ough a Russian shareholder and
director. The GAO noted that this individual "had a close relationship with companies
associated with members of the former Soviet Union’s intelligence agency".534 This
Rassian individual was also a director of a US bank, Co~mnercial Bank of San
Francisco. This US financial institution opened bank accounts for the Delaware
corporations established by Euro-American without aw independent due diligence.53s
The GAO documented the establishinent of more than 2000 Delaware companies for
Russians over the period fi’om 1997 to 2000. The companies were formed in blocks of
10 to 20 at a time, and sold to Russian corporate brokers, who sometimes sold the
shell companies to others who, according to the GAO Report, may also have sold
them again.536
The GAO notes that a Euro-American employee indicated that "Euro-Amefican
conducted no due diligence with respect to any company it incorporated because state
law does not require it".s37 Delaware law requires no filing of financial information as
a corporate matter, nor is any required for tax purposes, where companies are not
subject to US tax.
Euro-American rented an office in Delaware although no one physically occupied the
premises. Telephone calls mad mail were forwarded to an office of Euro-American
sn United States General Accounting Office, Suspicious Baoking Activities: Possible Money
~asundering by U S. Corporations Formed for Russian Entities (2000 GAO) 10.
Ibid 11.
lbid 7.
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outside the state. Despite a presence in the state described by Eum-American as a
mere "formality’’s3s, the GAO was advised by an official of Delawm’e’s Division 
Corporations that the virttaal presence complied with Era’o-American’s obligations as
a Delaware registered incorporation agent,s39
Two US banks opened a total of 236 bank accounts for these companies with no due
diligence beyond Euro-Amefican’s assurances that it had investigated the companies.
On investigation the GAO was informed that the bank accounts were used to "move
money ont of Russia".54° The GAO tracked $1.4 billion wire transfe~a’ed to such
accounts, usually fi’om ontside the US. Most of the funds were transferred out sho~lly
after receipt to other foreign accounts. The GAO concluded that "flaese banking
activities raise questions about whether the US banks were used to lannder money".54~
No information of any kind was obtained about the shareholders of the Delaware
companies, and there was no requirement to provide financial infomaation. There was
no appm’ent prospect of retrieving such data by an investigative system or in any othe
fashion, since the chain of resellers and the ultimate user of the company would be
unknown to Euro-American in its capacity as the Delaware service provider.542 In any
event, Euro-American maintained no substantive presence in the State and was no
apparently amenable to effective supervision.
53~ lbid 7.
539 Ibid.
~40 Ibid.
54~ Ibid 2.
54z Ibid 7. "According to the president oflBC and the Em’o-banerican employee, Era’o-American
conducted no due diligence witl~ respect to any cmnpany it h~corporsted because state law does not
requh’e it."
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The absence of any of the elements of information which the OECD insists must be
available in Non-OECD OFCs is standard practice under Delaware’s current regime
for iucorporation.
The GAO summarised their report on the Delaware companies in question as follows:
It is relatively easy for foreign individuals or entities to hide their identities
while forming shell corporations that can be used for the purpose of
laundering money.543
The US Senate Cormnission report on suspicious banking activity tabled in February
2001 made no reference to the GAO repm~, despite having requested the Report and
receiving it in October 2000.
Given the GAO’s conclusion and that the OECD’s expe~t group was presumably
aware of the GAO Report, Stikeman Elliot asserts that two alternative explanations
may exist for why the OECD did not choose to cormnent substantively on Delaware
LLCs in the OECD Repm~. The first is that the assumptions in the OECD Report are
\vrong and that therefore the OECD judged that the risk of illegal activities using
standards exemplified by the existing regulatory regime for Delaware LLCs does not
justify increasing the regulatory burden for Delaware LLC’s when to do so might
undermine the competitive position of Delaware LLCs as the vehicle of choice for the
large market share of international business now held by Delaware. The secoM
alternative is that the assumptions in the OECD Report are correct but that multiple
5~3 lbid 11.
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standards are being advanced by the OECD with non-OECD jurisdictions being
expected to beat’ more onerous burdens in order to displace the relatively small
amount of international financial services business which these jurisdictions euta’ently
provide.544
09 Case Study - Luxembourg 1929 Holding Companies
Luxembourg is an OECD Member with a long established and very large inte~aational
finance centre which competes directly with many non-OECD IFCs. Luxembourg has
a corporate regime to encourage the incorporation of companies that hold and manage
shareholdings in other companies. These companies are prohibited fi’om carrying on
industrial or commercial activities, establishing offices open to the public and holding
real estate. As of Januat3’ 1998 there were 13,700 such companies with subscribed
capital of approximately EUR 31 billion.545 Given that this amomat reflects only
subscribed capital, the total value of these companies is no doubt significantly higher.
A 1929 Holding Company is exempt frmn all co~]?orate taxes in Luxembourg, except
for a 1% tax on subscribed share capital and an annual subscription duty of 0.2% on
the pat’ value of the company’s shares. There is no withholding tax on dividends pai
by the company and no tax in Luxembourg on liquidation.546
Although a 1929 Holding Company must have a registered office in Luxembourg and
file abridged audited financial statements (which do not contain details of the
Slikeman Elliot, above n 525.
The Luxembomg "1929" Holding Company and the "Societal de Participation Financi~re", pubt
Luxembourg: KPMG Financial Engineering, 2000, p. 4.
Stikemao Elliot, above n 544.
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composition of the portfolios held by the company), there is limited public
bfl’ormation available on 1929 Holding Companies. The founding shareholders are
identified in the Articles of Incorporation of the company which are registered with
the "Administration de l’Em’egistrement" and filed With the Companies’ Registrar.
Nominee shareholders are permitted, as there is no obligation to file beneficial
owuership information. Furthermore, a 1929 Holding Company can issue bearer
shares which are fi’eely transferable by the physical transfer of a share certificate.
Thus, after incorporation it may become difficult if not impossible to identify the
beneficial owner(s) of the company. 1929 Holding Companies may have nominee
directors as well as corporate directors and a corporate secretary. There is no
requirement for directors to be resident in Luxembourg. There is accordingly, little
information readily available to the Luxembourg authorities on beneficial ownerslfip
and control of 1929 Holding Companies.547
Luxembourg has fiscal and banking secrecy laws. In the international fiscal context,
the Luxelnbourg judicial authorities can only assist foreign tax authorities on matters
relating to tax frand but not e~vil or administrative tax matters.
The OECD Report notes that vehicles are subject to misuse where they enable
individuals to hide their identity behind corporate fm~s and where "the capacity of
the authorities to obtain and share information on beneficial ownership aud control for
regulatory/supexwisory and law enforcement purposes" is constrained,s48 The OECD
~ Robert den Hartog and George Deitz Parliament to Pass Lm~,s on Royalty Withholding Tax and
1929 Holding Companies (2004) Deloitte
~Www.deloitte.com/dtt/cd~/doc/content/lu tax 050404(1).pdf> at 28 Apr 2004.
*~ Organisation for Economic Cooperation an~t Development, above n 518, 13.
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Repo~qt does not address concerns regarding the susceptibility of the Luxembourg
1929 Holding Company to misuse.
As was the case in regard to the absence of substantive comment in the OECD Report
regarding the Delaware LLC, Stikeman Elliot again asserts that two conclusions are
possible in respect of Luxembourg 1929 holding companies. The fn’st is that the
regulatory regime in Luxembourg is appropriate to the risk and benefits associated
with tiffs segment of the financial se~wices industry generally and that therefore the
assumptions in the OECD Report are wrong. The second is that the OECD employs
mnltiple standards in the OECD Repo~ depending upon whether the relevant
regulatory regime for a particular segment of trade in services is within an OECD
Member State or in a competitor of OECD Member States.
5.5.2 Trusts
(a) Uses of Trusts
The OECD recognises the trust549 to be an "important, usefnl, and legitimate vehicle
for the transfer and management of assets".55° Trusts are used to facilitate control and
management of assets held for the benefit of miuors and individuals who are
incapacitated, for charitable purposes, for tax and estate planning and for supporting
corporate transactions. The preservation of family assets tlu’ough generations is the
key for many individual settlors, particularly those with experience of repressiv
governments.
549 Treated as a corporate vebicle for purposes of the OECD Repo~~t, which it is not.
55o Organisation for Econonfic Cooperation and Development, above n 548, 25.
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lu the personal context trusts are used for the following:
inter vivos and testamentary family trusts;
o trusts arising under wills and hrtestacies;
estates under administration; and
charitable trusts.
(b) The Natm’e of a Trust
The OECD Reporqc examines t~aasts on the premise that tire toast is a "corporate
vehicle". This description is no doubt adopted for convenience, though it implies
confusion over the fundamental nature of the trust concept,ssl
Trusts provide for a distinction between legal ’and equitable ownership. A trust has
been defined as follows:
A trust is an equitable obligation, binding a person (who is called a trustee) to
deal with property over which he has control (wlfich is called the trust
property), for the benefit of persons (who are called the beneficiaries or
cestuis que trust), of whom he may himself be one, and any of whom may
enforce the obligation.5s2
ss~ lbid.
s~ Underhill and Hayton, Lmv of Trusts and Trustees (15t~ ed, 1995) 3. As they note, these sentences
Were expressly approved by Romer LJ in Green v Russell [1959] 2 QB 226 at 241, though they lmve
been criticised as not being exhaustive. For example, developments in trusts h~ recent years are such
that this definition may now be seen as too narrow; it does not inclnde, for example, non-charitable
purpose tt~asts.
As a matter of legal principle, an Anglo-Saxon trust is a relationship, not a contractual
agreement as the OECD indicates.S53 It is not an entity or vehicle, as it is not a legal
person.
The OECD Report notes the use of trusts primarily in English Conmaon law
jurisdictions,554 overlooking the increasing recognition of the use of trusts in civil law
jurisdictions. Whilst such countries may not have their own trust laws yet, some, such
as Switzerland, actively conduct the administration of foreign law trusts. Countries
which undet{ake such administration must therefore by definition be inclnded in any
analysis and should likewise be part of tire process of setting the international
standards.
The Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts and Their Recognition (198
has been ratified by most jurisdictions with significant financial se~Mces sectors.
Article II provides as follows:
For the pmq?oses of this Convention, the term "trust" refers to the lega
relationships created...by a person, the settlor, when assets have been place
under the control of a trustee for the benefit of a beneficiary or for a specified
pmq?ose.555
A trust has the following characteristics:
(a) the assets constitute a separate fund and are not pm~t of the trustee’s own estate;
553 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, above n 551, 45.
554 Ibid 25.             ~ ....... ~-nal Law Co~wention On The Law Applicable To Trusts
555 ttague Conference 011 ~-rlvate illte[l~t~u
And On Theh’ Recognition (Concluded July 1st, 1985)
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b) title to the trust assets stands in the name of the trustee or in the name of another
person on behalf of the trustee;
c) the trustee has the power and the duty, in respect of which he is accountable, to
manage, employ or dispose of the assets in accordance with the terms of the trust
and the speeial duties imposed upon him by law.
The reservation by the settlor of certain rights and powers, and the fact that the trustee
may himself have rights as a beneficiary, are not necessarily inconsistent with the
existence of a trugt.
The settlor’s ability to choose to retain significant rights over assets transfen’ed to a
trust is, accordingly, widely accepted. The OECD Repotqc states that "settlors
attempting to evade taxes may transfer assets into a trust and then falsely claim that
they have relinquished control over the assets’’556. If a settler retains excessive contro!
or a trust is not administered in accordance with its terms and its governing law, the
trust is subject to challenge as invalid, or a sham. Trustees are aware of the risks of
acting as the settlor’s stooge and few will run the risk of a suit for breach of trust by
disgruntled beneficiaries.
(c) Benchmark
One of the reasons given for the OECD’s focus on Non-OECD OFCs was that such
countries allegedly had weak supervisory and regulatory systems. Findings
~56 Organisation for Economic Cooperation aud Development, above n 554, 26.
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concerning the regulation of t~’ustees557 indicate that this allegation is incorrect, as it
was also in the corporate service provider context.
Trust services providers are licensed or regnlated, in all of the non-OECD
jurisdictions examined with the exception of the Isle of Man, which is due to
introduce regulation of trustees shortly. By contrast, most of the OECD jurisdictions
do not regulate or license their trustees. The Transcrime Report confirms this in
relation to Ireland:
There is some opacity in the management of the trust as well; there is no
anthority that supervises the activity of trustees.558
The "Level Playing Field" report concluded that OECD jurisdictions are thus for t
most part unable to regulate or control the quality or fitness to practice of trustees
based or operating within such states, and lack the power to impose, monitor an
importantly, enforce standards of competence and probity on those t~tstees.
Research by the ITIO presented in the "Level Playing Field" report indicates that
non-OECD OFCs examined have extensive legislation regulating trustees, and
some cases, such legislation has been in place for some considerable time. They arg
that the non-OECD OFCs are clearly well advanced compared to the majority
OECD countries. Non-OECD OFCs note that the OECD has acknowledged that n
Detailed review found under Appendix D.
Research Centre on Trat~snational Crime - lJniversity of Trento, above n 514, 106.
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ECD OFC regulatory and supervisory regimes would serve as useful models for
’ es 559
onshore" jurisdictions seeking to improve their regulatory or supervisory reglm .
Ability to Exchange Information Internationally
To benchmark the "Level Playing Field" report, it is determined whether the countries
surveyed are members of the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units (the
,’Egmont Group") on the basis that membership of this group is a reliable indicator of
whether provisions for intelaaational exchange of information exist in any particular
The Egmont Group now comprises 69 member countries which maintain operational
financial intelligence units ("FlU"s). An FIU is a specialised govermnent agency
which has been created as part of a country’s systems for dealing with the problem of
money laundering. These entities facilitate fire collation and exchange of information
for the interdiction of money laundering between financial institutions and law
e~fforcement/prosecutorial authorities within individual countries, as well as between
jurisdictions.
Of the 15 jurisdictions evaluated all are members of the Egmont Group¯
5.6 Recommendations and Conclusions
5,6.1 Argument for a Level Playing Field
It is argued by Stikeman Elliot that for progress to be premised on the basis that
uniform tales, developed in an inclusive process are implemented by all states, on the
same time frame, with the same consequences for those states which do not co-
operate. This is a fundamental objective, and essential to effectively ac!fieving an
equitable result.
The imposition of more onerous "compliance requirements" exclusively on non
0ECD Member countries could be seen as hypocritical. Efforts to minimise the
misuse of corporate vehicles should not be used as a guise for undermining th
competitive position of those jurisdictions which have limited input into th
standards’ design process. To allow this misuse would be to componnd the non-ta
barriers to the trade hr selwices arising in other initiatives.
The ITIO believed that individual sovereign jurisdictions should have the opportu
to develop their own methods to ensure the timely access to corporate ownersh
i~ffom~ation and the exchange of such information which is consistent with their
legal and soeial environmant. As long as such infom~ation is available on a ti
basis and subjeet to exchange in texans and circumstances agreed by consensus,
means through which this is aelfieved should be left to the individual st
concerned .561
5.6.2 Balancing Competing Considerations - Confidentiality
561 Stikeman Elliot, above rt 559.
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It is essential that confidentiality considerations are also taken into account in any
development of new rules and regulations. R is dangerously inappropriate to seek law
enforcement objectives to the exclusion of other considerations in civil society.
Co~afidentiality is a basic human right and accordingly, any implications which may
concern cmffidentiality need to be seriously considered by all the countries concerned.
5.6.3 Proportionate and Risk-Based Regulation
Appropriate regulation must strike a balance between law enforcement objectives and
the reasonable needs of legitimate commerce. Accordingly the regulations must be
proportionate to the risks and benefits associated with the activity being regulated.
A regulatory regime should focus attention and resources on those customers,
accounts aud transactions that are most vulnerable to money laundering and terrorist
financing. An approach which does not permit a meaningfid differentiation among
customers, accounts and transactions will result in a misallocation of resources and
reduce effective deterrence and prevention.
5.7 EU Savings Tax Directive Changes Level Playing Field
The EU came to a decision on the EU Savings Tax Directive.562 With the introduction
of automatic exchauge for some and withholding tax for others, the level playing field
is perceived to have become clem’ly biased. The EU Savings Tax Directive effectively
gives the green light for four different regimes from 1 Janum3’ 2004:
Council Directive (EC) No 2003/48/EC of 3 June 2003 Tm’ation of Savings htcome in the Form of
hlterest Payments [2003] OJ L 157, 38,
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Withholding tax on EU residents’ accounts (Switzerland, Austria, Belgium,
Luxembourg, and probably Andorra, San Marino, Liechtenstein)
Automatic exchauge of information on EU resident accounts (EU and Gibraltar
including probably the Crown Dependencies, Overseas Territories)
The US (exchange of information and automatic exchange via bilateral tax treaties)
The rest of the world, some of whom had committed to OECD (e.g. Panama,
Antigua and Barbuda) and others likely to come under new pressures (e.g. Hong
Kong, Singapore)563
Nevertheless, even in the absence of the detail, it is felt that this is a very good
outcome for the Swiss, as it means no timetabled commitment to automatic exchange.
The pressure is now off the Swiss and they can take an even more robust line with th
OECD. But more importantly this is an excellent outcome for the US, who have
controversially been deemed equivalent by the EU.
The OECD denied that the EU proposal meant that the OCED was moving a~vay fr
a level playing field approach in its drive to end harmful tax practices and ensure fa
competition on tax matters.564
563 The European Union Savings Dh’ective (council directive 2003/48/EC) was agreed on 3 June 2003.
sea In 2002, by promising a level playing field (non-discrimination) between members (incinding all 
coantries) and non-members, the OECD encouraged nnmerous small countries, including most ITIO
members, to co,muir to exchanging tax information on request fi’om 2006. However, the proposed EU
saving tax directive flies in the face of the OECD pro~nise by giving four OECD members - Anstria,
Belgium and Lnxembonrg and Switzerland - a competitive advantage over non-OECD com~tries by
allowing them to defer exchanging information until 2011 or later. See ’Europe tba’eatening OECD’s
plans to swap tax info~ natinn (2003) Trusts & Trastees <http://www.tt~asts-and-
trustees.coln/crn/press_release/pr_apr01-04"html> at 28 April 2004.
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The EU and the OECD projects have been and continue to be different in their
scope and eoverage. With regard to hlformation exchange, the EU’s objective
is the automatic exchange of information on personal savings accounts. The
OECD countries are looking for exchange of information in relation to a
broader range of ~nobile financial se~-cices, but on a case-by-case basis rather
than an automatic basis.565
5.8 Selective Offshore Responses to OECD and FATF Initiatives
5.8.1 Caribbean
(i) Cayman Islands
Money Laundering Legislation
In order to establish how the Cayman authorities have reacted to international
pressure, attention is drawn to the Cayman Islands legislation as this was the
first British dependency to pass "all crimes anti-money laundering"
legislation,s66 Similar legislation has now been passed in a number of other
co~mnon law offshore jurisdictions. It has followed an evolutionary path
similar to that of onshore legislation.
56~ Quotation fi’om spokesman Nick Bray fi’om Keith Johnston, ’Changing the Rules of the Game’
!.2.003) 11 The STEP Journal 16.
~ Money Laundering Regulations 2000 (Laws of the Cayman Islauds)
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In 1990, the Misuse of Drugs Laws67 ("MODL") implemented the Viem~a
Convention recommendations by creating anti-money laundering provisions in
respect of the proceeds of drug-related offences, reporting of the proceeds and
mutual legal assistance in respect of investigations into drug-related crime,s68
These broad provisions were extended to all serious crimes in 1996, when the
Cayman Islands’ legislature enacted the Proceeds of Criminal Conduct Law569
("PCCL"). These two statutes now operate alongside one another: the MDL
applying to the proceeds of drug-related offences; the PCCL applying to the
proceeds of all other indictable offences.
The PCCL created four offences of money laundering based upon the UK
Criminal Justice ActsT° (CJA), namely, the offences of
facilitating tbe retention of the proceeds of criminal conduct (s.21)
acquiring, possessing or using the proceeds of criminal conduct
(s .22)
concealing, disguising or transfen’ing the proceeds of criminal
conduct (s.23)
tipping off (s.24)
567 Misuse of Drugs Lmv 1990 rev (Laws of the Cayman Islands)
565 Tiffs fldfills the FATF Recommendations 4: Each count~’ should take such measures as may 
necessmy, including legislative ones, to eoable it to criminalise money lanndering as set forth in the
Vienna Convention. Each countt2~ should extend the offence of drag tunney laundering to one based on
serinns offences. Each conntry would determine which serious crimes wonld be desigaated as money
lanndering predicate offences; and 5: As provided in the Vienna Convention, the offence of money
lanndering shnnld apply at least to knowing money laundering activity, innluding the concept that
knowledge may be Iffferred from objective factual circmnstances.
5~9 a ConductLmv 1996 Laws of the Cayman Islands)Proceeds of Cr#nin 1 ( Order 1957o mal usttce Act 1988 Apphcatmnto Service Cmu’ts) (Evidence)UnitedKit~gdom CHt "ti J " (    " ’ "
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The above offences are committed by anyone who facilitates the retention
(s.21), acquisition (s.22) or concealment (s.23) of the proceeds, of criminal
conduct while "knowing or suspecting" its real provenance.
In order to avoid liability under the PCCL, banks, trust companies and other
financial institutions must disclose suspicious transactions to a Repo~ing
Authority whose function is to collate and investigate such repo~s. Banks and
other financial institutions making a disclosure report in good faith cannot be
held liable to their customers in these circumstances for breach of their duty of
confidentiality.571
By s.21(10) of the PCCL, the original offence that gives rise to the proceeds of
criminal conduct must be an offence to which the PCCL relates, specifically
an indictable (i.e. serious) offence committed in the geographical
jurisdiction of the Cayman Islands
conduct that would amount to an offence indictable (i.e. triable) in
the Cayman Islands if that condnct has occurred in the
geographical jurisdiction of the Cayman Islands.
~-~TThis fulfils FATF Recolmnendatinn 16: Financial institutions, their directors, officers and
elnpinyees should be protected by legal provisions fi’om criminal or civil liability for breach of any
restriction on disclosure of information imposed by contract or by any legislative, regulatory or
administrative provision, if they report their suspicions in good faith to the competent authorities, even
if they did not know precisely what the underlying criminal activity was, aud regardless of \vhether
illegal activity actually occurred.
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These provisions represent a statntory definition of a traditional common law
principle known as the "dual criminality principle". A person is liable for
laundering the proceeds of crime if (and only if) the original crime is
indictable in the Cayman Islands (in 99% of cases this means it must have
been committed there) or the criminal conduct wonld amount to an offence
indictable in the Cayman Islands had that conduct occurred in the Cayman
Islands. In simple terms, this means that the original offence must be a crime
committed in the Cayman Islands, or that the specific conduct would amount
to a crime had it been committed in the Cayman Islands.sTa
PCCL and Tax Evasion: The Majority View
Does the offence of facilitating the retention (s.21), acquisition (s.22) or
concealment (s.23) of tire proceeds of criminal conduct include retaining,
acquiring or concealing the proceeds of foreign tax evasion? Is a Caymania
finaucial services provider obliged to disclose to the Repo~ing Aufl~ority hi
belief or suspicion that his services are being used unlawfully to evade foreig
tax?
The Cayman Islands now have "all crimes ~noney laundering" legislation 
contains a si~nple statuto~2¢ dual criminality provision. A bank, trust compa
or service provider will become liable if it assists in facilitating the retentio
acquisition or conceahnent etc. of the proceeds of criminal conduct if (an
only if) the criminal conduct
572 Parkinson and Howarth, above n 304, 92-4.
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is a crime indictable in the Cayman Islands, or
would amount to an indictable crime if the conduct had occun’ed in the
Cayman Islands
It is argued by many Caymmfian commentators that as the Cayman Islands
have no form of direct taxation, and therefore no laws making it a crime to
evade such tax, it cmmot be a crime to facilitate the retention, acquisition or
concealment of the proceeds of foreign tax evasion. Furthermore, there is no
requirement to make a disclosure to the Reporting Authority if an institution
believes or suspects that its services are being used by a customer to evade
foreign tax.
Filing a false tax return in the US is not a crime in the Cayman Islands.
Besides, it is tbe opinion of the majority that it would not amount to a crime
had the conduct occurred in the Cayman Islands. There is no income tax in the
Cayman Islands and it cannot, therefore, be a crhne to evade it. 573
Au agreement was made between the Gove~nent of the United States of
America and the Govermnent of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, including the Gove~nent of the Cayman Islands, for tbe
exchange of infmanation relating to taxes, with respect to criminal tax evasion
s~3 lbid 95-6.
241
for taxable periods commencing fi’om 2004, and shall have effect with respect
to all other matters for taxable periods commencing fl’om 2006.574
The Minority View
While it is true that there are no direct taxes levied in the Cayman Islands
there is still some form of "tax" in the more general sense of the word, (such
as a tourist tax, stamp duty and import duties). It is a criminal offenc
unlawfully to evade these types of taxes in the Cayman Islands (by, f
example, dishonestly filing a false return to the appropriate governmen
authority). It could, therefore, be argued that tax evasion in its widest sense i
an indictable crime in the Islands. Accordingly, an argument could 
developed that the evasion of foreign tax would be a crime if that conduct h
occurred in the Cayman Islands. A service provider who facilitates t
retention and conceals the source of foreign tax evasion is, therefore, guilty o
money laundering contrary to the PCCL.
Even if tax evasion is not a crime in the Cayman Islands, an individual 
has unlawfully evaded tax abroad may not be indicted for the crime of t
evasion. He may (in the UK for instance) be indicted for the conunon l
offence of cheat/fi’aud, or for any of the "theft" offences, such as deceptio
false accounting or forgery. These types of offence are very much a crime 
the Cayman Islands and, therefore, the dual criminality test referred to abo
may be met. It could, therefore, be argued that an individual perpetratin
374 U.S. Treasury Press Release, ’Agreement Between U.S. and Gov’t of UK, Northern Ireland and
Cayman Islands for Tax Info Exchange" 2001
<http:lAwvw.usa’eas.govlpressh’eleaseslarchives/2OOl.htmt> at 28 April 2004.
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foreign tax fraud would, by Iris conduct, have conmaitted the crimes of fraud,
deception, and false accounting etc., if his conduct had occurred in the
Cayman Islands. A service provider who facilitates the retention and conceals
the source of foreign tax evasion is, therefore, guilty of money laundering
contrary to the PCCL. 575
In sununary, however, the conventional view is that the Cayman Islands anti-
money laundering legislation (the PCCL) rests upon a dual criminality test.
There is no crime of tax evasion in the Cayman Islands (because there are no
direct taxes) and, therefore, there can be no offence of laundering the proceeds
of foreign tax evasion. It re~nains to be seen whether the conventional view is
accepted by the judiciary.
The Schedule to tire PCCL of 1996 at the interpretation section in paragraph
3(1) contained a clause, which provided that:
(Criminal) conduct to which (the) Schedule applies is conduct which:576
constitutes an offence to which (the PCCL) applies, or
would constitute such an offence if it had occun’ed in the Cayman
Islands, other than drug trafficking offences (covered by the MDL)
rOCeeds of Crhninal Conduct Lcm, 1996 (Laws of the Cayman Islands) para 3(1).
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"and offences which relate directly or indirectly to the regulation,
imposition, calculation or collection of taxes..."
The Schedule is principally concerned with the enforcement of foreign
confiscation orders. The exception refen’ed to in the interpretation section,
therefore, says in effect that the Grand Court of the Cayman Islands will not
enforce foreign judgment or foreign confiscation orders made in relation to tax
debts, or in relation to the evasion of foreign taxes. However, the exception
originally found in the PCCL of 1996 and emphasised by the italics above was
removed two years later by the Proceeds of Criminal Conduct (Foreign
Offences) (Amendment) Law (Law 18 of 1998).
Disregarding the political manoeuvring, if any, the exception has now bee
repealed, and the Cayman Islands anti-money laundering legislation rests npo
a dual criminality provision. Of course, if the majority view prevails, thi
means that financial service providers will not become liable for money
laundering if they facilitate the retention (s.21), acqnisition (s.22) or
concealment of the source (s.24) of the proceeds of foreign tax evasion. Nor
do they have to repox~t those customers and clients whom they suspect ar
unlawfully evading foreign tax.
The compelling nature of this argument rests upon the fact that the Cayma
Islands do not finpose any fol~n of direct tax. It is an argtmaent which is (
will be) adopted by other nil tax havens that have enacted "all crimes an
money laundering" legislation. It is not an argument, however, that can 
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adopted by the low tax havens of Europe, such as the Channel Islands and the
Isle of Man (nor indeed by Bermuda because of its pay-roll tax) which feel
that they have now been placed at a significant disadvantage as international
financial centres when compared with the Caribbean nil tax centres. 577
Mutual Legal Assistance
Mutual legal assistance and, in particular, the sharing between states of
information relating to money laundering, is another OECD
578
recommenoatlon.
The Confidential Relationships (Preservation) Law makes it a crinfinal offence
for any person to divulge, attempt to divulge, wilfully obtain or attempt to
obtain any information which is confidential. In 1986 a treaty was signed
between the United States and the United Kingdom (including the Cayman
Islands) on mutual legal assistance in crinfinal matters - The Mntual Legal
Assistance Treaty.
The objects stated in the treaty are to improve the effectiveness of the law
e~fforcement authorities of both the United States and the Cayman Islands in
the investigation, prosecution and suppression of crime tlu’ough co-operation
and mutual legal assistance in criminal matters. The treaty provides machinery
whereby the Attorney-General of the United States can request that otherwise
57s arkinson and Howarth, above n 575, 97-9,This is the OECD Recommendation 8: Exchanges of information - Countries should trade take
programs to h~tensify exchange of information concerning transactions h~ tax havens and preferential
tax regimes constituting harmfid tax competition,
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confidential infolTnation be ordered to be released by the Cayman authority
(the Chief Justice of the Cayman Islands or other Grand Court Judge) when
the Cayman authority is satisfied that the information is properly required in
connection with the investigation, suppression or persecution of various types
of criminal activity.579
The Repo~ing Authority established under the PCCL may share information i
receives in relation to suspicious transactions with other agencies including,
with the consent of the Attorney General, overseas agencies situated outside
the geographical jurisdiction of the Cayman Islands.
Confiscation anti forfeiture orders and restraining orders may be made in
respect of the proceeds of criminal conduct that find their way into the
Cayman Islands’ financial system (s.6 PCCL). Fm~hermore, the Grand Cou
of the Cayman Islands will enforce foreign confiscation and forfeiture orders
when it has been established by a foreign cou~t that funds in the Caym
Islands’ financial system represent the proceeds of criminal condnct (ss.29-36
580
Secrecy and Confidentiality
Banking confidentiality is well-established in Cayman thi’ough the c
law, and is also ensln’ined both in the Banks and Trust Compmfies Law
and in the Co~ffidential Relationships (Preservation) Law 1995. Bankin
579                   ~ C I o~at~o~l <ht /Iwww aall corn> at 3AallTrustandBanki~g -p’" , tp:     . .         November2003.
5~0 Parkinson and Howarth, above n 577, 100-1.
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and government officials face civil and criminal sanctions if information is
disclosed without authorisation. A mlmber of laws permit the enforcement of
foreign ,judgements or the disclosure of information in response to a cout~t
order, but normally in the context of criminal activity and drug use or dealing.
Despite mutual assistance treaties, the Cayman Islands will not normally co-
operate with fiscal investigations, and does not no~ally respond to requests
for assistance on fiscal matters.58~
Conchtsion
The provisions of modern anti-money laundering legislation oblige banks,
tvast companies, and other financial and corporate service providers to be
exceedingly careful. Inquiries concerning the provenance of each client’s
funds have to be made more prudent than at any time in the past. The clear
objective of the legislation is to eradicate the laundering of the proceeds of all
crime. If financial service providers do receive monies that represent the
proceeds of criminal conduct, or become suspicious about their provenance,
the matter ought to be reported to the appropriate authorities (namely, the
authority mentioned in the applicable money laundering legislation). 582
The Cayman Islands which was not included in OECD’s list of tax havens, is
no longer on the FATF NCCTs list, now complies with the directives of the
various supranational organisations as can be seen fi’om the above analysis.
~1~Low~ax.net, Cayman Islands table ofstatute~ <http://w~vw.lowtax 7tet/lowtax/html/jcahom.html> at
’~July 2004.
~
ParkinSon and Howa~h, above n 580, 105-7.
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Money Laundering Legislation
In 2000 Panama adopted four stringent decrees to tin, her screen out money
laundering. These measures were:
1) Legislative Assembly Law No. 41 of October 2, 2000, entitled "Capita
Laundering" and amending the Penal Code by imposing harsh penalties 
up to ten years imprisortment for publicly breaching the secrecy of
information or carrying out unlawful transactions related to capita
laundering;
2) Legislative Assembly Law No. 42 of October 2, 2000, setting dow
Measures for the Prevention of the Crime of Capital Laundering;
3) Ministry of the Presidency Decree No. 136 of October 3, 2000, creating
the Financial Intelligence United for the Prevention of Capital Launderin
4)
and
Executive Decree No. 213 of October 3, 2000, amending the 1984 Decre
relating to the practice of trusts and making it compulsory for banks a
certain financial institutions to render information on "suspicio
transactions".
Under a Panamanian law passed in 1994 with the help of the Panamanian
association, money laundering is penalized with prison sentences recen
raised to a maximtun of 12 years, no bail for defendants, and confiscatio
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assets. Bauk employees are subject to criminal responsibility if found guilty of
allowing any money laundering or bending the rules for extradition of
offenders in drug-related cases.583
A "Financial Analysis Unit (FAU) for the Prevention of Money Laundering
Obtained from Drug Trafficking" operating under Executive Decree No. 136
of June 9,1991 has been successful in compiling information fi’om banks and
other private and Government entities and individuals to inhibit activities
linked to money laundering. In 2000, the FAU received increased authority to
analyze all information compiled to detect suspicious or unusual transactions
and movements of cash in the country from drag trafficking. Confidentiality of
all financial and banking transactions is honoured in order to protect the
respectable status of the FAU.584
Panama and Tax Evasion
Panama has not entered into any double taxation treaties. The mutual legal
assistance treaties contain limited exchange of information provisions.
Information exchange is restricted to i~fformation extracted fi’om the carrying
out of prosecution procedures, not excluding tax matters. The local authorities
~’~This lhlfils the FATF Reconnnendations 4: Each country sbould take such measures as may be
necessary, including legislative ones, to enable it to criminalise money laundering as set forth in the
Vienna Convention. Each couotry should extend the offence of drug money laundering to one based on
Serious offences. Each cormtry would detel~uine which serious crimes would be designated as money
launderiog predicate offences; 5: As provided in the Vienna Conventinn, the offence of money
lauadering should apply at least to knowing money laundering activity, including the concept that
knowledge may bo infeta’ed fi’om objective factual ch’cumstances; aud 6: Where possible, corporations
themselves, nnt only their employees - should be subject to criminal liability.
~ An excerpt fi~o~ Walter-H and Dorothy B Diamond, Panama as a Tax Haven Sovereigu
Managemeut Services, S.A.: Tax Havens of the World <http://www.offshore-
pr°tection.com/panamaHaven.htnal> at 11 November 2003.
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would not grant a request for assistance in an investigation into tax evasion. A
request for co-operation would have to be made by petition.585
Mutual Legal Assistance
In April, 1991, Panama signed an agreement for a "Treaty for the Mutual
Assistance on Criminal Matters" with the United States in order to provide for
more effective coordination between the two countries in dealing with
investigating, prosecuting, and snppressing serious crimes, and with
continuing effort to increase this effectiveness. Despite powerful opposition
from Panamanian bankers, who were concerned the treaty would violate their
secrecy statns code, the National Legislative Assembly of the Republic of
Panama approved the execution of the treaty in July 1991. This Mutual
Assistance Treaty, similar to those approved with other Caribbean Basin
Initiative countries, including Bahanaas, British Virgin Islands and Cayman
Islands, relates to drug abuse, crime and fi’aud, or specifically such criminal
activities as illegal narcotics, theft, crime of violence, fi’aud, or use of fi’aud, or
violation of a law of one of the Contracting States relating to cun’ency or other
financial transactions contributing to the crime. The provisions in the treaty do
not allow for any exchange of information in matters relating to taxation.586
In an effort to cooperate in the arrest of money launderers, the Govenunent
also signed-a Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement with the United Kingdom
585 Spitz, above ~l 274, 623.
s86 This fails to adhere to the OECD Recotnmendation 14: Assistance hi recovery of tax claims -
Conntries should review the ctu~cent tales applying to tbe enforcement of tax claims of other cotmtrles
for the addition to tax conventions.
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and adopted a law tighte~ting requirements for companies’ registered agents
concerning gathering information and their client references. 587
Secrecy and Exchange of Information
Panama has concluded mutua! legal assistance treaties with the US, Costa Rica,
E1 Salvador, Guatemala, Hondnras, Nicaragua and Colo~nbia. The treaties
operate at the administrative level: in other words, Court procedures are not
required, although there is an appeal procedure. The treaties cover serious
crime, but do not include fiscal crime. The Panamanian authorities do not
entertain requests for information on fiscal matters.588
Executive Decree No. 213 of October 2, 2000, which established the Financial
Intelligence Unit for the Prevention of Capital Laundering, covers disclosure
of information eonceruing trusts obtained by the Bmtking Superintendency or
any other Govermnent inspectors and introduces penalties for breaches of
confidentiality in all financial matters. A public official violating this
provision may have to pay a fine up to $1,000,000.
Banks and other financial institutions must practice proper due diligence under
Panamauian law. They are required to know their clients, monitor and repo~
suspicious transactions of which they are aware, establish internal procedures
and controls to prevent money laundering operations, train personnel properly
Dia’n°~d:e~,~;eu215e~tx’ation-- -- Treaties it, Panama
<hltp:llwww.lowtax.netllowtaxlhtmlljpahom.html> at 10 July 2004.
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to deter tainted transactions, and keep records of all documents and
transactions for a period of five years,s89
The July 27, 1994 Law was further strengthened by Executive Decree No. 468
of September 19 of that year, and the Code of Conduct approved by the
International Lawyers Association, which makes it mandatory for all attorneys
to know their clients and ~o obtain sufficient information and references fi’om
clients before rendering any services. A high-level Presidential Conmlission
operates with anthority to use all means to prevent money lanndering and a so-
called "Drug ezra’" coordinates its efforts with other activities to promote anti-
money latmdering.
Presidential Decree No. 163 of October 2, 2000 amended Decree No. 136 of
June 9, 1995, extending the operational capacity of the Financial Intelligence
Unit by listing in detail the Unit’s functions for: (1) covering collection of
information fi’om public institutions and private entities; (2) identifying
suspicious or um~sual transactions by studying information; (3) exchange of
information with si~nilar enterprises in other countries; and (4) providing
assistance when required to the Office of the Attorney Genera! and Banking
Snperintendency.89°
5~9 This fitlfils FATF Recommendation 12: Financial institotions should maintain, for at least five year
all necessary records on trausactions, both domestic or international, to enable them to comply swiftly
with hfformatiml requests fi’om the competent authorities. Such records must be sufficient to pem~it
reconstraetion of individual traasactions (including the aotounts and types of cma’ency involved if auy)
so as to provide, if necessary, evidence for prosecution of criminal behavimu’. Financial iustitutions
should keep records on customer identification (e.g. copies or records of official identification
documents like passports, identity cards, drivhlg licenses or similar documents), account files and
business correspondence for at least five years after the acconnt is closed. These documents should be
available to domestic competent authorities in tile coutext of relevant criminal prosecutions and
investigations.
5~o Diamond, above n 587.
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The FATF on Money Laundering "Black List"
On June 26, 2000, the FATF on Money Laundering issued a "Black List" of
countries considered non-cooperative jurisdictions. Panama was included in
that Black List, as a Class 3 country, which meant that it was a country that
did not co-operate with tax authorities of OECD countries. In June 2001, the
FATF updated the list of NCCTs with the publication of its second NCCT
Review. The four couutries which were taken off the list were Bahamas,
Caynlan Islands, Liechtenstein and Panama.s91
Consequences for Panama
Tile effect for Pauama of its inclusion in this list, was that the OECD
governments had tln’eatened to impose sanctions on the listed countries,
including the prohibition for their financial institutions to perform any kind of
business with any institution located in a listed country.
The curt’era govetamaent, tln’ough the High Level Presidential Cormnission
Against Money Laundering, has the primary responsibility of analyzing the
international events that are affecting the condition of Panama as a centre for
international business, and in particular, the initiatives of the OECD, which
~9~ Fhmncial Action Task Force, Review to Identify Non-Cooperative CounO’ies or Territories:
h~creasing the Worldwide Effectiveness of Anti-ll,ioney Launderh~g Measures (2001 FATF).
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may cause a negative impact in their capability of attracting foreign
investment. 5~
Conclusion
All the legislative improvements are based on the intention to keep Pano~a’s
offshore system, its secrecy laws, banking centre and all its international
seiwices sectors out of the reach of criminals. Furthermore, the" gove~am~ent
wanted to send a clear message to the FATF and the OECD, that Pmaama wa
implementing serious measures to prevent the use of the country for unlawfal
international crimes.593 That paid off and in June 2001, Panama was one of the
four countries taken off the list of countries deemed non-cooperative in the
fight against money laundering.
Panama, which was on both the FATF NCCTs list and the OECD’s list of t
havens, now complies with the directives of the various supranationa
organisations as c~a be seen fi’om the above analysis.
(iii) British Virgin lslands (BV1)
Anti-Money Laundering Legislation
592 Salvatore Bacile and Alvaro Aguilar, Comments of the New World Trends to Enforce Access to
Banking bformation with Tax Purposes (2003) The American Chamber of Cotmnerce and Industay of
Panama (AMCHAM) <www.panamcham.cona> at 11 November 2003.
59~ Parkinson and Hmvarth, above n 582, 15.
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The Proceeds of Criminal Conduct Aet, (together with the Code of Practice /
Money Laundering Regulations passed thereunder) comprise the BVI’s latest
and, in the commercial enviromnent of this jurisdiction, most significant step
in the area of anti-money laundering legislation. This Act came into force on 2
Janum2¢ 1998 and complements pre-existing legislation such as the Drug
Trafficking Offences Act, the Criminal Justice (International Cooperation) Act
and the Mutual Legal Assistance (USA) Act.
In December 1996, the Association of Registered Agents approved a
governing Code of Conduct which extensively covers a wide range of due
diligence procedures to be followed by trust companies and company
formation agents in order to preserve the BVI as an offshore centre and to
prevent the use of the jurisdiction for illegal and criminal purposes. It was the
intention to fmanulate the Code of Conduct into legislation for the purpose of
enhancing the regulatory measures germane to the maintenance of the BVI as
a sound international financial centre.594
Tax Information Exchange Agreement
At the signing of a new Tax lafformation Exchange Agreement with the United
States was the creation of a competent anti-tax evasion tool.595
59~ Joint Anti-Money Lannderiug, Coordinating Committee, Guidance Notes on the Prevention of
MOney Launderh~g, British Virgin Islands, Anti-money Laundering Code of Practice (1999) Official
~OeUments <\vww.archive.official-documents.co.uk> at 11 November 2003.
This fulfills OECD Reconunendations 8: Exchanges of hfformation - Coun~a’ies should undertake
programs to h~tensify exchange of information concerning transactions in tax havens and preferential
tax regimes constituting harmful tax competition; and 14: Assistance in recovel3, of tax clahns -
COUntries should review the current rules applying to the enforcement of tax elahns of other countries
for the addition to tax conventions.
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In line with the aga’eement with the OECD, the BVI agreed with the US an
effective exchange of information on request for crhninal tax matters from
596
January 1 2004 and for civd tax matter from January 1, 2006.
Speaking after the signing of the agreement, BVI Governor, Frank Savage,
observed that allowing the US Internal Revenue Service to pierce banking
secrecy in cases of tax evasion and money laundering, clearly demonstrated
that the country had been working ’to increase tire transparency of our systems
and reduce the potential for abuse’¯ 597
US Treasury Secretary, Paul O~eill said that the Bush administration
welcomed the agreement with the BVI, explaining that: ’We have an
obligation to enforce our tax laws because failing to do so, undermines the
confidence of honest taxpayers of our system. One of the keys to enforcement
of our tax laws is access to needed information.’598
Mutual Legal Assistance
Mutual Legal Assistance (USA) Act 1990 (No. 5 of 1990) is intended to give
effect to the terms of a treaty made between the Government of the United
States of America and the Govermnent of the United Kingdom dated 3rd July
1986 for improving the effectiveness of the law etfforcement authorities of the
Hamey Westwood & Riegels, Transparency and the Obligation of Confidentiality in the British
l"irgin Islands (2002) Harneys <http://www.barneys.com> at 11 November 2003.
www.lawandtax-news.com, British Virgin Islands, ~nternational Agreements.
Ibid.
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United States of Anlerica and the British Virgin Islands in the prosecution and
suppression of crime thi’ough co-operation and mutual legal assistance in
criminal matters and for purposes connected therewith. The Act allows the
United States Central Authority, defined in the Treaty to be the Attorney
General or person designated by him, to make a request of the British Virgin
Islands Central Authority, the Attorney General, for assistance in obtaining
information conce~xfing a criminal offence. The provisions of the Act do not
extend to any matter which relates to regulation including fiscal matters or to
offences which are not punishable by a term of imprisonnlent of more than one
year. (Paragraph 1 of ha’title 3 of the treaty.) The Act extends protection to
allow for confidential information to be obtained. Section 9 provides that there
shall be no criminal or civil sanction against a person who divulges
confidential information pursum~t to a request. 599
Secrecy and Confidentiality
There is no statutory duty of confidence under British Virgin Islands la~v.
However a duty of confidence is imposed at common law. Alternatively a dnty
of confidence may be imposed by contract. A breach, or thi’eatened breach, of
confidence (common law or contractual) is actionable in the High Com~ in the
British Virgin Islands. The High Cou~ will grant an injunction to restrain any
s.~ Harney Westwood & Riegels, above n 596. This fidfils the FATF Recommendation 16: Fh~ancial
~nstitutions, their directors, officers and employees should be protected by legal provisinns fi:om
trichinal or civil liability for b~ach ofauy restriction on disclosta’e of information imposed by contract
or by any legislative, regulatory or admir~strative provision, if they report theh’ suspicions in good faith
to the competent authorities, even if they did not know precisely what the underlying criminal activity
Was, and regardless of whether illegal activity actually ocem’red.
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tin’eatened breach and will award damages for any actual breach. There is
criminal sanction for breach of a duty of confidence.
The extent of the common law duty of confidence depends upon the nature 
the relationship between the relevant parties. A duty of confidence aris
whenever confidential information comes to the knowledge of a person, i
circumstances where he has notice, or is held to have agreed, that th
information is confidential, with the effect that it would be just in all th
circumstances that he should be precluded fi’om disclosing the information 
others. There is a public interest in prese~Mng a duty of confidence which t
Court will enforce. However, there are thi’ee general limiting principles on t
duty of confidence.6°°
The BVI Government signed a Tax Information Exchange Agreement with
UK and the USA on 3 April 2002. The BVI thns joined Antigua and Bar
the Bahamas and the Cayman Islands who have already executed 
agreements. The agreement provided arrangements for the excha
information about criminal tax evasion fi’om 1 Janum2¢ 2004 and all ot
matters from 1 January 2006.6°1
Notwithstanding any duty of confidence which exists at cormnon la
pursuant to a contract, there are several circumstances whereupon it may
necessary to provide information to third parties. The following comprise 
Ibid.
The ILS Group, Around the World (2002) <www.ils-world.com> at 11 November 2003.
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most siglfificant exceptions which exist pursuant to statute and at cormnon
law.
1) Evidence (Proceedings in Foreign Jurisdictions) Act (Cap 24);
2) Mntual Legal Assistance (USA) Act 1990 (No. 5 of 1990);
3) Criminal Justice (International Co-operation) Act 1993 (No. 8 of 1993);
4) Proceeds of Criminal Conduct Act 1997 (No. 5 of 1997) as amended;
5) Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1992 1992 (No. 5 of 1992);
6) Banker Books Evidence Act (Cap 7);
7) Banks and Trust Companies Act 1990 (No. 9 of 1990) as amended;
8) Company Management Act 1990 (No. 8 of 1990) as amended;
9) Mutual Funds Act 1996 (No. 6 of 1996) as amended;
10) Insurance Act 1994 (No.15 of 1994) as amended;
11) Financial Services (International Co-operation) Act 2000 as amended;
12) Financial Services Commission Act 2001;
13) Orders for discovery and inspection of documents pursuant to Pmq~ 28 of
the Civil Procedure Rules of the Supreme Court;
14) Discover3, Proceedings in the British Virgin Islands (Norwich Pharmacal
proceedings); and
15) Tax Infomaation Exchange Agreement (USA & UK) Act 2002602
Conclusion
~o2 Harney Westwood & Riegels, above n 600.
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With its high quality financial services, sound regulatory fi.amework and
political stability, the British Virgin Islands (BVI) has established a reputation
as one of the world’s leading international offshore centres. The BVI has
earned a solid reputation as the world’s leading domicile for International
Business Companies (IBCs). The 1984 IBC Act has proved to be a milestone
in the development of the financial services industry. Since the adoption of
this legislation, the BVI has become a high-quality international financial
centre, regnlarly undertaking programmes to expand its financial services
offering to meet the delnands of international financial markets. The key to the
development of the BVI has been the pm~nership which exists between the
government and the private sector, and the commitment of both to creating a
jnrisdiction that is a leader in the provision and regulation of financial services.
603
The BVI Financial Services Commission is reviewing the existing Companies
Act and the 1BC Act, intending to update and amalgamate into a single
corporate statue, with the aim of enforcing it in 2005. The new Compmfies Act
will retain all the virtues of the IBC but will be enhanced to be made more
attractive to clients. The new legislation will extend the same zero tax regime
enjoyed by IBCs to local companies and thereby bringing BVI into line with
the EU Code of Conduct on Business Taiation. This will make the BVI
603 ’BVI Launches New Package of Insolvency and Trasts Regulation’ (2003) 8 Offshore Red." An oFC
Nea,s Update 98.
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company an even better international proposition and cement their position as
the first-choice offshore incorporation destination.6°4
The British Virgin Islands, which was on both the FATF NCCTs list and the
OECD’s list of tax havens, now complies with the directives of the various
supranational organisation~ as can be seen from the above analysis.
(iv) The Bahamas
Anti-Money Laundet’ing Legislation
Money Laundering (Proceeds of Crime) Act 1996
1) A person is guilty of an offence if he uses. transfers the proceeds of, sends
or delivers to any person or place, transports, transmits, alters, disposes of
or otherwise deals with, in any manner and by any means, any property or
any proceeds of any property with intent to conceal or convert that
property or those proceeds and knowing that all or a part of that propex~ty
or of those proceeds was obtained or derived directly or indirectly as a
result of-
(a) the commission in The Bahamas of any offence under the Danget’ous
Drugs Act;
~o~ Robert Mathavious, ’Overview of the Regulato~2 Envh’onment in the BVI’ (Speech delivered at the
"The BVI Advantage" Seminar held by the BVI International Finance Centre, Singapore, 13 May
~00~).
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(b) the commission in The Bahamas of any offence which is punishable b
a term of imprisonment of not less than five years;
(c) an act or omission anywhere that, if it had, occurred in The Bahama
would have constituted an offence under the Dangerous Drugs Act;
(d) an act or omission anywhere that if it had occurred in The Baham
would be punishable by a ter~n of imprisormaent of not less than fiv
years.
2) A person who commits an offence under subsection (1) shall be liable -
(a) on conviction on information to imprisonment for a term not exceedin
ten years; or
(b) on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding fiv
years.60s
The establistmaent of the Financial Intelligence Unit under the provisions
the Financial Intelligence Unit Act (No. 39 of 2000) now means that t
Financial Intelligence Unit is responsible for receiving, analyzing, obtaini
and disseminating information which relates to or may relate to the procee
of crime under the provisions of the Proceeds of Crime Act, 2000 (No. 44 
2000) nanaely offences under the Prevention of Bribery Act~ drag trafficki
60s United Nations, Office on Drugs and Crime, Money Laundering (Proceeds of Crime) Act, 1996
(1996) <ww~v.unodc.org> at 9 November 2003.
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offences, money laundering offences, offences which may be tried on
information other than drug trafficking offences and offences committed
anywhere that if they occurred in The Bahamas would constitute offences in
The Bahamas. The Act provides the principal legai mechanism for
international cooperation with other foreign Financial Intelligence Units and
law enforcement anthorities. Pursuant to the Financial Intelligence Unit Act,
the Unit may now provide information relating to the commission of an
offence specified in the Proceeds of Crime Act, 2000 to any Foreign Financial
Intelligence Unit, subject to any conditions as may be considered appropriate
by the Director of the Financial Intelligence Unit of The Bahamas. Under the
Act, the Unit is given power to enter into any agreement or arrangement, in
writing, with a Foreign Financial Intelligence Unit which the Director
considers necessary or desirable for the discharge or performance of the
functions of the Financial Intelligence Unit.6°6
Tax Evasion
Since the Bahamas do not levy direct taxes, there are no double tax treaties
between the Bahmnas and other countries.
There are ~nutual assistance ta’eaties with tire US, Canada and the UK which
include exchange of infotanation provisions; but fiscal information is exclnded.
Disclosure is limited to criminal matters, and tax evasion is not a crime in the
Babamas. The Babamian statute Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgements Act
~Organisation of American States, ’The Bahamian International Cooperation Regime for Criminal
Matters’ (2000) <http://www.oas.org> at 9 November 2003.
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1924 allows Conunonwealth judgements to be enforced in the Bahamas, but
revenue matters are excluded.6°7
The Mutual Legal Assistance (Criminal Matters) Act, 1988
The Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Treaty signed by th
Govermnents of The Bahamas and the United States of America on 12th Jun
1987 and 8th August 1987 respectively, is given domestic effect by the Mutua
Legal Assistance (Criminal Matters) Act 1988 (No.2 of 1988). The sai
legislation came into force on 20th August 1990. The Mutual Legal Assistanc
Treaty signed with Canada on the 13th March, 1990 is given domestic effe
by the Mutual Legal Assistance Criminal Matters Act, 1988 (Amendment 
Schedule) Order, 1990 (S.I. No. 54 of 1990). Under both Treaties the Attorne
General of The Commonwealth of The Bahamas is the Central Authority
whom requests for assistance should be addressed.
In the absence of a Treaty and its relevant do~nestic enabling legislation
foreign Court, tribunal or anthority seeking evidence or the disclosure 
information in connection with criminal proceedings that have been institute
or a criminal investigation that is being carried on, must apply to the Attorn
General for assistance pursuant to the provisions of the Criminal Justi
(International Co-operation) Act, 2000 (No.42 of 2000).~°8
~o7 Lowtax.net, Double Ttzration Treaties in Battamas
<http://www.lowtax.net/lowtax/html/jbahom.html> at 10 July 2004. This fails to adhere to tile OEC
Recommeodation 14: Assistance in recovery of tax claims - Countries should review the current rules
~8plylng to the euforcement of tax clahns of other countries for the addition to tax conventions.
Organisatiou of banerican States, above n 606.
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Secrecy and Confidentiality
Secrecy and confidentiality is preserved under the Bank and Trust Companies
Regulation Act. There is no requirement for disclosure of the Beneficial
Ownership to the authorities. While there is no requirement to file audited
accounts with the authorities, a company is required to keep financial records.
The Bahamian Banks and Trust Companies Regulation Act 1965 stipulates
stiff penalties: up to two years in jail and a fine equivalent to $15,000 for any
employee who discloses comqdential client information.6°9
The Bahamas has based its confidentiality laws on the Swiss model of bank
secrecy. Banks practice due diligence and follow "Know Your Customer"
rules. Access to bank records is only available to signatories on the account-
and to no one else. Only by proving in coux~t that it helps in the prosecution of
a criminal act, could a foreign authority, such as the IRS, be granted access to
banking records in the Bahamas.6~°
The Financial Intelligence Unit is also responsible for the receipt and analysis
of suspicious transaction reports reqnired to be made under the provisions of
the new Financial Transactions Reporting Act, 2000 (No.40 of 2000). Under
the Financial Transactions Reporting Act, 2000, financial institutions within
The Bahamas are now required under penalty of law to verify the
~ Paul Zaleski, Bank Secrecy Waiver Agt’eements: The Confidentiality Exception (2000) Escape Artist
<h~//~wv escapeartist.com/Offshore_Fina~ce_USA/Bank_Secrecy-Waiver’html> at 9 November
2003.
~0 Stephanie O’Hanley, Password Please (2001) Vault Magazh~e
<htlp:llw\wv.ofcpublications.comllndexlartlcleslartjfO 1-0028.hbnl> at 9 November 2003.
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identification of customers and to report suspicious transactions which they
know, suspect or have reasonable grounds to suspect involves proceeds of
criminal conduct as defined in the Proceeds of Crime Act, 2000, or any
offence under the Proceeds of Crime Act, 2000, or an attempt to avoid the
enforcement of any provision of the Proceeds of Crime Act to the Financial
Intelligence Unit.6~
Conclusion
The Bahamas has been a domicile for funds for 40 years and currently has 75
regulated funds with assets of approxintately US$100 billion. Since the
creation of the Securities Board, now the Securities Commission, and the
passing of the Mutual Funds Act and regulatiops in 1995, The Bahamas ha
been vying for recognition as a properly regulated envh’onment fo
establishing and operating funds. There are more than 50 licensed fun
administrators in The Bahamas.
Out of all the jurisdictions blacklisted as ’harmful’ tax havens by the OEC
and ’uncooperative’ in the global fight against money laundering by th
6~ Organisation of American States, above n 608. This fulfils fl~e FATF Recommendations 10:
Financial institutinns should not keep anonymous accouuts or accounts in obviously fictitious names
they should be required (by law, by regulations, by agreements between snperviso~3’ authorities and
financial institutions or by self-regnlatory agreements among financial institutions) to identify, on tb
basis of an official or other reliable identifying document, and record the identify of their clients, eith
occasional or usual, when establishing business relations or conducting transactioos (in particular
opening of accounts or passbooks, entering into fiducia~3’ transactions, renting of safe deposit boxes,
performing large cash transactions); and 14: Financial institutinns should pay special attention to all
complex, unusual large transactions, and all tmusual patterus of tt’ansactions, which have no apparent
economic or visible la\vfid purpose. The background and purpose of such transactions should, as far as
possible, be examined, the ISmdings established in writing, and be available to help supervisors, audi
and law enforcement agencies.652 Ernst & Yomag (Nassan), ’Mutual Funds in The Bahamas’ (2003) 8 Offshore Red: An OFC NewS
Update 138.
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FATF613, the Bahamas believes that it has introduced some of the most
comprehensive new legislation into its financial services sector. But tiffs is
stil! not enough for the multilaterals, as the FATF has identified a crucial
element the Bahamas government has omitted in its extensive legislative
progranmle.
The Bahamas Jotu’nal reported (13/2/01) that the FATF has called upon the
Bahamas govel’nment to correct legislative deficiencies it has discovered in the
country’s securities, namely the Securities Act, the Mutual Funds Act and the
Insurance Act. This came as a real setback to the Bahamas, wlffch was so
close to coming off the blacklist, but if the jurisdiction refused it, could risk
staying on the FATF blacklist of 15 jurisdictions.
The FATF viewed provisions in the Securities Act, the Mutual Funds Act and
the Insurance Act still allowed for secrecy and need to be amended to ensure
for cooperation in investigating suspected money laundering activities.
The Executive Secretm’y of the FATF, Patrick Moulette, is repo~ed to have
said that the FATF’s policy is that anti-money laundering measm’es should
apply not only to battks but also to non-bank financial like remittance
businesses, insurance companies and securities bush~esses.614
6~3 See Appendix U for a list of NCCTs.
~u This is accordhlg to Recommendation 8 which states: Recommendations 10 to 29 should apply not
only to banks, but also to non-bank financial institutions. Even for those non-bank financial institutions
which are                         ritual sa ervlSOl le nile nl all countries, fo~ example blneauxnot subject toafonnalprude ’    p ’ "Y’g .....
de change, govermnents should ensttre tlmt these institutions are subject to the same aoti-money
!aundering laws or regulations as all other financial [nstitutinns and that these laws or regulations are
~raplentented effectively.
267
Pelwersely, the FATF, in its 2001 review meeting615, voted the Bahamas as
one of seven jurisdictions most likely to be removed from the blacklist in the
near future.
On 23 July 2003, the IMF concluded the Article IV consultation with The
Bahamas and released its Staff Repol~. In the Staff Report, it recognised the
country’s long track record of ’prudent macroeconomic management and
financial stability’. The Report noted that Bahamian financial regulations and
supervision have continued to improve, including anti-money laundering
legislation.
The Report emphasised that fresher progress with structural refom~ would help
to lower costs and preserve external competitiveness. It also saw a need to
rednce trade restrictions, including the very high tariff rates, and to simplify
the tariff structure. It also recommended a gradual move towm’d a ’more
flexible and market-oriented fi.amework for liquidity and credit management’.
The Repm~t also cited the sta’engthening supervisory envirormaent in Th
Bahamas. 6~6
In response to the Report, the. Bahamas Financial Se~wices Bom’d (BFSB
released a statement saying that it ’will build on the extensive work complete
in 2001 where a comprehensive proposal was submitted to government and
regulators based on active participation of many professional industry
associations with regard to the new FATF 40 recommendations.’ The BFS
See Financial Action Task Force, above n 591.
’Bahamas Gets Positive IlVlF Report’ (2003) 8 Offshore Red: An OFC News Update 124.
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also s~ated that meetings with professional indush2¢ associations and regulators
like the Secva’ities Conmaission, Central Bank and the Registrar have been held.
The BFSB was hopeful that significant progress would be made tlu’ough the
introduation of the new Investnrent Fnnds Act, Regulations and SMART
Funds templates, policy dh’ectives on matters such as corporate directors and
private trust companies, and other such projeats.617
The Bahamas, which was on both the FATF NCCTs list and the OECD’s list
of tax havens, now complies with the directives of the various supranational
organisations as can be seen from the above analysis.
5.8.2 Pacific Basin
(i) Cook Islands
Anti-Money Legislation
Prior to its August 2000 enaetment of the Money Laundering Prevention Act,
the Cook Islands had in place the Offshore Industry (Criminal Provisions) Act
(the "OIA’) and the International Trusts (Due Diligence) Regulations (the
"Regs"). The OIA permitted trustee companies to repo~ suspicious
transactions to a regulatory authority. The regulato~2~ authority could then seek
directions from the Cook Islands High Court regarding the matter, including
directions as to the disposition of the funds involved in the transaction. The
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Regs required t~astee companies to obtain certain assurances as to the origin
and ownership of funds trangferred to international trasts, and to obtain
additional assurealces as to the solvency of the settlor. However, neither the
OIA nor the Regs (both of which continue in force) made money laundering a
crime, nor did either establish a mutual assistance structure.618
The Money Laundering Prevention Act makes money laundering a crim
under Cook Islands law. The Act defines "Money Laundering" as knowingly
(a) engaging directly or indirectly, in a business transaction that involves
property that is the proceeds of crime, knowing or having reasonable
gn’ounds for believing the same to be the proceeds of crime; or
(b) receiving, possessing, concealing, disguising, transferring, converting,
disposing of, removing fi’om or bringing into the Cook Islands an
prope~y that is the proceeds of crime, knowing or having reasonabl
grounds for believing the same to be the proceeds of crime.
The term "proceeds of crime" is defined as "the proceeds of unlawful activi
(whether derived or obtained directly or indirectly tl~’ough such activity), a
includes any property that is mingled with property that is the proceeds 
unlawful activity."
6~s withont classil~ing money laundering as a crime, it is not adhering to the FATF Recommendation
Each countl3, should take such measures as may be necessm3’, including legislative ones, to enable it to
crinfinnlise money laundering as set forth in the Vienna Convention. Each country shonld extend the
offence of drug money laundering to one based on serious offences. Each counia’y would determine
which serious crimes would be designated as money laundering predicate offences.
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The term "unlawful activity" means "any activity which -
(a) is an offence under the Crimes Act 1969 [of the Cook Islands] and carries
a maximum penalty of impriso~maent of not less than 5 years imprisormaent
or the death penalty; or
(b) under .the laws of the place where the activity occurs, constitutes drug
trafficking; or
(i) under the laws of any place where the activity occurs constitutes an
offence which carries a maximum penalty of imprisonment of not less than
5 yem’s or the death penalty, and
(ii) would be an offence under the Crimes Act 1969 if such activity
occun’ed within the Cook Islands and such offence carries a maximum
penalty of imprisonment of not less than 5 years or the death penalty.
The Act establishes a Money Laundering Authority, to which repo~s of
suspicious activity are to be made.619
After the 11 September, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States, the Cook
Islands reiterated its commitment to the prevention of money laundering
activities set out in the Money Laundering Prevention Act 2000 by announcing
the Money Laundering Prevention Regulations 2001.
6~9 Donlevy-Rosen and P A Rosen, Prevention of Money Laundering: Recent Offshore Legislation
(2000) The Asset Protection News <http://www,assetprotectionnews.condapn9-2-fi’.html> at 9
November 2003,
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The new rules inco~qgorate Guidance Notes for Financial Institutions based on
models from New Zealand, Japan and Guernsey. Issues covered in the notes
include ’Know Your Customer’ rules; recognising suspicious customers or
transactions; reporting of suspicion transactions; and keeping records and
training.62°
The Financial Supervism~ Commission (FSC) Act establishes a new statutory
commission to licence and regnlate all trustee companies and banks providing
domestic and international services in or fi’om the Cook Islands. Insurance
companies also come within the jurisdiction of the FSC.
The Banking Act sets out a new licensing regime for domestic and
international banks and introduces increased levels of regulation and
supervision as well as more stringent licensing requh’ements. Previously,
domestic and offshore banks have been licensed under separate statuto~2~
regimes. Existing banks licensed under the previous domestic and offshore
bank!ng acts are deemed to be licensed under the new act, but only for one
year following the coming into force of that Act. Domestic and international
licensees are required to have a physical presence in the Cook Islands and to
have at least two persons resident in the Cook Islands as directors. 62~
Tax Evasion
620 Lowtax.net, Double Taxation Treaties io Cook lsland
<http://\ws~v.lowtax.net/lowtax/htmt/jcihom.html> at 10 July 2004. This fififils the FATF
Reco~mnendations 10 - 15.
6~ ’Batch of New Fh~ancial Laws Passed in the Cook Islands’ (2003) 8 Offshore Red: An OFC News
Update 103.
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The Cook Islands have not entered into any Double Tax or Mutual Assistance
treaties with other countries. The Islands have passed other laws dealing with
provision of information in respect of criminal matters, but the authorities
generally do not respond to requests for information regarding fiscal matters or
tax evasion.6~
Mutual Legal Assistance
The Money Laundering Prevention Act 2000 makes provision for co-operation
by the Authority with a foreign State, with whom the Cook Islands has entered
into mutual assistance arrangements on a bilateral or multilateral basis, in the
investigation or prosecution of an unlawful activity. There is also provision for
mutual assistance with a foreign state, subject to the approval of the Minister
of Finance, where no agreement exists but where the seriousness of the money
laundering offence under investigation wan’ants mutual assistance.623
Secrecy and Confidentiality
Govermnent officials and the employees of banks, insurance companies, trust
& co~-porate entities are compelled to observe secrecy and failure to do so
leading to an unauthorized disclosure will result in penal sanctions.
The general rule prohibiting disclosure is subject to 3 exceptions namely:
6~ Lowtax.net, above n 620.
6~ Co~mnissioner For Offshore Financial Services, Mathilda C R Uhrle, ’Meastu’es Taken in the Cook
Islands to Counter Money Laundering’ (Speech dehvered at the Asmn Development Bank 34 Annual
Meeth~g of the Board of Governors, Honohdu, 7 May 2001)
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1) Under the International Companies Act 1981 the high cou~ on application
of an interested party has power to order disclosure of corporate
information in a case involving drug trafficking or money laundering. The
power to order disclosure does not extend to fiscal crime. Appeal lies to
the Islands’ Com~ of Appeal and thereafter to the Privy Council in London.
2) Under the Offshore (Criminal Provisions) Act 1996 an officer or employee
of a registered Wast entity (which incorporates and manages companies
and trusts) who has cause to suspect that a company or trust is involved in
drug trafficking or that a person related to or involved with that entity has
been convicted of serious criminal activity, must refer the matter to the
Gove~xtment regulatory body. Furthermore the registered taust entity is to
provide such reasonable assistance, documentation and other information
as may be required by the Government regulato~¢ body under the law
Serious criminal activity is defined as drug trafficking or any other activity
whether in the Cook Islands or elsewhere wlfich if committed in the
Islands is or would be an offence under the Crimes Act 1969 carrying a
maximum penalty of 5 years or more. Information provided in these
circumstances does not breach confidentiality provisions of the Cook
Islands. Disclosure never extends to fiscal crime.
3) The Trustee Compa~fies (Due Diligence) Regulations 1996 require the
officers and employees of a registered trust company to take reasonable
precautions to ensure that an International Trust is not being used to shelter
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assets derived from drug smuggling, money laundering or other serious
¯ icrime and to repo~ any such actw ty.
The Financial Transactions Repotting Act fornaally establishes customer
ideutification procedures for financial institutions. Financial institutions are
also required to carry out ongoing scrutiny of customer trmasactions and to
maintain transaction records¯ The Financial Transactions Report Act also
requires the reporting to the Cook Islands Financial Intelligence Unit, of cash
and international wire trmasfers exceeding 10,000 New Zealand dollars
03855,700). Suspicious transactions must also be repotted to the Financial
Intelligence Unit¯ The confidentiality provisions in other statutes relating to
the financial services industry are overridden by this requirement.625
FA TF Blacklist626
In June 2000, the Cook Islands was blacklisted by the FATF as a non-
cooperative attd harmful tax haven.
In September 2000, the Cook Islands parliament passed the Money
Laundering Prevention Act, which provided for the setting up of a Money
Laundering Authority, to consist of the government’s financial secretao,, the
cormnissioner for offshore financial services and the commissioner of police.
Lowtax.uet, above n 622.
Offshore Red: An OFC News Update, above u 621.
lie FATF Blacklist of NCCTs as updated to July 2004.
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In 2003, a series of nine new measures were introduced in the Cook Islands
Parliament over the regulation of domestic and offshore financial industries
after the cabinet approved the work of an Anti-Money Laundering/Counte
Fh~ancing Ten’orism Committee. The Committee repox~ed it was hopeful th
enactment of the legislation would finally satisfy the FATF. The bills include
a Financial Transactions Reporting Act, which will require all banks to repo
local and international money transfers to a central financial intelligence
unit.627
Conclusion
The Cook Islands, which was on both the FATF NCCTs list and the OEC
list of tax havens, remains on the FATF NCCTs list as of July 2004.
Anti-Money Laundering Legislation
The primary legal framework for anti-money lanndering (AML) meastu’es 
Vanuatn is based upon the Serious Offences (Confiscation of Proceeds) Ac
which criminalises money laundering and provides for the confiscation of th
proceeds of crime; the Mutual Assistance in Crhninal Matters Act, wlfic
provides for international cooperation; and the Financial Transactio
Repo~ing Act, which provides four major pillars, i.e., customer identificatio
6~7 Lowtax.net, above n 624.
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record keeping, suspicious transaction reporting and the establislmaent of a
Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU).628
In addition, the FIU and the Reserve Bank of Vanuatu have issued Guidelines
and Practice Notes, respectively, on the anti-money laundering obligations of
regulated entities.
These measures are augmented by provisions in the Financial Institutions Act
that require the retention of certain documents and enhanced due diligence for
suspect transactions and customers. In addition, the Act requires fit and proper
tests for significant shareholders and management of domestic banks upon
licensing, and the Insurance Act requires fit and proper tests for officers of
domestic insurers upon licensing. The Banking Act and the Financial
Institutions Act prohibit a person convicted of dishonesty from acting as au
officer of a bank.629
Tax Evasion
Not having any taxes other than customs duties and sta~np duty, Vanuatu has
not entered into any Double Tax treaties with other counta’ies.
62s By crhninalising money laundering, the Serinus Offences (Confiscation of Proceeds) Act fulfils the
FATF Reco~mnendatlon 4: Each counia’y should take such measures as may be necessmy, incindi~g
legislative ones, to enable it to criminalise money laundering as set forth in the Vienna Convention.
Each country should extend the offence of drug money laundering to one based on serious offences.
Each counia’y would detenuine which serious crhnes would be designated as money laundering
predicate offeuces.
~9 Intematinnat Monetary Fund, Volume 1: Review of Financial Sector Regnlation and Supetvision of
Vanuatu (2003) <htlp:l/www.hnf.org/external/country/VUT/> at 6 November 2003.
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However, tax evasion is not a crime in Vanuatu, since there are no tax laws
and the Vanuatu authorities are unlikely to assist an investigation into a ta
matter.630
Mutual Legal Assistance
The Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act contains a procedure for co-
operation with foreign investigators, and the Serious Offences (Confiscation o
Proceeds) Act bas anti-money-laundering provisions which could encompas
fiscal crime.
The Mutual Assistance In Criminal Matters Act No. 52 Of 1989 is an act t
make provision with respect to the Scheme Relating to Mutual Assistance 
Criminal Matters within the Commonwealth and to facilitate its operation 
the Republic of Vanuatu and to make provision concerrfing mutual assistan
in criminal matters between the Republic of Vanuatu and countries other tha
Commonwealth countries.631
Secrecy and Confidentiality
The International Companies Act makes it a criminal offence for any person
divulge, attempt, offer or tbxeaten to divulge or induce or attempt to indu
other persons to divulge information concerning an international company.
630 Lowtax.net, Double Taxation Treaties in Vanuatu
<http:l/www.lowtax.netllowtaxlhtmlljvahom.h~nl> at 10 July 2004.
631 The Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 1989 (Vanuatu)
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The secrecy provisions of the Companies Act, the Trust Companies Act and
the International Companies Act are not um’estricted. Officers and employees
of companies may be required to provide evidence about those companies if
ordered by the Supreme Com’t of Vammtu. However, court proceedings
involving international or exempted companies are all heard in cm~aera. The
Serious Offences (Co~ffiscation of Proceeds) Act and the Mntual Assistance in
Criminal Matters Act were enacted in 1989 to, among other things, prevent the
laundering of proceeds of criminal activities.632
IMF Report
In August 2003, a team from the IMF made widespread criticism of the
regulation, licensing and snpervision of the offshore banking sector in Vanuatu.
In a report published in August 2003, the IMF repo~ed that the jurisdiction
was non-compliant in most of the key regulatory areas. 633
The offshore banking sector consists of 34 licensed banks, of which only tln’ee
have a real physical presence in Vannatu. The remaining are shell banks with
no presence beyond either a resident nominee director or resident agent who
acts mainiy as a service address. All 34 are prohibited fi’Oln undertaking
business with Vanuatu residents, while those licensed since 1993 are also
resta’icted, under a general condition of their license, fi’om soliciting funds
from the public in any jurisdiction. They may, however, take deposits from
associated and non-associated persons provided they do not publicly advertise
Lesstax4u net Inc Vunuatu Tax Haven <http://www lesstax4u.net> at 10 July 2004.
lntenmtional Monetary Fund, Volume 1: Revtew of Fmanctal Sector Regulatton and Supervtsto ~ of
Vanuatu (2003) <http://www.imf.org/external/counta°y/VUT/> at 6 November 2003.
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for deposits. Total known assets of the 34 banks as of December 2001 were
approximately US$2.4 billion, of wlfich US$1.8 billion were recorded as
market-related instruments and investments.
’The Banking Act (the primary legislation under which the ~anuatu Financial
Sex-vices Commission (VFSC) exercises its powers over the offshore or
exempt banks) provides a basic licensing and enforcement regime, but
explicitly exempts offshore banks from capital, liquidity and other pradential
standards. There is also considerable uncertainly about the extent to which the
VFSC can acquire information fi’om the banks under this Act in order to ca~a’y
out its supervisor3’ duties. Attempts to update the legislation have progressed
little over a period of four to six years,’ the report said.634
The VFSC clearly defines the role of the regulatory authority and provides it
with appropriate objectives. However, the Banking Act lacks any real basis by
which the VFSC can fulfil its objectives. This law was originally intended to
cover both domestic and offshore banks, but its objective with respect to the
offshore sector is apparent from the broad exemptions fi’om any prudential
requirements that it grants to offshore institutions. The VFSC is only able to
exercise any authority with respect to prudential matters by the issue of
directives on a general or case-by-case basis. The legal authority for this
approach is uncertain.635
634 Ibid.
635 ’IMF Savages Vam~atu in Recent RepoW (2003) 8 Offshore Red: An OFC News Update 127.
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Offshore banks ~re specifically exempted fi’o~n the capital and other prudential
nornas specified in the Act. There is provision for the VFSC to issue directives,
but the Act appears to limit this power to specific circumstances, and does not
explicitly permit it to be used to set general prudential rules. A 1995
arnendment to the Act gives the VFSC the power to conduct examinations of
the banks and to require the submission of information. However, many of the
banks believe that the disclosure of customer i~fformation, in particular, is
prohibited under Section 381 of the Compames Act, which provides for
extensive secrecy in relation to the affairs of exempt companies, which
includes the offshore banks.
This report has added further to the challenges experienced by Vanuatu. Its
reputation as a ~ton-cooperative jurisdiction has led to public skirmishes with
the OECD and the FATF. In addition, the Australian National Tax Office has
named Vanuatu as its number one target.636
However, the government has apparently established a high level Committee
to review the report and recommend to the Minister of Finance and Economic
Management what actions should be taken to give reconmlendations to the
report. The Conunittee is comprised of senior officials, fi’om the Reserve Bank
of Vanuatu, Vanuatu Financial Se~wice Cormnission, the State Law Office, the
Office of the Prime Minister and the Ministry of Finance and Economic
Management .637
Ibid.
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Conclusion
Vanuatu, which was on the OECD’s list of tax havens, now complies with t
directives of the various supranational organisations as can be seen fi’om the
above analysis.
5.8.3 Europe
Money Laundering Legislation
Jersey’s anti-money latmdering legislation places an "indirect" obligati
everybody in the Island to make a suspicious transaction report (STR) to
police where they have knowledge or suspicion of money laundering. 
person knowing or suspecting that they are involved in money laundering 
not corm~ait an offence where they disclose knowledge or suspicion to a p
officer before the act is done (and the act is done with the consent of a po
officeO, or after the act is done, so long as it is on their initiative and as 
as is reasonable. For example, a solicitor who suspects that he is being as
to put funds into his client account in order to conceal their criminal 
would conmfit an offence if he did so without disclosing the act to a p
officer and/or failed to obtain the consent of a police officer (in practice t
the Joint Financial Crimes Unit) before carrying out the transaction or,
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did not make the disclosure before the transaction was carried out, he failed to
do so as soon as it was reasonable after the transaction.
Under the Ten’orism (Jersey) Law 2002, a person employed by a financial
services business is also subject to an "objective" test, and it is an offence not
to report where there are reasonable grounds for knowing or suspecting that
another person has committed a money laundering offence involving terrorist
property.
Jersey’s anti-money laundering legislation allows a STR to be made either to a
police officer, or where the individual works for an employer which has a
money laundering reporting officer (MLRO), to the MLRO. Once a report is
made to an MLRO the responsibility rests on that officer to decide whether to
make a report to a police oft]eer (in practice tiffs is the Joint Financial Crimes
Unit).
The Money Laundering (Jersey) Order 1999 also obligates financial services
businesses to identify a person to whom a STR is to be made (MLRO), to
assess the STR, and to make exte~aal STRs to a police officer (again, in
practice the Joint Financial Crimes Unit).638
In June 2003, the Financial Services Commission (FSC) issued a consultative
document on proposals to reform the approach to recording company
63~ Jersey Financial Se~Mces Commission, the Office of the Data Protection Registrar, the Law
OffiCers’ Department, and the Joint Financial Crhnes Unit Anti-Money Launder’big Legislation and the
Data Pt’otection (Jersey) Lmv 1987, Guidance for Financial Set~,ices Businesses (2003) Jel~ey
l~inancial Services Conunission <www.jelzeyfsc.org/pdffaml_and_dp_gulde.pdf> at 9 November 2003.
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information.639 The new proposals, when adopted, reflect the jurisdietion’s
desire to be in the forefront of modern regulatol2¢ practice. The key changes
proposed are:
The creation of a pnblicly available register of directors of all Jersey
companies - similar to its UK counterpa~;
A requirement to inform the Companies Registrar of details of beneficial
o~vnership and control of Jersey companies (including any changes), and
of companies’ business activities; and
The requirement of all foreign inco~porated companies administered or
operating in Jersey to register their details with the Commission - with a
view to makh~g this information publicly available in the future.
The consultation paper also covered a number of teclmical points - among
them; establishing a fi’amework for the electronic filing of documents,
including the annual return; and bringing in a number of other changes,
generally reflecting current changes proposed to the UK Companies Act.64°
Tax Evasion
639 This fidfils the FATF Recommendation 10: Financial institntinns should not keep anonymous
accounts or accomlts in obviously fictitious names: fl]ey should be requh’ed (by law, by regulations, by
agreements between supervism3’ anthorities and financial institt~tions or by self-regulatot2¢ agreements
among financial institntions) to identify, on the basis of an official or other ~liable ideuti~ing
document, and record the identity of their clieuts, either occasional or usual, when establishh~g business
relatinns or condncting transactinns (in pm~icular opening of accounts or passbooks, entering into
fiducia~3’ transactions, renting of safe deposit boxes, performing large cash transactions).6~0 ’Jersey Issues Report on Company Data’ (2003) 80f/~hore Red: An OFC News Update 101.
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Proceeds of criminal conduct as defined under the Proceeds of Crime (Jersey)
Law 1999 includes any pecuniary advantage. In the area of fiscal crime this
would include the non-payment of taxes which would give rise to a pecuniary
advantage. All cases depend on their own particular facts. However, there are
likely to be few circumstances in which financial institutions are able to
facilitate the retention or control of a crimirial’s pecuniary advantage, in
connection with tax evasion.
Tiffs issue has tended to arise in two distinct circumstances. The first case
arises where a settlor, or account holder, transfers fimds to a financial
institution in circumstances where the transferor has failed to pay tax in
connection with these funds. This may arise because the transferor has failed
to pay gift tax arising on the transfer of the funds. Although a pecuniary
advantage has arisen, it is not cleat’ how the financial institution will have
facilitated the retention or control of this pecuniary advantage.
The second case arises where account holders have failed to declare interest
arising from monies held on account, or a beneficiary has failed to make a
declaration of a distribution. If a financial institution assists the criminal by
making a false declaration to a foreign tax authority, an offence under Article
32 may be connnitted. Simply holding monies in an account for a client, who
is not declaring interest is unlikely to be sufficient.64~
~ Bailhache Labesse, Proceeds of Crime (Jersey) Law 1999 (2000) <http://www.bailhache.com> at 10
July 2004.
285
It is worth mentioning that the only fiscal offence capable of constituting
criminal conduct, as defined under the law, is fiscal fraud. The constituen
elements of common law of fi’aud in Jersey were set down by the Coux~ o
Appeal in the case of Attorney General -v- Foster (1992) JLR 6CA. For the
offence to be committed there must be:
false reputation;
an intention to cause by false representation actual prejudice to someon
and actual benefit to someone;
actual prejudice suffered as a result of the false representation;
actual benefit accruing to the perpetrator of the fi’aud or to someone els
and
a causal link between the falsity and the inju~¢.
Generally speaking, individuals operating within their financial se~wic
business may be unlikely to be familiar enough with the affairs of a client
fo~xnulate l~aowledge or generally a suspicion that the client’s conduct conta
the necessary elements of fiscal fraud.642
Mutual Legal Assistance
In May 2002, Jersey, along with its fellow UK dependent ten’itories Guern
and the Isle of Man, agreed to be pa~t of the EU’s information-sharing reg
whereby financial institutions would be obliged to pass details of incom
Ibid.
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investments by nationals of EU member states to their home
administrations. It is as yet unclear whether such a regime will come
effect pending agreement from Switzerland and the US to be part of it.
tax
into
hr Novetnber, 2002, Jersey signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)
with the Gulf state of Bahrain, designed to facilitate cooperation between the
two countries on issues such as applications for licences fi’om financial
institutinns, and the investigation of irregularities.643
Financial Services Comtnission (JFSC) director-general, Richard Pratt
announced that: ’We wil! be providing information on request, but we would
also offer information spontaneously, as a partner regulator, if for example we
found out anything of value to them.’644
In October 2003, the Jersey Financial Services Cormnission announced that
Jersey had signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the
International Organisation of Securities Connnissions (IOSCO). The MoU,
which was initially agreed in 2002, was designed to combat securities and
derivatives violations. It obliges signatories to share information about the
illegal use of their secnrities and derivatives markets with each other. In
signing up to the MoU, Jersey joined another 24 members. However,
according to the JFSC, the islmrd is one of the first offshore finance centres to
~--~-Lowtax.net, Double Taxation Treaties ht Jersey <http://www.lowtax.net/lowtax/html/jjehom.html>
Spoataueous or "upon request" intematlonal information exchaoge ~latlng to suspicious transactions,
persons and cooorations involved in those transactions between competent authorities. Strict
safeguards should be established to ensure that this exchange of information is consistent with natimml
and international provisions on privacy and data protection.
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join. "By signing this memorandum with IOSCO, Jersey reinforces its status
as a leading international financial centre and gives international investors
greater confidence in the island," JFSC compliance director, John Pallor
explained.645
Secrecy and Confidentiality
No legislation governs bank secrecy, but it is possible to have a numbered
bank account in Jersey. Professional privilege pertains between professional
advisors and their elients. Such confidentiality is limited by the fact that
diselosure may be compelled by comqc order, where there is a duty to the public
to disclose suspicious transactions, or where the customer has consented.
Beneficial ownership must be disclosed to the authorities and references may
be required. However, absent evidence of criminal conduct is not to be
disclosed.646
Future of Jersey
Britain is responsible for its external affairs including negotiations with th
European Union; under the UK’s accession treaty with the EU, Jersey form
pm~ of the single mm’ket but is outside the EU fiscal area. Jersey’s uniq
situation with regard to the EU is both a strength and a weakness. The isla
will remain a favoured base for holding and trading companies working i
the EU, and for e-conunerce activity; but it has the EU and the OECD
Lowtax.net, above n 643.
Carlton Press <http://www.offshore-manual.com> at 28 April 2004.
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contend with. After several years of ’hands-off policy in regard to Jersey
taxation, the UK government in 2002 tlu’eatened Jersey with sanctions if it did
not comply with EU infm~cnation-sharing rules.
Jersey signed a ’conmfitment’ letter to the OECD in February 2002, but it
coutained an ’Isle of Man’ level playing field clause making changes
dependent on comparable changes in Switzerland and the USA. By mid-2003,
however, the OECD seemed to have reached a compromise position with
Jersey, and was assisting it to design a nil% corporate tax system.
In May, 2002, it became cleat’ that Jersey, along with its fellow UK dependent
teta’itories Guernsey and the Isle of Man, was ready to sign np to the EU
information-sharing regime if that became necessary; but after the EU finally
reached its compromise agreement on the Savings Tax Directive in early 2003,
Jersey decided, along with Guernsey and the Isle of Man, to apply a
withholding tax to the returns on personal savings for EU residents when the
Directive comes into force in 2005.647
Conclusion
Jersey, wlfich was on both the FATF list of countries reviewed in 2000 and the
OECD’s list of tax havens, now complies with the directives of the various
supranational organisations as can be seen from the above analysis.
~ Lowtax.net, above n 645.
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(i0 Sn,itzerland
Money Laundering Legislative
The "Federal Act on the prevention of money laundering in the financi
sector" (MLA), entered into effect on 1 April 1998 and selwes as a supplemen
to the provisions of the criminal code. It applies equally to all financia
intexxnediaries, i.e. any person who, on a professional basis, accepts, maintain
deposit of or helps to invest or transfer assets belonging to a third party (e.g.
banks, fiduciaries, wealth managers, traders in securities, funds directorates
lawyers and notaries, the post office or the Swiss Federal Railways and chan
bureaus).
The act imposes on financial intermediaries new organizational dutie
(training persom~el, internal controls) and policy duties (verify identity of th
contracting partner, verify beneficial owner, even clarification of the econom
background of a transaction that shows signs of laundering, retaini
documents attesting to the verifications made).
In accordance with tlfis law, all financial intermediaries were hencefort
obliged to inform the Federal ReproVing Office for Money Laundering whe
in a business relationship, they knew or presume, on the basis of sou
evidence, that money laundering was taking place¯ This office is attached
the Federal Office for Police.
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Since the first year the Money Laundering Act has been enforced, 80% of the
210 declarations recorded were made on behalf of banks. Cantonal
investigations are currently underway in 161 of the cases. In total, 423 million
Swiss fi’anes have been frozen.648
Tax Evasion
On Jnne 3, 2003, The European Union ECOFIN of Economic and Finance
Ministers (the "ECOFIN") formally adopted the tax package of the Directive
on the Taxation of Savings (the "Directive"). The Directive was to be effective
fi’om January 1, 2005, assuming each EU jurisdiction enacts the relevant
provisions by January 1, 2004, and providing agreement is reached within
certain thh’d party jurisdictions to be similarly bound by the terms of the
Dh’ective. Switzerland is the most relevant of these third party jurisdictions.649
Under the Directive, most EU jurisdictions will automatically exchange
i~fformation with each other about the beneficial ownership of accounts.
Where an individual, resident in the European Union, has an account in
another EU jurisdiction, that EU jm’isdietion wil! deliver the account holder
information to the jtu’isdiction where the account holder is resident. The
jurisdictions with banking secrecy will not automatically exchange
~s Micheloud a~d Cie, Measures used for the fight agab~st money laundering
<http://switzerland.isyours.com> at 9 November 2003.
~9 With the Directive on the Taxatiou of Savings, Switzerland can fulfil the OECD Reconmaendatinn 7:
ACcess to banking hfformatinn for tax purposes - Countries review their laws, regulations and practices
Which goven~ the access to baoking infunnatiou with the vie~v to removing impedimeuts to the access
to such infonnatlon by tax authorities.
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information in tiffs way. The jnrisdictions with banking secrecy will instead
impose a withholding tax on savings income.
When it is adopted, Switzerland will impose the withholding tax regime, rather
than the automatic exchange of information regime. Indeed, the Swiss Federal
Depm~ment of Finance released on its official website65° the heads of the draft
agreement. Also of interest is the comment made on the willingness of
Switzerland to provide administrative assistance (exchange of information), in
cases of tax fi’aud.651 Surprising though it may be, it will surely rely on an a
falling within the definition "tax fi’aud" under both the Swiss conception a
well as the conception of a foreign jurisdiction. Tax fi’aud in Switzerland
requires something more than the simple act of tax evasion. It is debatable
how truly Inapressive Swiss banking secrecy remains, or will remain,652 bu
since it seems that the wider perception is held that it does remain, then the
maintenance of banking secrecy (or the veneer of banking secrecy) cannot be
understated as far as the vitality of the Swiss banking industry is concerned.653
The Swiss and US Colnpetent Authorities entered into a mutual agreeme
("Agreement") on January 23, 2003, under the cun’ent (1996) US-Switzerlan
6so Swiss Federal Department of Finance <ht~p://\vww.efd.admin.ch/e/index.htm> at 10 July 2004.
6s~ Administrative Assistance: "Switzerland is cotmnitted to providing administrative assistance o
request to EU Member States in cases of tax fi:and or the like relating to interest payments as defined
by the agreement. After the agreement has been signed, Switzerland and the ELI Member States will
agree ou the adoption clanses concerning administrative assistance in tax fraud and the like in the
bilateral double taxation agreemeuts, which are not restricted to the scope of agreement on the taxation
of savings inconle.’~
652      ’ ’ "Part~cnlarly m the hght of recent developments bet~veen Switzerland and the USA. It is the opinion
of some practitioners that this agreement on the interpretation will foresee similar agreements between
Switzerland and other jm’isdictions, since the extent to which Switzerland, accordh~g to the agreemen
will exchange information seems to go fm’ther than the extent to which it has agreed to do so with these
other jurisdictions.653 Michael Grob, Marnin J Michaels, Philip Mm’covlci, Panl Gerrits and Stephanie Jarrett, ’The E
Saving Dh’ective and its Impact on the Banking I~dust~2¢: Part I’ (2003) Tax" Planning htternational
Review.
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income tax treaty. The US Treasury said that the Agreement sought to
facilitate "more effective tax information exchange" between the two
countries .654
Article 26 (Exchange of information) of the treaty, ~vhich was signed on
October 2, 1996, and entered into force o1~ December 19, 1997, provides that
the Competent Authorities of the US and Switzerland will exchange such
information as is necessary "for the prevention of tax fi’aud or the like in
relation to the taxes which are the subject of" the treaty. Under the Agreement,
the exchange of hiformation will be in regard to both civil and criminal
matters. The statute of limitations applicable under the laws of the requesting
country will apply, instead of the statute of limitation of the requested
country.655
Under Swiss Law, fi’aud would generally only be found when forged or
falsified doctmaents were used to deceive tax authorities, or a scheme of lies
was used to deceive tax authorities. In the US, however, fi’aud may also arise
fi’om non-filing or omission of income.. At first glance, ceL~ain inconsistent
subtleties between the two different legal definitions suggest practical
challenges that may undermine the purpose of the information exchange.656 In
tile past, tile Swiss anthorities took the position that the examples were tile
only oppodunities for exchange of information while the US took the view
65~ See BNA Daily Tax Report, Jamlary 27, 2003, p. GG-1.
6~s Cyntltia Shelton, Mamin J Michaels, Stephanie Jan’ett and Denis Berdoz, ’Switzerland and
~ee to Swap Tax Informatlm£ (2003) Journal ofh#ernational Taxation.
"F Roy Sedore, Manfiu J Michaels and Sahel Assar, How the US Focus on Tax Shelters Affects Non-
US Banks (2003) International Tax Review <http://\wwv.h~temationaltaxt~view.com> at 9 November
2003.
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that the examples were by way of illustration only. This new agreemen
confirms that the previous interpretation espoused by the US is henceforth the
agreed view.657
Mutual Legal Assistance
Switzerland has passed its own mutual assistance la~v, and is also a pm’ty to a
number of international mutual assistance treaties, some multilateral and som
bilateral, including the following:
The European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, 195
Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters with the USA, 1973;
The Federal Act on International Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matter
1983, as amended in 1997;
The European Convention on Laundering,
Confiscation of the Proceeds of Crime, 1993.
Search, Seizure and
The Federal Act, particularly since the 1997 amend~nents, enables th
transmission of documents and information abroad for the purposes o
criminal proceedings. 658 From the point of view of banking secrecy th
following can be said about the cnrrent situation:
657 Baker & MeKenzie, "Switzerland and United States Sign Tax [nformation Exchange Agreement",
Iutemational Tax, Asia Pacific, Febrnat3, 2003, in Baker & McKenzie, Eight Annual IntemationaI Tax
and Trusts Training Com’se, Singapore, September 2003.6~8 Though the Federal Act allows exchauge of information betweeu countries, it is not permitted in the
use of tax matters, tiros defeating the intention of the OECD Recommendation 8: Exchauges of
information - Countries should undedake progTams to intensify exchange of information concerning
transactions in tax havens and prefe~utial tax ~gimes constituting harmful tax competition.
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According to a recent decision of the Federal Supreme Court the
transmission of such infm3nation requires the permission of the Swiss
police attthorities who must inform the customer about the m’der and give
him a right to appeal;
It is not permitted to forward infm~ation on persons who are not the
subject matter of the investigation;
Information will not be given if
o The foreign authorities might use the infmrnation for purposes
other than those for which it was requested;
o The offence alleged is not equally punishable in Switzerland;
o The requesting state does not offer Switzerland reciprocal
treatment in these matters;
o The offence is related to tax, politics or mititaa2¢ matters.
The Swiss authorities now grant administrative assistance as well as judicial
assistauce. Administrative assistance is regulator to regulator contact as
opposed to judicial assistance which takes place between judicial authorities
within the scope of civil or criminal legal proceedings.6s9
Switzerland has ratified several other bilateral and multilateral international
agreements tin’ough which it is co~mnitted to providing judicial cooperation -
also refen’ed to as mutual assistance - in criminal matters. The ~nost signfificant
agreement was constituted by the European Convention on Mutual Assistance
LowtaX.llet, Double Ta~:ation Treaties in Switzerland
h~P://www.lowtax.nefflo~vtax/httnl/jswhom.html> at 10 July 2004.
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in Criminal Matters on 20 April 1957. In accordance with the "Federal Act on
international mutaal assistance in criminal matters" (1983), Switzerland grants
international judicial cooperation in criminal matters. In such procedures,
capital assets can be frozen and, if need be, released to the foreign authorities.
Judicial cooperation is granted when the crime under prosecution is also
punishable in Switzerland and the foreign authority guarantees that it will not
use the information issued from Switzerland for any purpose other than the
investigation.
Switzerland played an active pa~ in concluding the Declaration of the Basle
Cahnat on Banking Supe~wision, which, in 1988, established the firs
international code of conduct for banks, with an aim to prevent any abuse o
the banking industry for money laundering purposes.66°
Secrecy and Cot~dentiality
Two articles of the Swiss criminal code regulate Swiss bank secrecy:
/M’ticle 162 takes punitive action against the disclosure of trade secrets or
confidential business information.
"Any person who has divulged a trade secret or co~ffidential busines
information that was meant to be kept by virtue of legal or contractua
obligation, any person who has used this information to lfis or her benefit or to
~o Micheloud and Cie, Measures used to combat monO, laundering at an international level
<switzeflalid.isyout~.com> at 9 Novelnber 2003.
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that of a third party, will be, on prosecution, punished by imprisonment or by
ArtMe 320 deals with occupational confidentiality.
1. Any person who has divulged a secret entrusted to him or her as a
representative of authority or a civil servant, or who has acquired
knowledge by means of his or her practice or employment, will be
punished by imprisomnent or by fine. The disclosure remains punishable
even when the practice or employment has terminated.
2. The disclosure will not be punishable if it was made with the written
consent of a superior authority.66~
Exemptions are provided for under the Swiss Civil Code, debt collection and
banka’uptcy law, criminal law, administrative criminal law aud mutual
assistance cases. In such cases, against the wishes of the client banking
secrecy may also be waived by order of the courts. Banking secrecy is most
often waived in prosecution cases.
Switzerland cooperates fidly in the investigation of international criminal
activities. Swiss banks are obligated by law to provide information of any
nature relating to criminal investigations if requested to do so by the judicial
authorities. The banks lneet their obligation to provide requested infolanation
on the basis of very strict "know your customer" rules.66z
g~
Micheloud & Cie Swiss Bank Secree), <http’//switzerland.isyou "s corn> at 9 November 2003.
SW~tzerlandEmbassy, Swiss Banking Secrecy, <http:l/wv,’w.eda.admm.ch at 11Novembe~ 2003.
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Shvitzerland to be on OECD’s Blacklist?66~
In June 2003, the OECD threatened to place Switzerland on a blacklist, due to
what the organisation considers to be its tolerance of ’harmful tax practices’.
While the country’s appearance on the forum’s blacklist would not create an
legal obligations for Switzerland, its inclusion on such a blacklist could only
be detrimental to the jurisdiction’s international standing.
’This is not acceptable,’ finance minista’y spokesman Daniel Eekman said. ’
have major difficulties understanding how after five years of discussions abou
what should be considered a harmfi~l tax practice, the forum comes up with 
report that considers Switzerland the only count~3’ in the whole OECD wit
harmfid aspects in its tax legislation. We won’t make .concessions in thi
field,’ Eckman said.664
Money Laundering related suspicious activity repo~s (SAR) rose over 30% i
2002 in Switzerland, with 95% of the total SARs connected to the 11
September 2001 attacks, according to a statement fi’om the Money Launderin
Reporting Office (MROS) of the Swiss Federal Office of Police. The figures
rose from 311 repox~s in 2001 to 417 in 2002, with the MROS forwarding 380
of these cases to law enforcement agencies.665
See Appendix U for the list of OECD’s Tax Havens as at 2004.
’OECD Tlu’eatens Swiss Over Tax’ (2003) 8 Offshore Red: An OFC News Update.
Money Lmmdering Report Office Switzerland, 5~t’ Anmtal Report (2002 MROS).
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The report also showed that the majority of reports were generated from non-
financial institutions, such as law firms, money transfer businesses and others
involved in fiduciary transactions and asset administration in Geneva, Zurich
and Bern. ’As a result of the attacks in US, te~a’orism is the crime most
frequently mentioned as a prior act in the reports about suspected money
laundering. Further crimes mentioned include fraud, corruption and
embezzlement,’ the MROS said.666
Conclusion
As with Singapore, Switzerland which was not on the OECD list of tax havens
or the FATF list of jurisdictions and territories for review, now complies with
the directives of the various supranational organisations as can be seen from
the above analysis.
5.8.4 Indian Ocean
Mauritius
Money Laundering Legislation
Mauritius has a range of legislation governing the domestic and offshore financial
services industry but legislation dealing with money laundering specifically is in its
i~ffaney. In the past legislation has regulated banks and other financial institutions on a
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pt~adential basis. However, new legislation, namely Economic Crime and Anti-Money
Laundering Act 2000 (ECAML Act) and the Dangerous Drugs Act 2000 have been
introduced to combat money laundering. However, legislation relating to international
co-operation needs to be reviewed to ensure compliance with FATF Recommendation
38. At the time of the visit no Extradition Act was in place and the team was told that
the Vie~ma Convention could not be ratified until this had been done. It is noted that
since the evaluation took place the Evaluation Team had been informed that the
Government has deposited its instta~ment of ratification in respect of the Vienna
Convention with the office of the United Nations Secretary General on 6th March
2001. Accordingly, the Convention was due to come into force for Mauritius on 4th
June 2001.
The regulation of the finance industry is currently fragmented into banking and non-
banking sectors, with responsibilities divided amongst separate regulator3’ bodies,
namely, the Central Bank and the MOBAA, the Controller of Insurance and the Stoc
Exchange Commission. Recognising this factor, the Goverrmlent is setting up a
Financial Services Cormnission which will be responsible for the.licensing, regulation
and supervision of non-banking financial services initially and, at a later stage, t
integrate the Financial Services Commission with the Bank of Manritius, the
supervisory attthority of the banking sector, in a move to a single unified regulatory
authority for the whole financial services in Manritius. In the meantime, there are
provisions in the ECAML Act 2000 for tackling money laundering tln’eats and for th
involvement of different regulatory bodies e.g. lodging of reports of suspicious
transactions with the Central Bank. The Bank can further refer the matter to th
appropriate bodies regulating the financial insfitutions who can take appropriat
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action under their relevant legislation. (Sections 22(1) and 21(6) respectively).
ttowever, the Evaluafion Team considers that strengthening and improving
operation between different regulatory bodies should be developed in the shoa~t
667lerm.
On 19 June 2003, the goverrunent mmounced ftn~her legislatiou to strengthen its anti-
~noney laundering (AML) regime. Among the measures being considered were: a
convention for the Suppression of Terrorism Bill, a Mutual Legal Assistance Bill and
an Extraction Bill. These ttu’ee measures have been drafted and will be finalised
during the summer. Mauritius has made significant headway in developing its AML
approach and at the end of 2002 was assessed by a team fi’om the IMF / World Bank
under a Financial Sector Assessment Programme (FSAP). Tiffs exercise was designed
to help countries enhance their resilience to financial crisis, and to foster growth by
promoting financial soundness and stability.668
The assessment included a review of AML/CFT (Combating the Financing of
Ten’orism) regime in place. The FSAP reports were presented to the IMF executive
board in October 2003, and Mauritius would then seek an upgrading of its ranking by
the Financial Stability Forum (FSF).
Mauritius was ranked in the third and lowest category of offshore financial centres by
the FSF in April 2000 with regard to the quality of its financial supervision.669
~7 Fhrancial Action Task Force, Annual Report 2001-2002 (2002 FATF) 51-2.
~ ’Mauritius Toughens Lauuderh~g Rules’ (2003) 80Jfshore Red: An OFCNews Update 103.
~9 Fhrancial Stability Forum, Financial Stability Forum Releases Groupitlg of Offshore Fh~ancial
Cent~.es (OFCs) to Assist in Setth~g Priorities for Assessment (2000) <htlp://wxwv.fsfopam.org> at 28
April 2004.
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Sushil Khushiram, minister of economic development, financial services and
corporate affairs, said the govenmaent anticipated a favourable assessment and
therefore adjustment to the countt3"s FSF ranking will further strengthen its
credibility in attracting new and better business in financial services.
"As part of the FSAP exercise, amendments have been proposed to the exiting
legislation to fine-tune some provisions and clear certain ambiguities. A team of two
AML/CFT experts visited Mauritius in March 2003 and submitted their final report in
April. A broad-based National Coordination AML/CFT committee was set np to
ensure proper inaplementation of the key points."67°
Tax Evasion
The Financial Intelligence and Anti-Money Lanndering Act 2002 (FIAML Act)67~
The FIAML Act makes provision for the establishment and management of 
Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) as the central agency responsible for receiving,
requesting, analysing and disseminating to the investigatory and supervisof
authorities, disclosures of financial information:
concerning suspected proceeds of crime and alleged money laundering offences.
Banks, financial institutions, cash dealers and relevant professionals are require
to repo~t suspicious transactions in relation to money laundering activities to the
FIU;
670 ’Mauritius Toughens Laundering Rules’ (2003) 8 Offshore Red: An OFCNeu,s Update 103.
67~ The Financial Intelligence and .4nti-Money Laundering Act 2002 (Mauritius).
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required by or under any enactment in order to counter money laundering; or
concenaing the financing of any activities or transactions related to terrorism, as
specified in Part II[ of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2002.
Tiffs Act also makes provision for mutual assistance with overseas bodies in respect of
investigation and prosecution of money laundering cases.
The FIU has already been set up and is operational.67~
Mutual Legal Assistance
The Mutual Assistance in Criminal and Related Matters Bill which aims at enabling
tbe widest possible ~rteasure of international cooperation being given and received by
the Republic of Mauritius pro~npt~y and to the fullest extent possible, in investigations,
prosecutions or proceedings concerning serious offences and related civil matters.673
Mauritius has, as a tax planning jurisdiction focused the development of its global
business sector (formerly known as the offshore sector) on the use of its growing
network of double Taxation Avoidance Treaties. The expanding network of these
double taxation agreements (DTA’s) reinforces the seriousness of Mauritius as a tax
efficient jurisdiction for structuring investment abroad in the global business sector.
~-~RRepublic of Mauritius, Minislxy of Economic Development, Financial Services & Corporate Affairs,
Financial Services Division (2003) <http://economicdevelopmeut.gov.mu> at 2 November 2003.
6~J Mauritius Prime Minister’s Office, Cabinet Decisions taken on 01 August 2003 (2003)
~http:l/ncb.int~et.mu/pmoldecisions.h~n> at 9 November 2003.
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Mauritius has been used as a route for investment into emerging regions such as India,
China and Pakistan.
¯ .           .               ¯ 674As at 11 February 2004, Mauritius has ratified 32 treaties and is negotiating several
others.675
The Prevention of Terrorism Act 2002 provides for measures to combat terrorism and
for related matters. Its objects are to:
(a) suppress the financing of terrorist acts;
S(b) criminalise the financmg of terrorist act ;
(c) fi’eeze funds and assets of terrorists and terrorist orgarfisations;
(d) establish terrorists acts as serious criminal offences in domestic laws and
regulations; Afford international assistance in investigations, prosecution of
financing of ten’orism;
(e) to exchange information and collaborate internationally on terrorist acts.
The new legislation enacted to combat financial crime, money laundering and terrori
financing enhances the security of the Mauritian financial services sector as well 
674 See Appendix P for the list of 32 ratified treaties.
675 Manritius Financial Services Commission, Double Taxation Avoidance Treaties
<\\a~v.fscmauritius.org/tax.htm> at 9 November 2003.
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conrforts the reputation of Mauritius as credible financial hub of international
676
repute.
Secrecy and Confidentiality
The Matu’itius Offshore Business Activities Act 1992 (MOBA) requh’es that all
iaformation and documentation received be kept secret and confidential except on
proof beyond reasonable doubt that the confidential h~fm~mation is bona fide required
for the purpose of any enquiry relating to drug trafficking, mxns dealing and money
laundering under the new Economic Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2000.677
An imposed penalty of a fine of up to 300,000 rupees and imprisomnent for a te~aaa of
not exceeding 8 years for failure to comply.67s
Mauritius Strengthening its’ Appeal as a OFC
Mauritins adheres to the international requirements. A review of its financial sector by
the IMF/World Bank under a fmancial sector assessment program was conducted in
2003. The report was positive. The Financial Services Commission exerts the
regulatory authority on all non-banking activities.
In 2003 Mauritius joined the Egmont Group. Its prestige i’s greatly erdaanced by tiffs
membership, which is further proof of the high regard wlffch Mauritius comrnands in
676 Ministry of~conomie Development, Fina~cial Services & Corporate Affairs, Financial Services
~ivisioa <http://economicdevelopment.gov.mu> at 3 November 2003.    .                 ,
~ h~ternational Company Se~wices Lhnited, Mauritius (1999) <http://www.~csl.co n> at 3 Novemve~
2003.67s Finor Associates Ltd, Jurisdictions: Mauritius (2003) <http://www.fmcor.com> at 3 November
2003.
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the international financial arena and confilxns its standing as one of today’s best
financial centres.679
Conchtsion
Mauritius, which was on the FATF list of jurisdictions and te~a’itories for review, now
complies with the directives of the various supranational organisations as can be seen
fi’om the above analysis.
5.8.5 Asia
(i) Hong Kong
Money Laundering Legislation
Over the last four years approximately 3000 investigations into money
laundering have resulted in a mere 49 convictions. Hong Kong must now face
up to the danger of being blacklisted by the FATF if it does not tighten up it
cula’ent laws that have allowed many money-launderers to get away with th
criminal activities.
This warning came fi’om Hong Kong’s commissioner for narcotics, Claire L
Kn Ka-Lee, who has reported to a Bills Committee meeting on a new money-
679 Ludovic Verbist, The Sunny Side of Financial Services, htternational Financial Seta,ice Centres:
The Case for Mauritius (2004) Asian Legal Business <http://www.asianlegalonline.com> at 10 May
2004.
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laundering law recently, that Hong Kong must improve its financial services
laws to avoid the threat of sanctions fi’om the FATF and the OECD.
Lo has argued that if Hong Kong does not improve itself, there is a possibility
it could be blacklisted some time in the future. Hung Kong as an international
financial centre, needs in order to maintain its status, combat money
laundering.68°
In 1999 the FATF carried out an assessment of the Hong Kong’s Speeial
Administrative Region wlfich indicated that the jurisdiction’s regulations were
not quite up to par in the global fight against money laundering.68t The
multilateral cited Hong Kong’s low tax system, sophisticated banking facilities
and the absence of cun’ency and exchange controls as ’susceptible’ to money-
laundering activities.
The report stated that, since tire first evalnation in 1994, Hong Kong had taken
a nunaber of impol~ant steps in its anti-money laundering regime. The
expansion of its anti-money laundering legislation under both the Drug
Trafficking (Recovery of Proceeds) Ordinance (DTRoP) and the Organised
and Serious Crimes Ordinance (OSCO), which include the extension of the
money laundering offence fi’om only drug trafficking to the proceeds of
serious crimes and statutory mandatory suspicions reporting, have provided a
solid foundation for penal action.
6s0 Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office, ’FATF Annual Report under Hong Kong’s Presidency
~e~ased’ (2002) 6 The Circle 4.
ehmncial Action Task Force, above n 615.
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Although the report described the legislative steps taken by Hung Kong to b
’fundamentally sound’ it raised concerns that the reporting of suspiein
transactions mandatory for both dpag offences and other serious crime wer
inadequate. The report stated: "the number of repo~s received are still smal
relative to the size of the Hong Kong financial markets and repox~ing levels i
other jurisdictions.., the low nnmber of suspicious transactions repo~s and o
convictions for money laundering, suggest that the effeetiveness of the syste
can be further improved.’ 682
The FATF released its thirteenth annual report on its anti-money launderi
and anti-terrorist financing activities at a press conference held on June 21
2002 at the conclusion of its plenat3~ meeting in Paris.
"The annual repo~683 outlined the main achievements of the FATF in 20
2002 under the presidency of Hong Kong, China, including the significa
progress that has been made in combating ten’orist financing and in the w
on Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories (NCCTs)," said IVfi’s. Clarie 
the outgoing FATF President and Hong Kong’s Co~mnissioner for Narcotics
In the repo~ 684, eleven FATF members, including Hong Kong, h
implemented all of the twenty-eight recommendations requiring specif
action.685
Financial Action Task Force, Ammal Report 1998-1999 (1999 FATF) 15.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office, above n 680.
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Hong Kong has money laundering rules which are wider than those that apply
in most other countries. For example, disclosure to the authorities must be
made by any person who merely "ought to have suspected" that monies
received originated from criminal activities. Fm~hermore, this thi’eshold is met
evan if the activity abroad that generated the funds was not illegal in that
country but would have be illegal had it been done in Hong Kong. On the
other hand, if an offence overseas would not have been an offence if it had
been conmaitted in Hong Kong, no report need to be filed. Thus, the receipt of
funds from gambling activities conducted abroad must be repol~ed, but fuMs
received in violation of foreign exchange controls do not.68~
In the case of Robert Pang Yiu Hung v Commissioner of Police (2 December
2000), a practicing barrister was arrested for failing to disclose his suspicion
that certain securities held by client were to be sold, and the proceeds
transfen’ed to the account of the client’s solicitor. The relationship between the
bm’rister and his client was professional, and the purpose for which the client
was selling the shares was to pay his legal fees to his solicitor in order to
defend himself in the action for which the ban’ister was retained. The issue
that arose in tiffs case was whether a bm’rister (and a solicitor) were excused
fi’om filing a money-laundering report to the authorities by claiming legal
professional privilege. The comet held that the privilege applied, and that no
report needed to be filed. The ban’ister was therefore acquitted.687
~ This is because Hong Kong criminalises gambling but does not have exchange con~’ol laws of her
~\~ichael Olensnicky, "Recent Developments Affecth~g the Private B~nking la~dustry in Key
JUrisdictions _ Hong Kong", Baker & McKenzie, Eight Ammal Intenmtional Tax and Tn~sts Training
Course, Singapore, September 2003.
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This is an important decision which affirms the sacrosanct rule that a person
should be permitted to make full disclosure to his legal advisor for the purpose
of seeking legal advise without fearing that anything said by him in seeking
that advise would be snbject to disclosure. The court expressed reluctance to
adopt the rule that would require ban’isters and solicitors in the discharge of
their professional duty of acting for a client to essentially act as informers
against their clients. The comet recognised that legal professional privilege is
nowadays recognised as a fundamental human right, and indeed is protected i
such conventions as the Inte~aational Covenant for Civil and Political Rights
which is enshi’ined in Hong Kong’s Basic Law, which is Hong Kong’s "mi
constitution". A disclosure requirement would be fundamentally incompatible
with the constitutional guarantee of an independeut profession which is
implicit in the Basic Law.
During the course of the hearing, the government enacted clarifying legislation
that now expressly states that nothing in the money laundering legislatio
requires a disclosure of any items subject to legal privilege.68s
Tax Evasion
Ti~e State Council submitted the draft amendment to the Tax Admi~fistrati
Law in August 2000 for review by the Standing Conmaittee of the Nin
National People’s Congress. The draft amendment included the introduction 
a minimum penalty for tax evasion. According to the proposal, the penalty f
Ibid.
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tax evasion was to range fi’om 50 per cent to 500 per cent of the amount of tax
evaded.
A taxpayer is deemed to have conunitted an act of tax evasion under Article
40 of the Tax Administration Law if he "forges or alters information, conceals
information or destroys account books or account vouchers without
authofisation, records an excess amount of expenditure or fails to record an
insufficient amount of income in aceouut books or uses other means to falsify
tax declarations and this results in non-payment or underpayment of tax."
Current Tax Administration Law labels tax evasion a criminal offence if the
amount evaded is over 10 per cent of the tax payable and over RMB10,000. In
July this year, a Hong Kong resident who has engaged in VAT frauds was
sentenced to death, subject to a two-year suspension. While more than 70
Peoples Republic of China (PRC) citizens who connnitted VAT fi’aud have
been sentenced to death, this is the first one that involves a Hong Kong
resident in a PRC tax case.689
Mutual Legal Assistance
Hong Kong has 8 Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Orders which
have come into force with Australia, Canada, France, South Korea, New
Zealand, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States of America.69°
s9 Peter Kung and Bolivia Cheung, The Bulletin (2000) The Hong Kong General Chamber of
o~runerce <http://www.chamber.org.l~k> at 9 November 2003.90 Hong Kong Department of Justice, Bilingual Laws Information System, List of Mutual Legal
ssistance Ago’cements <hRp:/lwww.justice.gov.hk> at 9 November 2003.
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The judgments and awards of the Hong Kong High Coutnt and above, may b
enforced in most conmlon law jurisdictions and in consequence of
international agreements and an’angements, in a number of foreign countries
including France, Germany and Italy. Reciprocal an’angements exist for the
enforcement in Hong Kong of the judgments of the superior courts of those
countries that will enforce Hong Kong’s judgments. Similarly, maintenance
orders made in matrimonial proceedings can be enforced, on a reciprocal basis,
in a number of overseas countries.
Extradition agreements provide for the su~a’ender of persons who are accused
or convicted of a serious criminal offence co~mnitted within the jurisdiction of
one of the Pm~ies to the agreement who are found in the territo~2¢ of the other
Party. The com~s in Hong Kong also have jurisdiction, on request fi’om a
foreign com~, to obtain evidence in Hong Kong for civil or criminal
proceedings in that com~. Similarly, the com~s in Hong Kong can issue Letters
of Reqnest to overseas courts for the obtaining of evidence. Mutual legal
assistance in the investigation and prosecution of crimina! offences in Hong
Kong and overseas and in the recovery of proceeds of crime is also given and
obtained directly by the International Law Division of the Department of
Justice, under the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Ordinance
(Cap 525).691
Secrecy and Confidentiality
691 Depm~nent of Justice, Legal System in Hong Kong, The Courts
<http://www.info.gov.hk/justiceh~ew/legal!right htm> at 9 November 2003. "
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There is no legal provisions governing the collection and disclosure of
colvanercial credit data in Hong Kong. However, under the common law
principle, banks general regard it their duty to maintain confidential
informafion about their customers. They would not non’aally disclose such
information unless prior consent has been obtaiued from the customers.692
Hong Kong’s Potential as an Offshore Financial Centre
Chinese officials are no longer so keen on Hong Kong becoming an offshore
remninbi centre. The Chinese officials apparently fear that such action could
devastate the cun’ency and give an unfair advantage to Hong Kong and its
ballks.693
In early August 2003, the Central Govel~unent agreed to consider allowing
banks in Hong Kong to trial run personal renminbi business, including
deposits, remittance, exchange and credit-card business. The Centa’al
Govenunent also agreed to give preference to Hong Kong to consider
liberalisation in market access in respect of offshore renminbi financial
business.
Such a move was thought to be of benefit to both Hong Kong’s development
as an international financial centre and to the growing economic integration
between Hong Kong and the Mainland. The move was also thought to
6~2, Hong Kong IVlonetary Authority <l~tttp://www.hlfo.gov.hk/hkma/eng> at 6 November 2003.
"~ ’Chhm Wavers on Hong Kong’s Offshore Activities’ (2003) 8 Offshore Red: An OFC News Update
122.
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potemially reduce money laundering, promote domestic competition and
provide more credit tools for borrowers and lenders.
However, the Central Government’s initially positive response to Hong Kong
becoming an offshore centre seems to be not as strong as originally thought.
The Financial Times reported that, "mainland finance industry officials,
especially in Shanghai, are objecting to the plan. Shanghai has been struggling
to establish itself as a remninbi finance centre and fears its role may be
undermined by concessions to Hong Kong." Hong Kong has a far superior
infi’astructure and skills base, which would likely make it more a favourable
finance centre.
The relationship between the Chinese anthorities and the financial centre in
Hong Kong remains problematic. This is another example of Beijing’s
unwillingness to allow the separate culture of Hong Kong to remain intact.
Competition pressures from Beijing and Shanghai will add to Hong Kong’
woes. The SARS virus dealt a heavy blow to Hong Kong and its capacity t
compete on a global stage is being further undermined by this latest
development.694
The impact of SARS is mainly on the economy. Ho~vever, it is also causin
some political turbulence. After 500,000 took to the street to voice their
Ibid.
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grievances against the ruling cabinet and the ailing economy, two ministers
including the Financial Secretary resigned.695
Such negative news was accompanied by an increase in tax rates from 16% to
17.5%, which is quite a controversial move to increase government revenue
under a dragging recession and a historically high unemployment rate of over
8%.
On the positive front, Hong Kong has yet again been named the world’s fi’eest
economy for the s~venth consecutive year by Canada’s Fraser Institute. It has
also topped the Heritage Foundation/Wall Street Journal Index of Economic
Freedom for the past nine years.
Moreover, to protect the lustre of this Pearl of the Orient, China signed with
Hong Kong the Closer Economic Partnership Arrangements (CEPA) on 29
June 2003. This is one of the devices to boost the local economy. Under CEPA,
tariffs on some 270 categories of goods manufactured in Hong Kong will be
removed. Also, 17 Hong Kong service industries will get first mover access to
the mainland market. These include management consultancy, accounting,
legal, banking, securities and insurance.
Companies incorporated and operating in Hong Kong will be eligible for the
advantage. Foreign firms without substantial operations in Hong Kong can
695 Citing Cheong, ’China Warns HK; Don’t Sta’ay Too Far’, The Straits Times (Singapore) 18 February
2004, 1.
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take advantage of the CEPA by partnering with or acquiring eligible loca
companies .696
However, Beijing’s most recent conmaents on "capital outflows" seem to have
spelt a death nail to the SRA’s sovereign risle, which for European investor,
will surely see the funds move to Singapore as the more stable and attractive
of the two Asian Regional Financial Centres.697
Conchtsion
As with Singapore, Hong Kong which was not on the OECD list of tax havens
or the FATF list of jurisdictions and ten’itories for review, now complies with
the directives of the various supranational organisations as can be seen fi’om
the above analysis.
5.9 Conclusion
The responses of the OFCs covered by the detailed and extensive maalysis in tiffs
chapter, demonstrated the compromise positions that have been reached between the
supranational directives and the regulatory amendments of the key OFCs.
The level of co-operation by the prominent OFCs is now at an unprecedented level
and the depth and quality of their regulation far outstrips those nations which
constantly criticise the island nations tlu’ough global agencies. Switzerland, an OECD
696 Yvonne Fong, ’Fh~ancial Markets h~ Asia’ (2004) The OFC Report 2004 15.
697 Chlng, above n 695.
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member, still has not given up on banking secrecy and bankers in Switzerland still
seem reluctant to move. Yet British chancellor Gordon Brown has said he will put
renewed pressure on Jersey, Guernsey and the Isle of Man to move fi’om their
co~mnon position of a withholding tax to automatic information exchange under the
terms of the European savings tax dh’ective.698
The revision in thought mnong OFCs some years ago which obliged many to come to
the realisation that the only way forward was to provide outstanding levels of services
and to co~nply with the larger international eolmnunity has been a force for the good.
But the inevitable conclusion from this process appears to be that there will be fewer
OFCs and that the less conforming states offering offshore services will eventually
disappear.
Nevertheless as the number of viable OFCs falls fi’om 65 or so to 15-20, those
remai~fing will be robust structures, articulately managed centres and able to compete
with the world’s best. Some will be full service jurisdictions and others will be
excellent ~fiche players.
It appears that the larger developed economies which benefited tln’ough the coercion
of these offshore states with the name-and-shame tactics, may cease their political
manoeuvrings. The OFCs have complied in full measure but the big states are
perceived to have mmfifestly failed to achieve a level playing field. In a fot~lMght
demonstration of their intellectual creativity the offshore centres - notable Gibraltar
and the Isle of Man - have managed to create a tax environment wtfieh meets the full
698 Bob Reynolds, ’Editor’s Note’ (2003) 8 Offshore Red." An OFC News Update 153.
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demands of international transparency and a competitive mm’ketplace. It is this degree
of agility of thought and action which the OFCs will need on a continuing basis i
they are to stand a chance of sutMval in the intemationa! corridors of power.699
The following chapter now brings this thesis to the point where it is noted that havin
analysed the responses of the various OFCs including Switzerland in Europe an
Hong Kong in Asia, and it will also be noted that the relocation of global wealth
management is now being diverted fi’om the traditiona! European regimes to th
newly emerging Asian regional financial centre of Singapore.
Chapter 6 examines the legislative and regulatory responses of Singapore to the major
supranational directives concerning harmful tax practices, money laundering
confidantiality and exchange of information. This analysis will also draw attention t
the eompm’isons with the Swiss model in terms of secrecy 700 and ban
confidentiality.7°1 The Wolfsberg Principles are given further attention as Singapore is
positioning itself to be another alternative besides Switzerland, in the realm of private
banking and global wealth management. The relevance is heavier as the origins of t
Wolfsberg Principles are that of private banks who wish to have regulations in plac
to combat money laundering and tax evasion in line with the directives of the OEC
and the FATF.
699 Ibid.
700 Swiss Civil Code, ba-t 398. The agent is obligated, in general, to use fl~e same ca~ as the employee
under an employment contract. Affirmed by the Swiss Federal Tribunal in 1937:63 Arr~ts du Tribtmat
Fdddral Swiss II 242, 16 September 1937.70~ Federal Law Relating to Banks and Saving Banks, Recueil Syst6mafique du Droit F6d6ral (amended
1934, 1991), 952 (the Swiss Bamking Law), Art 47 (Official Collection of Federal Laws and
Regulations 1971 at 808).
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Chapter 6: Singapore as a Compliant Jurisdiction
6,1 Introduction
Switzerland cun:ently manages approxhnately US$2.2 trillion of offshore assets7°2 due
to its lfistofic stable financial and political enviromnental, which translates into a safe
haven for investing money. FreSher, it also has long-standing expertise in multi-
currency investments, with pro-investor banking secrecy laws, and discrete and well
regarded personalised se~Mces. To many, Switzerland is a politically-neutral, tax-
efficient and trustworthy financial centre.
But Switzerland’s position as a offshore financial centre is set to weaken with the
possibility of significant fund outflows to Asia and elsewhere. Switzerland will soon
lose some of its tax competitiveness which is one of the main benefits for its past
success in attracting offshore funds.
In June 2003, under pressure fi’om G8 countries, Switzerland has agreed to repatriate
inco~ne taxes on accounts held by citizens of the European Union, due to stm~ in July
2005, but which may be delayed tin, her until 2006. The tax rate will start at 15
percent and increase to 35 percent by 2011.7°3
Other EU’s countries have also adopted or will adopt the EU’s Savings Tax Directive,
which requires financial institutions to report financial information on their non-
70z Laura Colin and David Fairlamb, Singapore Andlts Growing Effect On Private BankO~g. Su,iss
Banks: Paradise Lost (2003) eBfftin Hosting <http://www.ebrainhosthig.biz/englisb/news/news-
8h~gapore~orivate.html> at 29 Febl~aary 2004.
~0~ SwissInfo, EU Tax Deal Leaves Swiss Banking Secrecy httaet (2003)
<htip:/Avww.swissinfo.org/sen/Swissinfo.html?siteSec~105&sid=3900237> at 24 October 2003.
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resident investors. This means that account holders will have to pay taxes on their
investment income to their respective goverrmlents, which previously was not done.
In light of these developments, the analysis of this chapter will demonstrate how it is
likely that the wealthy may decide to place their wealth away from Switzerland, and
the other ~vealth management centres in Europe. The wealth management indust~¢ in
Asia, especially Sir~gapore, in response to all the supranational directives, is poised to
benefit fi’om these recent developments in Europe over and above the growing amount
of indigenous wealth in Asia.
Si~nilar to Switzerland, Singapore has strong fundamentals. Firstly, it has a good
record of creating and maintaining sound economic policies and is politically stable.
Its financial indust~3, is regulated to the highest international standards. Secondly, it is
the world’s fuurth largest foreign exchange centre with a large presence of public
equity, private equity, fixed income and hedge fund managers .704
Thirdly, Singapore has an extremely favourable regulatory environment for the
placement and investment of offshore funds. Its tax system allows offshore funds to
co~npound tax free, as no taxes on interest and capital gains are imposed on non-
residents. There are also no ban’iers to the entry and repatriation of funds.
Fom~hly, the Singapore government plays an active role at increasing transparency
and minimising bureaucratic practices. It also has stringent client confidentiality laws,
comparable to those of Switzerland. With these advantageous factors in place,
70~ Francis Koh, Lee Choon Li and Parthsarthi Jindai, ’Sh~gapol~ as an Emergh~g Hub for Wealth
Management’ (2003) November Pnlses, A monthly publication of Shtgapore Exchange Lhnited 10,
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singapore has positioned itself to being a benefiting party to the movement of
offshore funds out of Europe.7°5
It can be seen that Singapore’s development as an international financial centre began
in the late 1960s. Since then, Singapore has implemented an economic blueprint that
has encouraged inward investments of multinational corporations to Singapore. The
inflows of foreign direct investment fi’om the UK, US and Japan provided an impetus
to the development of the financial sector. By the 1980s, many of the world’s leading
financial institutions had set up operations in Singapore.7°6
Over the years, its sound economic and financial fundamentals, conducive regulatory
and business environment, strategic location, skilled and educated workforce,
excellent teleconununlcations and infrastructure, and high living standards have
attracted many reputable international financial institutions to set up operations in
Singapore. On the back of growing prosperity in the region and support fi’om the
authorities, Singapore has developed into a regional, and subsequently, global foreign
exchange trading centre. Today, only London, New York and Tokyo record lfigher
foreign exchange trading volumes than Singapore. The Singapore International
Monetary Exchange (SIMEX)7°7, the first derivative exchange in Asia, also grew in
stature to become a key Asian financial hub in the global chain of leading future
markets. Today, financial services account for 11% of Singapore’s GDP.7°8
7o5 Ibid.
70~ Economic Review Committee, Sub-Committee on Services lndasla’ies, Financial Services Working
Group, Positioning Singapore as a Pre-eminent Financial Centre hi Asia (2002) Cha~mel News Asia
<http://w\wv.channelnewsasia.com> at 9 November 2003.70~ SIMEx and tile Stock Exchange of Singapore (SES) have since merged to become tile Singapore
~sX~;~l~orityOh~._~,oc,_v, of Singapore <http://www.mas.gov.sg> at3 November 2003.
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There is a large and diversified gronp of local and foreign financial institutions,
numbering about 700, located in Singapore and offering a wide range of financia
products and services. These include trade financing, foreign exchange, derivative
products, capital market activities, loan syndication, underwriting, mergers and
acquisitions, asset management, securities trading, financial advisory services, and
specialised insurance services. The presence of these leading institutions has
contributed to the vibrancy and sophistication of Singapore’s financial indust~T¢.7°9
Fund management companies in Singapore have expanded in terms of size, regiona
responsibility and capabilities, with 70% of funds under management sourced from
the US, Europe and Asia.71°
Singapore’s asset management industry has managed good growth since 1994. Asset
under management (AUM) by Singapore-based financial institutions have grow
steadily fi’om S$66 billion in 1994 prior to the implementation of developmental
measures to S$307 billion as at end of 2001. Singapore has evolved into a majo
regional asset management centre, hosting more than 200 asset management ontfits,
which employed 1114 professionals as at end of 2001. Almost ttu’ee-quarters of
discretionary AUM is sourced from overseas.TM
709 Ibid.
7~o Ecouomic Review Cotmnittee, Sub-Conuuittee on Services Industries, Financial Services Working
Group, above n 706. The major Swiss and European private banks such as LISB, Credit Suisse and
ABN-kanro all have regional headquarters in Singapore.
7~ Ibid.
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private banking is a discrete industry, but a survey of Asia / Pacific Private Banking
and Wealth Management by Pficewaterhouse Coopers released in July 2003 revealed
that AUM grew 11 per teat region-wide and 12 per cent in Singapore in 2002.712
Singapore’s developmental objective is to become a centre for (a) managing the Asian
investment portfolios of both Asian and Western clients and (b) managing global
iavestments of clients in Asia. Today, 43% of assets managed in Singapore were
sourced fi’om Em’ope and North America, with 30% of assets invested in Singapore,
9% in Japan and 18% in the rest of the Asia Pacific. However, Singapore remains a
predominantly Asian mandate centre, with funds mostly invested in Asia, although the
mnount of investment in the US and Europe carried out fi’om Singapore has increased
in recent years. 713
The offshore-banking business is under pressure around the world. But as offshore
pm~icipants (particularly the many institutions with businesses in Switzerland) review
their business in light of mffavourable regulatory charges, they will find they have
several options that will help them remain competitive.
One of the options is to grow beyond their home market. They can do so by building
onshore presences in selected locations or by intensifying their efforts to grow in other
key offshore locations such as Singapore. Thus there is the increasing need for
7t2 Vffa’am Khalma, ’Tougher Times for Private Banking’ Business Times (Singapore) 5 November
2003.
~o Economic Review Committee, Sub-Coiranlttee on Services h~dustries, Financial Services Working
Group, above n 711.
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Singapore to cement in the minds of the offshore players, her position as the next best
alternative.714
After examining the OFCs legislation and responses to the directives of the
supranational organisafion in respect to (a) harmful tax practices, (b) money
laundering, (c) confidentiality and (d) exchange of i~ffom~ation, the following analysis
of Singapore’s legal and regulatory systems will de~nonstrate how it has responded to
these issues and why in totality this regional financial centre will continue to develop
ahead of the other OFCs, and in doing so, will beco~ne the new jurisdiction of choice
for those seeking to use an OFC for future wealth management.
6.2 Legal Framework- Legislation Enacted by the Parliament of Singapore
Singapore, which is a republic, was a colony of the United Kingd6m and briefly pa~
of the Federation of Malaya. She has a unicameral parliament and a government
patterned after the Westminster model, in which Parliament enacts laws and confers
executive powers thereunder npon ministers,7~5 who form a cabinet headed by the
Prime Minister.
The President is the constitutional Head of State. Although the President does not
have execntive powers, his assent is required before any legislation can have the force
of law.716 Local legislation comprises acts passed by Parliament and assented to by
7a4 The Boston Consulting Group, above n 398.
7~ The Ivlhfisters usually are empowered under their respective Acts to promnlgate such subsidiary
legislation as h~ necessat3, for the hnplementation of Acts.
7~6Artiete 58 of the Sh~gapore Constitution provides that "the power of Legislature to make laws shall
.... i n "be exercised by Bills passed by Parhament and assented to by the P~es de t:
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the President, and subsidiary legislation promulgated thereunder by ministers
exercising their delegated authority.
Singapore’s judicial system comprises tlu’ee tiers of courts:
(i) The Subordinate Com~s, consisting of the Coroners’ Courts, the Juvenile
Couats, the Magistrates’ Courts, and the Small Claims Tribunal;
(ii) The Supreme Court, which comprises the High Cou~, the Coul~t of Appeal,
and the Criminal Court of Appeal, and
(iii) The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, which traditionally has been the
highest court of appeal for Britain’s former colonies.
6.3 English Common Law and Statutes
The reception of English Common law in Singapore was effected by the Letters
Pateut issued on November 27, 1826, more conmaonly referred to as the Second
Charter of Justice, which established the Court of Jndicature of Prince of Wales Island,
Singapore, and Malacca and required the cou~ "to give and pass Judgement and
Sentence according to Justice aud Right". This phi’ase traditionally has been
interpreted to mean that the English law and equity, as it stood in England in 1826,
was part of the law of the Straits Settlements.717
As a result of the foregoing, matters wlfich have not been legislated upon by the
Singapore Parliament, are governed by English Common Law, embodied in decided
~7 Regh~a v. lVilliams (1858) 3 Kyshe 16; Fatimah v. Logan (1871) Kyshe 225.
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cases of the English cou~s, ~vith such adaptation as are required by local
circumstances.V18
The Common Law enjoys continuous reception in Singapore as ’the Conm~on Law
was traditionally conceived of as having existed fi’om time immemorial and was
merely declared by the judges fi’om time to time ...’. 719 According to this
interpretation of the Common Law, the courts in England deciding a casp today
simply would be declaring the law as it has always been (and, hence, as it was at the
date of the Second Cha~er of Justice), and applying it to the facts before them.
6.4 Harmful Tax Practices: Singapore Tax System
Taxation is a cost both to the individual and the business. The burden of personal
income tax on individnals whether borne by the individual himself, his employer or
partly by both is a consideration of great importance. In Singapore, as in any other
country, the total burden of income tax, whether company or personal, is determined
by two factors - first, the amount of income that is snbject to tax and secondly, the
rates of tax that apply to such income.72°
Under the current Singapore tax system, interest income derived by a Singapore
resident individual from investing in Singapore interest-bearing instn~ments will be
718 See Walter Woon (ed), The Sit~gapore Legal System (1989), 119, where he states modifications to
suit the customs, manners, usages aud religions of the native inhabitants." An example, he cites the
relaxation, h~ colonial days, of the conuuon law concept of monogamous marriage in the case of the
Chinese.719 See G W Bartholomew, ’English Law in Partibus Orieutalium’ in A J l-Iarding (ed), The Common
La3v itt Singapore and Malco~sia (1986) 15.7~0 Angela Tan, Jennifer Sng Gek Neo and Tau How Teck, Singapore Master Tax Guide 2002 (21st ed,
2002) 564.
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taxed at the individual’s ltighest applicable marginal tax rate. As urn’emitted interest
income from offshore investments is not subject to Singapore tax, individuals are
amtivated to move savings offshore and not repatriate these funds.
The repatriation of offshore Singapore wealth will provide a substantial boost to the
local wealth management industry. This will help to anchor financial institutions iu
Singapore. To encotu’age firms to source for more foreign funds for management in
Singapore, there were proposals that tax exemptions be granted for: (a) domestic
source investment inco~ne and foreign source income remitted to Singapore, aud (b)
management fee income earned by fund managers fi’om managing funds sourced
overseas. These two proposals were accepted and announced in Singapore Budget
2004.TM
Tax friendly conditions are essential to creating an attractive business environment.
While tax is only one factor in deciding where to locate business operations, it is often
a significant factor for consideration, especially with increasing labour and capital
mobility.
It has been recommended that to maintain Singapore’s domestic competitiveness as a
financial centre, there should be a general shift in resources from the public sector to
the private sector through reduced tax collections. The use of targeted tax incentives
should also be maintained, as this would give Singapore an edge in attracting
expertise and higher-value added financial selwices. 722
7~1 Economic Review Conmaittee, Budget Speech 2004 (2004) Budget 2004
~t~P://wxvw.budget2004.gov.sg> at 28 April 2004.
" Economic Review Committee, Sub-Cmm:nittee on Services Indnstries, Financial Services Working
Group, above n 713.
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In 2002, Singapore’s imputation system of taxation was abolished and replaced by th
one tier income tax system. Under the one tier system, foreign income wil! oifly be
taxed in Singapore in so far the income is remitted, or is deemed remitted in to
Singapore. The Singapore Income Tax Act contains a number of provisions on th
basis of which income will be deemed to have been remitted into Singapore. Fo
instance, repayment of debt out of income kept offshore, triggers a deeming provisio
resulting in the foreign income becoming taxable in Singapore. The initial conclusio
was that the declaration of an interim dividend should not trigger mentioned deemin
provision as the payment of an interim dividend could not be regarded as a repayme
ofdebt.
The Inland Revenue Authority of Singapore (IRA8) has published a Supplemen
Circular on the one-tier corporate tax system. This Circular confirms that foreig
sourc.ed income kept offshore out of which dividends are distributed, will not 
considered to have been remitted into Singapore. Final dividends too can therefore 
distributed out of such income.
Singapore has become a very interesting location for distributing foreign income 
foreign shareholders. It is impol~ant to note, however, that if the Singapore comp
would wish to claim the treaty benefits in respect of such foreign income, Singapo
tax treaties generally include a provisiou which stipulates that treaty benefits can o
be claimed in respect of remitted foreign income.
The following favourable changes were made to the Singapore tax law.
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first of all, the corporate tax rate was reduced fi’om 24.5% to 22%7;~3 and estate
duty for movable assets situated in Singapore for non-domiciled individuals is
exempted;
more impol~antly, section 44 of the Income Tax ActTM was replaced by a one-
tier corporate tax system - tax collected fi’om corporate profits is now final;
dividends paid out of corporate profits will be exempt fi’om tax in the hands of
the shareholders and companies will no longer be requh’ed to fi’ank their
dividends under the present dividend imputation system.
Thus a company with offshore income or capital gains will be able to pay dividends
out of its untaxed income or gains without having to deduct tax from the dividends
declared. It is no longer necessary for trust structures to use Singapore non-resident
companies. However, offshore income brought into the countt3, by a Singapore
company will still be subject to tax in Singapore as income received locally.
The Companies Act725 has also been relaxed. Private exempt companies with an
a~mual turnover of less than S$5 million will be exempted fi’om submitting audited
accounts. Private companies are allowed to have a sole shareholder and director; the
director must be resident in Singapore.
Like Hong Kong, Singapore has never been blacklisted in the major international
reports, including those of the OECD and FATF. With the debates of EU savings tax
directives and other compliance issues faced by European counterparts, these two
~23 The coq~orate tax rate will be cut fi’om 22% to 20% with effect fi’om Year of Assessme~t (YA) 2005.
~come Tax .4ct (Chapter 134) 1948 (Singapore) s40.
~ btCome Tax Act (Chapter 134) 1948 (Singapore) s44.
Con~panies Act (Chapter 50) 1967 (Sh~gapore) s205C.
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financial centres in Asia should be able to benefit in the longer term.726 Although as
noted previously, Hong Kong has a perceived sovereign risk attached to it, as a result
of the recent ruling of the Standing Committee of China’s National People’s Congress
(NPC) on 6 April 2004 that it has a veto over how Hong Kong’s leader and legislature
should be elected. It said that wlfile Hong Kong can change its election laws fi’om
2007, it first mnst obtain approval from Beijing. The decision rests on an
interpretation of territory’s mini-constitution, the Basic Law. It effectively means that
China can veto any moves to give Hong Kong more democracy, such as direct
elections for its chief executive.727
On 21 May 2003, the IRAS released a Circular which contained further details on the
"Tax exemption for foreign-sourced dividends, foreign branch profits and foreign-
sourced service income.", as proposed in the Budget 2003. The tax exemption applies
to the specified foreign sourced income received in Singapore on or after 1 June 2003;
the income does not need to be earned on or after mentioned date. The exemption is,
where applicable, available to Singapore based incorporations and individuals resident
in Singapore. The conditions for qualifying are as follows. In the year the income is
received in Singapore, the headline tax rate of the foreign jurisdiction fi’om which the
income is received is at least 15%. Furthermore, the income has been subjected to tax
in the foreign jurisdiction from wlfich these were received.7~8
6.4.1 Tax Evasion
726 Fong, above n 696.
7~7 BBC News, China Veto Augers HK Democrats (2004) <http:/h~exvs.bbc.¢o.ttk/go/prlfxl-/21hilasia-
pacific/3602921.stm> at 10 May 2004.
728 "Loyens & Loeff, Asia Newsletter, St.rm~er 2003.
330
The Association of Banks in Singapore (ABS) issued its first Guidelines: "Prevention
of the Misuse of the Singapore Banking System for Drug Trafficking and Money
Laundering Purposes" in 1990. In 1994, after the passing of The Drug Trafficking
(Confiscation of Benefits) Act (DTA), ABS revised the 1990 Guidelines. The scope
of the anti-money laundering law under the DTA was significantly enlarged under
The Co~a’uption, Drug Trafficking and Other Serious Crimes (Confiscation of Benefits)
Act (SCA)729, which replaced the DTA. 730
One of the most significant changes under the SCA is the extension of the Act to
criminalise non drug-related criminal offences. These offences are called ’Serious
Offences’ and ’Foreign Serious Offences’ (collectively termed ’Criminal Conduct’).
Thus the SCA has now cfiminalised all Drug Trafficking Offences, Foreign Drug
OffencesTM, Serious Crimes and Foreign Serious Crimes.732
There are 182 Serious Crimes listed in Schednle 2 of the SCA.733 These criminal
offences are punishable under ten penal statutesTM which include the Penal Code,
Kidnapping Act, Prevention of Corruption Act and Women’s Charter.
729 Cona~ption, Drug Trafficking And Other Serious Crimes (Confiscation Of Benefits) Act (Chapter
65a) 1993 (Sh~l~apore)
The Assoemhon of Ba~ks in Singapore, Guidelines on Prevention of Money Laundering (2001)
<www.abs.org.sg> at 15 November 2003.
nt ’Foreign Dpag Tt~fficklug Offence’ means a drug-lrafficking offence punishable under a
corresoondin~_      ~ law    ._(s. 2 ).
Foreign Serious Offence neans an offence committed outside Singapore which constitutes a
Serious Offence trader the SCA (s. 2).
~73~ See Appendix L for the fidt list of 182 Serious Crimes.
1~ The ten statues specified in Schednle 2 are: (i) SCA itself; (ii) Children and Young Persons Act; (iii)
Corrosive and Explosive Snbsta~lces and Offensive Weapons Act; (iv) Hijacking of Aircraft and
Protection of Aircraft and International Airports Act; (v) Kidnapping Act; (vi) Penal Code; (vii)
Prevention of Com~ption Act; (viii) Termination of Pregnancy Act; (ix) Vandalism Act; and (x)
Wo~nen’s Charter.
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While the enlargement of the scope of money laundering law under the SCA is ve~
inclusive, one could say that the SCA has not gone far enough because it fails to
criminalise some of the other serious crimes. For instance, tax evasion (which
includes duty evasion, exchange control and capital control evasion) is omitted from
Schedule 2 even though these are conmaon activities in ASEAN. Since such criminal
activities are not inclnded in the 182 Serious Offences, they do not constitute the
offence of money laundering under the SCA.
It is interesting to note that out of the 182 Serious Crimes in the Schedule, many of
these criminal activities do not generate financial gains or proceeds. For instance,
homicidal cases (Offences 54-58), causing hm~ (Offences 63-74), wrongful
confinement (Offeuces 81-82) are hardly associated with money laundering.
Therefore, it could be argued that the SCA would be more effective if it had included
more of the financial-related offences (such as tax evasion, smuggling, corporate
offences) in places of these non-financial serious crimes. 735
Singapore has 46 comprehensive tax treaties that are in force. Singapore has als
entered into limited tax treaties with 6 other countries (Bahi’ain, Chile, Oman, Saud
Arabia, United Arab Emirates, US) for reciprocal tax exemption on income derive
from international shipping mad/or air services.736
In any tax plamfing, an extremely important consideration is whether the ant
avoidance provisions will apply. The general anti-avoidance provision in the Inco
735 Tan Sin Liang, ’Singapore: New Money-Laundering Law under the Corruption, Drag Traffickh3g
and other Serious Crhnes (Confiscation of Benefits) Act’, (2000) 3 Journal of Money Laundering
ConO’o1260-1.7~s Ministry of Finance, Singapore <http://www.mof.gov.sg> at 3 November 2003.
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Tax Act (Section 33) confers upon the tax authorities wide powers to disregard or
vary the arrangement, and to make the appropriate adjustments. This provision,
however, does not apply to any an’angement carried out for bona fide co~mnercial
reasons and which does not have as one of its main puqgoses the avoidance or
reduction of tax,737
6.4.2 Conclusion
In conclusion, from the above analysis, it needs to be restated that Singapore was
never listed in the 1998 OECD report entitled Harn~d Tax Competition: An
Emerging Global [sstte.738
In Singapore, income is taxed on a ten’itorial basis. Section 10(1) of the Singapore
Income Tax Act ("SITA"), Cap 134 provides:
hlcome tax shall ... be payable at the rate or rates specified hereinafter for
each year of assessment upon the income of any person accruing in or derived
fi’om Singapore or received in Singapore fi’om outside Singapore.
Only income which accrues in or is derived from Singapore will be subject to tax in
Singapore. Where the income is accrued in or derived frmn outside Singapore, it has
to be remitted to Singapore in order to be subject to tax in Singapore. Capital gains are
generally not subject to tax in Singapore.
737 Ibid.
738 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, above n 505.
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6.5 Money Laundering - Singapore’s Legislation
The IMF released a repot~t assessing Singapore’s financial system stability and
revealed the fol!owing standards and codes which Singapore had in place in its
banking and finance system, a summary of which follows:739
Basel Core Principles (BCP) for Effective Banking Snpervision: Overall, the MAS
has established a sound prudential and regulatory fi’mnework for effective
supervision of its commercial banking sector and has achieved a high level of
observance of the BCP. There are no weaknesses that raise financial stability
concern,
International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) Insurance Core
Principles: Singapore has a high level of observance of the IAIS principles.
Significant initiatives are cun’ently being developed in consultation with the
indnstry - pm~ieularly the overbaul of the capital standards to a more
comprehensive and risk-based approach with new rules giving specific attention to
cot!oorate governance and internal controls. The implementation and enforcement
of these initiatives, which are well advanced, will further improve observance.
International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) Objectives m~d
Principles of Securities Regulation: Singapore has achieved a high degree of
compliance with the IOSCO principles. The fi’amework for the oversight and
739 International Monetary Fund, Singapore: Financial System Stability Assessment, bwluding Reports
on the Obse~ance of Standards and Cod~ on the followh~g topi~: Banking Supet~,ision, h~surance
Regulation, Secto’ities Regulation, Pco~ment and Settlement Systems, Monetary attd Financial Polio,
Transparent, and Anti-Mono’ Laundering (2004 IMF)
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regulation of securities markets, intemaediaries, issuers, and collective investment
schemes is well developed, sophisticated, and meets international standards. The
MAS should require periodic repo~ing of net asset values and ensure that a
Collective Investment Scheme (CIS) operator has systems in place to calculate net
asset values correctly.
Conunittee on Payment and Settlement System (CPSS) Core Principles for
Systemically Impox~ant Payment Systems (CPSIPS): Singapore has a highly
developed payment system. The MEPS - a systemically important payment
system - is a reliable and robust real-time gross settlement system and exhibits
significant observance of CPSIPS principles. The settlement risk of foreign
exchange transactions in Singapore dollm’s has been tin, her reduced by the
inclnsion of the Singapore dollar in the CLS in September 2003.
CPSS-IOSC0 Recommendations for Securities Settlement Systems: Neither the
MAS Electronic Payment System-Singapore Gover~maent Securities (MEPS-SGS)
- Milch clears and settles SGS on an real-time gross settlement basis--nor the
Central Depository Private Li~nited (CDP) - which clears and settles equities and
private debt securities - is subject to major vulnerabilities. While the MAS
oversigbt objectives with respect to securities settlement systems are set out in
various documents, it is recommended that the MAS publish a document on the
oversight fi’amework for securities settlement systems and its approach to its
administration.
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Transparency in Moneta~3’ and Financial Policies: The transparency of monetary
policy fi’amework has improved substantially in recent years. Given the exchange
rate regime-based monetary policy, however, the authorities remain cautious about
publishing certain information on the monetary policy fi.ame~vork and monetat3,
operations. For example, neither the weights used in the trade-weighted exchange
rate index nor the precise limits of the band are disclosed. Similarly, the extent of
MAS interventions in the foreign exchange market is not disclosed on a
predetermined or timely schedule. Greater disclosure in these areas could be
considered to the extent it does not compromise the monetary policy regime. The
MAS has made steady progress toward improving transparency in financi
policies in recent years and now meets many of the elements of the Transparency
Code. The MAS could further improve transpareney through providing mor
detailed information on recent developments in the financial sector and its
supervisory activities in its regular pnblicafions, including regarding loca
financial institutions’ overseas operations.
Anti-Money Lanndering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT
Singapore now has in place a sound and comprehensive legal, institutional, a
policy and supervisory framework for AML/CFT and the authorities hav
demonstrated a strong commitment to its effective implementation. Though some
steps have been taken with the enactment of a domestic mutual legal assistanc
law and ongoing negotiations for several bilateral treaties, the effectiveness o
cross-border mutual legal assistance needs to be improved as it relates t
compulsory assistance at international request, including the provision of bao
records. The Palermo Convention is signed but yet to be ratified. Some aspects 
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best practice for customer due diligence need to be specified more clearly and in
greater detail, though implementation was obse~,ced in individual institutions.
Although tire regulatory systems and supervisory practices exhibit a high degree of
observance of international standards and codes, the IMF made some specific
Leconunendations to further enhance the risk-based regulatory and supervisory
frmnework, strengthen the accountability and independence on the MAS, and improve
monetary and financial policy transparency.74°
6.5.1 Singapore’s Guidelines on Prevention of Money Laundering
The Corruption, Drug Trafficking and Other Serious Crimes (Colffiscation of Benefits)
Act (SCA)TM itself was further amended by the Mntual Assistance in Criminal
Matters Act (MACMA), passed by parliament on 22 February 2000. Owing to the
changes in the anti-money laundering law in Singapore and with the benefit of the six
years of experience in implementing the 1994 Guidelines, the ABS revised the 1994
Guidelines to keep the banks abreast with the law and to provide a more
comprehensive guideline to help banks in Singapore combat money laundering more
effectively.
ABS recommends these Guidelines for the preservation, nationally and internationally,
of the good name of the banking conununity in Singapore. Further ABS recognises
the need to prevent or miuimise the banking system fi’o~n being used for the
~lbid 36 endix L for the 182 Serious Offences listed under the SCA.
See App
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furtherance of criminal purposes by means of money laundering activities, taking into
consideration:
(i) The latest "Guidelines on prevention of Money Laundering" issued by the
Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS 626);
(ii) The Statement of Principles proposed by the Basle Cormnittee on Banking
Regulations and Supelwisory Practices in December 1988;
(iii) The Financial Action Task Force’s 40 Recommendation;
(iv) The Corruption, Drug Trafficking and Other Serious Crimes (Confiscation of
Benefits) Act; and
(v) The Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 2000
These Guidelines apply to all banks and their subsidiaries in the banking secto
operating in Singapore. They also apply to the foreign branches and subsidiaries o
Singapore-incorporated banks. Where the laws of the foreign jurisdictions conflict
with these Guidelines, the foreign branches and subsidiaries must comply with th
former; provided fire head office of the Singapore-incorporated bank is informed of
the departure fi’om these Guidelines. These Guidelines constitute the best practices for
all banks operating in Singapore in matters relating t,o the prevention of money
laundering in Singapore.74~ Some of the Guideline are mentioned here to highlight the
countEc’s stand with the OECD and the FATF,
6.5.2 Guideline 4 - Know Your Customer (KYC)
742 The Association of Banks in Singapore, above n 730.
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Under Guideline 4, Singapore’s policy is in line with the FATF’s recommendations in
cornbatiug money laundering and Wolfsberg Principles as analysed in Chapter 2.743
All banks are to know their customers. This means that each bank must be able to
establish the identity and a basic background of their customers. Each bank must
establish its own KYC programme, tailored to suit the size, nature and complexity of
its operation and business in Singapore.
There should be an explicit policy in every bank not to conduct any significant
business with a customer (prospective or otherwise) who fails or refuses to provide
basic information under this Guideline 4 necessary to establish the customer’s true
identity or the background of the transaction the bank is asked to carry out. In the
event a bank decides not to carry out the transaction requested by the customer on the
ground that it is a suspicious h’ansaction, the bank must nevertheless consider,
depending on the circumstances of the case, its legal obligation to report under section
39(1) of the SCA.
6.5.3 Guideline 6 - Suspicious Transaction Reporting (STR)
Each bank is to clarify the economic background and pnrpose of transactions that are
inconsistent with the customer’s transaction profile or where the economic purpose or
the legality of the transactions is not inm~ediately evident. In determining whether it is
a suspicious transaction, a bank must consider the totality of the transactions put
together and not each transaction (which, on its own, may be perfectly legitimate) in
7~30rganisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, above n 738.
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isolation. A transaction or a series of transactions shall be considered as "suspicious’
if the transaction / transactions in question is / are inconsistent with the customer’s
known transaction profile or does not make economic sense.744
According to section 39(1) of the SCA, a bank employee has a legal duty to make a
suspicious transaction report (STR) if he or she knows, or has reasonable grounds to
suspect, that the transaction in question involves drug trafficking or criminal conduct
(i.e. money laundering).
Al! banks are to repm~t suspicious transactions to the Suspicious Transaction
Reporting Office (STRO), Commercial Affairs Department (CAD), and each copy o
each STR is to be folvcarded to the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS). A ban
will then fully investigate and evaluate, according to its internal procedures, a
apparent potentially suspicious transaction and satisfy itself that it is a suspiciou
transaction before making a STR. In investigating into an apparent suspicio
transaction, a bank is to give adequate opportunity to the customer (or prospectiv
customer) to explain the concerns raised by the bank. In carrying out its due diligenc
a bank must exercise due care not to unwittingly commit a tipping-off offence i
contravention of section 50 of the SCA. Notwithstancling that, after its ow
investigation, a bank may decide not to establish a banking relationstfip wit
prospective customer or to terminate its existing banking relationship with th
customer, it should nevertheless consider its legal obligation to repo~t under sectio
39(1) of the SCA. 745
744 See Appendix M for the examples of suspicious transactions as listed in MAS 626.
7~ The Association of Banks in Singapore, above n 742.
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A bank owes a duty of confidentiality to a customer not to disclose col~fidential
ioformation relating to his account to an unauthorised third patty. To facilitate the
~naking of STRs, the law, pursuant to the SCA, allows a bank to disclose confidential
i~fol~ation relating to a customer’s account (used to conduct a suspicious transaction)
to an Authorised Officer without contravening its duty of confidentiality and without
being liable to the customer for damages suffered arising fi’om the disclosure.746
Prior to the amendment under the SCA, it was not legally mandatory for a person to
report a suspicious transaction. However, under the SCA, suspicious transacfions
repo~ing (STR) is now mandatory. The legislatare aclfieved this by substituting the
discretionary language (’may’) with a mandatory language (’shall’) in the new s. 38(1)
of the SCA.
An area which is likely to trouble compliance bankers is the repox~ing of suspicious
transactions which may not be related to a money laundering offence as defined by
SCA. To be sure, the SCA provides comprehensive statuto~3, protection under s. 41
aud s. 41A for a whistle blower against civil and crhnlnal proceedings. However,
these statutory protections can only be invoked if the ilfformation disclosed involves
drug trafficking or criminal conduct. It will always be difficnlt (sometimes inapossible)
to be sure of the actual source of the criminal proceeds from the underlying suspicious
transactions reported. This can pose real problems in practice for a banker.
For example, one bank was in a dilemma in deciding whether to repo~ a customer
from a neighbouring conntry which deposited a total sum of SGD3.5 million (palely in
341
cash, the remainder in third-party cheques issued by a money change0 with no
satisfactol: explanation. There was no doubt that this was a suspicious transaction,
but the source of these funds was in doubt. There was a very sta’ong suspicion that the
funds were criminal proceeds from either con’uption or capital control evasion (or
both); but it was not definite. If it was corruption, the bank would be safe in reporting;
however if it was solely capital control evasion, it would be unsafe to report the
transaction. R is argued that a banker, in such circumstances, may nevertheless report
to an Authorised Officer with impunity if he has reasonable grounds to believe that
the funds are proceeds, partially or directly or indirectly, derived from con’uption
activities (a Criminal Conduct under s. 38(1)). This view is further fortified by
subsections 41(3) and 41A(3), which merely require tire disclosure of a bona fide
’suspicion’ or ’belief’. 747
6.5.4 Guideline 8 - Training
Banks are prime targets for money laundering activities. Therefore, it has been
imperative that banks train their employees, at various levels, to detect money
laundering activities. This has assisted banks in Singapore to reduce (if not, to prevent)
the incidences of money laundering activities that may take place in their operations.
Training is also important in ensuring a bank’s legal compliance with the anti-money
laundering la~vs in Singapore. This will help a bank and its employees to avoi
prosecution for money laundering and other related offences. Each bank had to adopt
747 Tan, above n 735,261-2.
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a training prograrmne suited to its size, nature and the complexity of its business and
operation in Singapore.748
6.5.5 Characterisafion of Terrorism Financing and Money Laundering in
Singapore
In most jurisdictions, terrorisnr financing would be cbaracterised as a money
laundering offences. Where does terrorism financing fit into the anti-money
laundering legal regime in Singapore? Is terrorism financing a money laundering
offence in Singapore? The answer is negative for 2 reasons. First, "ten’orism" or
"telTorist act" is not included in the predicated offences under SCA. Secondly, the
aoti-money laundering regime in the SCA does not envisage a "reverse money
laundering" activity. An activity criminalised as a "money laundering" offence when
a person attempts to conceal the proceeds from some criminal activities (i.e. "dimity
money"). In Singapore it is, strictly speaking, not a money laundering offence, if the
proceeds fi’om legitimate businesses are used to commit a crime because there is no
"proceeds fi’om" the predicated money laundering offence (i.e. not "dirty money"). 749
This does not mean that there is no criminal offence committed; the person carrying
out such an activity can be charged under other crhnina! statutes (e.g. Penal Code).
For example, in the case of hijacking, it is a money latmdering offence under SCA ira
bank kmowingly wire transfers proceeds fi’om hijacking for its customer. However, it
is not a money laundering offence under the SCA if the same bank were to wire
transfer funds from a legitimate business (e.g. public donations to a religious charity
~he Association of Banks in Singapore, above n 746.,                          .
Tan Sin Liang, ’The Threat of Terrorism & Singapore s Legislative Response to Ten’orJsm
lZinaneing’ (2003).
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organisation) to a customer who used these funds to conunit a hijacking offence
because the source of these funds is "clean". This is "reverse money laundering".
Ten’orism is a classic form of "reverse money laundering". The SCA clearly does not
gove~a "reverse money lanndering" activities but such activities relating to terrorism
and te~a’orism financing are directly "caught" under the anti-terrorism laws in
Singapore.75°
6.5.6 Compliance Challenges for Financial Institutions against Terrorism
Financing
The challenges facing a bank and a professional adviser or compliance officer i
combating terrorism financing are mnnerous. First they must ensure that the cnstomer
is not a "Teta’orist’’75~ or a "Terrorist Entity’’752 and the account or transaction is
related to "Terrorist Propelq:y’’753 or to facilitate a "Ten’odst Act’’754. The list of
"Terrorist" and "Te~’orist Entities" are named in the Schedules of both the U
Regulations and the MAS Regulations and they are constantly growing. Many of t
individual terrorists have numerous aliases and several birthdates. This is 
compliance officer’s worse nightmare. It is neither practical nor administratively
viable to monitor this ever growing list of ten’odsts manually. The only viable optio
is to use sophisticated computer software to track these terrorists. Besides the
multiplicity of names and bi~hdates of individual Terrorists, compliance officers mu
7s0 Ibid.
7si A "Terrorist" is defined hi Reg. 4(1), UN Regnlations; Reg. 4(1) MAS Regulations and section 2,
Te~Torism Act to mean a person who cmmuits, participates or facilitates a "Terrorist Act".
75~ A "Terrorist Entity" is defined in s. 2, Tela’orism Act to mean an entity owned or controlled by any
TelTorist or a gronp of Terrorlsts.753 This term is used to refer to a property owner or controlled by or on behalf of any Terrorist or
Ten’orist Entity.
75a There is a long defmition of"Te~Torist Act" (with the same meanh~g) in Reg. 4(1), UN Regulations;
Reg. 4(1) MAS Regulations and s. 4(2), Terrorism Act
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be watchful for Terrorist Entities with unsuspecting commercial names such as "AI-
Nut Honey Press Sbop" (Yemen), "Barakat Wire Transfer", "Benevolence
nternational Fund" and "Global Relief Foundation".755
Secondly, the next challenge is whistle-blowing. It is mandatory for a Singapore
citizen / resident or a financial institution who / which has (a) possession, custody or
coatrol of a Terrorist Property or (b) information about any transaction relating to a
Yen’ofist Prope~y to report irmaaediately to the Police Commissioner (for the public at
arge) or to MAS (for banks).756 But what protection does the law provide for wlfistle-
lowers? The Ten’orism Act757 and the Banking Act758 expressly irmnunise a whistle-
blower (pursuant to the Terrorism Act and the MAS Regulations, respectively) against
any criminal and civil proceedings. The UN Act759 also irmnunises a whistle blower
pursuant to the UN Regulations) against civil proceedings but is unclear against
riminal proceedings. 760
6.5.7 SupervismT Framework
h~ line with Singapore’s goal to become a premier global financial centre, the MAS
has instituted a new supervisory framework based on the key tenets of:-
Maintaining High Prudential and Supervisory Standards
n,. n
’ ~ .9 MAS Re ulations and s. 8, Terrorism Act.
above 749.
Reg 10, UN Regulaho~ s, Reg ,       g
~ection 9(5)aud section 10(3), Terrorism Act.here is no safe harbour provision for whistle blowing in tile MAS Regulations. It is, however,
s°gund h~ s. 27A(3) of the Banking Act.
Like the MAS Regulations, there is no express statuto~2¢ protection provision in tile UN Regulations.
o invoke tile statutory nrotection, one has to invoke s.3(l) of the UN Act.
Tan Sin Liang, above n 755.
345
MAS continues to oversee the financial sector professionally, vigilantly and
proactively. The maintenance of high standards of integrity and sound financial
management does not contradict the aim to create a more dynamic, imaovative and
vibrant financial sector. A sound financial system serves as the foundation on
which the liberalisation of the financial sector can take place.
Shifting the Emphasis fi’om Regulation to Supervision
MAS has shifted its emphasis in overseeing the financial sector fi’om regulation to
supervision. The supervisor’s primary responsibility is to protect the stability of,
and maintain confidence in, the financial system. MAS will shift ftotn ’one-size-
fits-all’ regulation towards a greater emphasis on supervision, which entails
monitoring and examining institutions for compliance with laws and guidelines,
and assessing asset quality and the adequacy of risk management systems. Thi
enables the MAS to provide stronger institutions the flexibility to develop and
innovate, while maintaining stricter controls on weaker ones.
Implementing a Risk-Focused Approach to Bank Supervision
MAS has adopted a risk-focused, top-down approach to bank supervision, movi
away from the traditional, bottom-up method. Rapid technological advancements
increased linkages between institutions and financial markets, and the conseqnen
growth in complexity of banks’ activities, have necessitated a more holistic an
risk-focused supervisory approach. The approach will enable the allocation o
limited supervisory resources to major risk areas and improve the effectiveness
and efficiency of the examination process.
346
A Risk-Based Examination Approach for Banks
MAS adopts a risk focused approach to bank examination, which focuses on the
institution’s management quality and processes, and its risk management and
control systems. This new approach is better suited to cope with the growing
complexity of banks’ activities and organisational structures, hacreased linkages
with non-bank financial institutions and institutions abroad, and technological
advancements.
MAS’ examination procedures focus on a top-down, risk focused approach as
compared to a bottom-up, ~nicro approach. Emphasis is placed on the process by
which a bank’s management itself addresses its risks, instead of reviewing the
books for control deficiencies.TM
The MAS informs banks of upcoming examinations beforehand, allowing pre-
consultations with bank management to shorten the actual examination. MAS still
conducts surprise examinations when circumstances call for it.
As with the practice of supervisors in other major financial centres, MAS
examinations will be more frequent and regular. This enables MAS to disth~guish
stronger banks, with well-developed systems of internal control, fi’om weaker ones.
On-site examination will be supplemented by off-site reviews which involves
continuous tracking of institutions, the review of statistical returns and audit repm~s
submitted by banks, and regular meetings with bank management. Full
implementation of the new approach will be phased in over the next few years. In
changing its approach, the MAS does not inadvertently lower its supervisory
76~ Moaetary Authority of Singapore Supervisory Framework <
http://www.mas.gov.sg/masmcn~bh~/ptlSupervisory_Fralnework,htm> at 9 November 2003.
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standm’ds. High-quality examinations and supervision form the cornerstone of a sound
banking system.
Vesting the Public with the Responsibility to Make Their Ov~a Informed
Investment Decisions
To assist investors in making informed decisions, MAS is providing greate
transparency in its regulations, raising disclosure standards and fostering market
discipline in the financial industry. MAS also encourages industt~¢ groups t
develop and enforce standards of good practice.
Forging a Closer Partnership Between the Government and the Financial Servic
Industry
MAS is building a closer partnership with the industa’y and promoting a more o
operating environment. MAS actively seeks industry inputs to adjust its policies
rapidly changing market realities. It will also set up private sector co~nmittees 
examine issues pertaining to the financial sector. Fudhermore, MAS w
disseminate policy thinking through associations of the finance industry.
External/Internal Auditors
External and internal auditors play an impm~ant role in MAS’ snpervisory pro
MAS engages in regnlar dialogue with the external anditors, and the int
auditors upon the completion of their andits of the Singapore operations to disc
the internal control environment of the institution and issues of mntual conc
Anditors are required to submit audit reports to MAS on the institution’s inte
controls, and compliance with prudential standards. In addition, external aud
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am requh’ed to confirm the adequacy of provisions, in conjunction with their
statutox3, audit.762
6.5.8 Conclusion
From the above analysis, it was shown how Singapore complies with the
recommendations of the FATF (40+8), OECD and in particular, very stringently to
the Wolfsberg Principles.
Banks and other financial institutions may be unwittingly used as intermediaries for
the transfer or deposit of funds derived from criminal activity. Criminals and their
associates use the financial system to make payments and transfers of funds from one
account to another; to hide the source and beneficial ownership of money; and to
provide storage for bank-notes through a safe-deposit facility. These activities have
been commonly referred to as money-lamadering.
In conclusion, it can be seen that the MAS has for the preservation, nationally and
internationally, of the good name of the banking colmnunlty in Singapore and
recognising the need to prevent the banking system from being used in furtherance of
money laundering activities arising fi’om or in connection with drug trafficking or
erimiual conduct, has introduced the following:
(i) the provisions of the Corruption, Drug Trafficking and Other Serious Crimes
(Confiscation of Benefits) Act (Chapter 84A) (the Act);
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(ii) the Financial Action Task Force 40 Recommendations, in pal~ticular
Recommendations 9 to 20; and
(iii) the Statement of Principles proposed by tire Basle Committee on Banking
Supervision and Supervising Practices in December 1988; banks in Singapore should
comply with these above guidelines.763
6.6 Confidentiality: Secrecy and Confidentiali~ in Singapore
6.6.1 Banking Secrecy in Singapore
In Singapore, the duty of banking confidentiality or secrecy in respect of the client’s
affairs stems from two sources:
(i) The duty of confidentiality implied by the Common Law by virtue of the
banker-customer relationslfip, and
(ii) A statuto~:¢ duty imposed by section 47 of the Banking Act (referred to herein
as the "section 47 duty" or "the statutory duty").TM
The Common Law principle is imported as part of the commereial law of England and
the Banking Act is part of the legislation enacted by Singapore’s Parliament. 765
763 Monetat2 Authority of Singapore, Notice to Banks (2002)
<htlp://www.mas.gov.sg/masmcm/bin/ptlNotice 626 Gnidelines on Prevention of Money Laande
riag.htm> at 10 Jnly 2004.
va~ Chapter 19 of the 1985 Revised Edition of the Singapore Statutes
765 Angeline Yap, ’Singapore’ in Dermis Campbell (ed), h~ternational Bank Secrecy (1992) 577-601.
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6.6.2 Contractual Duty of Secrecy
The banker’s duty to his customer to keep confidential information regarding the
affairs of his customer (such information being referred to hereafter as "confidential
iuformation") arises out of the banker and customer relationship and is a term of their
contraet, implied by the Common Law.766
It is referred to herein as "the contractual duty of COlffidentiality" or the "contractual
duty". The customer enforces this contractual right by suing the banker for damages
in the event of a breach of this duty. When he does so, the contractual duty of
confidentiality, and its scope and application would, in the words of section 5 of the
Civil La~v Act, be ’questions or issues which arise or which have to be decided in
Singapore with respect to the law ... of banks and banking’.767
Since there is no other provision made by any law having force in Singapore imposing
a contractual duty of secrecy, and since the exceptions enumerated in section 5 of the
Civil Law Act do not apply, in the words of section 5, "the law with respect to those
matters to be administered shall be the same as would be administered in England in
the like ease, at the co~xesponding period, if such question or issue had arisen or had
to be decided in England ..." subject to modifications required to adapt the Conunon
la~v to local circumstances.
6.6,3 Duty of Secrecy under Common Law
ee Tournier v. National Provhwial & Union Bank of England [1924] 1 K.B. 461.
Cap. 43 1988 Ed.
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Under the Common Law, it is au implied term of the contract between a bank and its
customer that the bank will not divulge i~fformation to third persons, without the
express or implied consent of the customer, either:76s
(i) The state of the customer s account,
(ii) Any of his transactions with the bank, or
(iii) Any infomaation relating to the customer acquired tln’ough the keeping of his
account.
These conditions apply unless the bank is compelled to release information:
(i) By order of court;
(ii) Where circumstances give rise to a public duty of disclosure, or
¯ 769(iii) Where protection of the bank’s own interest reqmres ~t.
6.6.4 Exceptions at Common Law
Bankes, LJ in Tournier v. National Provincial and Union Bank, identified four
general exceptions to the duty which have been accepted as an accurate statement of
the law:77°
(i) Where disclosure is under compulsion by law (e.g., where the bank is
compelled to obey an order under the Bankers’ Books Evidence Act);
768 Yap, above n 765.769 See Bankh~g Act, section 2.
770 See the Jack Co~mnitlee Report, paragraph 5.04.
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(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
Where there is a duty to the public to disclose (e.g., where danger to the state
or public duty supersede the duty of the agent to his principle);
Where the interests of the bank require disclosure (e.g., where a bank issues a
writ claiming payment of an overdraft stating on the face of the writ the
amount of the overdraft),
Where the disclosure is made by the expense or implied consent of the
customer (the familiar instance is where the customer authorises a reference to
his banker).TM
6.6.5 Scope of Duty Not Confined to Information Derived from Account
Both Bankes and Atkin L.J.J. thought that the duty is not confined to information
derived fi’om the customer’s account.772 In their opinion, the duty extended to
information derived fi’om som’ces other than the customer’s account.
The information in the Tournier Case, for example, ~vas derived fi’om another
customer’s account rather than from the plaintiff’s own account. Nevertheless, the
Cou~ of Appeal held that the banker’s duty did extend to it.773 Fm~hermore, Atkin L.J.
said:
"I further think that the obligation extends to information obtained fi’om other sources
than the customer’s actual account, if the occasion upon which the information was
obtained arose out of the banking relations of the bank and its customers - fox"
~Ournier, p. 473.
~ Tournier ~. National Provincial & Union Bank of England [1924] 1 K.B. 461.
¯ .. the confidence is not conf’med to the actnal state of the customer’s account. It extends to
hffOrmation derived fi’om the account itself...", per Bankes L J, Tournier, p. 473,475.
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example, with a view to assisting the bank in conducting the customer’s business, or
in coming to decisions as to its treatment of its customers.’’774
Information gained during the currency of the account remains confidential unless
released under one of the four exceptions. Their Lordships in the Tom’nier Case were
of the view that the duty to keep infom~ation confidential contim~es even after the
customer ceases to be a customer of the bank. That is, the bank is under a duty to keep
the customer’s affairs confidential:
(i) During the currency of the banker-customer relationship, and
(ii) After the banker-customer relationship has been terminated.
In the Tom’nier case, Bankes L.J. took the view that danger to the state may supersede
the duty of confidentiality.775
6.6.6 Amendments to the Banking Act of Singapore - 6th Schedule
Under the Banking (Amendment) Act 2001, a slew of amendments were introduced to
the Banking Act, including the banking secrecy provisions. As a result, section 47 (the
key provision) together with section 45 and section 46 (previously 46 and 46A) have
been re-enacted and a new 6th Schedule introduced (the "Amendments"). 776
774 L J Scrutton, however, felt that the dnty did not extend to hffonnation derived from the account of
another customer. His Lordship said (at p. 482), "It appears to me, therefore, that we cannot imply an
obligation to keep sec~t information about a customer derived not from that enstomer or Iris account,
but fi’mn the account of another customer."7rs Tournier, p.473.
77~ The Banking (Amendment) Bill (No. 2112001) was passed by parliament on 16 May 2001. The
Amendments became effective on 18 July 2001.
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The application of some of the banking secrecy rules in the Banking Act under the
previous reginre has always been a challenge for the banks in Singapore. There have
been "gaps" in the rule book and there were "interpretational" problems of some of
he statutory banking secrecy provisions. Some banks (particularly foreign banks)
have also felt that their operations have, to some extent, been hampered by the rigidity
of the banking secrecy laws in sharing certain information required by their head
offices, overseas branches and affiliates. Tiffs has always been (and still remains) a
"sensitive" area.
The Amendments attempt to liberalise the banking secrecy regime further by
introducing additional "exceptions" to the general rule of confidentiality. Some of
these new "exceptions" represent the "gaps" mauy bankers have long waited to be
filled. The growing list of "exceptions" (both old and new) are now consolidated h~
the form of the 6th Schedule. Undoubtedly, many of the Amendments (particularly the
uew exceptions) will be welcomed by the banks. The question is, however, whether
they have gone far enough.
6.6.7 Section 47 of the Banking Act - Customer Information
The term "Customer Info~aation" is new. It is defined in section 40A to mean:
(a) "any infolanation relating to, or particular of, an account of a customer of the bank,
whether the account is in respect of a loan, investment or any other type of
ransactlon...
(b) "deposit information"
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The concept of Customer Infoxxaation is central to the law on banking secrecy in the
Banking Act. If a subject matter does not come within the definition of "Customer
Information", the issue of banking secrecy does not arise. For instance, if the
Commercial Affairs Department (CAD) of the Singapore Police Force were to ask a
bank to disclose the names of the customers who bought gold tentulas fi’om them, is
this a banking secrecy issue? Is this a disclosure of Customer Infolanation? It is of
note that the definition of "Customer Information" in section 40A does not include
any "Account Information" and "Deposit Information" that is not referable to any
named customer or group of named customers. So disclosure of unnamed global
figures relating to customers’ account is permissible. In asee~laining the scope of
Customer Information, it is also useful to bear in mind the definition of a "customer".
Again, if the info~xnation relates to an entity which does not come witlfin the
definition of a "customer", there is no banking secrecy issue. No "customer", no
"Customer Information", hence no banking seerecy. It is wollh noting that banks
themselves are not considered "customers" (however, MAS and other central banks
are, hence banking secrecy still apply).777
6.6.8 Section 47 of the Banking Act - Disclosure of Information is an Offence
The "general rule" of banking secrecy is enstn’ined in section 47(1), which states:
777 Tan Sin Liang, ’Singapore: Money Laundering - Legal Ianplications for Financial Institutions’ (1997)
1 doto*nal of Money Laundering Control
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"Customer information" shall not, in any way, be disclosed by a bank in
Singapore or any of its officers to any other persons exempt as expressly
provided in this Act.’’778
In Singapore, in addition to the contractual duty, the bank’s employees have a
statutory duty, imposed by section 47 of the Banking Act, to keep the affairs of a bank
customer confidential. Section 47(3) provides for a gen.eral prohibition against
disclosure. Section 47(3) reads:
Subject to subsection (4), no official of any bank and no person who by reason
of his capacity or office has by any means access to the records of the bank,
registers or any correspondence or material with regard to the accotmt of any
individual customer of that bank shall, while his employment in or
professional relationship with the bank, as the case me be, continues or after
the termination thereof, give divulge or reveal any information whatsoever
regardhag the money or other relevant particulars of the account of that
custonler.
This is followed by a number of exceptions in section 47(4), which provides that
section 47(3) shall not apply:779
(i) Where there is consent (which, since the 1984 amendment to section 47, must
be written);
Ibid.
Ibid.
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(ii) Where the customer is declared a bankrupt (or is being wound up, in the case
of a company);
(iii) In Civil proceedings -
a) between the bank and the customer or, since the 1984 amendments,
between the bank and its customer’s guarantor relating to the
customer’s banking transaction, or
b) in which the bank is one of a few parties making adverse claims to
money in the client’s account where the bank seeks relief by way of
interpleader;
(iv) Where the officials of the bank are compelled under any .written law in force
in Singapore to co-operate with authorities investigating or prosecuting a
crime;
(v) Where the client’s monies are attached under a garnishee order (introduced in
the 1984 amendments);
(vi) Where the branch of a foreign bank forwards information required by its head
office relating solely to credit facilities which it has granted the customer
(introduced in the 1984 amendments), or
(vii) Where information which, since the 1984 amendments may only be of "a
general nature", is required to assess the customer’s creditwol~hiness in
connection with a bona fide cormnercial transaction or a prospective
transaction.
6.6.9 Consent under Section 47
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It will be noticed that, whereas in England, consent can be implied from the
sula’onnding circumstances of the case, since the 1984 amendments to the Banking
Act, permission must be granted in writing under section 47.780
However, the position on banker’s references is provided in section 47(4)(g), which
permits the disclosure of information required
... to assess that creditworthiness of a customer in connection with or relating
to a bona fide commercial transaction or a prospective conunercial transaction,
so long a the information required is of a general nature and in no way related
to the details of a customer’s account.
Hence, the statutory exception in relation to the whole m’ea of consent and banker’s
references may be restated as follows:
Except for information relating to a customer’s creditworthiness, it is an
offence to divulge information relating to the money or relevant particulars of
a customer’s account without his written consent. In relation to requests for
credit references, the information required must be:
1) Required to asses the customer’s creditworthiness;
2) Required in com~ection with or relating to a bona fide commercial
transaction wlfich may be a prospective transaction, and
3) Of a genera! nattu’e, um’elated to the details of the customer’s account.
~80 This would appear, at least on one view, to still leave open the possibility of ’implied written
per~nission’. See Soh Kee B~m, Current Developments h~ h~ternational Banking and Corporate
Financial Operations 298.
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Of course, banks must bear in their mind that in giving such references, they have a
dnty towards the recipients not to be negligent in addition to their duty to the customer
to exercise due care in doing so.78~
6.6.10 Compulsion by Law
It may be perceived that banking secrecy takes second place to criminal investigations
in Singapore because wide powers to obtain information about bank accounts are
confe~a’ed by legislation.782
The list of such legislation is set out in section 47(8) of the Banking Act, which
defines "written law" to mean Pmqc IV of the Evidence Act, the Criminal Procedar
Code, the Internal Security Act, the Income Tax Act, the Prevention of Co~a’uptio
Act, the Kidnapping Act, and the companies Act. Failure to co-operate renders th
pm~y concerned liable to legal penalties under the relevant legislation.783
However, it is interesting to note that this list of legislation appears scanty compared
to the position in the United Kingdom, where the Jack Committee has identified a
least 19 Acts requiring disclosure to the autlmrities. 784 In Singapore, such
investigations are also the exception rather than the norm, and the vast majority o
banking transactions are protected by the general rules of secrecy at Common La
and under section 47 of the Banking Act of Singapore.
7s~ See Poh Chu Chai, Lmv of Banking (tst ed, 1989) 170.
7s~ Ibid.
7s3 Banking Act (Chapter 19) 1971 (Singapore) s47(8).
7~4 See the Jack Committee Report, paragraph 5.07. The legislation ~qnh’ing disclosure is listed at
Appendix Q to the Report.
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Fnrthe~nore, wide as these powers may apparently be, it must be remembered that the
officers conducting such investigations would arguably fall witlfin the scope of
persons "who by reasons of ... capacity or office has by any means" access to the
bank’s records, registers, correspondence, or material regarding an account.
Accordingly, they ~vould appear to be under a duty to ~naintain the confidentiality of
i~ffommtion relating to the account. The issue relating to persons prohibiting from
divulging confidential information below deals with the question of whether section
47 applies to govermnent officers. 785
6.6.11 Exceptions to Disclosure of Information under Section 47
The exceptions to the general rule of banking secrecy are now "codified" in the form
of the 6tI~ Schedule. No disclosure of Customer Information may be made to a third
party outside the 6t~’ Schedule unless it is expressly consented to by the customer.
Reliance on the 6th Schedule bec6mes particularly important to a bank when the
"disclosure clauses" in the printed standard terms and conditions of the account
opening forms ("Ts & Cs") are silent on the pm~icular issue at hand or the express
consent from the client or clients is either unlikely or the cost and effort to obtain the
eousent is too prohibitive. Under such circumstances, the 6t~ Schedule becomes
critical in deciding whether a disclosure of Customer Information can be made.78a
Tan Sin Liang, "Banking Secrecy - Legal hnplications of the Latest Bm~king Act Amendments for
Banks in Singapore", Ernst & Young.
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6.6.12 Further or Secondary Disclosures
The 6tl~ Schedule (which is divided into 3 columns) defines the scope and the
conditions for disclosure without the customers’ consent. The 1st column defines th
purpose for which the Customer Information may be disclosed. The 2nd colum
defines the persons who may receive the Customer Information ("Disclosees"). The
persons disclosing such information will be the bank employees under the Part I and
Part II Disclosees. The 3rd column defines the conditions (if any) under w!fich the
Customer Infomaation may be disclosed. Part I is where further disclosure is permitted
and Part II is where further disclosure is prohibited unless allowed under the 6t~l
Schedule.
A new concept is introduced in the 6tl’ Schedule to limit the further disclosure of
Customer Information under certain circumstances. Under the 6tl’ Schedule, a bank is
allowed to disclose Customer Information (for the put’poses specified in the 1st
column) to the permitted Disclosees (2’la column). This is regarded as "Prima~
Disclosure" here. Under Part I of the 6th Schedule, the Diselosee is allowed to furthe
disclose to a third party. This is regarded as "Secondary Disclosure" here. Under Pa
II of the 6t~ Sehednle, no Secondary Disclosure is allowed unless it is authorise
under the 6t~’ Schedule or if it is sanctioned by a court order787. It is therefore,
utmost importance for Pal~t II Disclosees not to disclose Customer Information to a
third party unless it is sanctioned under either of these two conditions. As a gener
rule, the Customer Information flow stops at the Pm’t II Diselosees. 788
787 See s. 47(6).
788 Tan Sh~ Liang, above n 786.
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6.6.13 Higher Confidentialily Agreement (HCA)
A new section 47(8) was introduced under the Amendments in 2001 to allow a bank
and its customers to enter into an "express agreement for a higher degree of
co~fidentiality" than that prescribed in section 47 and the 6t~ Schedule ("Higher
Confidentiality Agreement" or HCA). This expression probably meaus a more
restrictive disclosure than that provided in section 47(1) and the 6t~ Schedule. In other
words, section 47(8) allows a bank and its customers to contract out of the statutory
exceptions in the 6tl~ Schedule for a more restrictive disclosure. The question is to
what extent can a bank, or should a bank, contract out of the 6t~l Schedule? Unlike a
commercial agreement between a bank and its customer, a HCA is not a laisser-faire
agreement. Tan asserts that there are obvious legal constraints and "boundaries" as to
how far two contracting pat~ies can contract out of the Banking Act.
Before exercising caution and prudence in negotiating the terms and the scope of the
HCA, banks should be vigilant in inquh’ing into the customer’s desire to operate their
account under a level of secrecy which is lfigher than normal (i.e. 6tl~ Schedule).
Banks should be inquiring whether tlfis could be a sign of avoiding detection of some
criminal activities by the customer. In the light of the above, Tan has argued that
banks are unlikely to be in a hma’y to sign HCAs with their customers. It will be more
costly to admhfister and more onerous to manage such accounts. Who are more likely
to ask a bank to sign a HCA? Such customers are likely to be the bank’s "private
banking" clients. Even for such clients, care and prudence must be exercised in
negotiating a HCA.789
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6.6.14 Persons Prohibited from Divulging Confidential Information
The statutoay duty under section 47 covers officials of any bank defined in subsecti
(8) to include directors and employees. The definition is not exhaustive.
The statutory duty also applies to any "person who by reason of Iris capacity or off
has by any means access to the records of the bank, registers or any co~a’espondence
material with regard to the account of any individual customer of the bank". That
apart fi’om accountants, it apparently also applies to officials of government bodi
who are authofised to look into bank accounts, as well as all others who have acce
to the bank’s records by virtue of their capacity or office.
One argument against the extension of section 47 to government officials is that t
provision that the duty is to last "while his employment in or professional relationsh
with fl~e bank, as the case may be, continues or after the termination thereot" wo
seem to imply that only employees or those subject to some form of contractua
relationship with the bank are subject to the section 47 duty.
Against that, it could be countered that section 47 utilises the term "employment i
the bank as opposed to "employment by" the bank and also that the term "professi
relationship" is defined by section 47 to include, i.e., it is not confined to, the ban
relationship with a computer bureau. Furthermore, there is no restriction in section 
tbat the persons who would thereby gain access to the bank’s records need do so 
result of their office or capacity within the bank.
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Yap argues that this would have been easy enough to provide had it been the
legislative intention. It would therefore appear that section 47 could not be wide
enough to cover govermnent officials.
By its Notice to Banks, MAS 614, issued pursuant to the 1984 amendments to the
banking secrecy provisions, the MAS has laid down requirements aimed at ensuring
that auditors of the head offices of foreign banks comply with the statutory duty of
secrecy. MAS 614 spells out clearly that the prohibition under section 47 of the
Banking Act ’covers all persons regardless of whether they are residents or non-
residents’.
It also provides that inte~aal auditors or inspectors from the head offices of foreign
banks are required to comply with section 47 should they gain access to the records of
the accounts of individual customers in the course of the audit or inspection. Prior to
such audit or inspection, they are also required to submit to the MAS statutoa3~
declarations that they m’e aware of the requirements of section 47 of the Banking Act
and will strictly observe them. A copy of the inspection or audit report to the head
office must also be submitted to the MAS.79°
6.6.15 Duration and Subject Duty of Statutory Duty
A banking officer or other person who acquires information relating to an account is
required, in the words of section 47(3), not to "give, divulge or reveal" it "while his
Yap, above n 785.
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employment in or professional relationship with the bank, as the case may be,
continues of after the tel~nination thereof’. Since no mention is made of the duty
lapsing after a reasonable period, it would appear to impose a pel~petual vow of silence.
Section 47 prohibits those concerned from giving, divulging, or revealing "any
information whatsoever regarding the money or other relevant particulars of the
account of [the bank’s] customer". It will be noticed that a moratorium is imposed on
"any information whatsoever", that related to:
1) The money in the customer’s account, or
2) Relevant particulars of the account.
It would appear that according to Yap, an omission has been made in respect of the
affairs of the customer other than the money in, or relevant particulars, of the account.
The sitaation in Tournier, for example, would apparently fall ontside the wording 
section 47 as the information divulged in that case was that the banks’ customer had
diverted the proceeds of a cheque to his bookanaker. This neither relates to the money
in his account, nor is it a particular of his account.TM
6.6.16 Enhanced Protection
The statutory framework for banking secrecy is further enhanced by the fact tha
despite having a wide supe~wisory jurisdiction over banks, which empowers it to
791 ]bid.
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conduct investigations of banks’ books, the MAS is required by sections 44 and 45 of
the Banking Act to do so under conditions of secrecy.
Furthermore, section 47(1) of the Banking Act specifically states that the MAS is not
authorised to inquire into the affairs of any individual customer of any bank. Finally,
section 47(2) provides that any incidental information relating to the affairs of an
individual customer obtained by the MAS shall be secret between the MAS and the
bank. Doubtless, any MAS official ~vho comes into possession of such information in
the course of investigations also would be under a section 47 duty of secrecy.
The position regarding merchant banks is broadly similar. It is also found in
Directives 11 and 12 of the MAS Directives to Merchant Banks. Directive 6 of the
MAS Directives to Merchant Banks also provides that any i~fformation wtfich a
merchant bank is required to furnish to the MAS to enable the latter to supervise the
merchant bank ’shall be secret as between that ~nel~chaut bank and the Authority’ ,792
6.6.17 Comparison of Cmnmon Lmv and Statutory Duties
A comparison between the Common Law duty and the statutory duty shows that:
1) The Banking secrecy laws of Singapore provide for contractual liability for the
bank ~vith criminal liability for the bank’s directors, employees, accountants,
and other persons whose office or capacity ~vould give them access to the
bank’s records, who would not be contractually liable;
792 Monetary Authority of Singapore, Dh’ectives to Merchant Banks (1985)
<ht~p://~vww.mas.gov.sg/masmcm!bin/ptlDirective 6 Infommtion to be Furnished_by_Me~vhant_
Banks.ht~n> at 10 July 2004.
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2) Until the 1984 amendments, the section 47 exceptions were almost identical to
the Common Law exceptions;
3) The exceptions provided under section 47 are (since the 1984 amendments)
more numerous than those available in England under the Common Law;
4) The consent exception in section 47 now requires the customer’s authorisation
to be w’itten while, under the Colmnon Law position, consent can either be
expressed or implied, and
5) The public interest exception is not included in section 47, with the result that
academic opinion on its applicability in Singapore is divided.
Yap’s view is that a contractual duty of confidentiality is implied.into the banker-
customer contract by the Common Law applied vide section 5 of the Civil Law Act is
clear as section 47 does not deal with hnplying a contractual duty. That a statutory
duty exists on the part of its employees, directors, and others with access to
confidential information and the extent of that dnty is clear from section 47 of the
Banking Act.793
96.6.18 Does the Public Interest Exception Apply in Singapore.
This is however a point of view that ’it is arguable that the Common Law exception o
disclosure in the public interest can be applied.’794
793 Yap, above n 791.
794 See Soh Kee Bun, "Banking Secrecy and Takh~g Evidence Abroad" (1989) Vol IX of the Sh~gapore
Conferences on International Business Law series, titled Current Developments ht International
Bankh~g and Cot’porate Financial Operations 298.
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It also has been argued that section 47 is not exhaustive as ’such an interpretation is
too restrictive’ as section 47 ’does not cover certain situations where banking secrecy
will be justifiably encroached upon’ such as the situation in Sunde~’land, where it was
in the bank’s interest to make a disclosure in circumstances other than those provided
in section 47.79s
According to Soh, it can be filrther argued against interpreting section 47 as being
exhaustive as the provision ’does not deal with situations ~vhere banking secrecy can
be violated if the bank has a public duty to disclose other than under compulsion of
law.’ This vie,v is supported by the example of legislation amended or enacted to
enable the accounts of suspected drug s~nugglers to be disclosed, which ’may not be
written law as defined’.796
Poh asserts that one line of reasoning supporting such vie~vs would be as follows.
Applying section 5 of the Civil Law Act, the issue or question of whether a banker is
permitted to make disclosure in the public interest ~vould be decided in the aff’n’mative
under English Conmaon Law. The application of Common Law would not be ousted
by the existence of section 47, as section 5 of the Civil Law Act only provides that
English la~v will not apply where there is a corresponding piece of legislation enacted
by the Singapore parliament. Since section 47 imposes a statutory duty, it is not sucha
piece of legislation.797
795 See Myint Soe, "Changes in the Law Relating to Bmtking Secrecy, The Banking (Amendment) Act
t986", [1983] 25 Mal. L.R. 387, p. 391796 Poid 390.
797 Poh, above n 782, 167.
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Furthermore, besides being a Common Law duty, the banker’s duty of confidentiality
is a contractual one, giving rise to civil liability, while section 47 serves a different
purpose, namely that of making the persons responsible for divulging the information,
who would not be contractually liable, subject to criminal liability.
The opposing view is that the issue should be characterised as what exceptions to the
contractual duty operate in Singapore. Characterised in that way, the Common Law
exceptions would have to be modified by section 47 because section 5(3)(a) of the
Civil Law Act requires the Common Law to be applied ’subject to such modifications
and adaptations as the circumstances of Singapore may require.’
Hence, the position ~vould be that criminal liability for disclosure is imposed by
section 47 of the Banking Act while the Common Law operates concurrently to
impose contractual liability, but the Common Law exceptions are modified in that
they are restricted by the exceptions listed in section 47. It also may be argued that, in
respect of a customer’s affairs, apa~ fi’om the money in or other relevant particulars of
an account, the Common Law contractual duty applies without modification.
For example, it can be argued that, since one of the cardinal principles observed by
the courts in implying terms into a contract is that an implied term mnst not be
contrary to law, the Common Law exception of public interest cam~ot apply in
Singapore.798
798 Ibid.
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This school of thought as highlighted by Poh, would point out that there is yet another 
weakness in the view that the Common Law exceptions can apply if they are excluded 
from section 47. That is, it relies on an unnatural distinction between the bank and its 
employee, excusing on the part of the institution acts which it could only do tlu'ough 
its employees and which arc crimes under wTittenlaw. 
It is hence argued by Pob that in Singapore the contractual duty is separate and 
distinct fi'om the statutory duty imposed by section 47 and that the legislation never 
intended section 47 to replace it. This is supported by the fact that the purposes or 
functions and the subject matter of the two duties differ. 
The Common Law imposes a contractual duty on the bank because of the intimate 
knowledge that a bank acquires into its customer's aniti!"s, whereas section 47 
imposes criminal liability on persons described therein who would not be 
contractually liable to the customer since they are not palty to the contract between 
the customer and Iris bank. 
COllsidering the width of investigative powers given to the authorities in Singapore, 
the public interest exception might not be very usefhl even if it were applicable in 
Singapore. First, most investigations would be conducted under the receptive pieces 
of legislation mentioned earlier. Second, the disclosure of information under the 
Common Law public duty exception would be subject to restrictions very similar to 
those outlined in the statutory provisions. 
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When the MAS conducts investigations, it does so under conditions of secrecy, only 
general information may be sought, it may not inqnire into the affaiTs of any specific
customer, and any incidental information acquu'cd is to be kept secret. That this is 
very similar to the factors applicable to the public interest exception will be apparent
from a later discussion. 
The above analysis of the issue of bank secrecy demonstrates the I'igour with which
Singapore's confidentiality platform is enhanced to support the global wealth
management industry. 799 
6.6.19 Public Interest Exception at Common Law 
An interesting Common Law decision on the public duty exception in the recent case
of Price Waterhollse v, BCCI Holdings (Luxembourg) ."l.A. & ()lhel~v8oo, reported ill
T71e Times on October 30, 1991, 
In this case, the High Court of England decided that the public interest in maintaining
the confidentiality owed by a bank to its customers might be outweighed by some
countervailing public interest in disclosure, and the latter was not liTnited to the public
interest in detecting or preventing wrongdoing. 
Hence, it mled that Price Waterhouse (PW) could be pennitted under the exception to
make disclosures of certain confidential information to an enquiry set up to review
BCel's past performance of its statutory fUllctions. PW was seeking to give evidence
799 n'id. 
800 Price Waterhouse v BCCl Holdings (Luxembourg) SA [1992] BCLC 583 
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voluntarily without BCC]'s consent as the enquilY, not having been convened under 
the Tribnnals of Enquuy and Evidence Act ]92], could not compel the disclosure of 
confidential information. 
At issue was the question whether voluntary disclosure could be made without the 
consent ofBCCr, to whom PW owed a duty of confidentiality. The court decided that, 
as the United Kingdom legislature had conferred a general power of supervision upon 
the Bank of England, there was an important puhlic illterest in the effective regulation 
and supervision of authorised banking ulstitutions and the protection of depositors. It 
held that this public interest ought to prevail over the interest in confidentiality. A few 
points from Millet J. 'SEOl decision are worth noting: 
I) The scope of disclosure was limited ~ The interest in disclosure to the enquuy 
was at least as wide as the interest in disclosure to the Bank of England, 
"provided that dissemination of such information was no wider in the latter 
case than would be authorised in the fOimer case" (the powers of the MAS and 
the Bank of England are similar). 
2) Infrequent and less serious invasions .. The enquily would be dealing with 
matters more ahstract and remote from the details of the underlying banking 
transactions than the Bank of England in its routine supervision; it was less 
likely that details of particular accounts would requll'e to be identified, and the 
occasions when banking confidentiality was invaded were likely to be fewer 
and less serious. 
BOI The United Kingdom Parliament, Judgments - Regina v Special Commissioner and Another, Ex P 
Morgan Grenfell & Co Ltd (2002) <http://www.parliament.the-statiollery-
oflice.co.ukJpalld200 102/Idjlldgmtljd020516Imorgan-2.htm> at 30 April 2004. 
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3) The enquh'y had undertaken to respect confidentiality - It would do this where 
it could properly do so. The extent to which confidentiality would be invaded 
would depend upon the judgement of responsible persons at several different 
levels.802 
6.6.20 Public Intet·est and Compulsion by Law 
In the BCCI case discussed above, the court inferred the existence of a public interest 
in the proper supervision of fmancial institutions from tile fact that section 1 of the 
United Kingdom Banking Act 1987 iulposes a duty on the Bank of England 
"generally to supervise the institutions authorised by it in the exercise of' its powers. 
In Singapore, the MAS has a similar duty. Section 28 of the Monetary Authority of 
Singapore Act, Cap 186 (MAS Act), empowers the MAS to approve financial 
institutions and control their operations and section 27 of the Act provides that the 
MAS may, if it thinks necessary in the public hlterest, request information from and 
make reconunendations to such financial institutions as the Authority may from thne 
to time determhle. 
The MAS also may issue directions under section 27 for the purpose of securing tIlat 
effect is given to such requests or recommendations. 
The similarity between the approach of the Common Law "public interest exception", 
and the "compulsion by law" provisions of which the MAS provisions provide an 
802 Yap, above n 793. 
374 
 example, does not need to he belaboured. So great is the similarity between the two 
that the Jack Committee has descrihed the compulsion of law exception as a 
codification of the public duty exception and the purpose of the latter as being "to 
catch those items which have not yet been codified". 803 
In the United Kingdom, as noted previously, there were 19 Acts requiring disclosure 
to the authorities at the date of the Jack Committee's Report, and the C01111nittee 
therefore recommended an exhaustive codification of all relevant legislation, 
requiring disclosure, with the fhrther recommendation that all subsequent disclosure 
requirements should only be added by way of amending that provision.804 
6.6.21 Conclusion 
In conclusion, as can be seen from the above analysis, in Singapore, the duty of 
banking confidentiality ill respect of the client's affairs stems fi'Oln two sources: 
(i) The duty of confidentiality implied by the C01111llon Law by virtue of the 
banker-customer relationship, and 
(ii) A statutory duty imposed by section 47 of the Banking Act (referred to herein 
as the "section 47 duty" or "the statutory duty,,)805 
The "general rule" of banking confidentiality is enshrined III section 47(1), which 
states: 
'03 See the Jack Committee Report, paragraph 5,06. 
804 Yap, above n S02, 577·601. 
805 Chapter 19 of the 1985 Revised Edition ofthe Singapore Statutes, 
375 
Customer information" shall not, in any way, be disclosed by a bank in 
Singapore 01' any of its officers to any other persons exempt as expressly 
provided in this Act. B06 
And whilst exceptions are provided under section 47(4), none of the above would 
contradict the recommendations of the supranational organisations. 
6.7 Exchange oflnformation - Mutual Legal Assistance 
Following the discussion of its second mutual evaluation report at the FATF Plenary 
meeting in Febtuary 1999, the Singaporean delegation reported back in June 1999 on 
the measures that it would be introducing. In September 1999, Singapore advised that 
its Corruption, Drug Trafficking and Other Serious Crimes (Confiscation of Benefits) 
Act 1999 was passed on 6 July 1999 and came into force on 13 September 1999. The 
amending legislation extended the money laundering offence to a wide range of 
serious crimes, increased the powers to confiscate criminal assets, clarified tbe 
requirement to repOlt suspicious transactions, and introduced several other measures 
to enhance the anti-money laundering regime. On the provision of mutual legal 
assistance, Singapore enacted the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act, which 
came into effect on 1 April 2000, to provide for a more comprehensive legal 
framework for mutual assistance in legal matters. B07 
The Mutual Assistance In Criminal Matters Act 2000 came into force on 1 April 2000. 
The Act facilitates the provision and obtaining, by Singapore, of intemational 
806 Ibid. 
807 Financial Action Task Force, Singapore (2001) <wwwl.oecd.org> at 9 November 2003. 
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assistance in criminal matters. It provides the legislative basis for Singapore to enter 
into arrangements with other countries for international co-operation in criminal 
matters. The fonus of assistance provided for by the Act include: 808 
1. the obtaining of evidence and other articles; 
2. the making of arrangements for persons to give evidence or assist in criminal 
investigations; 
3. the recovery and forfeiture of, and the restraining of dealings in, proceeds and 
instrumentalities of crime; 
4. the execution of requests for search and seizure; 
5. the location and identification of persons; and 
6. the service of documents. 
In general, assistance under the Act may be obtained or provided in relatioll to any 
'criminal matter', which is defined to mean a criminal investigation, criminal 
proceedings or an ancillary crimina! matter (ie the restraining of dealing in, or the 
seizure, forfeiture or confiscation ot~ proceeds or instrumentalities of crime, or the 
obtaining, enforcement or satisfaction of a confiscation order), 
The cl'uninaimatter must -
1. in the case of assistance sought by Singapore, relatc to a Singapore offence, ie an 
offence in the First or Second Schedule to the COfluption, Drug Trafficking and 
Other Serious Crimes (Confiscation of Benefits) Act (the CDTSCA); or 
 
"8 MII/llal Assislallce ill Criminal Assistallce Act (2000) (Chapte]' 190A). 
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2. in the case of assistance sought by a foreign country, relate to a foreign offence, ie 
a dmg offence or an offence that consists of or includes conduct which, if it had 
occurred in Singapore, would have constituted an offence under the Second 
Schedule to the CDTSCA.809 
Singapore Minister for Foreign Af'fairs and Minister for Law, Professor S Jayakumar 
signed a mutual legal assistance treaty with the United States Ambassador to 
Singapore, Mr Steven J Green on 3 November 2000. This is the fust mutual legal 
assistance treaty signed by Singapore. Earlier that year, the Singapore Parliament 
passed the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act which set out the legal basis for 
Singapore to enter into mutuallegai assistance treaties. 
The trcuty provided a framework for cooperation between Singapore and US 
authorities in the fight against dmg trafficking. It strengthens the relationship 
between the law enforcement agencies of the two countries and increases their ability 
to provide assistance to each other, and also to serve as an important tool in the light 
against drug trafficking offences. 
Under the treaty, the law enforcement authorities of Singapore and the United States 
provide assistance to each other in investigations, prosecutions and related 
proceedings concerning drug trafficking and drug money laundering offences. 
FOllllS of assistance available include taking tcstimony of witnesses, releasing 
documents and records, locating and identifying persons or evidence, serving 
809 Elizabeth Wong, Legislation Update Allen & Gledhill <www.lawgazette.colll.sg> at 9 November 
2003, 
378 
documents, executing requests for search and seizure and freezing and forfeiture of 
proceeds of drug trafficking.8lo 
This enhancement of the legislation has fil1'ther strengthened Singapore's global 
reputation as a compliant jurisdiction. 
6.7.1 SeA's compliance with FATF 40 Recommendations811 
The SCA has, to a large extent, provided the legal framework for Singapore to 
embrace the PATF's 40 Recommendation. In particular, it has: 
(i) Criminalised non-drug related serious crimes, albeit not all serious crimes (RS); 
(ii) Adopted objective knowledge in establishing the otll'mce of money laundering 
(R6); 
(iii) Imposed penalties against corporations themselves and not just their 
employees (R7); 
(Iv) Provided confiscation 01' forfeiture powers (RS); 
(v) Extended money-laundering law to non-bank financial institutions CR9); 
(vi) Imposed a statutory requirement for the retention 0 f fmancial transaction 
documents for more than five years (R14); 
(vii) Provided statutory protection requirement for the retention of financial 
institutions and employees against criminal and civil proceedings in good faith 
reporting of suspicious transactions (R 16); 
(viii) Criminalising tipping-off offences (R17); 
810 Ministry of Law, Sillgapore & US sign agreement 011 co-operation against drug trafficking (2000) 
<:http://wlVw.lllinlaw.gov.sg> at 9 November 2003, 
"1 See Appendix G for the list of FAT!" s 40 + 8 Recommendations against money laundering. 
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(ix) Made reporting of suspicious transaction mandatory (Rl 8); 
(x) Facilitated the issuance of anti-money-Iaundering guidelines through MAS 
(lUg); 
(xi) Provided the legal framework for Singapore to enter into mutual legal 
assistance treaties (MLAT) with other countries in relation to Production 
Orders, Search Wa11'ants, Confiscation Orders for foreign offences (R37 and 
R38); and 
(xii) Recognised money laundering as an extraditable offence (R40) 
The new legal regime under the SCA has given more teeth to Singapore's anti-money 
laundering laws. Hence, its law enforcement agencies are now better armed to combat 
money-laundering activities in Singapore and the Asia Pacific region.812 
Singapore bas ill place a sound and comprehensive legal, institutional, policy and 
supervisory framework for Anti Money Laundering/Combating the Financing of 
Te!1'orism (AML/CFT). The legal system is well regarded, with a low crime rate, an 
intolerance for cOl'luption, and an efficient judiciary. Singapore has taken systematic 
and effective steps to address many of the l'ecOlmnendations of the FA TF mutual 
evaluation in 1998-1999. The Corruption, Drug TraffICking and other Serious Crimes 
Act criminalized money laundering for a range of serious offences beyond drug 
trafficking, imposed a duty on all persons to make repOlts of suspicions transactions. 
and changed the criminal intent requirement for criminal ML offences to a reasonable 
ground to believe standard. Singapore has in place a framework for the provision of 
mutual assistance through the enactment in 2000 of the Mutual Assistance in Criminal 
812 Tan, above n 747, 264. 
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Matters Act (MACMA). Legally-binding Notices issued by the MAS imposed sector-
specific requirements and guidance in the areas of customer due diligence, internal 
controls, audit, and training, among others. These legislative and regulatory changes 
as well as institutional efforts to improve feedback to institutions, enhance 
supervisory oversight, and improve training resulted in a significant strengthening of 
Singapore's framework. 
However, according to the IMF, thew remain areas requirulg attention. TIlere arc 
limitations on Singapore's ability in practice to provide particular kinds of mutual 
legal assistance such as the provision of bank records, restraint of proceeds, and 
enforcement of confiscation orders. Customer identification measures for wire 
transfers need to be put ill place by February 2005, as recommended by FATF Special 
Recommendation VII. The Palermo Convention has yet to be ratified. The authorities 
recognize that to comply with the revised FATF 40 Recommendations of June 2003, 
the current sector specific Notices should be updated during 2004. While providulg 
valuable guidance, the principles-based Notices could be improved by maki.ng theil' 
provisions more detailed and direct, supplementing the current statements of principle 
with firm provisions and explicit guidance to assist financial institutions in the 
practical implementation of effective AML/CFT measures. Work on amendments to 
the sector-specific Notices has already commenced. Singapore has provided a 
framework for mutual legal assistance through MACMA but the lack of treaties or 
other relationships means that certain forms of assistance are not available to foreign 
authorities. Non-coercive measures (service of process and location of persons) and 
taking of evidence for foreign criminal proceedings arc available, but assistance 
requiring coercion, for example, the provision of bank records, production orders, 
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search and seizure, pre-trial restraints, proceeds identification and tracing, and 
enforcement of foreign confiscation orders, may be provided only to "prescribed" 
countries, cUlTently limited to the U.S. for drug trafficking matters. Singapore has also 
signed a mutual legal assistance treaty with Hong Kong in June 2003, which will 
. . h P . I 'fi d' 813 come mto operatlon as soon as t e artles lave rah Ie It. 
6.7.2 Conclusion 
From the above analysis, it can be seen that Singapore supports the exchange of 
information and lnlltuallegal assistance under the MACMA. This may be achieved or 
provided in relation to any 'criminal matter', which is defined to mean a criminal 
investigation, criminal proceedings or an ancillary criminal matter (ie the restraining 
of dealing in, or the seizure, forfeiture 01' confiscation of, proceeds or instrumentalities 
of crime, or the obtaining, enforcement or satisfaction of a confiscation order). 
Despite the enlargement of the SCA to encompass the scope of money-laundering, tax 
evasion (which includes duty evasion, exchange control and capital control evasion) is 
not listed as a serious crime and thus Singapore is not obligated to offer mutual legal 
assistance in tax matters, which is now the subject of the recent June 2004 OECD 
repmi entitled A Pl'OcessjiJ/' Achieving a Global Level Playing Field. 814 
6.8 Conclusion 
813 Illtemational Monetary Fnnd, above 11 739. 
814 Organisation of Economic Co~operatioll and Development, above n 18. 
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T 
The above analysis of Singapore's position in regard to harmful tax practices, money 
laundering, confidentiality and exchange of information, as revealed by its responses 
to the supranational organisations, OEeD, FATF, IMF and the Wolfsberg Principles, 
demonstrates how the city State has heen progressively positioning itself over the past 
five years to take advantage ofthe changes in global regulatory dynamics, particularly 
affecting European investors whose funds have been traditionally held by Swiss banks, 
(i) EU's Directive on the Taxation of Savings 
Singapore and Hong Kong, which have long been keen to estahlish themselves as 
off~hore financial centres to rival Europe's, and which already hold an estimated 
US$500 billion in offshore funds,815 are most likely to benefit fi'om the EU's 
Directive on tbe Taxation of Savings, Indeed, Singapore, which displaced 
Luxembourg as the number two offshore banking centre of choice816 is especially 
well-placed ahead of Hong Kong, 
Singapore has positioned itself as a first-class global wealth management centre, 
Among its advantages are a stable political enviromnent, a good reputation as a weU-
mn centre with transparent mles and a position close to Asia's growing economies, 
but not too close to locations where political developments may still be difficult to 
predict 
Hong Kong, though rated alongside Singapore as one of the most sophisticated 
offshore centres in the world, suffers from its proximity to China and investors unease 
'" According to the 2003 slU'Vey ofRostoll Consulting Group, 
'''IBM Rusiness ConSUlting Services' 2003 smvey oflhe Emopean private-banking indllshy, 
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over the long-term implications of control from Beijing. Bnt it could still benefit from 
the expected movement of funds from Europe in spite of recent comments from 
Beijing meant to put the market and the pro-democracy movement on notice. 817 
Perhaps a key reason the Swiss pmticipants are keen to expand into Asia is that even 
without law changes, the offshore banking system is well under review. In its mmual 
survey of this field, published in July 2003, the Boston Consulting Group says Swiss 
wealth managers are entering a highly competitive phase during which they will fight 
for new clients and market share. This is because the overall asset base is shrinking, 
revenue grO\vth is lower and there is low growth in new business. According to the 
report, wealth managers need to develop proactive strategies, enabling them to defend 
their offshore positions and develop a strong global onshore presence. Geographic 
diversiftcation, is one stmtegic option. 818 
However, as Singapore makes the regulatory changes and manages to win substantial 
business from Sv.~tzerland and the other traditional offshore centres, these established 
financial institutions are unlikely to fmd life any easier. Not only are the Singapore 
authorities keen to demonstrate the purity of their systems by introducing tougher 
regulations, but clients are no longer content to have their assets sit idly in their bmlk 
vaults. Offshore or onshore, the clients want their assets to work and will seek 
geographical and jurisdictional diversification to ensure snch a situation. 819 
(it) Singapore- an altemative to Switzerland 
817 Chlng, above l\ 697. 
818 Roger Trapp, 'Asia's Offsbore Centres will Benefit fi'om Europe's Tightening Regulations', 7Ile 
Asian Wall Street .Journal (Singapore) 10 September 2003. 
'''Ibid. 
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 Will Singapore replace Switzerland as the world's premier centre for private banking? 
Not immediately. But it is possible that in the next 5 years, a pOliion of the US$2.2 
trillion of private money managed by banks in Switzerland (as at the end of2002) will 
flow to the republic - thanks partly to catalytic tax changes within the European 
Union (EU) and Switzerland. 
In June 2003, the EU agreement with Switzerland to claw back some tax revenue 
from income eal'lled on assets of Ell citizens that are held by Swiss banks, opened the 
gates for the capital outflow of assets under management by its private banking 
industry. 
Under the deal, in 2005, Ell-based clients of Swiss banks will face a 15 per cent tax 
on income and! or dividends from assets - such as bonds - purchased from their 
Swiss bank accounts. The taxes will be passed on directly by the Swiss banks to the 
governments ortbe clients' home countries, without the clients' names being revealed. 
The deal allows Switzerland to maintain its banking secrecy laws, while permitting 
the governments of Ell countries to collect tax revenue that has, thus far, eluded them. 
Over time, the tax rates will be raised, in stages, to a maximum of 35 per cent. 
After 2005, therefore, private banking clients who keep assets in Switzerland will he 
faced with the prospect of lower - and progressively declining - post-tax rates of 
return on their boldings. 
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Many of them have already been induced to move their money elsewhere. According 
to Vikram, many Swiss banks consider Singapore a bettcr alternative, and are gearing 
up for the shift, since the regulatory and legal systems are ill place, these global 
investors are starting to vote with their feet; a clear vote of confidence in Singapore's 
1· . I I . I d' . 820 comp lance Wltl t le supranahona lrCctlves. 
(iii) Singapore - Financial System Stability Assessment 
Singapore has evolved into a major regional asset management centre over the past 
few years in response [0 the government's eHarts to develop this industry and now 
hosts more than 200 asset management finns. Total assets managed by Singapore-
based financial institutions increased from S$151 billion in 1998 to S$344 billion in 
2002. This increase can be attributed to transfers of regional portfolios to Singapore 
for management and continued expansion of management and advisory activities for 
the pan-Asian region in light of Singapore's sound legal and tax envirollment and 
higbly developed infrastructure. Some asset managers also centralized theh' regional 
trading and back office functions in Singapore. Of the S$183 billion of discretionary 
assets as of end-2002, 30 percent came Ii'om Singapore and the rest from abroad -
mainly Europe and the United States. 
Although the regulatory systems and supervisory practices exhibit a high degree of 
observance of international standards and codes, the 1MI' made some specitic 
recommendations to further enhance the risk-based regulatory and supervisory 
820 Vikram, above n 712. 
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  fi'amework, strengthen the accountability and independence on the MAS, and improve 
monetary and financial policy transparency821 
In this chapter's analysis of Singapore as a compliant jurisdiction, it was seen that 
Singapore complies well and in particular with most of the assessable FATF (40 + 8) 
Recommendations. The main deficiency is revealed in the provision of mutual legal 
assistance. Even so, in the next and final chapter of tlus thesis, the argument in favour 
of Singapore is sLUnmarised and concluded. 
821 International Monetary Fund, above n 813, 36. 
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 Chapter 7 Conclusion 
7.1 Introdllction 
In 1998, the Committee on Fiscal Affairs of the OECD embarked upon a major Ilew 
project to eliminate what it considered harmful tax practices in both OECD member 
and non-member coulltries. It issued a lellgthy discussion draft entitled Harmful Tax 
Competition: All Emerging Global Issue. 822 
III the guise of all effort to promote transparency and information exchanges in tax 
matters globally, the supranational bodies have ostensibly sought to prevellt and 
eradicate lax havens and preferential regimes. Although theoretically aimed at tax 
evasion, its impact, has been to reduce tax minimisation oppOltunities for legitimate 
international business activities. 
The analysis of the response to the subsequent effOlis of the OECD ct ai, by the 
OFC's has been the theme of this thesis. However, the subsequent emergence of 
Singapore as the compliant jurisdiction of choice, is now the fInal conclusion of the 
thesis. 
7.2 Money Lanndering & HarmfnI Tax Practices 
CUITently, with regard to tax havens, the scope of the project has been reduced to 
solely promoting transparency and infol1nation exchange, a position supported by the 
'22 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, above n 738. 
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international community. At this point in time, as analysed in this thesis in Chapter 5, 
it has becn argued that tbe majority of the OFC's, as selectively represented from the 
Caribbean, Pacific Basin, Europe, Indian Ocean and Asia, have agreed to co-operate 
within the OECD's timetable. 
However, to approach money laundering solely from the perspective of the legal 
mechanisms available diTeetly against launderers and their impact upon human rigbts, 
is to miss important aspects of the impact of money laundering upon the legal 
environment. The other side oflhe coin is to do with financial services' regulation and 
its relationship to the duties of professionals. The advent of money laundering 
regulation has altered the nature of the relationships many professionals have with 
their clients. The argument for regulation and reporting requirements is tbat only thus 
can suspicious transactions be located. The argument against regulation was that the 
regulatory structures are just a nllihel' ul1Ilecessary intrusion, expense, and disruption 
of professional relationships, which do little to apprehend launderers or to affect 
levels of laundering. 82J 
The international drive against money laundering has led to pressure for 
homogenisation of substantive criminal laws and enforcement mechanisms as 
hetween countries. As was seen in Chapter 5, legislation was introduced 01' amended 
in these jurisdictions and territories to allow them to comply with the OECD and 
FATF recommendations. III so doing it has helped recast the relationships that existed 
between Nation-States. From the point of view of individual States, it has provided 
the strongest challenge to the traditional concept of criminal law as being one matter 
823 DUllcan E Alford, 'Anti-money laundering regulations: a burden 011 financial ith,titutions' (1994) J 9 
North CarolinG Joul'!lai of illtemaliollo/ Lm<' alld Commercial Regulation 437, 
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in respect of which the sovereignty Nation-State is still the predominant political unit. 
English criminal law is now unashamedly the handmaiden of international markets. 824 
After the Human rughts claims, the imposition of duties upon professionals was seen 
as the most hotly contested area of Money Laundering Law. Frolll a position of scant 
compliance to one of resentment the mood has slrifted at least to unenthusiastic but 
fearful compliance. Subject to the argument from competition, client confidentiality 
appears to have been given up by bankers and accountants, and has been retained in 
the legal profession only hy the making of some concessions. Alldddge asserts that 
nothing will concentrate professional minds helter than a sentence of six months' 
imprisomnent for a solicitor who had pleaded guilty to failing to disclose knowledge 
or sllspicion of money laundering that was not, in the circu111stances, excessive. 825 
The period after 11 September 200 I has been a very significant one for the offshore 
industry. Reporting requirements have been extended, and levels of reporting have 
increased substantially. Privacy law is being stretched (in the case of coni1scation) or 
ignored (in the case of forfeiture, and perhaps, civil recovery). The profcssions are 
heing pulled in at least two opposing dil'ections.826 
With the apparent failUl'e of the EU tax anmesties to lead to a repatriation of the 
majority of the ftmds held in the OFCs, the individual EU countries now have to rely 
npon the sharing of withholding tax with Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg and 
Switzerland in respect of their non-compliant taxpayers. As withholding tax increases, 
step by step, to 35% after 1 January 20 II, this will, as has been seen, lead to a flight 
82, Alldridge, above n 382, 19. 
", Ibid 273. 
'" Ibid. 
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of undisclosed funds from those jurisdictions with such a high withholding tax to 
jurisdictions which do not apply high rates of withholding tax of this nature, such as 
Singapore.827 
It is unlikely that there may be further pressure on Switzerland in the coming period 
as a result of increased pressure from the United States, the EO and the OECD. If the 
past is any guide, the Swiss, particularly following their successfhl negotiations with 
the Ell, upholding the primacy of their banking secrecy, may feel vindicated in 
standing fum on this issue. Nevertheless, there must be the risk of the further 
haemorrhage of funds from Switzerland back onshore, in the face of stiffer penalties 
for tax evasion, increased transparency in the case of tax fraud and ongoing tax 
amnesty programmes in various different jurisdictions. As a result of this, the more 
forward looking private banks in Switzerland are increasulgly looking to design 
financial structures for onshore families which are tax compliant in jurisdictions such 
as SUlgapore. 
While prominent OFC jurisdictions like Jersey, Guernsey, the Cayman Islands, the 
Bahamas, and Bermuda continue to survive, smaller jurisdictions, such as Nauru and 
Niue, which have been unable to lTIeet mininmm requirements in respect of anti-
money laundering rcgulles, are being forced out of the industry. This conclusion is 
imminent, despite the more laissez faire approach of the Bush administration, has 
been in no small measure due to the dramatic change in mood in the US fullowing the 
821 Paul Stibbard, 'Tluiving in a Trallsparent World - Understanding Clients' Needs' Bakel' & 
McKellzie, Eight A ""/lailn/emotional Tax and 7i'/lsls Training COIIl'se (Singapore) September 2003. 
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events of September 11, 2001, and the determination that bank secrecy should never 
again be used as a cloak to mask terrorist conspiracies. 828 
Singapore uow has in place a sound and comprehensive legal, institutional, and policy 
and supervisory fi'amework for AMLlCFT and the authorities have demonstrated a 
strong commitment to its effective implementation. Though some steps have been 
taken with the enactment of a domestic mutual legal assistance law and ongoing 
negotiations for several hilateral treaties, the effectiveness of cross-border lllutual 
legal assistance needs to be improved as it relates to compulsory assistance at 
intemational request, including the provision of bank records. 
It was noted that Singapore adopts international standards and best practices for 
regulation and supervision, including a comprehensive framework to combat money 
laundering and terrorism financing. A full member of the FATF, Singapore is 
committed to inlplementing the FATF recommendations.829 
Singapore's laws, regulations and institutional arrangements provide a strong legal, 
institutional, policy and supervisory fi'amework are deemed to be adhering to the 
FATF 40+8 Recommendations for the prevention and detection of MLIFT. Many of 
the suggestions for fmiher improvements will be implemented as Singapore continues 
to strengthen its AMLlCFT framework to comply with the revised FATF 40 
Recommendations of June 2003.830 
7.3 Confidentiality & Exchange ofInfOl'mation 
". Ibid. 
", Monetary Authority of Singapore <hltp:llwww.mas.gov.sg> at J November 2003" 
830 intemational Monetary Fund, above II 821. 
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The several challenges aimed at offshore confidentiality as a legal concept have been 
examined and some may be seen to be without proper basis in law and legal policy. 
Indeed, this thesis has analysed in detail the areas which the OFes, and by extension 
the tool of offuhore confidentiality, have been criticised and demonstrated the several 
flaws in the arguments presented. These are and include the offshore tax function, the 
issue of money laundering and international crime and the question of comity. The 
quest for privacy in commercial and personal affairs and the assertion of the privilege 
against self-discrimination and sovereignty are thrther responses to challenges to 
confidentiality. Justifying confidentiality in offuhore fInance, therefore, does involve a 
defence of the offshore fInancial sector itself. In defending the offshore sector, the 
legitimacy of confidentiality, one of its most important tools, is nnderscored. 
The offshore sector is seen to he, first and foremost, an economic phenomenon 
created to respond to the needs of international business. Secondly, it offers safe and 
reliable alternatives to traditional fonns of investment in onshore jurisdictions. 
Thirdly, the sector is supported by a legal infi·astmcture that derives its very 
legitimacy from onshore legal regimes. Offshore jurisdictions have merely adapted 
legal concepts and principles well known in onshore states. This factor compromises 
the ability of onshore jurisdictions snccessfully to undenlline the legal foundation Oil 
which the sector is established. In many areas, such as trusts and tax, offshore 
practices and concepts are suppOlted both in traditional municipal law and in 
international law. The offshore sector has thus created an innovative legal regime to 
respond to modern comlllercial needs. Its structure has produced a diverse and 
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 creative jurisprudence which challenges the orthodoxy of onshore legal regimes and 
concepts. 831 
This thesis analysed how off.~hore jurisdictions understand well the need for 
regulation, and SUppOlt such regulation where it is legitimate. In matters for which 
there is as yet, no consensus on the acceptable reach of disclosure, such as in fiscal 
matters, the way forward must be through international and bilateral agreements. 
However, as will confidentiality in other areas of financial law and commerce, 
off.~hore confidentiality will continue to be zealously protected outside of these 
parameters. 832 Shlgapore, as analysed in this thesis, has become the compliant 
jurisdiction of choice. 
It has been demonstrated that the threats to financial confidentiality as a viable legal 
concept mask the real questions which are essentially economic and political. The real 
concel'll of onshore countries is the significant financial haemon'hage fi'om onshore 
countries filtering off income to offshore states. In the past, OFCs were being targeted 
and threatened with sanctions for activities which onshore states themselves engage in. 
They are attacked for laws, legal policies and practices which are not unlawful or for 
which there are no accepted intemational standards. 
The OECD and FATF challenges to OFCs, premised on 'harmful tax competition' 
and charges of money laundering, highlight the many inconsistencies contained ill the 
charges against OFCs and confidentiality. These compromise the objections raised by 
onshore states to offshore legal policy. This perhaps best explains why the UK has 
831 Antoine, above n473, 325-6. 
832 Ibid 327. 
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been less hostile to OFes than the US. Its dependencies derive considerable economic 
benefit from their ovm OFes. This, in tUiTI, reduced financial dependency on the UK 
government. 
Offshore jurisdictions, it was seen, have been accused of unfair tax practices in an 
international fiscal environment which has reached no consensus with regards to 
ownership of taxable worldwide income and which recognises no limits on a 
countIy's right to set fiscal policy. It is also occurring in a global environment which 
encourages competition generally and condenms protectionism. As documented 
earlier, not only do onshore states offer fiscal incentives to non-residents but they also 
accept the well-established legal principle of the lawfulness of tax avoidance and the 
non-enforcement of foreign fiscal law, two principles which ground offshore fiscal 
policy. 
The OEeD's challenge to conlidentiality because of its inherent value to tax planning 
vehicles, has been demonstrated to be misplaced. Where investors engage in tax 
plamling, a legal activity, ti1eir use of confidentiality as an investment tool cannot 
seriously be questioned in law. Similarly, given the rule on non-enforcement of fiscal 
law, OFes cannot appropriately be challenged for their refusal to deviate fro111 
offShore confidentiality norms by assisting onshore countries in disclosure efforts to 
llarness fiscal revenue. 
However, the OEeD report entitled A Process jo/' Achieving a Global Level Playing 
Field released in June 2004 seeks to renew the OEeD's campaign in regard to the 
transparency and effective cxchange of inlormation for tax purposes, sought from 
395 
r 
significant fmaneial centres, which includes Singapore. B33 The main point of concern 
is that despite the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act whieh provides the 
legislative basis for Singapore to enter into arrangements with other countries for 
international co-operation in criminal matters, tax evasion is not listed under the SCA 
Singapore is under no obligation to co-operate with foreign countries by sharing 
information which facilitates tax collection. 
Fm1her, the attack on offshore confidentiality ostensibly to prevent money laundering 
may be questioned. Confidentiality and money lanndering afe often being used as 
scapegoats merely to obtain information on potential tax revenue of onshore states. In 
so doing, the OEeD and its suppOliers have been willing to rewrite fundamental 
precepts of money laundering law to achieve that by encompassing even tax evasion 
as a predicate offence. 
Such challenges also ignore the facts about money laundering in OFCs. First, as 
pointed out in Chapter 5, most OFCs have well regulated systems with respect to 
money laundering, in some cases more vigilant than onshore states. There is evidence 
to suggest that offshore COutts are co-operative, and V\~l1ing to assist in the prevention 
of money laundering crime in OFCs. This is well demonstrated by the Illany 
legislative improvements and treaty initiatives relating to mutual legal assistance 
which enhance law enforcement. Secondly, it was shown that evidence abounds that 
onshore financial centres, such as London and New York, are actually the uue centres 
of money laundering proceeds. 
&33 Organisation tor Economic Co-operation and Development, above n 814. 
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The most recent challenges to confidentiality, that is, terrorist financing, can be 
viewed along similar lines. Indeed, there is a belief that money launderers and 
terrorists are too sophisticated to utilise 'red flag' OFes for their endeavours, as such 
centres attract far too much attention. However, while it is clear that ten'orist funds 
may have been concentrated onshore, OFes have generally welcomed the opportunity 
to assist in the fight against terrorism. The direction taken by OFes have been more 
focnsed on not overprotecting financial confidentiality rather than strengthening 
money laundering law to fight terrorism. 
Yet, even amidst fears of money laundering and telTorism, offshore confidentiality 
and disclosure must be approached with caution and with appropriate regard for legal 
principles and the rule of law. As discussed, one such principle is comity, the respect 
which one country must give to the law of another. Just as the confidentiality law of 
onshore states are accepted judicially as essential hl supporting commercial secrets 
and other commercial concems in the national interest, so must offshore 
confidentiality laws also be accepted. Indeed, Jinancial confidentiality laws in OFes 
may be seen to have even more of an instrumentall'ole than those onshore. 
Similarly, the 1111e of law dictates that fundamental humanl'ights must be respected in 
any challenges to confidentiality. In pmticular, the principles on privacy, the privilege 
against self-incrimination and search and seizure are developing, and apply to 
fmandal confidentiality. While such rights may be surrendered hl for public interest, 
tlus lllllSt be done according to recognised principles of proportionality, which accords 
the greatest possible measure of human rights protection to every citizen. Even US 
citizens are questioning the siege-induced assumption that controlling terrorism must 
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 necessarily equate to an eclipse of human rights and civil liberties. Many now fear a 
diminution of their right to privacy. 834 
However, it is noted that in Singapore, the customer's right to confidentiality is a 
cardinal principle in the Singapore hanking sector, and assured by statutory provisions 
in the Banking Act. The Banking Act prohibits a Singapore bank and its employees 
from disclosing customer information without the customer's written consent. 
Coniidentiality provisions may only be lifted by a comt order within a well-defined 
legal framework of safeguards and conditions. 
7.4 Singapore's Role as a :Fiuaucial Cenh'e 
From the preceding chapter it was highlighted that the sophisticated banking system, 
the transparent regulatOlY and the credible English Common law system have aided 
SUlgapore's development as a pre-eminent regional financial centre in Asia which is 
also underpinned by the existence of an attractive business envu'omllent for tinancial 
institutions and a desirable quality of life for professionals. Effective promotion to 
cOlllmnnicate Singapore's value proposition and financial sector opportunities has 
attracted financial institutions and talent to Singapore. A deep pool of financial sector 
expertise and pro-physical inii'astructlll'e are key components of an attractive business 
environment. This attractive business environment has been created by focusing on 
the promotion of Singapore's financial centre, education and training, taxation policies 
d b · .. C: 8]< an USlless ll11fastlUcture. --
'34 Antoine, above 11 832, 328-9. 
835 Economic Review Committee, Sub-Committee on Services Industries, Financial Services Working 
Grollp, above n 722. 
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Wealth management needs are well supported by a full range of financial services. 
More than 500 of the world's top financial institutions are present in Singapore, 
engaging in a wide range of financial activities- commercial banking, investment 
banking, treasury activities, insurance and reinsurance, asset management and private 
banking. As a global forex hub - Singapore is the world's largest forex trading centre 
after London, Ncw York and Tokyo. The SGX's derivatives market was the first 
Asian exchange to offer Eurodollar futures on Japanese and Taiwanese stock 
indices.836 
Singapore is becoming the chosen ground for many o,ff:~hore investors. The regional 
chief executive officer of Credit Suisse, explains, "The only other tme global private 
banking centre is Switzerland, and we think Singapore shares many of the 
characteristics of Switzerland. It is clearly superior to most of the traditional offshore 
centres, and offers all the features of a world class financial centre." 837 
It has been noted that "Singapore is politically stable, it has the world!s most 
competitive economy, the best rated legal system and is a leader in information 
technology. There are stringent client confidentiality laws, no taxation for non-
residents, and robust anti money laundering laws. Like Switzerland, Singapore is 
nelltral and has an international reputation as a safe and secure envil'oml1ent. ,,838 
Since Switzerland has fallen in line with the EU's Savings Tax Directive, with an 
estimated $2 trillion in offshore assets held by EU citizellS to be affected, it is not 
83' Monetmy Authority of Singapore <hltp:!!www.mas.gov.sg>at 3 November 2003. 
8" Peter J Cooper, Interview with Regional CEO of Credit Suisse - Dr Alex Widmer, AME Info FZ 
LLC (Executive Interview, 3 Febrnary 200 1). 
8" Ibid. 
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surprisingly, that many of Europe's wealthy are reviewing other places to transfer 
their cash. 111e likely recipient of some of the outt1ow, is now conflrmed, to be 
Singapore, which is not party to the EO directive. 
"When you have to pay 15% and eventually 35% in taxes, you are going to have a 
natural attrition of funds to where you don't have that -like Singapore," said the head 
of Asian private banking for Societe Gcnomle in Singapore. 
Although Singapore has long toiled to develop as an offshore banking center, it has 
had to date, modest success. However, as more private banking and fund management 
operations are relocated to Singapore as the trend has ah'eady commenced, assets 
under management will grow at a much faster rate. 
Competition is limited. The global crackdown on terrorism financing means tax 
havens in the Caribbean and the South Pacific are blacklisted 01' otherwise seen as 
tainted. Singapore is among the few still passing the "sniff test". Hong Kong, as been 
noted, suffers "sovereignty risk" ~ Mainland China's increasing inteliercnce in the 
territory's afiitil's. "Thousands of people protesting in the streets in July 2003 didn't 
help that image," sais the head of Societe Gcneraie839 
Then to reinforce this concel'll, corrnnents niade by a senior Chinese official, Wen Wei 
Po, Beijing's mouthpiece in Hong Kong, about Hong Kong's shaky fmandal future: 
839 Justin Dacbel., "Taking Shelter. SingapoJ'<) Iival Switzerland for private banking." Forbes Global, 
September I, 2003. 
400 
"Given our greater economic might now and Hong Kong's heavy dependency 
on China, to set up a new stove is not a problem. We are not afraid that such a 
move would trigger off a capital fligbt."S40 
7.5 Conclusion 
This thesis has analysed the principal issues of harmful tax practices, money 
Immdering, confidentiality and exchange of infonnation with respect to the 
supranational directives in regards to OFCs. 
The analysis of these directives and the responses of the major OFCs, has in 
conclusion demonstrated the regulatory environment of Singapore to be well-
established, and supported by jndicial and banking systems, which differentiate 
Singapore from the OFCs analysed in Chapter 5. 
It has been argued that Singapore has satisfied the recommendations of the OECD, 
FATF, FSI" and the Wolfsberg Principles in telms of harmful tax practices, money 
laundering, confidentiality and exchange of information. 
With these basic pillars in place, the city-state has now positioned itself to emerge as a 
possible beneficiary ofthe flight of funds from Europe. 
840 Ching, above l\ 817. 
40] 
r 
Switzerland's decision to repatriate income taxes 011 accounts held by citizens of the 
EU from 2005 could have the citizens cOllSider Singapore to be an alternative major 
private hanking centre. 
Switzerland, the world's largest private banking centre, with $2.2 trillion in offshore 
assets (assets held by EU citizens), could see some ofits funds diverted to Singapore. 
The EU's Savings Tax Directive rate starts at 15% but will rise to 35% by 2011. All 
of Europe's other tax havens, not already part of the EU have also fallen in line with 
the EU's Savings Tax Directive. In Singapore, the funds will be able to compound 
tax-free. 
To date, Singapore has enjoyed only modest success as an offshore banking centre. 
Offshore assets are estimated at $120 billion, a tcnth that of Switzerland's, and most 
of that is held by overseas Chillcscfrom Southeast Asia. Assets held by EU citizens 
are easily under 5%. 
Over the past five years, Singapore has increased its financial centre profilc, with 
bureaucrats on oftlcial trips to Europe holding meetings with private bankers to 
promote the benefits of the Southeast Asian llation.84 I There is a significant number of 
major banks and fmancial institutions which have established a presence in Singapore 
and the subsequent flow of funds under wealth management in Singapore. 
8H 'Swiss Tax Decision could see Singapore Shine as a Haven' (2003) 8 Offshore Red: All ope News 
Update 175. 
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It has been argued that Singapore, with both its judicial and fmandal platforms in 
place, has responded to the directives of the supranational bodies and successfully 
positioned itself to be the compliant jurisdiction of choice for the global wealth 
management industry, 
At the time of submission of this thesis, the OEeD report entitled A Process fbI' 
Achieving a Global Level Playing Field was released in June 2004842 It would seen 
that this report is, as stated, a response to the OEeD's concern to prevent the 
migration of business to economies which do not engage in transparency and effective 
exchange of information for tax purposes, Whilst the subsequent responses and 
developments from these named "significant fmalleial centres" are not yet available, it 
does appear to support this thesis, that Singapore is being identified as one of the 
recipients of the migration of investment funds from Europe, It has positioned itselfto 
be the jurisdiction of choice of global wealth management. However the reason for 
any influx of foreign funds has yet to be proven by the OEeD to be that of a lack of 
transparency and ineffective exchange of information for tax pUll)oses, 
842 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, above nS33, 
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APPENDIXH 
PROFESSIONAL FIRMS PARTICIPATING IN 
HENCHMARKING CHARTS 
Stikeman Elliott's London team comprised Richard Hay, Jeffrey Keey, Leigh Nicoll, 
Robelt Reymond and Heather Tibbo. 
We gratefully acknowledge the assistance received from leadiug law firms in the 
jurisdictions surveyed as part of the benchmarking review. We note that counsel 
detailed below have reviewed the attached chatts. These firms did not review the main 
repOit including the case studies. Accordingly, responsibility for elTors or omissions, 
as well as editorial comment, rests with the main authors and contributors. We are 
grateful for the assistance provided by: 
• The Bahamas: Higgs & Johnson, John Delaney 
• Bermuda: Appleby Spurling & Kempe, Alison MacKrili 
• British Virgin Islands: Hamey Westwood & Riegc1s, Richard Peters 
e Canada: Stikeman Elliott, Toronto, Philip Henderson 
• Cayman Islands: Maples & Calder, Anthony Travers 
• England & WaleslUK re: corporations and limited pattnershlps: Stikeman 
Elliott, London, Jeftl'ey Keey 
• England & Wales re: trusts: Allen & Overy, Ceris Gardner 
e Hong Kong: Stikeman Elliott, Hong Kong, Clifford Ng 
• Isle of Man: Cains, Andrew Corlett 
• Jersey: Ogier & Le Masurier, Steven Meiklejohn 
.. Luxembourg:Le _ Goueff@vocats,com, Stepban Le Goueff 
.. New Zealand: John Hart, Banister 
.. Singapore: Khauar Wong & Partners, Gurbachan Singh 
.. Switzerland: Lenz & Staehelin, Richard Pease 
.. USA: Shutts & Bowen, Stepben Gray 
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CANADA 
1 All references are to federal provisions unless otherwise stated, 
2 Pursuant to subsection 24(1) of the Canada Business Corporations Act, RS,C, 1985, as 
amended ("CBCA"), shares of a corporation must be in registered form, As such, bearer shares 
are not permitted, However, bearer shares are permitted in Quebec (certifical au porleur) under 
the Companies Act, RS,Q" c,C-38, although their use is limited, 
3 Paragraph 105(1)(c) of the CBCA indicates that a director of a corporation cannot be a person 
who is not an individual. 
4 All corporations formed pursuant to the CBCA must file an annual return (I.e" Form 22 - Annual 
Return, CBCA Regulations, Schedule I) 
5 In Ontario, corporations whose securities are publicly traded must file audited finanCial 
statements with the applicable securities regulatory authorities and also must post their financial 
statements for public viewing on SEDARcom (the "System for Electronic Document Retrieval and 
Analysis"), All companies mllst file financial statements (not required to be audited) with the 
applicable income tax authorities, 
6 Corporations whose securities are publicly traded are required to have their financial statements 
audited, Pursuant to SUbsection 163(1) of the CBCA, shareholders of a private corporation may 
resolve to not have the corporation's financial statements audited, 
7 The directors of a corporation, pursuant to subsection 133(1) of Ihe CBCA, must call an annual 
meeting of shareholders no later than 15 months after the last preceding annual meeting and no 
later than 6 months after the end of the corporation's preceding financial year. Solicitation of 
proxies is mandatory pursuant to s. 149 of the CBCA, unless a corporation has 50 or fewer 
shareholders and is not a distributing corporation, Pursuant to S5, 570) of the CBCA Regulations, a 
management proxy circular must contain information about the name of each person who, to the 
knowledge of the directors or officers of the corporation, beneficially owns, directly or indirectly, or 
exercises control or direction over, shares carrying more than 10% of the votes attached to any 
class of shares entitled to vote in connection with any mailers being proposed for consideration at 
the meeting, Pursuant s, 235 of the CBCA, the Director of the CBCA may inquire into the 
ownership and control of a corporation's security in certain circumstances, 
ENGLAND & WALES 
8 Companies incorporated under the Companies Act 1985, with or without limited liability, 
9 Save to the extent the services provided comprise regulated activities for the purposes of the 
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) Order 2001, in which case the 
service provider must be authorised by the Financial Services Authority under section 19 of the 
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, 
10 Section 188 Companies Act 1985 - a company limited by shares may, if authorised by its 
articles, issue for fully paid shares a share warrant entitling the bearer to the shares specified in it 
which are transferred by delivery of the warrant 
11 Section 289(2) Companies Act 1985 - corporate directors are permitted, but details of corporate 
name and registered or prinCipal office must appear in the register of directors' required to be 
maintained by each company, Those details must also be provided within 14 days of,appointment 
to the Registrar of Companies (section 288(2) Companies Act 1985) and are available for public 
inspection, 
12Sections 363(1) and 709 Companies Act 1985 - every company is required to make an annual 
return to Companies House which is available for public inspection, This confirms information 
including its registered office and place where its share holding registers are kept, its type and 
business activities, details (including names and addresses) of its directors, secretary and 
shareholders and details of its authorised and issued share capital (sections 364 and 364A 
Companies Act 1985), 
13 Section 242 Companies Act 1985 - certain "small" and "medium-sized" companies are eligible 
for exemption from the requirement to prepare and file with the Registrar of Companies full audited 
accounts (Chapter II, Part VII Companies Act 1985), Accounts filed with the Registrar of 
Companies are available for public inspection (section 704, Companies Act 1985), Unlimited 
companies need not prepare or lile accounts if not a subsidiary af, controlled by or a parent of a 
limited undertaking (section 254, Companies Act 1985), 
14 Part Vlt Companies Act 1985 - all companies are required to have their accounts audited, 
save for certain small or dormant companies, 
15 There is no legal procedure for compelling disclosure of beneficial interests in shares in a 
private company or in respect of non-voting shares, However, nominee shareholders must be 
disclosed, pursuant to a requirement that the name and address of, and class and number of 
shares held by, each member of a company must be maintained in the statutory register of 
members maintained by each company (section 352, Companies Act 1985) and shown in the 
409 
 annual relurn which every company is required to make, In the case of a nominee share holding of 
voting shares in a company incorporated as a public limited company, disclosure of material 
interests in shares representing more than 3% of the share capital is required ( section 198 
Companies Act 1985) and tha company may also require the identity of a beneficial owner of its 
shares be disclosed (section 212 Companies Act 1985), Nondisclosure can result in freezing of 
transfer, voting and distribution rights (section 216 Companies Act 1985), 
IRELAND 
16 Corporate service providers are not generally regulated, although certain types of service 
providers are regulated, These include investment companies, insurance intermediaries and credit 
institutions, insurance companies and mortgage providers, 
17 Although permitted, bearer shares are unusual - the general view is that private companies 
may not issue them without imperiling their private status, 
18 Section 176 Companies Act 1963, 
19 Sections 125 - 129 Companies Act 1963 - returns must be submitted annually in Companies 
Registration Office, Mutual funds afe exempt. 
20 Every company is obliged to submit an annual return to the Registrar of Companies, The 
annual return must have the following annexed: balance sheet; profit and loss account; director's 
report and a copy of the auditor's report, where the company is audited, However, small private 
companies are exempted from Ihe requirement to annex a copy of its profit and loss accollnt and 
the director's report to the return but must provide an abridged balance sheet. A medium sized 
company is required to give an abridged balance sheet and short-form profit and loss account. 
21 Section 160 Companies Act 1963 - all companies, with a de minimis exception for small private 
companies, are required to appoint an auditor. Companies are generally obliged by law to submit 
their accounts at least once a year for scrutiny by an independent professional auditor. A non-
charitable company can be exempted from the requirement to have an annual audit provided that it 
complies with certain conditions which are set out in Part III of the Companies (Amendment) (No, 2) 
Act 1999, 
22 A list of shareholders must be contained in the annual return, In Ihe case of a nominee 
shareholder there are certain disclosure rules concerning beneficial ownership where the beneficial 
owner attains a 5% or greater interest in Ihe voting capital in a public company, In the case of 
private companies certain interested parties may apply to the court for an order compelling 
disclosure of beneficial ownership, but there is no general obligation of disclosure for this type of 
company, 
LUXEMBOURG 1929 HOLDING COMPANY 
23 luxembourg holding companies are usually incorporated as a socillie anonyme which permits 
shareholders to relain a high level of confidentiality through the use of bearer shares, Due to the 
overwhelming recourse to the societe anonyme form for holding companies, only this form of 
incorporation will be discussed herein, A holding company can also be incorporated under Ihe form 
of a S,a,r.i., A Senc, an Seca, or a Sc, 
24 There is no specific organisation for the regulation of service providers. 
25 Once the shares are fully paid up, and provided that there is no provision to the contrary in the 
articles of association, the shares of a luxembourg company may be in bearer form (and so 
transferable by the physical transfer of the related certificates), 
26 1929 holding companies are obliged to file and publish abridged annual accounts, 
27 The commercial company law provides that companies are obliged 10 use the services 01 a 
"reviseur d' entelPrises" (I.e" an independent auditor) for the control of their accounts if two of the 
following criteria are met: a total balance sheet is in excess of EUR 2,305,410; the net turnover of 
the company exceeds EUR 4,610,820; the number of personal employed full time during the fiscal 
year exceeds 50 employees, 
28 No disclosure of the beneficial owner to the authorities is required, 
NEW ZEALAND 
29 The Registrar of Companies is responsible for administration of the Companies Act 1993, 
though, there is no regulation of corporate service providers, 
30 Section 51 Companies Act 1993, 
31 Section 208 and 214 Companies Act 1993, See also the 4th Schedule, Companies Act 1993 
"Information to be contained in Annual Return", 
32 While there is a requirement to file an annual return with the Registrar of Companies, this only 
involves very basic information concerning the identity and addresses of the directors and 
shareholders, and the existence of any changes, There is no obligation to file accounts, except in 
relation to "non exempt" companies, These are companies which have 25% or more foreign 
410 
shareholding as described in footnote 35. In olher words, there is bolh an account filing and audil 
requirement for such non-exempt companies. Those companies which have taxable income are 
required to file an abridged summary of income/expenses etc to enable computetion of the income 
lax liability 10 Ihe tax authorities. 
33 Section 196 Companies Act 1993 - an appointment of an auditor is normally required but some 
companies may unanimously resolve nol to appoint an auditor. (This exception does nat apply to a 
subsidiary of a company or body corporate incorporated outside of New Zealand or New Zealand 
companies owned as to 25% or more by an overseas entity or to "issuers" within the meaning of 
Section 4 of the Financial Reporting Act 1993. 
34 Section 87 Companies Act 1993 - every company must keep a register of its shareholders. 
Shareholder information must be filed with the Registrar of Companies on an annual basis. There 
is no requirement to disclose beneficial ownership where parties are holding shares as nominees, 
except in relation to listed companies. 
SWITZERLAND 
35 Corporate service providers are not generally regulated, although the Federal Banking 
Commission acts as the supervisory authority for Ihe entities that are subject to the Federal Law on 
Banks or that are securities dealers under the Federal Stock Exchange Act. Corporations used as 
investment vehicles and which do not fall within the above categories are not subject \0 any 
specific supervision. 
36 Corporations may however be represented by nominee directors. A majority of the directors 
must be Swiss nationals. 
37 No requirement 10 file accounts with any registry, but banks, deposit-taking finance companies 
etc must fulfil special filing requirements. Accounts, must however, be filed with the federal tax 
administration not later than seven months after the end of the company's accounting period. 
38 Auditing is required for Swiss corporations (<< Aktiengesellschaft» I « societe anonyme »). 
Auditing is not required for other forms of companies, e.g. limited liability companies 
«( Gesellschaft mit beschrllnkter Haftung » / « Societe II responsabilite limitee »). 
39 The Trade Registry contains no information as to the shareholders / beneficial owners of a 
corporation. In the case of a limited liability company, the Trade Registry discloses the identity of 
the holders of the shares in the limited liability company. There is however no requiremenlthal the 
holder of the share be the ultimate beneficial owner. Should a corporation open a bank account, 
Ihe bank must comply with the Swiss Know Your Customer rules which imply Ihe identification of 
the beneficial owner for example whenever the accounlholder is a company with no commercial 
activities of its own, i.e. a domiciliary company. 
U.S. (DELAWARE) 
40 A limited liability company, commonly referred to as an "LLC" is an entity which has 
characteristics of both a corporation and a partnership. It is similar to a partnership as the llC is 
no! a separate taxable entity and also like a corporation in that all LLC owners are protected from 
personal liability for business debts and claims. 
41 Corporate service providers/administrators are neither licensed nor regulated. 
42 Thare is no distinction between shareholders and directors since management of the company 
is vested in the members of the company. 
43 LLCs are not required to disclose beneficial ownership. There is no administrative procedure for 
compelling a nominee to disclose Ihe identity of the beneficial owner. 
THE BAHAMAS 
44 An international business company (IBC) may only be incorporated by licensed bank and trust 
companies and licensed financial and corporate service providers. An IBC incorporated by a 
licensed bank or trust company is regulated by the Inspector of Banks and Trust Companies and 
an IBC incorporated by a licensed financial and corporate service provider is regulated by the 
Inspector of Financial and Corporate Services. Furthermore, The Bahamas Compliance 
Commission, under Ihe Financial Transactions Reporting Act, is responsible for the regulation 01 
financial institutions which includes banks and trust companies licensed under the Banks and Trust 
Companies Regulation Act 2000. 
45 An IBC may issue registered shares but not shares issued to bearer (section 10(a) International 
Business Companies Act 2000). An IBC shall keep a share register at its registered office which 
contains such information as the names and addresses 01 persons who hold registered shares in 
the company, the number of shares 01 each class and series of registered shares held by each 
person and the dale Ihe name of each person was entered in the share register. 
46 Companies are nat required to file accounts with the Companies Registry. However, in the case 
of a public company, the Registrar may, at any time, request in writing a copy of the annual 
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financial returns. Furthermore, public companies, banks and insurance companies (subject to de 
minimis exceptions), must file accounts with the relevant authorities. 
47 Public companies are obliged to have accounts audited - sections 123-128 Companies Act 
1992. Financial statements of an IBC are not required to be audited unless required by the IBC's 
Articles of Association. IBCs are not required to appoint an auditor and members of a private 
company may resolve not to appoint an auditor (section 130 Companies Act 1992). 
48 There is no legal requirement to publicly file the list of shareholders for an IBC. Other 
companies are required to include a list of shareholders in their annual return. There is no legal 
procedure for compelling a nominee holding shares in any company to disclose identity of the 
benefiCial owner except where money laundering is suspected. A company licensed under the 
Financial and Corporate Service Providers Act 2000 ("FCSPA") must keep a record in respect of 
each client, including the name and address of the beneficial owners of all IBCs incorporated and 
or existing under the Intemational Business Companies Act 2000 (section 14(3) FCSPA). 
BERMUDA 
49 Service providers are regulated by Ihe Bermuda Monetary Authority and the Bermuda 
Registrar of Companies. 
50 However, exempted companies must provide an annual Declaration of Business confirming the 
assessable capital and business of that company. 
51 However, insurance companies are required to file audited financials and a financial return 
annually with the Bermuda Monetary Authority. 
52 Companies are required to appoint audilors and accountants, but the appointment of an auditor 
and the laying of audited financial statements belore a company in general meeting can be waived. 
However, if the production 01 audited financial statements is waived, a company must slill maintain 
accounts sufficient for the directors and resident representative of that company to ascertain with 
reasonable accuracy the financial position of a company in any 3 month period. 
53 Every company is required to keep a register of its shareholders which is open to inspection by 
the public. Every person that inlends to hold 5% or mora of the authorised share capital of a 
company must provide certain further information to Ihe Bermuda Monetary Authority, whose 
consent is required to issue or transfer shares 10 any person who will hold 5% or more of a 
company's authorised share capilal. There is no disclosure of the beneficial ownership of a 
proposed shareholdar 01 a Bermuda company in the case of companies whose shares are listed 
on an Appointed Stock Exchange (as are prescribed by the Ministar of Finance). Nominee 
share holding is permitted however disclosure of the beneficial owner to the Bermuda Monetary 
Authority is required on a confidential basis, however the Bermuda Monetary Authority and, in the 
case of insurance companies, the Insurance Division of the Registrar of Companies may disclose 
information to a regulator with similar responsibilities if there is reciprocity. 
BRITISH VIRGIN ISLANDS 
54 In January 2002, the government established the Financial Services Commission, an 
independent body which is responsible for supervision of corporate service providers. However, 
the Financial Services Commission is not yel responsible for regulating investment business. 
55 Government has made a public commitment to amend tha International Business Companies 
(lBC) Act to "immobilize" bearer shares. The process of immobilization is under consideration. 
Bearer shares are not permitted for companies carrying on certain regulated activities in the BV!. 
56 Non-BVI corporate directors are nol permitted for managers or administrators licensed under 
the Mutual Funds Act, 1996. 
57 Public companies incorporated under the Companies Act must submit an annual audited 
balance sheet to the Registrar of Companies, banks, trust companies and management 
companies must submit annual audited accounts to the Head of Banking and Fiduciary at the 
Financial Services Commission; public funds registered under the Mutual Funds Act 1996 must 
keep annual audited financial statements and insurance companies must submit to the Insurance 
Supervisor annual audited accounts. Government has made a public commitment to amend the 
IBC Act to require names and addresses of directors of IBGs to be filed at the Registry of 
Companies. 
58 Public companies under the local Companies Act must file audited financial statements wilh the 
Registrar of Companies. Private companies are not required to file accounts of any type with the 
Registrar of Companies. However, companies incorporated under the local Companies Act must 
file an income tax return which would almost always be supported by financial statements. 
59 Public companies, banks and trust companies, insurance companies, public mutual funds and 
company management companies and mutual funds managers and administrators are required to 
appoint auditors. Public companies must fila an auditor's report on annual accounts. 
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60 On establishment the Memorandum of Association which includes names, addresses and 
descriptions of subscribers must be delivered to the Registrar of Companies. Local companies are 
required to submit shareholder information in their annual return. Discovery of the identity of the 
beneficial owner of a nominee shareholding is achieved by application of evidence rules generally 
in criminal and civil matters. The Anti-Money Laundering Code of Practice requires registered 
agents of IBCs to maintain records of identity in respect of new clients, except in circumstances 
where the client has been introduced by a similarly regulated entity from another jurisdiction. 
These records need not be retained in the BVI as long as they are available on request of the 
registered agent. 
CAYMAN ISLANDS 
61 Service Providers are regulated by the Cayman Monetary Authority. 
62 Bearer shares are not permitted unless they are subject to custodial arrangements with a 
recognised international custodian or licensed Cayman Islands entity. 
63 An annual retum must be filed for every company with the Registrar of Companies in prescribed 
form. 
64 Regulated entities must file accounts. No requirement to file accounts with the Registrar of 
Companies but banks, trllst companies, mutual funds, mutual funds administrators, insurance 
companies and company management companies must prepare and file audited financial 
statements and reports in accordance with the relevant laws and any special terms and conditions 
imposed by the Cayman Islands Monetary Authority at the time of the granting of each individual 
licence. Financial statements must be maintained by all companies but only the entities designated 
must file audited financial statements with the Cayman Island Monetary Authority. 
65 Company financial statements must be prepared but need not be audited. 
66 On incorporation the Memorandum of Association which includes the names and addresses of 
subscribers must be delivered to the Registrar of Companies. The records are not available for 
public inspection. The Money Laundering Regulations and Guidance Notes contain specific 
provisions dealing with the obligation of any financial service provider to obtain specified details on 
the beneficial owners. This information is available to the Cayman Island Monetary Authority. 
HONG KONG 
67 However, banks, restricted licenced banks and deposit-taking companies are regulated by the 
Hong Kong Monetary Authority and securities dealers, investment advisors, commodity dealers 
and securities margin financiers, together with investment products are regulated by the Securities 
and Futures Commission. 
68 A company may issue warrants to bearer if so authorised by its articles. 
69 However, corporate directors are not permitted in the case of a public company or a private 
company which is a member of a group of companies including a listed company. 
70 Submitted annually to the Registrar of Companies. 
71 Public companies are required to file financial accounts with the Companies Registrar (as part 
of the company's annual information return) and with the Inland Revenue Department (as part of 
the company's profiltax return). Private companies are not required to file financial accounts with 
the Companies Registrar but are required to file financial accounts with the Inland Revenue 
Department (as part of the company's profit tax return). 
72AII companies are required to have their financial statements audited by a certified public 
accounting firm in Hong Kong. 
73 The registers of members of both public and private companies are available for inspection by 
members and any other person at the registered office of the company. The register shows the 
registered owner, not the beneficial owner. There is no legal procedure for compelling a nominee 
holding shares in a private company to disclose the identity of the beneficial owner. For listed 
companies, disclosure is required if the beneficial owner is a director of the company or a 
substantial shareholder. There is no specific provision in any other legislation regarding identifying 
the beneficial owner of shares but the courts have a general power to make orders against a 
person in a specific case and there are investigative orders that may be granted by a court in the 
case of the investigation of organised and serious crime. 
ISLE OF MAN 
74 Under the Corporate Service Providers Act 2000, only those licensed as corporate service 
providers (CSPs) by the Financial Supervision Commission are now permitted to incorporate and 
administer companies. The Commission is also responsible for the regulation and supervision of 
CSPs. 
75 Warrants to bearer are permitted but as part of the Isle of Man's OECD commitment the 
legislation permitting warrants to bearer will be repealed. 
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76 Only public companies are required to deliver accounts to the Companies Registry. However, 
as part of the Isle of Man's OECD commitment, a company will either have to file accounts with the 
taxation authorities or prepare audited accounts which must be available for production to the 
taxation authorities on request. 
77 An audit is required unless the company is private and is either dormant or tax exempt pursuant 
to, principally, the Income Tax (Exempt Companies) Act 1984 and all its members have passed a 
resolution to dispense with the appointment of an auditor. This audit exemption is currently under 
review as part of the Isla of Man's OECD commitment. 
78 The nama and address of, and class and number of shares held by each member of a limited 
company must be shown in the annual return. The beneficial owners of companies are required to 
be known to and verified by the relevant corporate service provider and available on request to the 
Commission as part of its compliance procedures function or be produced to third parties by court 
order. 
JERSEY 
79 Service providers are regulated by the Jersey Financial Services Commission. 
80 Article 73(2)(d) Companies (Jersey) Law 1991 
81 Article 71 Companies (Jersey) Law 1991. 
82 Article 106 Companies (Jersey) Law 1991 - accounts for public companies must be filed with 
the Registrar of Companies and are open for public inspection. There are no requirements for 
private companies to file financial accounts with any central registry nor to submit accounts to any 
local tax authority. 
83 Public companies are required to prepare and file audited accounts annually. Article 109(1) 
and 110 Companies (Jersey) Law 1991- a private company only need prepare an audit if the 
articles of the company so require or if a resolution in a general meeting so requires. 
84 All companies must disclose beneficial ownership information to the Jersey Financial Services 
Commission (JFSC) on incorporation. In the case of an exempt company or an IBC, any changes 
in beneficial ownership must be reported to the JFSC when it occurs, (Control of Borrowing (Jersey) 
Order 1958). 
SINGAPORE 
85 There is no specific organisation which regulates corporate service providars in their capacity 
as such. However, corporate service providers (lawyers and accountants) are regulated by their 
respective professional bodies. The Monetary Authority of Singapore supervises the banking, 
insurance, securities and futures industries. 
86 Section 145 Companies Act Chapter 50, 1994 Revised Edition. 
S7 Annual accounts must be flied with the Registry of Companies and Business. However, "private 
exempt companies", which are defined as a company, with less than 20 shareholders all of whom 
are individuals are permitted to file a directors' report and accounts with the registrar. 
88 The name, and address of, and class and number of shares held by, each member of a limited 
company must be shown in the annual return. No administrative procedure exists for compelling a 
nominee holding shares in a priVate company (or non-voting shares in a publicly listed company) to 
disclose the identity of the beneficial owner. A substantial shareholder has the obligation to state 
whether he holds voting shares as beneficial owner or otherwise. 
As at 24 June 2002 
Stikeman Elliot! 2002 
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1 ie can be elicited through an administrative as opposed to judicial process 
CANADA 
2 The l.oan ane! Tmsl Corporations Act (Ontario) ("LTCA"), RS.O. 1990, c. L-25 regulates loan 
and trust corporations carrying on business in Ontario. 
3 The L TCA does not contain any requirement to file settlor and beneficiary information with the 
Superintendent (who is appointed under the Financial SelVices Commission of Ontario Act, 1997). 
However, the Proceee!s of Crime (Money Lallne!ering) Act, 1991, c. 26, establishes strict record-
keeping requirements including for banks and trust corporations and the identity of potential clients. 
New record-keeping requirements are expected to be implemented in 2002 pursuant to the 
regulations under the new legislation entitled the Proceee!s of Crime (Money Laundering) Act and 
Terrorist Financing Act, 2000, c. 17. 
ENGLAND & WALES 
4 Trust companies (which must be distinguished from "trust corporations" which have a statutory 
definition and are required to comply with specific statutory conditiond) are not regulated (other 
than having to comply with the Companies Act or Charities Acts (if appropriate». The Financial 
Services and Markets Act 2000 (the "Act") will apply if such a company is concerned with making 
or trading in investments or giving investment advice. However, subject to any contrary indication 
in the trust instrument, trustees have statutory powers to invest funds as if they were absolutely 
entitled to the trust assets and thus should not be within the terms 01 the Act. 
5 There is no central registry for trusts although certain information must be provided to 
Companies House and to the Charity Commission in respect of charitable Irusls. 
6 Other than the submission of annual tax returns to the Inland Revenue, there is no requirement 
for trustees to file financial statmenets. Subject to certain exceptions, charities are required to file 
their annual accounts with the Charity Commission. 
7 There is no requirement to audit financial statements, save that charities with an annual income 
of at least £250,000 are obliged to have their accounts audited. 
8 On the creation of atrust, trustees are required to submit a Form 41G (Trust) to the Inland 
Revenue which requires information about the trustees, the settlor and the assets settled. Certain 
olher events, depending on the type of trust, will also prompt a requirement lor further forms to be 
completed. Money laundering laws apply to trustees and advisers. The laws require client 
identification procedures to be adopted and information retained on file. 
IRELAND 
g Trust companies are regulated by the Central Bank 01 Ireland only in the context of mutual finds. 
10 The trustees of private trusts do not have to identify the settiors and all the beneficiaries of 
either existing or new trusts. Any relevant information is kept by Ihe trustees on file as there is no 
regulatory register. 
NEW ZEALAND 
11 There is no regulation of trust companies, although there is regulation in relation 10 trusteeship 
of deceased estates and the performance of a "statutory supervisor" function under the Securities 
Act 1978 which broadly relates to trusteeship/supervision of publicly offered securities. 
12 Pursuant to the Financial Transactions Reporting Act 1996, financial institutions, which include 
any person "whose business consists of acting as trustee in respect of funds of other persons" 
have imposed on them obligations, which include the verification of the identity of persons. There 
is no disclosure or central filing obligation as such; jusl a requirement 10 make inquiries and hold 
materials on file. 
SWITZERLAND 
13 A Swiss trustee qualifies as a financial intermediary under the Swiss Money Laundering Act 
("MLA") and is subject to the applicable supervision (official authority or self-regulating body). 
Information about the settlor and beneficiary must be known by the trustees and kept on file 
pursuant to the MLA, however this does not need to be filed with any central registry nor is il 
publicly available. However, should the trustee open a bank account, the bank will be obliged to 
identify the settior and beneficial owner under the applicable know your customer rules. 
U.S. (DELAWARE) 
14 There is no requirement that a trustee be licensed and there is no regulation as such 
(individuals can be trustees). The trustee must have a Delaware address. 
15 Business trusts have the opportunity to register a certificate of trust, but it is not required. 
16 The identities of the settlor and beneficiaries need not be disclosed. 
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THE BAHAMAS 
17 Trust companies conducting business in The Bahamas have been required to be licensed since 
1962. The Banks and Trusl Companies Regulation Act, 2000 ("BTCRA") expands Ihese provisions. 
18 Section 94 of the Truslee Act provides thai "Notwithstanding any provisions of the Registration 
of Records Act, any deed creating a trust, all deeds of appointment made pursuant to the terms of 
a trust and all other deeds (but not including conveyances of Bahamian real property or personalty) 
executed by the trustees, settlors, beneficiaries or protectors of a trust pursuant to the powers and 
discretions specified in the trust instrument, are exempt from registration under the provisions of 
the Registration of Records Act." 
19 Pursuant to the Financial Transactions Reporting Act, 2000 ('FTRA") and the Financial 
Transactions Reporting Regulations, 2000 ("FTRR"), a financial institution (inclusive of a bank or 
trust company licensed under the BTCRA) is required to verify the identity of both existing and new 
facility holders (including the beneficial ownar of the facility (if different from the facility holder». In 
the case of a trust, the settlor's identity must be verified as a facility holder. A financial institution is 
also required to verify the identity of beneficiaries of a trust with a vested interest. There is no 
requirement to verify the identity of potential beneficiaries ie persons who do not have a vested 
interest. Identification verification information must be retained by a financial institution for a 
minimum period of 5 years after the end of the relationship with a facility holder (section 24 FTRA). 
BERMUDA 
20 The Trusts (Regulation of Trust Business) Act 2001 requires that persons carrying on trust 
business in or from within Bermuda are licensed undertakings. Private trust companies which have 
been incorporated specifically to act as trustees for private family trusts or a group of related trusts 
are not regulated by the Act. 
21 Trustees are regulated under two separate areas of legislation; the proceeds of crime 
legislation (The Proceeds of Crime Act 1997, the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) 
Regulations 1998 and the Guidance Notes on the Prevention of Money Laundering) and the trusts 
regulation legislation (the Trusts (Regulation of Trust Business) Act 2001 (now in force) and the 
Statement of Principles and Code of Practice thereunder (expected to be in force later 2002)). 
Under the former, verification of the settlor and, where appropriate, the principal beneficiaries, is 
required. This information is held on file. Although there were grandfathering proVisions, any 
addition to the trust fund will trigger the verification procedure so in most cases verification has 
occurred even if the trust was an existing trust in 1997. Under the latter, the Code provides that the 
trustees must be able to satisfy the proceeds of crime legislation and, in addition, they are required 
to have adeqUate information relating to the beneficiaries (identity and their needs) so Ihat the 
trustees are in a position 10 carry out their responsibilities and fiduciary obligations. 
BRITISH VIRGIN ISLANDS 
22 The Banks and Trust Companies Act, 1990 requires all trust companies (no matter where 
they are incorporated) which carry on "trust business" within the BVI and all BVI-incorporated 
companies carrying on trust business (whether in the Territory or outside the Territory) to be 
licensed under that Act. Foreign incorporated trust companies operating in the BVI, which are in 
the business of providing trustee Of other specified services must also be licensed under the Banks 
and Trust Companies Act 1990. 
23 The Trustee (Amendment) Act 1993 exempts all deeds creating trusts, all deeds of 
appointment pursuant to the terms of a trust and all other deeds executed by trustees, settlers and 
beneficiaries pursuant to the powers and discretions in the instrument creating the trust, from 
registration and filing save for trust deeds relating 10 unit trusts which afe public funds under the 
Mutual Funds Act, 1996. 
24 Records of identity of new clients must be maintained by registered agents and other registered 
entities pursuant to the Anti-Money Laundering Code of Practice, save where the client has been 
introduced by a similarly regulated entity in another jurisdiction. Provided that the BVI trustee is 
satisfied the records are maintained and are readily accessible, there is no requirement for them 10 
be kept within the BVI. Thus the BVI trustee will have information about the seWor available on file. 
Information about the beneficiaries is not required by statute, but for best practice, BVI trustees 
should maintain this. 
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CAYMAN ISLANDS 
25 All companies acting as trustees must be licensed and regulated under The Banks and Trust 
Companies Law. 
26 There are no public filing requirements for inter vivos trusts, unless the trust is to be registered 
as an exempted trust. 
27 As a mailer of trust law the trustees are under an obligation to know the identities of the settlor 
and beneficiaries. Furthermore, verification of the identity of the seltior and all due diligence with 
regard to source of funds is required by the Money Laundering Regulations (and as further detailed 
in. the guidance notes), which are of necessary application to all licensed trust companies in the 
Cayman Islands. 
HONG KONG 
28 A Hong Kong incorporated company may apply to be registered as a trust company by the 
Registrar of Companies under the Trustee Ordinance (Section 77(1)). Registered trust companies 
and trustees are subject to the provisions of the Trustee Ordinance. A company that is not 
registered as a trust company can act as trustee and may not be subject to regulation (unless it is 
regulated as a bank, insurance company, securities dealer, etc. under another law). However, a 
company cannot act as executor of a will, apply for probate or letters of administration, nor be 
appointed by a court as a trustee, unless it is registered as a trust company. 
29 Trustees of private trusts do not have to identify the settlors and beneficiaries of a trust (absent 
a court order) pursuant to any statutory provisions. However, as a mailer of trust law the trustees 
will need to identify the settlor and beneficiaries. The information would be kept only on the 
trustee's file. 
ISLE OF MAN 
30 Providers of administration services to companies are regulated under the Corporate Service 
Providers Act 2000. There is no equivalent legislation for trustees, although the Isle of Man 
Government has announced its intention to introduce such legislation in the short term. 
31There is no central registry for constituting documents, but charitable purpose trusts are required 
under the Charities Registration Act 1989 to register with the Charities Registry. 
32 There is no requirement to file financial statements, save that charitable purpose trusts are 
required to file audited financial statements. 
33 There is no requirement to audit financial statements, save that charitable purpose trusts are 
required to file audited financial statements. 
34 Under the anti-money laundering know your customer requirements, a trustee must know and 
verify the identities of the real settlor, the protector (if any) and to the extent possible under the 
form of trust, the beneficiaries. In addition, the trustee has to satisfy himself as to the source of 
funds forming the corpus of the trust and the underlying identity of all those who have remitted 
such funds. 
JERSEY 
35 The Financial Services (Jersey) Law 1908 regulates the carrying on of "trust company 
business" both in or from within the Island and if carried out by a company incorporated in the 
Island, anywhere in the world. 
36 A Jersey trustee of a Jersey law trust will know the identities of the settlor and beneficiaries of 
the trust. 
SINGAPORE 
37 Service providers are regulated pursuant to the Trust Companies Act (1985). 
38 Private trusts are not required to be registered. The Charities Act provides for mandatory 
registration with the Commissioner of Charities of charitable trusts established in Singapore. 
39 Apart from income tax returns on distributions of income or deemed income and company law 
requirements as to substantial shareholders, there is no requirement by the trustees to register or 
file information on the settlor or benefiCiaries of a trust. In addition, at present, trustees of private 
trusts do not have to identify the settlors and all the beneficiaries of both existing and new trusts 
under any statute. As a matter of general trust law however, the trustee will have to identify the 
settlor and beneficiaries. 
As at 18 June 2002 
Stikeman Elliott 2002 
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• For the purposes of this exercise, only limited partnerships have been reviewed, This does not 
include limited liability partnerships, 
CANADA (ONTARIO) 
1 Under the Limited Partnership Act (Ontario) ("LPA"), R,S,O, 1990, c, L-16, as amended, and 
regulations made under the LPA ("lPA Regulations"), a wrilten declaration signed by all of Ihe general 
partners must be filed with the registrar appointed under the Business Names Act, R,S,O, 1990, c, B-
17 ("BNA"), The general partner will be deemed to be carrying on business in Ontario through the 
limited partnership, Pursuant to Ihe LPA Regulations, included among the prescribed information to be 
filed with the registrar is a statement of a partner's contribution to the limited partnership and the 
general nature of the business, A record of limited partners, pursuant to ss, 4(1) of lile LPA, must be 
kept at the limited partnership's principal place of business in Ontario, No person associated in a 
limited partnership may carry on business or identify himself or herself 10 the public unless Ihe name of 
the partnership has been registered by all partners or by a designaled partner under the LPA, 
2 However, pursuant to subsection 33(1) of the LPA, every limited partnership shall keep certain 
information at its principal place of business in Ontario, including a copy of the partnership agreement, 
a copy of the declaration and a copy of each declaration of change amending the declaration, 
Pursuant to subsection, 33(2) of the LPA, where an extra-provincial limited partnership ("EPLP") does 
nol have a principal place of business in Ontario, the documents referred to in the foregoing sentence 
shall be kept by the EPLP's allomey and representative in Ontario, 
3 Financial statements of the limited partnership are not required to be filed with the registrar. 
However, such information is required to be submiHed to the applicable income tax aulhorilies, 
4 Although a limited partnership's financial information would not normally be audited, the general 
partner's financials might be, 
5 Ownership information of a limited partnership must be filed with the registrar pursuant to Ihe 
regulations made under Ihe LPA, Pursuant to subsection 19(2) of the LPA, a declaration of change 
must be filed for the admission of a new general partner, but not for a new limited partner (also see 
section 17 01 the LPA), As stated above, however, a record of limited partners must be kepI at the 
limited partnership's principal place of business in Ontario, 
IRELAND 
6 Section 5 of the Limited Partnership Act 1907 - a state men! signed by all the partners which 
inctudes the full name of the partners must be sent to the Regislrar of Companies, 
7 Section 8 Limited Partnership Act 1 907 - principal place of business must be in the Republic 
of Ireland, 
8 It is not necessary to file financial accounts as at least one general partner has unlimited liability for 
the liabilities of the partnership, However, if all of the partners effectively have limited liability, then 
regulation 6 of the European Community (Accounts) Regulation 1993 applies and accounts must be 
filed, Furthermore, a limited partnership is required 10 file tax returns with the Irish Revenue 
Commissioners and the Revenue Commissioners look for financial statements to support tax 
computations, 
9 However, wilh regards to Investment Limited Partnerships, Ihe Central Bank is the regulator and may 
require audits of the partnership, 
10 Registration of Business Names Act 1963 - a full list of parlners must be filed with the Registrar of 
Companies on establishment and when changes occur. 
LUXEMBOURG 
11 We have reviewed the ordinary limited partnership (i.e" /e Societe en Commandite Simple), 
12 Except for limited partnerships where all their general partners are financing companies, 
13 The commercial company law provides that companies are obliged to use the services of a 
"reviseur d' enterprises" (I.e" an independent auditor) for the control of their accounls if two of the 
following criteria afe met: a total balance sheet is in excess of EUR 2,305,410; the net turnover of the 
company exceeds EUR 4,610,820; the number of personal employed full time during the fiscal year 
exceeds 50 employees, 
14 The commercial company law provides that a limited partnership must be formed under a business 
name which must comprise the name of one or more general partners, In addition, general partners' 
names must be filed on establishment and when changes occur. There are no such requirements for 
limited partners, 
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NEW ZEALAND (SPECIAL PARTNERSHIP) 
15 Section 50 Partnership Act 1908 - "[al partnership may consist of general partners, who shall be 
jointly and severally responsible as general partners '" [and] special [Iimitedl partners, who shall 
contribute to the common stock specific sums in money as capital, beyond which they shall not be 
responsible for any debt of the partnership" except in certain cases. 
16 Seclion 51 Partnership Act 1908 - all the partners must sign a certificate containing the 
information set oul in Section 51 which includes the names and addresses of all the partners, This 
certificate must be acknowledged by each partner before a Justice of the Peace and registered in the 
office ot Ihe High Court of New Zealand (Section 54), 
17 Limited partnerships are not required to file financial accounts wilh any central registry, However, 
the income of a partnership and the partners' shares in the partnership are disclosed 10 the 
Commissioner of Inland Revenue in a joint return, This information is confidentiat to the Commissioner. 
18 Partners' names and home addresses are filed at the High Court Registry on formation, It is 
common practice for changes of limited partners to be dealt with by way of contract, utilising a so 
called "deed of accession", There is no strict slatutory requirement for such changes of ownership 10 
be recorded in the High Court, although this would usually occur al Ihe time of renewal of a special 
partnership afler the expiry of its initial term (which has a maximum term of 7 years), Accordingly, the 
public record may not be current in identifying beneficial owners. 
UNITED KINGDOM 
19 Limited partnerships formed under the Limited Partnership Act 1907 (the "LPN') but not limited 
liability partnerships formed under the Limited Liability Partnership Act 2000, 
20 Section 8 of the LPA - a statement as to the firm's name, business, principal place of business, 
partners, terms and date of commencement and contribution of the limited partners must be filed with 
the Regislrar of Companies in Ihal part of the UK in which the firm's principal place 01 business is 
situated, Failure renders the firm a general partnership (section 5 of the LPA), Statements so filed are 
available for public inspection (section 16 of the LPA), 
21 Section 8 of the LPA - the principal place of business must be situated or proposed to be 
situated in the United Kingdom, 
22 However, when the firm is within the scope of the Partnerships and Unlimited (Accounts) 
Regulations 1993 because each 01 ils members is a limited company or an unlimited company, or a 
Scots firm, each of whose members is a limited company (wherever those entities are formed) Ihe 
local corporate partner must under those Regulations append the partnership return to its own retum-
unless the firm is consolidated in group accounts prepared by an EU member stale member (or parent 
of such member). 
23 Sections 8 and 9 of the LPA - all of Ihe partners' names, the contributions of limited partners and 
whether in cash or otherwise must be filed with the relevan! Registrar of Companies on establishment 
of the partnership and within 7 days of any changes, 
U,S, (DELAWARE) 
24 A certificate of limited partnership must be filed with the Delaware Secretary of State, 
25 There is a requirement of a local registered agent. There is no requirement of a local place of 
business, 
26 For alilimiled partnerships, the certificale of partnership, which lists the general partners only, is a 
public record, The identities of limited partners are not disclosed or public, 
THE BAHAMAS (EXEMPTED LIMITED PARTNERSHIP) 
27 Section g, Exempled Limited Partnerships Act 1995 (the "ELPA") - a statement signed by or on 
behalf of the general partners which includes the general nature of the business, the address in The 
Bahamas of the registered office of the exempted limiled partnership and the full name and address of 
each at Ihe general partners must be filed with the Registrar of Exempted Limited Partnerships. 
28 At least one general partner must be a Bahamian resident, an international business company 
exisling under the Internalional Business Companies Act 2000, a company Incorporated under the 
Companies Act 1992 or a foreign company registered in The Bahamas under the Companies Act 1992, 
29 Section 6(4) of the ELPA - exempted limiled partnerships must have a registered office in The 
Bahamas for the service of process and delivery of notices and other communications, 
3D Section 19(1) of the ELPA - an exempted limited partnership is required to file an annual relurn with 
the Companies Registry, Section 10(1) of the ELPA - additionally, any changes in the registered 
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particulars of the statement of the exempled limiled partnership musl also be filed at the Companies 
Registry. 
31 The names and addresses of each general partner must be filed with the Registrar an 
establishment af Ihe partnership and the information must be updated if any changes occur. Further, 
pursuant to seclian 14(3) of the Financial and Corporate SefVica Providers Act 2000 (the "FCSPA"), a 
company licensed under the FCSPA should keep a record in respect of each ciient, including the name 
and address of all partners regislered under the ELPA. 
BERMUDA (EXEMPTED LIMITED PARTNERSHIP) 
32 Certificale of Particulars of Limited Partnership, Certificate of Particulars of Exempted Partnership 
together with fully executed partnership articles, must be filed with Ihe Registrar of Companies. (n.b. 
when articles of partnership are amended the revised articles are nol required to ba registered.) 
33 However, sectiol117 of the Exempted Partnerships Act 1992 (as amended 1999) (Ihe "EPA") 
- an exempted partnership shall maintain a residant representative in Bermuda, Ihis person is 
frequenlly provided by the local sefVice providers but also a Bermuda exempted company that has 
appropriate objects can ael as Resident Representalive. 
34 Section 10(10) of the EPA. 
35 Section 12(1) of Ihe EPA - the partnership musl send to the Regislrar a declaration slating the 
general nature of the business transacted by Ihe exempted partnership each year. 
36 Section 16 of Ihe EPA - If in respect of a particular inlerval all the partners including limiled 
partners agree in wriling Ihal no financial siatemen!s or auditors report needs to be prepared, there is 
no abligalion to cause a financial slatement or audilor's report to be prepared far Ihat inlerval. 
37 During tha course of application for eonsenl for an Exampled Partnership details of Ihe beneficial 
ownership of the General Partners must be disclosed to the Bermuda Monelary Aulhority - this 
Information is nat available 10 the public. The Certificate of Particulars of Exempled Partnership must 
include the name and address of the General Partner - seclion 5 af Ihe EPA. In Ihe case of a Limited 
Partnership the regisler of limited partners must be mainlained at the Registered Office of the 
Partnership and is availabla to be inspected by Ihe public - section 7 and 8 of the Limited Partnership 
Act 1883. 
BRITISH VIRGIN ISLANDS (INTERNATIONAL LIMITED PARTNERSHIP) 
38 A memorandum which includes Ihe names of all general partners must be submitted to the 
Registrar for registration. (The articles only have to be submitted 10 the registered agent of Ihe limited 
partnership.) 
39 However, must maintain a registered agent in Ihe Blilish Virgin Islands. 
40 Section 82 The Partnership Act 1996. 
41 Not required unless it is a public fund registered under the Mutual Funds Act 1996, in which case 
annual audited financial statements must be kept available for examination by Ihe Registrar of Mulual 
Funds and all inveslors of the public fund at the fund's place of business or registered office in the 
British Virgin Islands. Managers and administrators of mulual funds are alsa required to appoint an 
audilar. 
42 See footnote 40 above. 
43 A memorandum which includes Ihe names of all general partners is required to be filed at the 
Registry an establishment. An amendmenl !a this memorandum is necessary to effect the admission 01 
additional general pariners. Additional limited partners are admilled by making an amendmenl to Ihe 
articles which need nat be filed at the Regislry. The Anti-Maney LaundeJing Cade of Practice requires 
sefVice providers 10 maintain records of identity in respect of new clients except in circumstances 
where Ihe client has been introduced by a similarly regulated entity from anolher jurisdiction. These 
recards need not be in the BVI as long as they are accessible and Ihe sefViee provider is satisfied Ihal 
Ihey are being mentioned. 
CAYMAN ISLANDS (EXEMPTED LIMITED PARTNERSHIP) 
44 Seclion 9(1) The Exempled Limited Partnership Law (2001 Revision) (Ihe "ELPL") - An 
exempted limited partnership must be regislered with the Registrar of Exempted Limi!ed Partnerships. 
It comes into existence an completion of Ihe partnership documenl but does not obtain the benefit of 
limited liability until registered. 
45 AI least one general pariner musl be an individual residant in the Cayman Islands or a company 
registered under tha Companies Law or registered under Part IX of Ihe Campanies Law or a 
partnership registered under the ELPL. 
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46 Section 6(4) of ELPL. 
47 Section 19 of the ELPL - an exempted partnership must file with the registrar each year a return 
certifying that the exempted partnership has complied with section 10(1) (notification 01 any changes) 
and there has been no breach 01 the declaration under section 9(1 (I) (no\ undertake business with the 
public in the Island). 
48 Partner information which must be filed is set aut in same detail in section 9(1 )(d) of the ELPL. 
Changes in general partners must also be filed under section 10. A Register 01 Limited Partners is 
maintained at the registered office and is available lor public inspection. 
HONG KONG 
49 Section 4 of the Limited Partnerships Ordinance - limited partnerships must be registered with the 
Campanies Registry. 
50 There are no statutory requirements for a registered affice in Hong Kong; however, a limited 
partnership must carry on business in Hong Kong to take advantage of the Limited Partnerships 
Ordinance. 
51 A limited partnership is not required to file its financial accounts with a central registry. However, a 
limited partnership must provide supporting information for its profits tax return which is filed with the 
Inland Revenue Department The Inland Revenue Department has broad authority to require 
information to be provided to it by a taxpayer. 
52 On the establishment of a partnership a statement which includes Ihe names 01 all the partners, 
including limited partners must be filed with the Registry. Any change to the information in the 
statement must be filed. 
ISLE OF MAN 
53 Section 48(1) 01 the Partnership Act 1909. The Corporate Service Providers Act 2000 requires that 
any administration services \0 a limited partnership is a licensable activity. Under the terms of the 
corporate service provider regulatory cades and the AML Code, a corporate service provider is 
required to apply full KYC due diligence an the limited partnership including its constituent parties and 
partnership assets. 
54 However, there is a requirement lor a lacal partner if a tax exemption is required. 
55 Sub·sectian 46A(1), The Partnership Act 1909 - Limited partnership must have a place of business 
an the Isle 01 Man. 
56 Sub-sections 51(1A) and 51(1B) The Partnership Act 1909 - An annual statement containing the 
firm name; the general nature of the business; the principal place 01 business; the name and address 
of each partner; the name and address of each person who has ceased to be a partner since the last 
annual statement or, if there has been no previous statement, since the registration 01 the partnership; 
and a description of every limited partner or former limited partner. 
57 Filing of accounts not normally required unless the partnership is licensed, eg under the 
Investment Business Act 1991. 
56 The lull name of all partners and their home addresses must be filed with the Registry an 
establishment and when changes occur. In addition see nata 52 above for KYC due diligence by the 
corporate service provider. 
JERSEY 
59 Article 4 althe Limited Partnerships (Jersey) Law 1994 - in order ta form a limited partnership under 
the Limited Partnerships (Jersey) Law 1994, a declaration must be filed with the Registrar of Limited 
Partnerships in Jersey stating the name of the partnership, its registered office in Jersey and details of 
the general partner, the duration of the partnership and such other particulars as may be prescribed. 
60 Article 6(1) Limited Partnerships (Jersey) Law 1994 - the partnership must have a registered 
affice in Jersey, notice 01 which (and any change in which) must be given to the Registrar of Limited 
Partnerships. 
61 There is no requirement for a limited partnership to file its financial accounts with any central 
registry nor any tax authority. 
62 Article 9(2) Limited Partnerships (Jersey) Law 1994 - Unless the partnership agreement provides 
otherwise, it is nat necessary for a limited partnership 10 appoint an auditor or have its accounts 
audited. 
63 Articles 4 and 5 Limited Partnerships (Jersey) Law 1994 - general partners' names must be filed on 
establishment and when changes accur. Article 6(4) - a register of limited partners must be held at the 
registered office but need nat be filed. 
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As at 24 June 2002 
Stikclllan Elliott 2002 
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APPENDIXF 
COUNTRIES REVIEWED IN }<'ATF REPORT ON NON-
COOPERATIVE COUNTRIES AND TERRITORIES (Febmary 2000) 
The countries reviewed were: 
* Antigua & Barbuda 
• Bahamas 
• Belize 
• Bermuda 
• British Virgin Islands 
• Cayman Islands 
• Cook Islands 
• Cyprus 
• Dominica 
• Gibraltar 
• Guernsey 
• The Isle of Man 
• Jersey 
• Israel 
• Lebanon 
• Liechtenstein 
• Malta 
• Marshall Islands 
• Mauritius 
• Monaco 
• Nau1'll 
• Niue 
• Panama 
• Philippines 
• Russia 
• Samoa 
• St. Kitts and Nevis 
• St. Lucia 
• St. Vincent and the Grenadines 
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The countries and territories identified as non-cooperative in the tight against money 
laundering were: 
• Bahamas 
• Cayman Islands 
• Cook Islands 
• Dominica 
• Israel 
• Lebanon 
• Liechtenstein 
• Marshall Islands 
• Nauru 
• Niue 
• Panama 
• Philippines 
• Russia 
• St. Kitts and Nevis 
• St. Vincent and the Grenadines 
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APPENDIXG 
FATF 40 + 8 RECOMMENDATIONS 
GENERAL n?AMEWORK OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS 
Recommendation ] 
Each country should take immediate steps to ratify and to implement fully, the 1988 
United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Dmgs and Psychotropic 
Substances (the Vielma Convention) 
Recommendation 2 
Financial institution secrecy laws should be conceived so as not to inhibit implementation 
of these recommendations. 
Recommendation 3 
An effective money I !lulldering ell forcement program should include ulcreased 
multilateral co-operation and mutual legal assistance in money laundering investigations 
and prosecutions and extradition in money laundering cases, where possible. 
ROLE OF NATlONAL LEGAL SYSTEMS IN COMBATING MONEY LAUNDERING 
Scope of the Criminal Offence of Money Laundering 
Recommendation 4 
Each country should take such measures as may be necessary, including legislative ones, 
to enable it to criminalise moncy laundering as set forth in the Vienna COllvention. Each 
country should extend the offence of drtlg llloney laundering to one based on serious 
offences. Each country would detennine which serious crimes would be designated as 
money laundering predicate offences. 
Recommendation 5 
As provided in the Vienna Convention, the offence of money lanndering should apply at 
least to knowing money laundering activity, including the concept that knowledge lllay 
be inferred Ii'om objective factual circumstances. 
Recommendation 6 
Where possible, corporations themselves - not only their employees - should he subject to 
criminal liability . 
Provisional MeaslIres and Confiscation 
Recommendation 7 
Countries should adopt measures sunilar to those set fOl1h in the Vienna Convention, as 
may be necessary, including legislative ones, to enable their competent authorities to 
confiscate property laundered, proceeds limn, instrumentalities used in 01' intended for 
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use in the commission of any money laundering offence, or propClty of corresponding 
value, without prejudicing the rights of bona fide third parties. 
Such measures should include the authority to: I) identify, trace and evaluate property 
whicb is subject to confiscation; 2) carry out provisional measures, such as freezing and 
seizing, to prevent any dealing, transfer 01' disposal of such property; and 3) take any 
appropriate investigative measures. 
In addition to confiscation and criminal sanctions, countries also should consider 
monetary and civil penalties, and/or proceedings including civil proceedings, to void 
contracts entered into by parties, where parties knew or should have known that as a 
result of the contract, the State would be prejudiced in its ability to recover financial 
claims, e.g. through confiscation or collection of nnes and penalties. 
ROLE OF THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM IN COMBATING MONEY LAUNDERING 
Recommendation 8 
Recommendations 10 to 29 should apply not only to banks, but also to nOll-bunk financial 
institutions. Evcn for those non-bank financial institutions which arc not subject to a 
formal pmdential supervisory regime in all countries, for example bureaux de change, 
governments should ensure that these institutions are subject to the same anti-money 
laundering laws or regulations as all other nnancial institutions and that these laws or 
regulations are implemented effectively. 
Recommendation 9 
The appropriate national authorities should consider applying Recommendations 10 to 21 
and 23 to the conduct of financial activities as a commercial undertaking by businesses or 
professions which are not flllancial institutions, where such conduct is allowed or not 
prohibited. Financial activities include, but are not limited to, those listed ill the attached 
annex. It is left to each country to decide whether special situations should be defined 
where the application of anti-money laundering measures is not necessmy, for example, 
when a financial activity is carried out on an occasional or limited basis. 
Customer Identification and Record-keeping Rilles 
Recommendation 10 
Financial institutions should not keep anonymous accounts or accounts in obviously 
fictitiolls names: they should be required (by law, by regulations, by agreements between 
supervisory authorities and financial institutions or by self-regulatory agreements among 
nnallcial institutions) to identify, on the basis of an official or other reliable identifying 
document, and record the identity of their clients, either occasional or usual, when 
establishing business relations or conducting transactions (in particular opening of 
accounts or passbooks, entering into fiduciary transactions, renting of safe deposit boxes, 
performing large cash transactions). 
In order to fulfil identification requirements concerning legal entities, financial 
institutions should, when necessary, take measures: 
• to verify the legal existence and stl1.lcture of the customer by obtaining eitber fhlln a 
public register or from the customer or botb, proof of incorporation, including 
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information concerning the customer's name, legal form, address, directors and 
provisions regulating the power to bind the entity. 
• to veri/)' that any person purporting to act on behalf of the customer is so authorised 
and identify that person. 
Recommendation 11 
Financial institutions should take reasonable measures to obtain information about the 
true identity of the persons on whose behalf an account is opened or a transaction 
conducted if there are any doubts as (0 whether these cHents or customers are acting on 
their own behalf, for example, in the case of domiciliary companies (i.e. institutions, 
corporations, foundations, trusts, ctc. that do not conduct any commercial or 
manufacturing business or any other form of conmlercial operation in the country where 
their registered office is located). 
Recollunendation 12 
Financial institutions should maintain, for at least five years, all necessary records on 
transactions, both domestic or international, to enable them to comply swiftly with 
information requests liOln the competent authorities. Such records must be sufficient to 
permit reconstl'llctioll of individual transactions (including the amounts and types of 
currency involved if any) so as to provide, if necessary, evidence fol' prosecution of 
criminal behavioUl'. 
Financial institutions should keep records 011 customer identification (e.g. copies or 
records of ofticial identitication documents like passports, identity cards, driving licenses 
or similar documents), account files and business correspondence for at least five years 
after the account is closed. 
These documerlts should be available to domestic competent authorities in the contcxt of 
relevant criminal prosecutions and investigations. 
Recommendation 13 
Countries should pay special attention to money laundering threats inherent in new or 
developing technologies that might favour anonymity, and take measures, if needed, to 
prevent their use in money laundering schemes. 
Increased Diligence of Financial Institutions 
Recommendation 14 
Financial institutions should pay special attention to all complex, unusual large 
transactions, and all unusual patterns of transactions, which have no apparent economic 
or visible lawful purpose. The background and purpose of such transactions should, as far 
as possible, be examined, the ll11dings established in writing, and be available to help 
supervisors, auditors and law enforcement agencies. 
RecOlmnendatiol1 15 
If financial institutions suspect that funds stem fi'om a criminal activity, they should be 
required to report promptly their suspicions to the competent authorities. 
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Recommendation 16 
Financial institutions, their directors, officers and employees should be protected by legal 
provisions ii'om criminal 01' civil liability fol' breach of any restriction on disclosure of 
information imposed by contract or by any legislative, regulatory 01' administrative 
provision, ifthey report their suspicions in good faith to the competent authorities, even if 
they did not know precisely what the underlying criminal activity was, and regardless of 
whether illegal activity actually occurred. 
Recommendation 17 
Financial institutions, their directors, officers and employees, should not, 01', where 
appropriate, should not be allowed to, wai'll their customers when inlbrmation relating to 
them is being reported to the competent authorities. 
Recommendation 18 
Financial institutions reporting their sllspicions should comply with instructions from the 
competent authorities. 
Recommendation 19 
Financial institutions should develop programs against money laundering. Tbese 
programs should include, as a minimum: 
• the development of intel'1lal policies, procedures and controls, inclnding the 
designation of compliance officers at management level, and adequate screening 
procedures to ensure high standards when hiring employees; 
• an ongoing employee training programme; 
• an audit function to test the system. 
Measures to Cope with the Problem of Countries with No or Insufficient Anti-Money 
Laundering Measures 
Recommendation 20 
Financial institutions should ensure that the principles mentioned above are also applied 
to branches and majority owned subsidiaries located abroad, especially in conntries 
which do not or insufficiently apply these Recommendations, to the extent that local 
applicable laws and regulations permit. When local applicable laws and regulations 
prohibit this implementation, competent authorities in the country of the mother 
institution should be informed by the financial institutions that they canllot apply these 
Recommendations. 
Recommendation 21 
Financial institutiolls should give special attention to business relations and transactions 
with persons, including companies and financial institutions, from countries which do 110! 
01' insufficiently apply these Recommendations. Whenever these transactions have no 
apparent economic or visible lawful purpose, their background and purpose should, as far 
as possible, be examined, the findings established in writing, and be available to help 
supervisol's, auditors and law enforcement agencies. 
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Other Measures to Avoid Money Laundering 
Recommendation 22 
Countries should consider implementing feasible measures to detect or monitor the 
physical cross-border transportation of cash and bearer negotiable instruments, subject to 
strict safeguards to ensure proper use of information and without impeding in any way 
the fl'eedom of capital movements, 
Recommendation 23 
Countries should consider the feasibility and utility of a system where banks and othel' 
financial institutions and intermediaries would report all domestic and international 
currency transactions above a fixed amount, to a national central agency with a 
computerised data base, available to competent authorities for use in money laundering 
cases, subject to strict safeguards to ensure propel' use of the information, 
Recommendatioll 24 
Countries should fmther encourage in general the development of model1l and secure 
techniques of money management, including increased use 0 f checks, payment cards, 
direct deposit of salary checks, and book entry recording of securities, as a means to 
encourage the replacement of cash transiers, 
Recommendation 25 
Countries should take llotice of the potential foJ' abuse of shell corporations by money 
launderers and should consider whetber additional measures are required to prevent 
unlawful use of such entities, 
Implementation and Role of ReglliatOlY and Of her Administrative Authorities 
Recommendation 26 
The competent authorities supervlslIlg banks or other linancial institutions or 
intermediaries, or other competent authorities, should ensure that the supervised 
institutions have adequate programs to guard against money laundering, These authorities 
should co-operate and lend expertise spontaneously or on request with other domestic 
judicial or law enforcement authorities in money laundering investigations and 
prosecutions, 
Recommendation 27 
Competent authorities should be designated to ensure an effective implementation of all 
these Recommendations, through administrative snpervision and regulation, in other 
professions dealing with cash as defined by each country, 
Recommendation 28 
The cOll1petent authorities should establish guidelines which will assist financial 
institutions in detecting suspicious patterns of behaviour by their cllstomers, It is 
understood that such guidelines must develop ovcr time, and will never be exhaustive, It 
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is fluthel' understood that slIch guidelines will primarily serve as an educational tool for 
financial institutions' persoillei. 
Recommendation 29 
The competent authorities regulating or supervising financial institutions should take the 
necessary legal or regulatory meaSllres to guard against control or acquisition of a 
significant pmticipation in financial institutions by criminals or their confederates. 
STRENGTHENING OF INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERA710N 
Administrative Co-operation 
Exchange of general injormation 
Recommendation 30 
National administrations should consider recording, at least in the aggregate, international 
flows 0 f cash in whatever currency, so that estimates can be made of cash flows and 
reflows from various sources abroad, when this is combined with central bank 
information. Such information should be made availahle to the International Monetary 
Fund and the Bank for International Settlements to facilitate international studies. 
Recommendation 31 
Intemational competent authorities, perhaps Interpol and the World Customs 
Organisation, should be given responsibility for gathering and disseminating information 
to competent authorities about the latest developments in money laundering and money 
laundering techniques. Central banks and hank regulators could do the same on their 
network. National authorities ill various spheres, in consultation with trade associations, 
could then disseminate this to flnancial institutions in individual countries. 
Exchange of injormation relating to suspicious transactions 
RecolUmendation 32 
Each country should make effOlts to improve a spontaneolls or "upon request" 
international information exchange relating to suspicious transactions, persons and 
corporations involved in those transactions between competent authorities. Strict 
safeguards should be established to ensure that this exchange of information is consistent 
with national and international provisions on privacy and data protection. 
Other F017I1S oj Co-operation 
Basis and means for co-operation in confiscation, lIIutual assistance and extradition 
Recommendation 33 
Countries should try to ensure, on a bilateral or multilateral basis, that different 
knowledge standards in national definitions - i.e. different standards concerning the 
intentional element of the inJ:l'actioll - do not affuct the ability or willingness of countries 
to provide each other with mutual legal assistance. 
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Recommendation 34 
International co-operation should be supported by a network of bilateral and multilateral 
agreements and arrangements based on generally shared legal concepts with the aim of 
providing practical measures to affect the widest possible range of mutual assistauce. 
Recommendation 35 
Countries should be encouraged to ratify and implement relevant international 
conventions on money laundering such as the 1990 COllncil of Europe Convention on 
Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime. 
Focus of improved mutnal assistance on money laundering issues 
Recommendation 36 
Co-operative investigations among countries' appropriate competent authorities should be 
encouraged. One valid and effective investigative technique in this respect is controlled 
delivery related to assets known or suspected to be the proceeds of crime. Countries are 
encouraged to SUppOit this technique, where possible. 
Recommendation 37 
There should be procedures for mutual assistance in criminal matters regarding the use of 
compulsory measures including the production of records by financial institutions and 
other persons, the search of persons and premises, seizure and obtaining of evidence for 
use in money laundering investigations and prosecutions and in related actions in i(lreign 
jurisdictions. 
Recommendation 38 
111ere should be authority to take expeditious action in response to requests by foreign 
countries to identify, freeze, seize and confiscate proceeds or other property of 
corresponding value to sllch proceeds, based on money laundering or the crimes 
underlying the laundering activity. There should also be arrangements for coordinating 
seizure and conJ1scation proceedings which may include the sharing of confiscated assets. 
Recommendation 39 
To avoid conflicts of jurisdiction, consideration should be given to devising and applying 
mechanisms for determining the best venue for prosecution of defendants in the interests 
of justice in cases that are subject to prosecution in more than one country. Similarly, 
there should he arrangements for coordinating seizure and confiscation proceedings 
which may include the sharing of contlscated assets. 
Recommendation 40 
COllntries should have procedures in place to extradite, where possible, individuals 
charged with a money laundering offence or related offences. With respect to its national 
legal system, each countly should recognise money laundering as an extraditable offence. 
Subject to their legal frameworks, countries may consider simplifying extradition by 
allowing direct transmission of extradition requests between appropriate ministries, 
extraditing persons based only on warrants of arrests or judgements, extraditing their 
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 nationals, and/ol' introducing a simplified extradition of consenting persons who waive 
lonnal extradition proceedings. 
AlIllex to Recommendation 9: List of Financial Activities undertaken by business oj' 
professions which are not financial institutions 
• Acceptance of deposits and other repayable funds from the public. 
o Lending.843 
• Fhlancialleasing. 
• Money transmission services. 
• Issuing and managing means of payment (e.g. credit and debit cards, cheques, 
traveller's cheques and bankers' drafts ... ) 
• Financial guarantees and commitments. 
• Trading for account of customers (spot, forward, swaps, futures, options ... ) in: 
o money market instruments (cheques, bills, CDs, etc.) ; 
• foreign excbange; 
• exchange, interest rate and index instruments; 
• transferable secllI'ities; 
• commodity fhtures tradhlg. 
• Pmticipation hI securities issues and the provision of financial services related to snch 
issues. 
o Individual and collective pOlifolio management. 
o Safekeeping and administration of cash or liquid secmities on behalf of clients. 
o Life insurance and other investment related insurance. 
o Money changing. 
SPECIAL RECOMMENDAI1ONS ON TERR01UST FINANCING 
l. Ratification and implementation of UN instruments 
Each coulltry should take immediate steps to ratify and to implement fully the 1999 
United Nations Intemational Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of 
Terrorism. Countries should also immediately implement the United Nations 
resolutions relating to the prevention and suppression of the financing of telTorist acts, 
particularly United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373. 
II. Criminalising the financing ofterrorism and associated moncy laundering 
Each coulltry should criminalise the financing of terrorism, terrorist acts and terrorist 
organisations. Countries should ensure that such offences are designated as money 
laundering predicate offences. 
III. Freezing and confiscating tenorist assets 
84J Including inter alia 
• consumer credit 
• 1ll0ltgage credit 
• factoringJ with 01' without recourse 
• finance of commercial transactions (including forfeiting) 
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Each country should implement measures to fi'eeze without delay funds or other 
assets of terrorists, those who fmance terrorism and terrorist organisations in 
accordance with the United Nations resolutions relating to the prevention and 
suppression of the financing of terrorist acts. 
Each cOllntry should also adopt and implement measures, including legislative ones, 
which would enable the competent authorities to seize and confiscate property that is 
the proceeds of, or used in, or intended or allocated for use in, the financing of 
terrorism, terrorist acts or ten'Ol'ist organisations. 
IV. Reportillg suspicious transactions related to terrorism 
If financial institutions, or other businesses or entities subject to anti-money 
laundering obligations, suspect or have reasonable grounds to suspect that funds are 
linked or related to, or are to he used for terrorism, terrorist acts or by terrorist 
organisations, they should be required to report promptly their suspicions to the 
competent authorities. 
V. International Co-operation 
Each country should afrOI'd another country, on the basis of a treaty, arrangement or 
other mechanism for mutual legal assistance or information exchange, the greatest 
possible measure of assistance in connection with criminal, civil enforcement, and 
administrative investigations, inquiries and proceedings relating to the financing of 
terrorism, terrorist acts and terrorist organisations. 
Countries should also take all possible measures to cnsUl'e that they do not provide 
safe havens for individuals charged with the financing of terrorism, tCl1'0rist acts 01' 
terrorist organisations, and should have procedlll'es in place to extradite, where 
possible, sllch individuals. 
VI. Altemative remittance 
Each coulltry should take measures to ensure that persons or legal entities, including 
agents, that provide a service for the trallsmission of money or value, including 
transmission through an informal money or value transfer system 01' network, should 
be licensed 01' registered and subject to a1\ the FATF Recommendations that apply to 
banks and non-bank financial institutions. Each country should ensure that persons or 
legal cntities that carry out this service illegally are subject to administrative, civil or 
criminal sanctions. 
VII. Wire transfers 
Countries should take measures to require financial institutions, including money 
remitters, to include accurate and meaningl:hl originator information (name, address 
and accollnt number) on funds transfers and related messages that are sent, and the 
information should remain with the transfer or related message through the payment 
chain. 
COllntries should take measures to ensure that financial institutions, including money 
remitters, conduct enhanced scrutiny of and monitor for suspicious activity funds 
transfers which do not co uta in complete originator information (name, address and 
account number). 
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VIII. Non-prallt organisations 
Countries should review the adequacy of laws and regulations that relate to entities 
that can be abused for the financing of terrorism. Non-prollt organisations are 
particularly vulnerable, and countries should ensure that they cannot be misused: 
(i) by terrorist organisations posing as legitimate entities; 
(ii) to exploit legitimate entities as conduits lor ten'orist llnancillg, including for the 
purpose of escaping asset fi'eezing measures; and 
(iii)to conceal or obscure the clandestine diversion of funds intended for legitimate 
purposes to ten'orist organisations. 
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APPENDIXH 
OEeD 19 Recommendations 
In total 19 recommendations are put forward to deal with hmmful tax pmctices. They are 
listed under the following categories: 
Recommendations concerning domestic legislation and practices. 
1. Controlled Foreign Corpomtions (CFCs) - Countries that do not have CFC rules 
consider adopting them. 
2. Foreign investment fimd 01' equivalent rules - Countries that do not have such I1lles 
adopt them to entities covered by practices considered to be hannfbl tax competition. 
3. Restrictions on participation exemptions and other systems of exempting foreign 
income in the context of harmllli tax competition - Countries that apply the 
exemption method to eliminate double taxation of foreign source income consider 
adopting rules that would ensure that foreign income benefiting from hmmlbl tax 
competition practices does not qualify for the application of the exemption method. 
4. Foreign information reporting rules - Countries that do not have rules conceming 
reporting of international transactions and foreign operations of resident taxpayers 
consider ~dopting such rules and that countries exchange information obtained under 
these 1'lIles. 
5. Advanced rulings - Countries offering advanced rulings concerning the particular 
position of a taxpayer make public the conditions for offering or denying such rulings. 
6. Transfer-pricing rules - Countries follow the guidelines set out in the DECD 1995 
guidelines on transfer pricing and not promote harmful tax competition. 
7. Access to banking information for tax purposes - Countries review their laws, 
regulations and practices which govern the access to banking information with the 
view to removing impediments to the access to such information by tax authorities. 
II. Recommendations concel'l1ing tax treaties. 
8. Exchanges of information - Countries should undertake programs to intensify 
exchange of information concerning transactions ill tax havens and preferential tax 
regimes constituting harmful tax competition. 
9. Entitlement to treaty benefits - Countries consider including in their tax convention 
provisions aimed at restricting the entitlement to treaty benefits for entities and 
income covered by measures constituting harmful tax practices. 
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10. Clarification of the status of domestic anti-abuse ntles and doctrines in tax treaties -
That the Commentary Oll the Model Tax Convention be clarified to remove any 
ambiguity regarding the compatibility of domestic anti-abuse measures with the 
Model Tax Convention. 
11. List of specific exclusion provisions found in treaties - The Committee should prepare 
a list of provisions lIsed by countries to exclude from the benefits of tax conventions 
certain specific entities and types of income. 
12. Tax treaties with tax bavens - Countries consider terminating their tax conventions 
witb tax havens and consider not entering into tax treaties with sllch countries in the 
future. 
1 3. Coordinated enforcement regimes (Joint audits, etc.) - Countries consider undeltaking 
joint enforcement programs slIch as simultaneous audits and examinations, in relation 
(0 income O\' (axpayers benefiting t!'om practices constituting harmful tax competition. 
14. Assistance in recovery of tax claims - Countries should review the CUlTent rules 
applying (0 tbe enforcement of tax claims of other countries for the addition to tax 
conventions. 
Recommendations to intensifY in/emotional cooperation in response to harmflll lax 
competitio/l. 
15. Guidelines and a fOl'Um on barmfhl tax practices - Member countries endorse the 
guidelines set out in the following list dealing with harmful preferential tax regimes. 
16. Produce a list of tax havens - The FOl'Ummandated to establish within one year of the 
first meeting ofthe flol'llm, a list of tax havens on the basis of factors identified in this 
report. 
17. Links with tax havens - Countries that have links to tax havens ensure that these links 
do not contribute to harmful tax competition and in pmticulal', that countries with 
dependencies that are tax havens ensure that the links with these territories are not 
used to promote 01' increase harmful tax competition. 
18. Develop and promote Principles of Good Tax Administration - The Committee be 
responsible for developing and promoting a set of principles to guide tax 
administrations in the enforcement of guidelines in tbis report. 
19. Associating nOll-member countries with the Recommendations - The FOl1lm engage 
in dialogue with nOli-member nations to promote these recommendations. 
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APPENDIX I 
FATF'S POLICY CONCERNING IMPLEMENTATION AND 
DE-LISTING IN RELATION TO NCCTs 
The FATF has articulated the steps that need to be taken by Non-Cooperative 
Countries or Territories (NCCTs) in order to be removed from the NCCT list. These steps 
have focused on what precisely should be required by way of implementation of 
legislative and regulatory reforms made by NCCTs to respond to the deficiencies 
identified by the FATF in the NCCT reports. This policy concerning implementation and 
de-listing enables the FATF to achieve equal and objective treatment among NCCT 
jurisdictions. 
In order to be removed from the NCCT list; 
1. An NCCT must enact laws and promulgate regulations that comply with international 
standards to address the deficiencies identified by the NCCT repOlt that formed the 
basis of the FA TF's decision to place the jurisdiction on the NCCT list ill the first 
instance. 
2. The NCCTs that have made substantial reform in their legislation should be requested 
to snbmit to the FATF through the applicable regional review group, an 
implementation plan with targets, milestones, and time £i'ames that will ensure 
effective implementation of the legislative and regulatory reforms. The NCCT should 
be asked palticularly to address the following important determinants in the FATF's 
judgement as to whether it can be de-listed: filing of suspicions activity reports; 
analysis and follow-up of reports; the conduct of money laundering investigations; 
examinations of financial institutions (patticularly with respect to cnstomer 
identification); inte111ational exchange of information; and the provision of budgetary 
and human resources. 
3. The appropriate regional review groups should examine the implementation plans 
submitted and prepare a response for submission to the NCCT at an appropriate time. 
The Chairs ofthe four review groups (Americas; AsiafPacific; Europe; Afi'ica and the 
Middle East) should report regularly on the progress of their work. A meeting of 
those Chairs, ifnecessary, to keep consistency among their responses to the NCCTs. 
4. The FATF, on the initiative of the applicable review group chair or any member of 
the review group, should make an Oil-site visit to the NCCT at an appropriate time to 
confirm effective implementation ofthe reforms. 
5. TIle review group chair shall report progress at subsequent meetlllgs of the FATF. 
When the review groups are satisfied that the NCCT has taken ~llfficient steps to 
ensure (:ontinned effective implement'!tion of the reforms, they shall recommend to 
the Plenary the removal of the jurisdiction from the NceT list. Based on an overall 
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assessment encompassing the determinants in paragraph 2, the FATF will rely on its 
collective judgement in taking the decision. 
6. AllY decision to remove countries from the list should be accompanied by a letter 
fromlhe FATF President: 
(a) clarifying that de-listing does not indicate a perfect anti-money laundering system; 
(b) setting out any outstanding concel'l1s regarding tbe jurisdiction in question; 
(c) proposing a monitoring mechanism to be carried out by FATF in consultation with 
the relevant FATF-style regional body, which would include the submission of 
regular implementation reports to the relevant review lo'1'OUP and a follow-up visit to 
assess progress in implementing reforms and to ensure that stated goals have, in lact, 
been fhllyachieved. 
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APPENDIXJ 
GLOBAL ANTI-MONEY-LAUNnJ;~RING GUIDELINES FOR 
PRIVATE BANKING 
WOLFSBERG844 AML PRINCIPLES 
(1ST REVISION, MAY 2002) 
The following major International Private Banks 
ABN AMRO Bank N.V. 
Bance Santander Central Hispano 
Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi Ltd 
Barclays Bank 
Citigroup 
Credit Suisse Group 
Deutsche Bank AG 
Goldman Sachs 
ESBC 
lP. Morgan Private Bank 
Societe Generale 
OBS AG 
have agreed to the following principles as impottant global guidance for sound 
business conduct in international private banking. 
Acknowledgement 
The banks collaborated with a team fmm Transparency International845 who invited 
two intemationul experts to participate, Stanley Monis 846 and Prof. Mark Pieth847 
Transparency International and the experts regard the principles as an impOliant step 
in the fight against money laundering, COl'lUptiOll and other related serious crimes. 
30.10.2000 
www.wolfsberg-principles.com 
'44 Wolfsberg is the location in Switzerland where an impOltant working sessioll to formulate the 
~!lidclilles was held. 
45 Transparency International (TI) is a Berliu based non-governmental organization, dedicated to 
increasing govcnUllcut accountability and curbing both illtematiollal and llational eomlption. TI is 
active in more than 70 cOllntries. TI was represented by its founder and Chainllan of the Board, Peter 
Eigc" and the Chairman of their US chapter, Fritz Heinlallll. 
&46 Stanley E. Morris is an intematiollal Consultant on Anti Money Laundering issues. He was head of 
FinCEN and a member of the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF). 
847 Prof. Mark Pietll is a law professor ill Basel, Switzerland. He is Chairman of the OECD Working 
Group on Bribery and Corruption and a former member of the Financial Action Task Foree Oil Money 
Laundering (FATF). 
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Preamble 
The following guidelines are understood to be appropriate for private banking 
relationships. Guidelines for other market segments may differ. It is recognized that 
the establishment of policies and procedures to adhere to these guidelines is the 
responsibility of management. 
I Client acceptance: general guidelines 
1.1 General 
Bank policy will be to prevent the use of its worldwide operations for criminal 
purposes. The bank will endeavour to accept only those clients whose source of 
wealth and funds can be reasonably established to be legitimate. The primary 
responsibility for this lies with the private banker who sponsors the client for 
acceptance. Mere fulfilment of internal review procedures does not relieve the private 
banker of this basic responsibility. 
1.2 Identification 
The bank will take reasonable measnres to establish the identity of its clients and 
beneficial owners and will only accept clients when this process has been completed. 
1.2.1 Client 
• Natlll'al persons: identity will be established to the bank's satisfaction by reference 
to official identity papers 01' such other evidence as may be appropriate under the 
circumstances. 
o Corporations, partnerships, foundations: the bank will receive documentary 
evidence of the due organization and existence. 
e Trusts: the bank will receive appropriate evidence of formation and existence 
along with identity of the tlUstees. 
• Identification documents must be cuncnt at the time of opening. 
1.2.2 Beneficial owner 
Beneficial ownership must be established for all accounts. Due diligence must he 
done on all principal beneficial owners identified in accordance with the following 
principles: 
• Natural persons: when the account is in the name of an individual, the private 
banker must establish whether the client is acting on his/her own behalf. If doubt 
exists, the bank will establish the capacity in which and on whose behalf the 
accountholder is acting. 
• Legal entities: where the client is a company, such as a private investment 
company, the private banker will understand the structure of the company 
snfficiently to determine the provider of funds, principal owner(s) of the shares 
and those who have control over the funds, e.g. the directors and those with the 
power to give direction to the directors of the company. With regard to other 
shareholders the private banker will make a reasonahle judgement as to the need 
for further due diligence. This principle applies regardless of whether the share 
capital is in registered or bearer fonll. 
e Trusts: where the client is a trustee, the private banker will understand the 
structure of the trust sutliciently to determine tbe provider of funds (e.g. settlor) 
those who have control over the thnds (e.g. trustees) and any persons or entities 
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who have the power to remove the t1ustees. The private banker will make a 
reasonable judgement as to the need for fmthel' due diligence. 
" Unincorporated associations: the above principles apply to UnlllcollJOrated 
associations. 
" The hank will not permit the use of its internal non-client accounts (sometimes 
refened to as "concentration" accounts) to prevent association of the identity of a 
client with the movement of funds on the client's behalf, i.e., the bank will not 
pertuit the use of such internal accounts in a mamler that would prevent the bank 
from appropriately monitoring the client's account activity. 
1.2.3 Accounts held in the name of money managers and similar intermediaries 
The private hanker will perform due diligence on the intermediary and establish that 
the intermediary has a due diligence process for its clients, or a regulatOlY obligation 
to conduct such due diligence, that is satisfactory to the bank. 
1.2.4 Powers of attorney/Authorized signers 
Where the holder of a power of attorney or another authorized signer is appointed hy a 
client, it is generally sufficient to do due diligence on the client. 
1.2.5 Practices for walk-in clients and electronic banking relationships 
A bank will determine whether walk-in clients or relationships initiated through 
electl'onic channels require a higher degree of due diligence plioI' to acconnt opening. 
The bank will specifically address measures to satisfactorily establish the identity of 
non-face- to-fhce cllstomers. 
1.3 Due diligence 
It is essential to collect and record information covering the following categories: 
• Purpose and reasons for opening the account 
o Anticipated account activity 
o Source of wealth (description ofthe economic activity which has generated the net 
worth) 
o Estimated net wOlth 
• Source of funds (description of the origin and the means of transier for monies 
that are accepted for the account opening) 
• References or other sources to corroborate reputation information where available. 
• Unless other measures reasonably suffice to do the due diligence on a client (e.g. 
favourable and reliable references), a client will be met prior to account opening. 
1.4 Numbered or alternate name accounts 
Numbered 01' alternate name accounts will only be accepted if the bank has 
established the identity of the client and the beneficial owner. These accounts lllllst be 
open to a level of sCl1ltiny by the hank's appropriate control layers equal to the level 
of scrutiny applicable to other client accounts. 
1.5 Offshore jurisdictions 
Risks associated with entities organized in offshore jurisdictions are covered by due 
diligence procedures laid out in these guidelines. 
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1.6 Oversight responsibility 
There will be a requirement that all new clients and new accounts be approved by at 
least one person other than the private banker. 
2 Client acceptance: situations requiring additional diligence / attention 
2.1 General 
In its internal policies, the bank must define categories of persons whose 
circumstances warrant additional diligence. This will typically be the case where the 
circumstances are likely to pose a higher than average risk to a bank. 
2.2 Indicators 
The circumstances of the following categories of persons afe indicators for dcfining 
thcm as requiring additional diligence: 
e Persons residing in and/or having funds sourced from countries identified by 
credible sources as having inadequate anti-money laundering standards or 
representing high risk for crime and conuption. 
• Persons engaged in types of business activities or sectors known to hc susceptible 
to money laundering. 
• "Politically Exposed Persons" (frequently abbreviated as "PEPs"), referring to 
individuals holding or having held positions of public trust, such as government 
officials, senior executives of government corporations, politicians, impOliant 
political party officials, etc., as well as their fiullilies and close associates. 
2.3 Senior management approval 
The banks' internal policies should indicate whether; for anyone or more among 
these categories, senior management must approve entering into new relationships. 
Relationships with Politically Exposed Persons may only be entered into with the 
approval ii·om senior management. 
3 Updating client files 
3.1 The private banker is responsible for updating the client file on a detined basis 
and/or when there are major changes. The private banker's supervisor or an 
independent control person will review relevant portions of client files on a regular 
basis to ensure consistency and completeness. The fi·equency of the reviews depends 
on the size, complexity and risk posed of the relationship. 
3.2 With respect to clients classitied under any category of persons mentioned in 2, 
the banks internal policies will indicate whether senior management must be involved 
in these reviews. 
3.3 Similarly, with respect to clients classified as set 10rth in 3.2, the bank's 
internal policies will indicate what management information must be provided to 
management and/or other control layers. The policies should also address the 
frequency of these information flows. 
3.4 The reviews of PEPs must require senior management's involvement. 
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4 Practices when identifying unusual 01' suspicious activities 
4.1 Definition of unusual 01' suspicious activities 
The bank will have a written policy on the identification of and follow-up on unusual 
01' suspicious activities. This policy will include a definition of what is considered to 
be suspicious or unusual and give examples thereof. 
Unusual or suspicious activities may include: 
• Account transactions 01' other activities which are not consistent with the due 
diligence file 
• Cash transactions over a certain amollnt 
• Pass-through / in-and-out-transactiolls. 
4.2 Identification of unusual or suspicious activities 
• Unusual or suspicious activities can be identified through: 
• Monitoring of transactions 
• Client contacts (meetings, discussions, in-country visits etc.) 
* Third party information (e.g. newspapers, Reuters, internet) 
• Private banker's / internal knowledge of the client's enviro!1ll1ent (e.g. political 
situation in his/her countly). 
4.3 Follow-up on unusual or suspicious activities 
The private banker, management andlor the control function will carry out an analysis 
of the background of any unusual or suspicious activity. If there is no plausible 
explanation a decision will be made involving the control ftmction: 
• To continue the business relationship with increased monitoring 
• To cancel the business relationship 
• To repOit the business relationship to the authorities. 
The repOli to the authOlities is made by tbe control function and SernOl' management 
may need to be notified (e.g. Senior Compliance Officer, CEO, Chief Auditor, 
General Counsel). As required by local laws and regulations the assets may be 
blocked and transactions may be subject to approval hy the control function. 
5 Monitoring 
5.1 Monitoring Program 
A suftlcient monitoring program must be in place. The primary responsibility for 
monitoring account activities lies with the private banker. Tile private banker will be 
familiar with significant transactions and increased activity in the account and will be 
especially aware ofullusual or suspicious activities (see 4.1). The bank will decide to 
what extent fulfilment of these responsibilities will need to he suppOlted through the 
use of automated systems or other means. 
5.2 Ongoing Monitoring 
With respect to clients classified under any category of persons mentioned in 2, the 
batlk's intemal policies 'will indicate how the account activities will be subject to 
monitoring. 
445 
 6 Control responsibilities 
A written control policy will be in place establishing standard control procedures to be 
undertaken by the various "control layers" (private banker, independent operations 
unit, Compliance, Intel'llal Audit). The control policy will cover issues of timing, 
degree of control, areas to be controlled, responsibilities and follow-up, etc. 
An independent audit function (which may be intel'llal to the banle) will test the 
programs contemplated by the control policy. 
7 Reporting 
There will be regular management reporting established 011 money laundering issues 
(e.g. number of reports to authorities, monitoring tools, changes in applicable laws 
and regulations, the number and scope oftraining sessions provided to employees). 
8 Education, training and information 
The banlc will establish a training program on the identification and prevention of 
money laundering for employees who have client contact and for Compliance 
personnel. Regular training (e.g. annually) will also include how to identify and 
follow-up on unusual or suspicious activities. In addition, employees will be informed 
about any major changes in anti-money-laundering laws and regulations. All new 
employees will be provided with guidelines on the anti-money-laundering procedures. 
9 Record retention requirements 
The bank will establish record retention requirements for all fmti-moncy-Iaundering 
related documents. The documents mllst be kept for a minimum of five years. 
10 Exceptions and deviations 
The ballie will establish an exception and deviation procedure that l'eq uires risk 
assessment and approval by an independent unit. 
11 Anti-money-Iaundering organization 
The bank will establish an adequately staffed and independent department responsible 
for the prevention of money laundering 
(e.g. Compliance, independent control unit, Legal). 
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APPENDIXK 
LIST OF OECD INITIATIVES RELATED TO CORRUPTION 
Recommendation to the Council on the Tax Deductibility of Bribes to Foreign 
Public Officials 
Recommendation on Improving Ethical Conduct in the Public Service (1998) 
COllvention of Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials ill International 
Business Transactions (1997) 
Revised Recommendation on Combating Bribery in International Business 
Transactions 1997 (revising the Recommendation on bribery in International 
Business Transactions 1994) 
Recommendation to Combat Corruption in Aid-Funded Procurement (1997) 
Rcconmlendation on the Tax Deductibility of Bribes to Foreign Public Officials 
(1996) 
Civil Law Convention on Corruption 1999 
Criminal Law Convention on Corruption 1998 
Convention on the Fight Against COlmption Involving Officials of the European 
Communities or Officials of Member States of the European Unioll1997 
Inter-American Convention Against Corruption ]996 
United Nations General Assembly Resolutions 51/59 and 51/191 
Please visit www.oecd.org for the details and updates. 
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APPENDIXL 
CORRUPTION, DRUG TRAFFICKING AND OTHER SERIOUS 
CIUMES (CONFISCATION OF BENEFITS) ACT OF 
SINGAPORE 
(CHAPTER 65A) 
SECOND SCHEDUJ,E 
Section 2 
SERIOUS OFFENCES 
Offences 
1, Section 44 of tins Act 
2, Section 47 of this Act 
Children and Young Persons Act 
(Cap, 38) 
3, Section 4 (I), 5 (a) and (b) 
COlTosive and Explosive Substances 
and Offensive Weapons Act (Cap, 65) 
Descl'iption* 
Assisting another to retaiu benetlts from 
criminal conduct 
Concealing or transferring benefits from 
crinnnal conduct 
lll-treatmellt of child or young person, 
4, Section 3 Possession of cOl1'0sive or explosive 
Hijacking of Aircraft and Protectioll of 
Aircraft and International Airports Act 
(Cap, 124) 
5, Section 3 (3) 
6, Section 4 
7, Section 5 
8, Section 7 
Kidnapping Act (Cap, 151) 
9, Section 3 
10, Section 4 
11, Section 5 
Penal Code (Cap, 224) 
12, Section 130 
13, Section 130B 
substance for purpose of causing hmi 
Hijacking 
Violence against passengers or crew 
Destroying, damaging or endangering safety 
of aircraft 
Endangering safety at aerodromes 
Abduction, wrongful restraint or wrongful 
confinement for ransom 
Knowingly receiving ransom 
Knowingly negotiating to obtain or for 
payment of ransom 
Aiding escape 0 f; rescuing, or harbouring 
such prisoner 
Piracy by law of nations 
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14. Section 130C 
15. Section 161 
16. Section 162 
17. Section 164 
18. Section 165 
19. Section 181 
20. Section 193 
2l. Section 194 
22. Section 195 
23. Section 196 
24. Section 20 I 
25. Section 203 
26. Section 204 
27. Section 205 
28. Section 206 
29. Section 207 
30. Section 208 
31. Section 212 
32. Section 213 
33. Section 214 
Piratical acts 
Public servant taking a gratification, other 
than legal remuneration, in respect of an 
official act 
Taking a gratification in order, by corrupt or 
illegal means, to influence a public servant 
Punishment for abetment by public servant 
of the offences above defined 
Public servant obtaining any valuable thing, 
without consideration, from person 
concerned m any proceeding or business 
transacted by such public servant 
False statement on oath to public servant 01' 
person authorised to administer an oath 
Punishment for false evidence 
Giving or fabricating false evidence with 
intent to procure conviction of a capital 
offence 
Giving or fabricating false evidence with 
intent to procure conviction of an offence 
punishable with imprisonment 
Using evidence known to be false 
of an 
false 
the 
Causing disappearance of evidence 
offence committed, or giving 
information touching it, to screen 
offender 
Giving false infbmlation respecting an 
offence committed 
Destruction of document to prevent its 
production as evidence 
False personation for the purpose of any act 
01' proceeding in a suit 
Fraudulent removal 01' concealment of 
property to prevent its seizure as a forfeiture 
01' in execution of a decree 
Fraudulent claim to property to prevent its 
seizure as a forfeiture or in execution of a 
decree 
Fraudulently suffering a decree for a sum 
not due 
Harbouring an offender 
Taking gift, etc., to screen an offender from 
punishment 
Offering gift 01' restoration of property in 
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34. Section 215 
35. Section 216 
36. Section 216A 
37. Section 217 
38. Section 218 
39. Section 221 
40. Section 222 
41. Section 225A 
42. Section 231 
43. Section 232 
44. Section 233 
45. Section 234 
46. Section 235 
41. Section 236 
48. Section 237 
49. Section 238 
50. Section 239 
51. Section 240 
52. Section 241 
consideration of screening offender 
Taking gift to help to recover stolen 
property, etc. 
Harbouring an offender who has escaped 
fi'Olll custody, 01' whose apprehension has 
been ordered 
Harbouring robbers 01' gang-robbers, etc. 
Public servant disobeying a direction of law 
with intent to save person from punishment 
or property from forfeiture 
Public servant ti'amillg an incorrect record 
or writing with intent to save person fi'om 
punishment or propelty Jiom forfeiture 
Intentional omission to apprehend on the 
palt of a public servant bound by law to 
apprehend 
Intentional omission to apprehend on the 
part of a public servant bound by law 10 
apprehend person under sentence of court of 
justice 
Public servant omitting to apprehend 01' 
suffering other persons to escape in cases 
not already provided for 
Couuterfeiting coin 
Countelfeiting cUI1'ent coin 
Making or selling instrument for 
counterfeiting coin 
Making 01' selling instrumell.t;:. for 
counterfeiting current coin ' 
Possession of instmmen! or material for the 
purpose of using the same for counterfeiting 
coin 
Abettnlg in Singapore the counterfeiting out 
of Singapore of coin 
Import 01' export of counlelfeit coin 
Import 01' export of counterfeits of curren! 
coin 
Delivery to another of coin possessed with 
knowledge that it is counterfeit 
Delivery of current coin, possessed with the 
knowledge that it is counterfeit 
Delivery to another of coin as genuine, 
which when fIrst possessed the deliverer did 
not know to be counterfeit 
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53. Section 242 
54. Section 302 
55. Section 304 
56. Section 307 (I) 
57. Section 307 (2) 
58. Section 308 
59. Section 312 
60. Section 313 
61. Section 315 (I) 
62. Section 316 
63. Section 324 
64. Section 325 
65. Section 326 
66. Sectioll 327 
67. Section 328 
68. Sectioll 329 
69. Section 330 
70. Section 331 
71. Section 332 
72. Section 333 
73. Section 335 
74. Scction 338 
75. Section 343 
Possession of counterfeit coin by a person 
who knew it to be counterfeit when he 
became possessed thereof 
Punishment for murder 
Punishment for culpable homicide not 
amounting to murder 
Attempt to murder 
Other offences by convicts 
Attempt to commit culpable homicide 
Causing miscarriage 
Causing miscarriage without woman's 
consent 
Child destruction before, at or immediately 
after birth 
Causing death of a quick unbom child by an 
act amounting to culpable homicide 
V oluntarily causing hurt by dangerous 
weapons or means 
Punishment for voluntarily causing grievous 
hurt 
Voluntarily causing grievous hurt by 
dangerous weapons or means 
Voluntarily causing hurt to extOli property 
or to constrain to an illegal act 
Causing hurt by means of poison, etc., with 
intent to cOll1lnit an offence 
Voluntarily causing grievous hurt to extOli 
propeliy, or to constrain to an illegal act 
Voluntarily causing . hurt to extort 
confession or to compel restoration of 
property 
Voluntarily causing grievous hmt to eAiort 
confession or to compel restoration of 
propelty 
Voluntarily causing hurt to detcr public 
servant fro111 his duty 
Voluntarily causing grievous hurt to deter 
public servant .iimn his duty 
Causing grievolls hurt on provocation 
Causing grievous hurt by an act which 
endangers life or personal safety of others 
Wronglhl confinement for 3 or 1110re days 
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76. Section 344 
77. Section 345 
78. Section 346 
79. Section 347 
80. Section 348 
81. Section 354 
82. Section 354A 
83. Section 363 
84. Section 364 
85. Section 365 
86. Section 366 
87. Section 367 
88. Section 368 
89. Section 369 
90. Section 370 
91. Section 371 
92. Section 372 
93. Section 373 
94. Section 373A 
95. Section 376 (1) and (2) 
96. Section 379 
97. Section 379A 
98. Section 380 
99. Section 381 
Wrongful confinement for 10 or more days 
Wrongful confinement of person for whose 
liberation a writ has been issued 
Wrongful confinement in secret 
Wrongtl.I1 confmement for the purpose of 
extorting property or constraining to an 
illegal act 
Wrongful confinement for the purpose of 
extorting confession or of compelling 
restoration of property 
Assault or use of criminal force to a person 
with intent to outrage modesty 
Outraging modesty in certain circuillstances 
Punishment for kidnapping 
Kidnapping or abducting in order to murder 
Kidnapping or abducting with intont to 
secretly and wrongflllly to confine a person 
Kidnapping or abducting a woman to 
compel her malTiage, etc. 
Kidnapping or abducting in order to subject 
a person to grievous hurt, slavery, etc. 
Wrongllilly concealing or keeping in 
confinement a kidnapped person 
Kidnapping or abducting child under 10 
years with intent to steal moveable property 
fi·Olll the person of such child 
Buying or disposing of any person as a 
slave 
Habitual dealing in slaves 
Selling minor for purposes of prostitution, 
etc. 
Buying minor for purposes of prostitution, 
etc. 
Importing hy fraud, brings, assist in 
bringing, sells or buys, with intent that any 
woman be used for purpose of prostitution 
Punislnllent for rape 
Punishment for theil 
Punishment for then of a motor vehicle 
Theft in dwelling house, etc. 
111eil by clerk or servant of property in 
possession of master 
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100. Section 382 
101. Section 384 
102. Section 385 
103. Section 386 
104. Section 387 
105. Section 388 
106. Section 389 
107. Section 392 
108. Section 393 
109. Section 394 
11 0.Section395 
111. Section 396 
112. Section 399 
113. Section 400 
114. Section 402 
115. Section 403 
116. Section 404 
117. Section 406 
118. Section 407 
119. Section 408 
120. Section 409 
121. Section 411 
122. Section 412 
123. Section 413 
124. Section 414 
125. Section 418 
Theft after preparation made for causing 
death or hurt in order to commit theft 
Punishment for extortion 
Putting person in fear of injury in order to 
connnit extortion 
Extortion by putting a person in fear of 
death or grievous hurt 
Putting person in fear of death or of 
grievous hurt in order to commit extortion 
Extortion by threat of accusation of an 
offence plUllshable with death, or 
imprisolllllent, etc. 
Putting person in fear of accusation of 
offence, in order to connnit extortion 
Punishment for robbery 
Attempt to commit robbery 
Voluntarily causing hmi m committing 
robbery 
Punislunent for gang-robbery 
Gang-robbery with murder 
Making preparation to connnit gang-
robbery 
PUlllshment for belonging to gang-robbers 
Assembling for purpose of cOllllllitting 
gang-robbery 
Dishonest misappropriation of property 
Dishonest nllsappropriation of property 
possessed by a deceased person at the time 
of his death 
Punislunent of criminal breach of trust 
Criminal breach of trust by carrier, etc. 
Criminal breach of trust by clerk or servant 
Criminal breach of trust by public servant, 
or by banker, merchant or agent 
Dishonestly receiving stolen property 
Dishonestly receiving property stolen ill the 
commission of a gang-robbery 
Habitually dealing in stolen property 
Assisting in concealment of stolen property 
Cheating with knowledge tbat wrongful loss 
may be thereby caused to a person whose 
interest the offender is bound to protect 
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126. Section 419 
127. Section 420 
128. Section 421 
129. Section 422 
130. Section 423 
131. Section 424 
132. Section 430A 
133. Section 431 
134. Section 431A 
135. Section 432 
136. Section 433 
137. Section 435 
138. Section 436 
139. Section 438 
140. Section 439 
141. Section 440 
142. Section 449 
143. Section 450 
144. Section 451 
Punishment for cheating by personation 
Cheating and dishonestly inducing a 
delivery of propelty 
Dishonest or fraudulent 
concealment of property 
distribution among creditors 
removal 01' 
to prevent 
Dishonestly or fraudulently preventing a 
debt or demand due to the offender from 
being made available for his creditors 
Dishonest or fraudulent execution of deed 
of transfer containing a false statement of 
consideration 
Dishonest or tJ'audulent removal 01' 
concealment of property or release of claim 
Mischief affecting railway engine, train, etc. 
Mischief by injury to public road, bridge or 
river 
Mischief by injury to telegraph cable, wiTe, 
etc. 
Mischief by 
obstruction to 
with damage 
Mischief by 
rendering less 
mark 
causing inundation or 
public drainage, attended 
destroying or moving or 
useful a lighthouse or sca-
Mischief by fITe or explosive substance with 
intent to cause damage to amount 0[$50 
Mischief by liTe or explosive substance with 
intent to destroy a house, etc. 
Punishment for the mischief described in 
section 437 when cOITmlitted by fue or any 
explosive substance 
Punishment for intentionally lUlming vessel 
aground or ashore with intent to commit 
then, etc. 
l\1ischief committed after preparation made 
for causing death or hurt 
House-trespass in order to conmlit an 
offence punishable with death 
House-trespass in order to commit an 
offence punishable with iTnprisolll1lent for 
life 
House-trespass in order to cOlmmt an 
offence punishable with imprisonmellt 
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145. Section 452 
146. Section 453 
147. Section 454 
148. Section 455 
149. Section 456 
150. Section 457 
151. Section 458 
152. Section 459 
153. Section 460 
154. Section 465 
155. Section 466 
156. Section 467 
157. Section 468 
158. Section 469 
159. Section 471 
160. Section 472 
161. Section 473 
162. Section 474 
163. Section 475 
164. Section 476 
House-trespass after preparation made fo1' 
causing hUll, etc. 
Punishment for lurking house-trespass 01' 
house-breaking 
Lurking house-trespass 01' house-breaking in 
order to commit an offence punishable with 
imprisonment 
Lmking house-trespass 01' house-breaking 
after preparation made for causing hUll, etc. 
Punishment for lurking house-trespass by 
night 01' house-breaking by night 
Lmkulg house-trespass by night or house-
breaking by night in order to commit an 
offence punishable with imprisonment 
LlII'king house-trespass 01' house-breakhlg 
by night after preparation made for causing 
hm!, etc. 
Grievous hUll caused while committing 
lurking house-trespass 01' house-breaking 
Lurking house-trespass by night 01' house-
breaking by night when death or grievous 
hurt is caused 
Punishment for forgery 
Forgery of record of a cOUlt of justice, or a 
public register ofbiIths, etc. 
Forgery of a valuable security or will 
Forgery for the purpose of cheating 
Forgery foJ' the purpose of harming the 
reputation of any person 
Using as genuine a forged document 
Making or possessing a counterfeit seal, 
plate, etc., with intent to conlllit a forgery 
punishable under section 467 
Making 01' possessing a counterfeit seal, 
plate, etc., with intent to conmlit a forgery 
punishable otherwise 
Having possession of a valnable seclIl'ity or 
will known 10 be forged, with intent to use it 
as genuine 
Connterfeiting a device ot' mark used for 
authenticating documents described III 
section 467, 01' possessing counterfeit 
marked material 
CounterfeitiIlg a device 01' mark used fol' 
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165. Section 489A 
166. Section 48913 
167. Section 489C 
Prevention of Corruption Act (Cap. 
241) 
authenticating documents otber than those 
described in sectioll 467, or possessing 
counterfeit marked material 
Forging or counterfeiting currency notes or 
bank notes 
Using as genuine forged or counterfeit 
currency notes 01' bank notes 
Possessioll of forged or cOllnterfeit currency 
notes or bank notes 
168. Section 5 Punishment for corrupt transactiolls where 
no agents involved 
169. Section 6 Punishment for conupt transactions 
involving agents or use of false documents 
to mislead prulCipal 
170. Section 10 Bribery in relation to Govermnent contracts 
171. Section 11 Bribery of Member of Parliament 
172. Section 12 Bribery of member of public body 
173. Section 29 Abetment of offences 
174. Section 30 Attempts 
175. Section3! Conspiracy 
Tennillation of Pregnancy Act (Cap. 
324) 
176. Section 3 (4) Medica! termination of pregnancy 
177. Section 5 Coercion 01' intimidation 
Vandalism Act (Cap. 341) 
178. Section 3 Penalty for acts ofvandalism 
Women's Charter (Cap. 353) 
179: Section 140 
180. Section 141 
181. Section 142 
182. Section 145 
[251997 
Offences relating to prostitution 
Trafficking in women and girls 
ImpOliation of woman or girl by false 
pretences 
Ca.using or encouraging prostitution oj~ 
intercourse with, oj' indecent assault 011, gh"! 
below the age of 16 
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Notice to Banks 
Banking Act, CAP 19 
APPENDlXM 
MAS 626 dated 11 Nov 2002 
Examp les of Suspicious Transactions 
I, General Comments 
The list of situations I,>iven below is intended mainly as a means of highlighting the 
hasic ways in which money may be laundered, Whlle each individual situation may 
not be sufficient to suggest that money laundering is taking place, a combination of 
such situations may be indicative of sllch a transaction, Further, the list is by no means 
complete, and will requiTe constant updating and adaptation to changing 
circumstances and new methods oflaundering money, The list is intended solely as an 
aid, and must not be applied as a routiue instrument in place of wmnlon sense, 
A customer's declarations regarding the background of such transactions should be 
checked for plausibility, Not every explanation offered by the customer can be 
accepted without scrutiny, 
It is justif1able to suspect any customer who is reluctant to provide nonnal information 
and documents required routinely by the bank in the course of the business 
relationship, Bartles should pay attention to cllstomers who provide minimal, false 01" 
misleading infol1natioll or, when applying to open an account, provide information 
that is difficult or expensive for the bank to verifY. 
2, Transactions Which Do Not Make Economic Sense 
i) A customer-relationship with the bank that does not appear to make economic 
sense, for example, a customer having a large number of accounts with the 
same bank, frequent transfers between different accounts or exaggeratedly 
high liquidity; 
ii) Transactions in which assets are withdrawn innnediately after being deposited, 
unless the customer's business activities furnish a plausible reason for 
immediate withdrawal; 
iii) Transactions that cannot be reconciled with the usual activities of the cllstomer, 
for example, the use of Lctters of Credit and other methods of trade finance to 
1110ve money between countries where such trade is not consistent with the 
customer's usual business; 
iv) Transactions which, without plausible reason, result in the intensive use of 
what was previously a relatively inactive account, such as a customer's 
account which shows viltually no HOllial personal or business related 
activities but is used to receive or disburse unusually large sums which have 
no obvious purpose 01" relationship to the customer andlor his business; 
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v) Provision of bank guarantees or indenmities as collateral for loans between 
third parties tilat are not in conformity with market conditions; 
vi) Unexpected repayment of an overdue credit without any plausible explanation; 
vii) Back-to-back loans without any identifiable and legally admissible purpose. 
3. Transactions Involving Large Amounts of Cash 
i) Exchanging an unusually large amollnt of small-denominated notes fOl' those 
of higher denomination; 
ii) Purchasing 01' selling of foreign currencies in substantial amounts by cash 
settlement despite the cllstomer having an account with the bank; 
iii) Frequent withdrawal of large amounts by Uleaus of cheques, including 
traveller's cheques; 
iv) Frequent withdrawal of large cash amounts that do not appear to be justified 
by the customer's business activity; 
v) Large cash withdrawals from a previously dormant/inactive account, or from 
an account which has just received an unexpected large credit from abroad; 
vi) Company transactions, both deposits and withdrawals, that are denominated 
by unusually large amounts of cash, rather than by way of debits and credits 
nonnally associated with the nOlIDal commercial operations of the company, 
e.g. cheques, letters of credit, bills of exchange, etc; 
vii) Depositing cash by means of numerous credit slips by a customer such that the 
amount of each deposit is not substantial, but the total of which is substantial; 
viii) The deposit of unusually large amounts of cash by a customer to cover 
requests for bankel's' drafts, money transfers 01' other negotiable and readily 
marketable money instruments; 
ix) Customers whose deposits contain counterfeit notes 01' forged instruments; 
x) Large cash deposits using night safe facilities, thereby avoiding direct contact 
with the bank; 
xi) Customers making large and frequent cash deposits but cheques drawn on the 
accounts are mostly to individuals and firms not normally associated with their 
business; 
xii) Customers who together, and simultaneously, use separate tellers to conduct 
large cash transactions 01' foreign exchange transactions. 
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4, Transactions Involving Bank Accounts 
i) Matching of payments out with credits paid in by cash on the same or previous 
day; 
ii) Paying in large third palty cheques endorsed in favour of the customer; 
iii) Substantial increases in deposits of cash or negotiable instruments by a 
professional firm or company, using client accounts 01' in-house company or 
trust accounts, especially if the deposits are promptly transferred between 
other client company and trust accounts; 
iv) High velocity of funds through an account, i.e" low beginning and ending 
daily balances, which do not reflect the large volume of funds flowing through 
an account; 
v) Multiple depositors using a single bank account; 
vi) An account opened in the name of a moneychangel' that receives structured 
deposits; 
vii) An account operated in the name of an offshore company with stluctured 
movement of funds. 
5. Transactions Involving Transfers Abroad 
i) Transfer of money abroad by an interim customerB48 in the absence of any 
legitimate reason; 
ii) A customer which appeal'S to have accounts with several banks ill the same 
locality, especially when the bank is aware of a regular consolidated process 
from such accounts prior to a request for onward transmission of the funds 
elsewhere; 
iii) Repeated transfers of large runounts of money abroad accompanied by the 
instl'llction to pay the beneficialY ill cash; 
iv) Large and regular payments that cmmot be clearly identified as bonafide 
transactions, £i'om and to countries associated with (i) the production, 
processmg or marketing of narcotics or other illegal drugs or (ii) criminal 
conduct; 
v) Substantial increase ill cash deposits by a customer without apparent cause, 
especially if such deposits are subsequently transferred within a short period 
out of the account andlor to a destination not normally associated with the 
customer; 
848 An interim customer is one who is not a regular customer of the bank in question) or doe...;; not 
maintain an aCCollllt, deposit account, safe deposit box, etc, with the bank. 
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vi) Building up large balances, not consistent with the known turnover of the 
customer's business, and subsequent transfer to account(s) held overseas; 
vii) Cash payments remitted to a single acconnt by a large number of different 
persons without an adequate explanation. 
6. Investment Related Transactions 
i) Pnl'chasing of securities to be held by the bank in safe custody, where this does 
not appeal' appropriate given the customer's apparent standing; 
ii) Requests by a customer for investment management services where the source 
of funds is unclear or not consistent with the customer's apparent standing; 
iii) Larger or unusual settlements of securities transactions in cash form; 
iv) Buying and selling of a security with no discernible purpose or ill 
ch'cumstances which appear unusual. 
7. Transactions Involving Unidentified Parties 
i) Provision of collateral by way of pledge or guarantee without any discel'llible 
plausible reason by third palties unknown to the bank and who have no 
identitIable close relationship with the customer; 
ii) Transfer of money to another bank without indication of the beneficiary; 
iii) Payment orders with inaccurate infOlmation concerning the person placing the 
orders; 
iv) Use of pseudonyms or numbered accounts for effecting commercial 
transactions by enterprises active in trade and llidustly; 
v) Holding in trust of shares in an unlisted company whose activities camlOt he 
asceltained by the bank; 
vi) Customers who wish to maintain a number of trustee or clients' accounts that 
do not appear consistent with their type of business, including transactions that 
involve nominee names. 
8. Ivtiscellaneous Transactions 
i) Purchase or sale of large amounts of precious metals by an interim customer; 
ii) Purchase of bank cheques on II large scale by an interim customer; 
iii) Extensive or iucreased use of safe deposit facilities that do not appear to be 
justified by the customer's personal 01' business activities. 
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APPENDIXN 
Dates of Tax Haven Commitments to O.F:CD Project and Release of 
OECD Reports 
Extracted £i'om Weiner, Joann M" "OECD Forum on Hannful Tax Practices Marks 
Fifth Year", Tax Notes International, Vo131, Issue 3, 21 July 2003 
Jurisdiction Date of Letter 
Advance COlllmitments 
""-
""--- i San Marino 4 April2QOO 
------ "~-----. 
Bennuda 15 May}OOO 
Cayman Islands 
----
18 ~ay 2000 
"-----~ 
Malta 19 May 2000 
-----""--
_ ... 
""~- ""-
Cyprus 
.--- """--
-.-._-
24 May 2000 
Mauritius 24 May 2000"-
"" "" """"-
"-Release of !\lpe report listing 35 potential tax havens 
Schedules Commitments 
"" " "."-
Netherlands Antilles 30Nov2000 
"" 
-"~" 
Isle of Man 13 Dec 2000 
"" 
Seyc1!eUes 13 Feb 2001 
--"" 
Aruba 31 May200l 
~" -----
Baln'ain 11 Sep 200J 
C--""" "" "" 
~ Rel()ase of Novembe"rreport 
" 
--_ .. 
~Collnnitment deadline extended to 28 February 2002 
.. --
Antigua!jnd Barbuda 20 Feb 2002 
Guernsey 22 Feb 2002 
."-~"" 
Jersey 22 Feb 2002 
~";"" .. _- "~---S t. Vincent 26 Feb 2002 
------
Gibraltar 27 Feb 2002 
-=" 
_., ... 
Grenada 27 Feb 2002 
------" --.- " 
Montserrat 27 Feb 2002 
---_. """--
St. Lucia 28 Feb 2002 
""------ "-_." ""-
U.S, Virgin Islands 04 Mar 2002 
"""-
Anguilla 05 Mar 2002 
------- """-
Dominica 05 Mar 2002 
"---._-- -----_.-
St. Kitts and Nevis 05 Mar 2002 
-.-... - ------
Belize 08 Mw'2002 
---_. 
Turks & Caicos Islands 08 Mar 2002 
-_.---. 
"" " --.--- ----_. 
Bahamas 15 Mal' 2002 
_.----- "-
Cook Islands , 22 Mar 2002 
------ "-
British Virgin Islands 02 Apr 2002 
1":::-""" .. -----Samoa 09 Apr ?()02 
------- .--- ------- ---_.-
Niue 11 Ap!: 2002 
Panama 1 ~.i\.pr 2002 
-----
.---
::~elease on 18 April 2002 list of uncoo]J~rative tax havens 
Vanuatu ] 07 May 2003 
-.----- ""-----
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APPENDlXO 
OECD Tax Haven Commitment _Letters 
Extracted fi'om Weinel', Joa1111 M., "OECD Forum on Harmful Tax Practices Marks 
Fifth Year", Tax Notes International, Vol 31, Issue 3, 21 July 2003 
Issues Raised 
Tax Haven Date of Letter Level Obtain Receive Maintain 
Playing Equivalent Technical Fiscal 
Field Commitment Assistance Autonomy 
Advance Commitments 
Bermuda 15 May 2000 -""" -- -
_._-
Cayman .18 May 2000 - - -""- -
Islands 
_.----- . 
CyplUS 24 May 2000 - - -- -
f-,;-;- ------ - ----
Malia 19 May 2000 - - - -
----_._-
---_ .. _------ -------
Mauritius 24 May 2000 - - --- -
"------_. -----_.-
San Mal'ino 4 Apr 2000 ------- --.---- --.---- -
""--------
Scheduled Commitments 
Anguilla 5 May 2002 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Antigua and 20 Feb 2002 Yes Yes No Yes 
Barbuda 
_.-----
Amba _ 3} May 2001 No No No No 
Bahamas 15 Mar 2002 Yes Yes No Yes 
"".-_._---
Bahrain 11 Sep 2001 No No No No 
.--_ .. "" 
------
-"---- --------_._. 
Belize 8 Mar 2002 Yes Yes No No 
-
--- - ------ ----
British 2 Apr 2002 Yes No No Yes 
Virgin 
Islands 
Cook 22 Mal' 2002 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Islands 
._""" .. -_._-
-----
~_~l~ica 5 Mal' 2002 Yes No No Yes 
27 Feb 2002 Yes Yes No 
----
Gibraltar Yes 
-.. _----_ ... " 
Grenada 27 Feb 2002 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
_._" ---- ----------
Guernsey 22 Feb 2002 Yes Yes No Yes 
---. 
--------
Isle of Man 13 Dec 2000 No Yes No Yes 
-------
Jersey 22 Feb 2002 Yes Yes No Yes 
... - .. -._--
-----
Montse11'at 27 Feb 2002 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
-:-:c-;--- - .. --
Netherlands lJ Nov 2000 No No Yes No 
Antilles 
-._-.-""-"." 
---
-----
Niue 11 Apr 2002 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
------_._-
Panama 15 Apr 2002 Yes 
- --- ". 
Yes No Yes 
Samoa 19 Apr 200? , Yes Yes Yes Yes 
---------""-""-_." 
St. Kitts 5 Mal' 2002 Yes No No Yes 
and Nevis 
-"-""-"" 
St. Lucia 28 Feb 2002 No No No No 
------ """ 
- -
----"-------"---"-" _"0" 
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~"""""""""""""-" """ """-"""""" """""" ~-." 
Seychelles 13 Feb 2001 No No No No 
--~----
st. Vincent 2 Feb 2002 Yes Yes No Yes 
------ -"""---
Turks & 8 Mar 2002 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Caicos 
-.----
U.S. Virgin 4 Mar 2002 No No No No 
Islands 
"--"._-
Vanuatu 15 May 2003 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
._---" """"""-
Note: This information is obtained from the letters sent to the GECD fi'om the jurisdictions and is 
available on the GECD Web site. Key dates in this process afe the release ofllle progress repOit in June 
2000. the progress repOlt in Novemher 2001 (which extended the deadline for making a commitment to 
Febmary 2002). and the release onlle list ofnncooperative tax havens on 18 April 2002. 
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APPENDIXP 
MAURITIUS' LIST OF nOUBLE TAXATION A VOInANCE 
Tru~ATIES 
As of II FeblUal'Y 2004, Mauritius has ratitled 32 treaties and is negotiating others. 
The treaties cUl1'ently in force are: 
Belgium 
Botswana 
Croatia 
Cyprus 
France 
Germany 
India 
Indonesia 
Italy 
Kuwait 
Lesotho 
Luxembourg 
Madagascar 
Malaysia 
Mozambique 
Namibia 
Nepal 
Oman 
Pakistan 
People's Republic of China 
Russian Federation 
Rwanda 
Senegal 
Singapore 
South Africa 
Sri Lanka 
Swaziland 
Sweden 
Thailand 
Uganda 
United Kingdom 
Zimbabwe 
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APPENDIXQ 
IMF KEY POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS TO SINGAPORE 
These recommendations were listed in the !MF's repOli, "Singapore: Financial 
System Stability Assessment, including Reports on the Observance of Standards and 
Codes on the following topics: Banking Supervision, Insurance Regulation, Securities 
Regulation, Payment and Settlement Systems, Monetary and Financial Policy 
Transparency, and Anti-Money Laundering". It is based on the information available 
at the time it was completed on 25 February 2004. 
• Macro-prudential monitoring: Further strengthen the MAS' monitoring of (i) the 
risks arising frol11new financial products; (ii) cross-border financial flows 
(including flows in the Asian Dollar Market (ASD) and particularly transactions 
between branches and head offices) to detcct potential strains in the offshore 
banking market; (iii) household and corporate sector balance sheets to assess the 
resilience of the private sector; and (iv) market and counter-party risks of 
derivatives activities by financial institutions. 
• Regulatory systems and supervisory practices: Further enhance the MAS' legal 
and regulatory framework through the completion ofthe review of the rcgulatolY 
minimum capital requu'ements for local banks and the inlplementatiol1 of its new 
risk-based capital fj'al11ework for the insurance industly, planned for introduction 
in late 2004; and complete the ongoing review ofthe MAS Act. 
• The MAS' accountability, independence, and oversight capabilities: Reduce the 
potential foJ' conflicts of interest arisIng from the multiple official responsibilities 
ofthe Chainnan of the MAS. 
• Monetary and financial policy transparency: Provide more information on how 
supervisory actions are taken ill line with the risk-based supervisory tj'amework 
and disclose more information to improve the public's ability to assess 
supervisory pelformance. 
• Anti-moncy laundering and C0l11batlllg the financing of terrorism: Improve the 
effectiveness of cross-border mutual legal assistance. 
G Capital market development: Review and address factors that may constrain the 
further development of the corporate bond market, including the limited lise of 
credit ratings, guaranteed interest rates of the Central Provident Fund (CPF), and 
the CPF investment policy. 
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APPENDIXR 
SINGAPORE: KEY FINANCIAL SECTOR REFORM M~~ASURES, 
1999 - 2003 
These reform measures were listed in the IMF's report, "Singapore: Financial System 
Stability Assessment, including Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes 
on the following topics: Banking Supervision, Insurance Regnlation, Securities 
Regulation, Payment and Settlement Systems, Monetary and Financial Policy 
Transparency, and Anti-Money Laundering". It is based 011 the information available 
at tbe time it was completed 011 25 February 2004. 
!Jbet:alisatioll measures 
Tbe MAS announced in 1999 a five-year program to liberalise the domestic banking 
sector in order to strengthen Singapore's banking system and the local banks. The 
program included all expansion of banking privileges and a broadening of the range of 
activities for foreign banks. Tbe consolidation of local banks was also encouraged. 
In 2002, all restrictions on the use of the Singapore dollar in international transactions 
were removed except for the following: 
• Non-resident financial entities must swap Singapore dollar proceeds from 
Singapore dollar loans, equity, and bond issues into foreign currency to finance 
activities abroad. 
e Financial institutions may not extend credit facilities larger than S$5 million if 
there is reason to believe that the funds may be used for Singapore dollar currency 
speculation. 
Legislative and regulatOlY refonllS 
2001 
• The Companies Act was amended to enhance prospectus disclosure requirements. 
• An amendment to the Banking Act brought into force new policy measures, 
including the separation of financial and lloll-tinancial businesses of local banks, 
and the revision of the rules 011 propmty-related loans to more effectively monitor 
banks' exposure to the propelty sector. 
.. The llew Liquidity Supervision Framework was passed to tie liquid asset 
requirements to a bank's liquidity profile and risk management capabilities. 
2002 
• The Financial Advisors Act (FAA) was enacted to integrate the diflerent acts 
governing financial advisory services and to streamline licensing requirements, 
and the Securities and Futures Act (SF A) to consolidate legislation of capital 
market activities and introduced disclosure-based market supervision. 
• A risk-based capital framework for securities for capital markets services license 
holders came into force. 
e The Payment and Settlement Systems (Finality and Netting) Act was enacted to 
provide for protection ofthe payment and settlement systems fi'om disruptions. 
• The Consumer Credit Bureau was established. 
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2003 
• The Code of Corporate Oovernance too effect. Although the Code is not 
mandatOlY, ulllisted companies arc required to disclose their governance practices 
and any deviations fi'om the Code in their annuall'epOits. 
• Listed companies with market capitalisation of 8$75 million or morc were 
required to make quarterly reports. 
Measures to develop capital markets 
1999 
.. The Singapore Exchange (SOX) was formed following the demutualization and 
merger of the Stock Exchange of Singapore and Singapore International Monetary 
Exchange. 
2000 
• Repo-related Singapore govenunent securities (SOS) holdings were allowed to 
count toward the liquid asset requirement to boost the repo market. 
.. A sccUlities lending facility for primary dealers of SOS securities was introduced. 
• The SOX was listed on the SOX Main Board. 
2001 
• Investment restrictions on CPF Special Accounts were liberalised. 
• The five-year SOS bond futures contract was launched by the SOX. 
e Fifteen-year SOS bonds were issues to extend the benchmark yield curve. 
2002 
.. A new SOX listing manual came into effect. The changes include revised 
distribution guidelines fol' initial public offerings. 
e The b01l'Owing period for the securities lending facility was extended, and full 
order book information on the SOX securities market was made available to 
investors on a subscription basis. 
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APPENDIXS 
SINGAPORE: MAIN FINDINGS OI<' THE ASSESSMENTS OF 
OBSERVANCE OF KEY INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS AND 
CODES 
These findings were listed ill the IMP's report, "Singapore: Financial System Stability 
Assessment, including Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes on the 
following topics: Banking Supervision, Insurance Regulation, Securities Regulation, 
Payment and Settlement Systems, Monetmy and Financial Policy Transparency, and 
Anti-Money Laundering". It is based on the information available at the time it was 
completed on25 February 2004. 
• Basel Core Principles (BCP) for Effective Banking Supervision: Overall, the MAS 
has established a sound prudential and regulatory framework for effective 
supervision of its commercial bmlking sector and has achieved a high level of 
observance of the BCP. There are no weaknesses tbat raise financial stability 
concern. 
" International Association of Insurance Supervisors (lAIS) Insurance Core 
Principles: Singapore has a high level of observance of the lAlS principles. 
Significant initiatives are currently being developed in consultation with the 
industry - particularly the overhaul of the capital standards to a more 
comprehensive and risk-based approach with new rules giving specific attention to 
corporate governance and intel'llal controls. The implementation and enforcement 
of these initiatives, which are well advanced, will further improve observance. 
.. International Organization of Securities Connnissiolls (lOSeO) Objectives and 
Principles of Securities Regulation: Singapore has achieved a high degree of 
compliance with the lOSCO principles. The framework for the oversight and 
regulation of securities markets, intelmediaries, issuers, and collective investment 
schemes is well developed, sophisticated, and meets inle1'l1ational standards. The 
MAS should require periodic reporting of net asset values and ensure that a 
Collective Investment Scheme (CIS) operator has systems ill place to calculate net 
asset values coneetly. 
" Committee on Payment mld Settlement System (CPSS) Core Principles for 
Systemically Important Payment Systems (CPSIPS): Singapore has a highly 
developed payment system. The MEPS - a systemically important payment 
system - is a reliable and robust real-tinle gross settlement system and exhibits 
significant observance of CPSIPS principles. The settlement risk of foreign 
exchange transactions in Singapore dollars has been further reduced by the 
inclusion of the Singapore dollar in the CLS in September 2003. 
" CPSS-IOSCO Recommendations for Securities Settlement Systems: Neither the 
MAS Electronic Payment System-Singapore Government Securities (MEPS-SGS) 
- which clears and settles SGS on an real-time gross settlement basis-nol' the 
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Central Depository Private Limited (CDP) - which clears and settles equities and 
private debt securities - is subject to major vulnerabilities. While tbe MAS 
oversight objectives with respect to securities settlement systems are set out in 
various documents, it is recollllnended that the MAS publish a document Oil the 
oversight iiamework for securities settlement systems and its approach to its 
adminish·atioll. 
.. Transparency in Monetary and Financial Policies: The transparency of monetary 
policy ll'amework has improved substantially in recent years. Given the exchange 
rate regime-based monetary policy, bowever, the authorities remain cautious about 
publishing certain informatiou on the monetary policy framework and monetary 
operations. For example, neither the weights used in the trade-weighted exchange 
rate index nor the precise limits of the band are disclosed. Similarly, the extent of 
MAS interventions in the foreign exchange market is not disclosed on a 
predetermined or timely schedule. Greater disclosure in these areas could be 
considered to the extent it does not compromise the monetary policy regime. The 
MAS has made steady progress toward improving transparency in financial 
policies in recent years and now meets many of the elements of the Transparency 
Code. The MAS could further improve transparency tln'ough providing more 
detailed information on recent developments in the fmandal sector and its 
supervisory activities in its regular publications, including regarding local 
financial institutions' overseas operations. 
• Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Tel1'orism (AML/CFT): 
Singapore now has in place a sound and comprehensive legal, institutional, and 
policy and supervisory framework for AMLlCFT and the authorities have 
demonstrated a strong cOllllnitment to its effective implementation. Though some 
steps have been taken with the enactment of a domestic mutual legal assistance 
law and ongoing negotiatioris for several bilateral treaties, the effectiveness of 
cross-horder mutual legal assistance needs to be improved as it relates to 
compulsOlY assistance at international request, including the provision of bank 
records. The Palermo Convention is signed but yet to be ratified. Some aspects of 
best practice for customer due diligence need to be specified more clearly and in 
greater detail, though implementation was observed in individual institutions. 
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APPENDIXT 
INTERNATIONAL TAX AND INVJ<:STMENT ORGANISATION 
(ITIO) MEMBERS 
Isle of Man 
Anguilla 
Antigua & Barbuda 
Bahamas 
Barbados 
Belize 
British Virgin Islands 
Cayman Islands 
St Kitts & Nevis 
StLucia 
St Vincent & the Grenadines 
Turks & Caicos 
Panama 
Pacific Cook Islands 
Samoa 
Vanuatu 
Labuun - Malaysia 
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APPENDIXU 
STATUS OF COUNTRIES AND TERRITORIES IN 
SUPRANATIONAL ORGANISATIONS' INITIATIVES 
First RCpOlt / List issued by OECD, FATF, FSF and IMF regarding tax havens and 
their anti-money laundering policy 
-;:;--- """---"--
I 
OECD8~g-- FA~FS50 I FTSI= .... IMFB52 Countries 
_ ...... 
.-
Andorra .. III 
._. 
Anguilla II III 
-----
" 
- -
Alltiguaand Barbuda .. 3 III 
--
._"" 
Aruba .. 3 iii r-:::-:-.- - .,,---_ ... 
Bahamas II x 3 III r-:::--;-.. 
2 Bahrain • III t-;;. --_ .... .--
Barbados • 2 III 
-
., .-
Belize • 'i 3 III -.--_. ---"---
Bermuda 'i 2 III 
British Virgin Islands • \j 3 III 
."."--- ------
Campione III 
----- -
-
Cayman Islands x 3 III 
_. 
---_.-
Cook Islands .. x 3 III 
--_._-"."- .-
Costa Rica 3 III 
--
" 
3 III Cyprus 
-
.- -------
-
Djibouti II 
-
-.-
_. 
Dominica til x III 
.-
---- ------
Dublin 1 III 
_. 
-
Gibraltar .. 
" 
2 III 
--;;;-... .- "---
Grenada • III - ......•• 
----
849 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Towards Global Tax Co-operation-
Repor/to the 2000 Minis/erial COl/llcil Meetillg (lnd ReCOli/melldatiolls by the COII/miltee 011 Fiscal 
Affairs - Progress ill IdelllW'ing alld Elimillatillg lIarllifui Tax Practices (2000, OECD) ... represents 
countries 01' territories listed as. tax havens in the report. 
-----
850 Financial Action Task FOl'ce~ Review to Idelltijj~ Non-Cooperative Countrie-s OJ' Tel1'ftories: 
Increasillg Ihe Worldwide Effectiveness of Allti-Molley Laul/dering Measures (2000, FATF) . ..,f 
represellts counn'ies or ten'itories which co~operated ill the fight against mouey Jaundering; x represents 
non-cooperative. 
851 Financial Stability Forum, 'Financial Stability Fonnll Releases Grouping of Offshore Financial 
Centres (OFCs) to Assist in Setting Pdorities for Assessment' (Press Release, 26 May 2000) 2. I 
represents countries or territories which are generally perceived as having legal infi·astrllctnres and 
supervisory practices, and/or a level of resources devoted to supervision and co~operatiolll"elative to 
the size of their fmaneial activities, and/or a level of co-operation that are largely of a good quality and 
hetter than ill other OFCs. 2 represents countries or tenitories which are generally perceived as having 
legal infi:asnllctures and supervisory practices, and/or a level of resources devoted to supervision and 
co-operation relative to the size ofthdr fmaneial activities, and/or a level of co-operation that are 
largely of a higher quality than group 3, but lower than group 1. 3 represents cO\UltJies or territories 
which are generally perceived as having legal inl'i"astl1lctnres and supervisory practices, andior a level 
ofl'csources devoted to supervision and co~operation relative to the size of their financial activities, 
and/or a level of co-operation that are largely of a lower qllality than in group 2. 
m IntemalionalMonet".yFund.OjJ.horeFinanciaICenlres~··IlIfF Background Paper (2000, IMF). " 
represents countries, territories OJ' jmisdictiol1s with OFes. 
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I 
,--;:;-~ .... ---.----
Guam III 
--- ~.-.. ~.~-
Guemse)"-:::~c-______ I--~~4I~ ___ ~_~~j .................. __01 __ +- III .... _ ... ~ 
Hong Kong SAR ___ -j ___ ...,_+_-01 __ t-_::::1IiI,_.~_ 
[sIe ofMan------- <II -V 1 III 
[sraeI x III 
Japan II ~ ....... ---------+----+--,--+~-
Jersey ej 1 1---::----. . ~. 
Labuan 
Lebanon 
Liberia 
Liechtenstein 
London 
Luxembourg 
MacauSAR 
x 
x 
2 III 
3 III 
III 
3 
III 
1 III 
2 III 
Madeira 
Maldives 
Malta 
Marianas 
-=----+_ .. _---
_______ --j-___ ~- __ ~~+I-_:::2,- .......: 
Marshall Islands <II x 3 
Mauritius ." 3 II 
Micronesia iii 
. ....~ .. ~ ... - .. ~.~-t--~-.-~ ... ~-. 
~~~~~ce~-1-.a-Ct---------1I----:-- 'i~ 2 ............ --~-~-
~ .-~.-----------+----- ··············x·········---·~3~ ....... ~_111-.... --
Nauru .. III 
-------------------------------------------------------------------.~---. ------ -.-----~-.-"".----. 
Netherlands III 
Netherlands Antilles .. 3 III 
Niue .. x 3 III ~~----------+----+---~ Panama • x 3 III 
----------- --.---"--~""-.- ---".-.""-"" -""-. 
. Philippines x III 
------------ --.---~ -------- ---- -------~-" "-""- ---------.-----.-----
III 
...... - ... ~ .... ~ .. -.~--+------+--='----I 
x 
Puerto Rico 
Russia 
........................................................................................... ~.-.-~~~ .. ~.~--I---,--+---::----+-----I 
Samoa e '>I 3 III 
Seychelles .. 3 III 
S ingapOl'e 1 III 
St Lucia e '>I 3 III 
St Christophel' & Nevis e x 3 III 
St Vincent and the Grenadines e x 3 III 
Switzerland I III 
Tahiti III 
United States 
Uruguay 
~l,JS Virgin Islands 
Vanuatu 
West Indies 
III 
3 III 
III 
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Lates! Repmt / List issued by OEeD and FA TF 
C-ou-nt-n-'e-s -·_··--"'-OECD85"'--::F""A-:::I·'f85 
----.. .-.. --.. -+----
Andorra 111 
---·'----··-·-----I·-·-·--j--··-·-
Anguilla .. __ . __ . __ _ 
Antigua and BUl'buda __ .. __ _ 
Amba 
"---_._._ .. _--
Bahamas 
Bahrain 
Barbados 
Belize 
Bermuda 
.--.. _._-_.---+ 
.--.--.. ---
.-.--.---
._ .. _.;----
British Virgin Islands 
o 
o--j-·-~-· 
--\--_._. 
o 
---+._.-'-. 
o .~ 
o 
o 
o 
o 
Caymanlslands ._-_-_-_-_-_- -i--- --_. _'J,--_ 
Cook Islands 0 x 
C prus_·-_-._. __ -----.--.. -1--- 'J 
-- -~~--~ Dominica 0 v 
Gibrait-a-r-·-·---··-··_·-+--o ~ 
-\-_ .. _.-1---'-
Grenada 0 
Guern-s-e-y-·---·-·-_·-f--._o_. __ f-_":''1. --. 
Indonesia x 
Isle of Man --I---·-o··-·-j--:;;-
Israel --- --+-·----·-j---r 
::~:~-on-·---... -.--.--I-·~~O-·-:..-. ·--t--r 
.-.--.---.. -.-.--+-------1--
Liberia 
.---. ._.-.----j-.-.-.-t---.. --,.--. 
Liechtenstein 1II·V 
._.--.=::......_._._._--/._._.--1---._.--. 
Maldives 0 ··-M-al-ta-·"---·--·--·---_-::.-::.~:-.• -··-:..-~-I---· 
Marshall Islands 
.. _.--.. _--
Mauritius 
. ~--.-.--.---
Monaco 
Monts"-e"-l1-'a-t -
._.-.--_.--t 
. Myarunar ._ .. _ .. __ _ 
Nauru 
Netherlands Antilles 
Nigeria 
Niue 
Panama 
Philippines .. 
Russia 
---
._._._--
x 
.-.~ .. 
--+.-_.:r-.. 
CD " ---1--·-· 
o 
x 
o x 
o 
x 
o 
o 
x 
Samoa 0 
.. _._._--_._ .. --'---
853 Organisation for Economic Co·operation and Development, The DEC'S's Project 0/1 Ham!/iil T", 
Praotioes: The 2004 Progress Report (2004, OECD). 0 represents co·operative tax lIavens. e 
rej1resents un-cooperating tax havens. 
ss Financial Action Task Force, Annual Review aINon-Cooperative COlmh'ies OJ' Territories (Paris: 
FATF, 2004) . ...J represents countries or territories which co-operated in tlie figlit against money 
laundering; x represents non~cooperative, 
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,~-~~ -_........._--,--
.~~ychelles 
8tLucia 
,-=--:'::c-=--..,- .. -;;-~--;----
8t Cluistopher & Nevis 
8t Vincent and tile Grenadines 
"-----.---_ ... _---.-----"" 
Tonga 
Turks & Caicos 
.O=-c------
US ViTgin Island::=s __ 
Vanuatu 
o 
o 'i 
o 
o 
o I 
o 
474 
Bibliography 
Books 
AlldIidge, Peter, Money Laundering Law (2003) 
Antoine, Rose-Marie, Confidentiality ill Offshore Financial Law (2002) 
Amokl, Brian J. and Dibout, Patrick, "General Report" Cahiel's De Droit Fiscal 
international, Volume LXXXVlb, Limits on the use of low-tax regimes by 
lIlultinational businesses: clIl'l'enlmeaSlIl'eS and emerging trends (2001) 
Bartholomew, G W, 'English Law in Partibus Orientalium' in A J Harding (ed), The 
COlllmon Law in Singapore and Malaysia (1986) 
Bassiouni, M Cherif and Gualtieri, David S, 'Intemational and National Responses to 
the Globalisation of Money Laundering' ill Savona, Ernesto U. (ed) Responding 10 
Money Laundering: International Perspectives (1997) 
Baxendale-Walker, Paul, 'OECD Demands and International Law' in The OFC 
Report 2004 (2004) 
Bennett, Tim, Tolley's lntel'l1ational Initiatives Affecting Financial Havens (2001) 
Bentley, Duncan (cd), Taxpayers' Rights: An International Perspective (1998) 
Birks, Peter, Laundering and Tracing (1995) 
Biswas, R, 'Inh'oduction: Globalisation, Tax Competition and Economic 
Development' in R Biswas (cd), Intel'l1atiol1al Tax Competition: Globalisation and 
Fiscal Sovereignty (2002) 
Blum, Jack, Financial Havens, Banking Secrecy and Money-Laundering (1998) 
Brooks, M and Head, J G, 'Tax Avoidance: In Economics, Law and Public Choice' in 
G S Cooper (ed), Tax Avoidance and the Rule of Law (1997) 
Brooks, Neil, 'The Role of Judges' in G.S. Cooper (cd), Tax Avoidance and the Rule 
o.f Law (1997) 
Campbell, Delmis, illternational Bank Secrecy (1992) 
Chambost, E, Bank Accolll1ts: A World Guide to Confidentiality (1983) 
Cooper, Graeme S, Tax Avoidance and the Rule of Law (1997) 
Dale, Richard, TIle Regulation ofIntel'l1ationai Banking (1984) 
Dressler, loshua, Cases and Materials 0/1 Criminal Law (3fd cd, 2003) 
477 
Easson, Alex, Taxation of Foreign Direct Investment: An Inlrodllction (1999) 
East Asia Analytical Unit, Depaliment of Foreign Afthirs and Trade (Australia), 
Asia's Financial Markets (1999) 
Fong, Yvonne, 'Financial Markets in Asia' in The OFC Report 2004 (2004) 
Gaffney, Mason, International Tax Competition: Harmful or Benei1cial? (1998) 
Ginsberg, Anthony Sanfield, Tax Havens (1991 ) 
Golding, .len, Laidlow, Philip and Stibbard, Paul, Tolley's Tax Havens (3,d ed, 2000) 
Gough, Leo, Going OjfShore (1995) 
Greider, William, Secrets of the Temple: How the Federal Reserve Runs the COIlI1t1y 
(1989) 
(hubert, Harry, 'Tax PlamJing by Companies and Tax Competition by Governments: 
Is There Evidence of Changes in BehaviorT in James R I-lines .11', (cd), Intel'l1ational 
Taxation and Multinational Activity (2001) 
Hampton, Mark P, The Ojfshore Intelface: Tax Havens in the Global Economy (1996) 
Harris, Loma and MUl1'ay, Christopher, Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (2000) 
Haufler, Andreas, Taxation in a Global Economy (200 I) 
Hayton, D J, The Law o.fTl'IIsls (2nd ed, 1993) 
Hinterseer, Kris, Criminal Finance: 7/1e Political Economy of Money Laundering in a 
Comparative Legal Context (2002) 
Hollander, Samuel, Classical Economics, (1987) 
International Fiscal Association (cd), CaMel'S De Droit Fiscal International, Volume 
lXXXVIla, Form and substance in tax law (2002) 
International Fiscal Association (ed), Cahiers De Droit Fiscal International, Volume 
LXXXVllb, The tax treatment o.f tramfer of residence by individuals (2002) 
Kapsteill, Ethan, Governing the Global EconolllY: Intel'l1ationai Finance and the State 
(1996) 
Kindleberger, Charles P, Manias, Panics and Crashes: A His/my of Financial Crises 
(1996) 
KPMG Financial Engineering, The Luxelllbourg 1929 Holding Company and the 
Societe de Participation Financiere (SOPARFI) (2000) 
478 
Latter, Tony, Handbooks in Central Banking No. 12: Callses and Management of 
Banking CI'I~ves (1997) 
Lehmarm, G and Coleman, C, Taxation Law in Australia (4U1 ed, 1996) 
Levi, Michael, Customer Confidentiality, l\Joney-Laundering, and Police-Bank 
Relationships: English Law and Practice in a Global Environment (1991) 
Mayer, Martin, The Bankers: The Next Generation (1998) 
McCracken, Sheelagh, Banking and Finance in Singapore: The Legal Framework 
(1993) 
Moffat, Graham, 1/'/lsls Law (2nd ed, 1994) 
Morrissey, Helena, International Secl//'itisation (1992) 
Naylor, R T, HoI Money and the Politics of Debt (1987) 
Neate, Francis and McCormick, Roger (cds), Bank Corifidentiality (1990) 
Neate, Francis and McCormick, Roger (eds), The Law of Confidentiality (1990) 
NOlion, Joseph, Devising International Bank SupervisOly Standards (1995) 
Oakley, Anthony, Constructive Trusts (1997) 
Parkinson and Howalih, Trust Creation: Law and Practice (2000) 
Poh Chu Chai, Law of Banking Singapore (1 st ed, 1989) 
Santangelo, Betty, Lorah, Tim O'Neal and Murray, Megan Elizabeth, Anti-Money 
Laundering Provisions of the USA Patriot Act 2001 (2002) 
Schneider, Jerome, The Complete Guide to QIf.~ho/'e Money Havens (1996) 
S01101es, Myron S, Wolf.~on, Mark A, Erickson, Merle, Maydew, Edward Land 
Shevlin, Terry, Taxes and Business Strategy: A Planning Approach (2nd ed, 2002) 
Sen, Anlartya, Development as Freedom (200 1 ) 
Shaviro, Daniel, 'Some Observations Concerning Multijurisdictional Tax 
Competition' ill D C Esty and D Geradin (eds) Regulatory Competition and Economic 
Integration: Comparative Perspectives (2001) 
Slemroti, Joe1., 'Tax Principles in an International Economy' in M Boskin and C E 
McLure Jl' (eds) World Tax Reforl/1 (1990) 
479 
Soh Kce Bun, 'Banking Secrecy and Taking Evidence Abroad', Vol IX of the 
Singapore Conferences on International Business Law series, Current Developlllent.~ 
in International Banking and Cmpomte Financial Operations (1989) 
Spitz, BatTY, Inlel'l1ational Tax Havens Guide (1999) 
Stessens, Guy, Money Laundering: A New Intel'l1ational Law Enforcement Model 
(2000) 
Strong, Simon, White Wash: Pablo Escobar and the Cocaine Wars (1995) 
Tan, Angela, Sng Gek Nco Jennifer and Tan How Teek, Singapore Mastel' Tax Guide 
2002 (2002) 
Tanzi, Vito, Taxation in an Integrating World (1995) 
Tanzi, Vito, 'Is There a Need for a World Tax Organization?' in A Razin and E Sadka 
(cds) The Economics 0/ Globalization: Policy Perspectives From Public Economist 
(1999) 
Tanzi, Vito and H H Zec, 'Can InfOlmatioll Exchange be Effective in Taxing Cross-
Border Income Flows?' in K Andersson, P Melz and C Silfverberg (eds) Modern 
issues in the Law a/International Taxation (200 I) 
Underhill and Hayton, Law a/Trllsts and Tl'IIstees (l5!h ed, 1995) 
Warbnrton, Peter, Debt and Delusion (2000) 
WOOD, Walter (ed), 1718 Singapore Legal System (1989) 
Yap, Angeline, 'Singapore' in Campbell, Dennis (cd) intel'l1ational Bank Secrecy 
(1992) 
480 
 Pel'iodicals, Journals, Newspapers & Reports 
Alford, Duncan E, 'Anti-Money Laundering Regulations: A Burden on Financial 
Institutions' (1991) 19 North Carolina JOl/mal of International Lmy and Commercial 
Regulation 452 
Alldridge, Peter, 'Reforming the Criminal Law of Corruption' (2000) 11 Criminal 
Lml' Forum 287 
Allen, William, I/Ilpact of Terrorists Activity 0/1 Financial Services (2001) Bahamas 
Financial Services Board 
<http://www.bfsb-bahamas.com/llcwsdetail.lasso?id=33072> at 3 November 2003 
The Association of Banks in Singapore, Guidelines 011 Prevention of Money 
Laundering (2001 ABS) 
Avi-Yonah, Reuven S, 'World-Class Tax Evasion' (2000) 11 l11e American Prospect 
Avi-Yonah, Reuven S, 'Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the 
Welfare State' (2000) 113 Harvard Law Review 1575 
A vi-Yonah, Reuven S, 'Tax, Trade and Harmful Tax Competition: Reflections on the 
FSC Controversy (Foreign Sales Corporation)' (2000) 21 Tax Notes International 
2841 
Avi-Yonuh, Reuven S, 'For Haven's Sake: Reflections on Inversion Transactions' 
(2002) 27 Tax Notes International 225 
Bacile, Salvatore, and Aguilar, Alvaro, Comments of the New World Trends 10 
Enforce Access to Banking Infofmalion with Tax PlII]Joses (2003) The American 
Chamber of Commerce and Industly of Panama (AMCHAM) 
<http://www.panamcham.com> at 3 November 2003 
Bagness, Kyle and Staiger, Robert W, 'Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Bilateral 
Opportunism and the Rules of GATT/WTO' (2004) 63 Journal of International 
Economics I 
'Bahamas Gets Positive IMF Report' (2003) 8 Ojjshore Red: An OFC News Update 
124 
Bailhache Labesse, The Regulation of Financial Services over the Internet in Jersey 
(2001) <http://www.bailhache.comlnews/briefingslregulationoffinancial.htm> at 3 
November 2003. 
Baker & McKenzie, 'Switzerland and United States Sign Tax InfOlmation Exchange 
Agreement', lntemational Tax, Asia Pacific, FebrualY 2003, in Baker & McKenzie, 
Eight AmlUal International Tax and Trusts Training Course, Singapore, September 
2003 
481 
Banks, Amanda, Sanders Renews Attack on OECD (2003) Tax-News.com 
<http://www.tax-news.com/asp/storylstOly.asp?stOlyname= 10447> at 10 July 2004. 
Barker, William B, 'Optimal International Taxation and Tax Competition: Overcome 
the Contradictions' (2002) 22 Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business 
Barnard, Johan, 'Fonner Tax Havens Prepared to Lift Bank Secrecy' (2003) 57 
Bulletin international Bureau of Fiscal Docl/mentation 9 
Barrett, Richard W, 'Confi'onting Tax Havens, the Offshore Phenomenon, and Money 
Laundering' (1997) 23 International Tax .Iollrnal12 
Bm1lett, Bl1lce, Europe's Undergrollnd Economies (1998) National Centre for Policy 
Analysis <http://www.ncpa.org/balba278.html> at 10 July 2004 
'Batch of New Financial Laws Passed in the Cook Islands' (2003) 8 Ojf.vho/'e Red: An 
OFC News Update 103 
Bates, Chris, 'European Regulatory Reform: The Pace Quickens' (2003) 18 
But/e/,1I'0rlhs ./ollrnal of International Banking and Financial Law 121 
BBC News, China Veto Angers HK Democrats (2004) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uklgo/pr/fr/-/2/hilasia-pacific/3602921.stlu> at 10 May 2004 
Bell, Kevin A, 'U.S., British VU'gin Islands Sign Tax Information Exchange 
Agreement' (2002) Tax Notes Inlemational 
Bierce, William, Staying Afloat When Going Offshore (2002) Optimize 
<hltp:llwww.optimizemag.com/article/show Article.jhtml?ru1icle1d= 17700722> at 3 
November 2003 
Blackman, Matt, Still In the Line of Fire (1999) Offshore Attack of Tax Havens by 
OECD <http://www.goldhaven.com/LincofFire.htrn> at 3 November 2003 
'I.R.S. to Seek Visa Cards Data', TIle New York TImes (New York), 30 March 2002, 
section C p. 2 
Brown, Karen B., 'Harmful Tax Competition: The OECD View' (1999) 32 George 
Washington Journal of intemational Lml' and Economics 311 
USA President George W. Bush, Executive Order on Terrorist FinanCing (200!) The 
White House <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/091200 1 0924-1.html> 
at 14 May 2004 
Blum, Jack, Levi, Michael, Naylor, Thomas and Williams, Phil, Financial Havens, 
Banking Secrecy and Money Laundering (1998 United Nations Office for Dmg 
Control and Crime Prevention under the Auspices of the Global Progrrumnc against 
Money Laundering) 
482 
Boland, Vincent, 'Trading in UK Gilts under Sel1ltiny', Financial Times (London), 10 
August 1999 
Bosworth-Davis, Rowan, 'Deviant Legitimacy - A Theory of Financial Crime' (J996) 
4 JOlll'l1al of Financial Crime 
Brinker Jr, Thomas M and Shennan, W Richard, 'Comparing the US, OECD and UN 
Model Tax Conventions' (2003) 57 JOlll'l1ai of Financial Service Professionals 68 
'BVl Launches New Package ofInsolvency and TlUsts Regulation' (2003) 8 Offihol'e 
Red: An OFC News Update 98 
Carlberg, Christopher K, 'A lluly Level Playing Field tOI' lntcmational Business: 
Improving the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery llsing Clear Standards' 
(2003) 26 Boston College Intel'l1ational and Comparative Law Review 9S 
Carla, Del Ponte and Peter, Eigcn, World Economic ForuIIl Knowledge Navigator -
Dirty 01' Hot Money 01' 'only' lax evasion? (2000) World Economic Forum 
<http://www.wefol1lm.ol'g> at 10 May 2004 
Chetcuti, Jean-Philippe, 'Compliance vs Competitiveness: Adapting to the new 
intemationallegai order' (2002) 
<http://www.ehetcuticauchi.com/jpc/research/Offshol.e-onshore.htm> at 3 November 
2003 
'China Wavers on Hong Kong's Off:~hore Activities' (2003) 8 Offi;liol'e Red: An OFe 
News Update 122 
Ching, Cheong, 'China Warns IlK; DOll't Stray Too Far', The Straits 1I111es 
(Singapore) 18 February 2004, 1 
The Coalition Information Centers, The Global War on Terrorism - The First 100 
Days (2001) The White House 
<http://www.whitehouse.govinews/releasesI200 1112/1 OOdayrcpOli.html> at 9 
November 2003 
Cohn, Laura and Fairlamb, David, Swiss Banks: Paradise Lost (2003) BusincssWeek 
Online 
<http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/contentl03_43/b3855183_mz035.htm> at 3 
November 2003. 
Collins, Jeffrey G, Questions and Answers about the USA PATlUOT Act (2003) US 
Depruiment of Justice <http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/mie/ctulFAQ_Patl.iot.htm> at 3 
November 2003 
Cooper, Peter J, Interview with Alex Widmer (United Arab Emirates, 3 February 
2001) 
Cowell, Alan and Andrews, Edmund, 'The Isle of Man as an Enclave of Intrigue', The 
New York Times (New York) 24 September J 999, section C p. I 
483 
Dagan, Tsilly, 'The Costs of Intel'llational Tax Cooperation' (Research Paper No 13, 
University of Michigan Law, 2002) 
Daly, Michael and Weinel', Joann, 'Corporate Tax Harmonization and Competition in 
Federal Countries: Some Lessons for the European Community?' (1993) 46 National 
Tax Journal 441 
DemlY, Charlotte, G7 Approves Plan to Choke Terral' }ll11ds (2001) Guardian 
Unlimited <http://www.guardian.co.uk/waronterroristory/0.1361.558233.00.html> at 
3 November 2003 
Desai, Mihir A, Are We Racing to the Bottom? Evidence on the Dynamics of 
International Tax Competition (1998) Mihir Desai's Publications and Working Papers 
<http://www.people.hbs.edu/mdesai/RACING.PDF> at 10 July 2004 
Deutsche Welle, EU Agrees on Taxing Foreign-Earned interest (2003) 
<http://www.dw-world.de/english/0.3367.1431_A_885626 _1_ A,OO.html> at 10 July 
2004 
Diamond, Walter II and Diamond, Dorotlly B, Panama as a Tax Haven Sovereign 
Management SelVices, S A 
<http://www.ofishore-protection.com/panamaHaven.html> at 3 November 2003 
Diamond, Walter H and Diamond, Dorotlly B, The United States as an Offshore 
Centre? (2002) T11lsts & Tlustees 
<http://www.trusts-and-trustees.comitrends/td_vB _iss2.html> at 28 April 2004 
Dinmgiba, Dellllis G, 'Recent Developments Affecting the Private Banking Industry 
in Key Jurisdictions -... Philippines' (2003) Bakel' & McKenzie, Eight Annual 
Intemational Tax and Trusts Training Course, Singapore 
Doebcle, Justin, Taking Shelter (2003) Forbes Global 
<http://www.iorbes.comlglobaI/2003/0901/023.htmi.> at 3 November 2003 
Donlevy-Rosen & Rosen, P A, Prevention of Money Laundering (2000) The Asset 
Protection News <http://www.assetprotectiollllews.comlapn9-2-fr.html> at 3 
November 2003 
Duke, J Richard, Cayman Exchange of Ilifi)/'/l/atiol1 Agreement (2002) T11lsts & 
Trustees <http://www.trusts-and-trustees.com/trends/tdv8jss2.html> at 28 April 
2004. 
Dwyer, Terence and Dwyer, Deborah, 1/'ansparcncy versus Privacy Reflections on 
OECD Concepts of Unfttir Tax Competition (2002) Center for Freedom and 
Prosperity <http://www.freedomandprosperity.org/PapersfDwyerkhvyel'.shtml> ·at 3 
November 2003 
D\vyer, Tel1'Y, 'The New Fiscal Imperialism' (2002) 18(4) Policy 12 
484 
Dycr, Andrew, de Juniac, Christian, Holley, Bruce M, and Aerni, Victor, Winning in a 
Challenging Market: Global Wealth 2003 (2003 The Boston Consulting Group) 
Easson, Alex, 'Harmonization of Direct Taxation in the European Community: from 
Neumark to Ruding' (1992) 40 Canadian Tax Journal 600 
Easson, Alex, 'Reporting Offshore Assets' (1996) 6 Canadian Current Tax 76 
Easson, Alex, 'Tax Competition Heats IIp in Central Europe' (1998) 52 Bulletin for 
International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation 192 
Easson, Alex, 'The OECD Recommendations on Harmful Tax Competition' (1998) 8 
Canadian Clll'rent Tax 109 
Easson, Alex, 'Tax Incentives for Foreign Investors' (1998) 42 Bulletin for 
International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation 467 
Easson, Alex, 'Tax Havens under Fire' (J 999) 9 Canadian Current Tax 62 
Easson, Alex, 'Tax Competitiveness' (J 999) 9 Canadian CUITent Tax 74 
Easson, Alex, 'The Tax Competition Controversy' (1999) 18 Tax Noles international 
371 
Easson, Alex, 'Do We Still Need Tax Treaties?' (2000) 54 Bnlletin for International 
Fiscal Documentation 619 
Easson, Alex, 'Countering Hannfhl Tax Competition', in International Fiscal 
Association (Canadian Branch), International Tax Seminal' (Kingston, ON: 
International Fiscal Association (Canadian Branch), 2000) 
Easson, Alex, 'Entity Entitlement to Treaty Benefits: A Conceptual Approach to 
Some Practical Problems', in Special Seminal' on Canadian Tax 1)'eaties: Policy and 
Practice (Kingston, ON: International Fiscal Association (Canadian Branch) 2001) 
Easson, Alex, 'Tax Incentives tor Foreign Direct Investment Pmi 2: Design 
Considerations' (2001) 55 Bulletin for intel'l1ational Bureau of Fiscal Docllmentation 
365 
Easson, Alex, 'Tax Incentives for Foreign Direct Investment Part I: Recent Trends 
and Countertrends' (2001) 55 Bulletin for international Bureau of Fiscal 
Documentation 2GG 
Easson, Alex, 'Harmful Tax Competition: An Evaluation of the OECD Initiative' 
(2004) 34 Tax Notes international 1037 
Economic Review Committee, Sub-Committee 011 Selvices Industries, Financial 
Selvices Working Group, Positioning Singapore as a Pre-eminent Financial Centre 
in Asia (2002 Ministry of Trade and Industry (Siugapore)) 
485 
The Economist, 'The Hitchhiker's Guide to Cybernomics: A Survey of the World 
Economy' 28 September 1996 
The Economist, 'Gimme Shelter' 29 January 2000 
Eggert, Wand Kolmar, M, 'Information Sharing, Multiple Nash Equilibria, and 
Asymmetric Capital-Tax Competition' (Working Paper No 02-01, Economic Policy 
Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen, 2002) 
The Egmol1t Group, 'Financiallntclligence Units ofthe World' (2004) 
<http://www.egmontgroup.org/>at 10 July 2004. 
Eigen, Peter, 'Opening Statement on the Release of New Anti-Money Laundering 
Guidelines' (press Release, 30 October 2000) 
Ellis and Pisani, 'The United States Treaties on Mutual Assistance in Criminal 
Matters: A Comparative Analysis' (1985) 19 International Lawyer 189 
Elliot, Stikeman, Towards a Level Playing Field- Regulating C0I1JOrate Vehicles in 
Cross-Border I)'ansactions (2002 Society of Trust and Estate Practitioners) 
Enayat, Maryam, Tax Bits Intel'llational: Free Bulletins (2001) Tax Analysts 
<http://www.tax.org> at 10 July 2004. 
Financial Action Task Force, Annual Report 1998-1999 (1999 FATF). 
Financial Action Task Force, Review to Identify Non-Cooperative Countries 01' 
Territories: Increasing the Worldwide Effectiveness of Anti-Money Laundering 
Measures (2000 F AlT) 
Financial Action Task Force, Annual Review of Non-Cooperative Countries 01' 
Territories (2002 F ATF) 
Financial Action Task Force, Annllal Report 2001-2002 (2002 FATF). 
Financial Action Task Force, Annual Review of Non-Cooperative COllntries 01' 
Territories (2003 FATF') 
Financial Action Task Force, The Forty Recommendations (2003 FATF) 
Financial Action Task Force, NCCT Initiative (2004) 
<http://wwwl.oecd.orgffatf/NCCT.cn.htm> at 10 June 2004 
Financial Action Task Force, Singapore <http://\vwwl.oecd.org/fatf/Ctl'Y-
ol'gpages/ctry-sgen.htm> at 3 November 2003 
Financial Stahility Forum, Report of the Working Group on Capital FlolI's (2000 FSF) 
Financial Stability Forum, Report of the Working Group on 0.f!\'hore Centres (2000 
FSF) 
486 
Financial Stability Forum, 'Financial Stability FOlum Releases Grouping of Offshore 
Financial Centres (OFCs) to Assist in Setting Priorities for Assessment' (Press 
Release, 26 May 2000) 
Financial Stability Forum, Financial Stability ForI/III: What We Do (2004) 
<http://www.fsforum.org/abollt!what_we_do.html> at 10 July 2004 
TIle Island Sun Newspaper, Financial Services Commission Holds First Board 
Meeting (2002) British Virgin Islands Island Sun Newspaper 
<http://www.islandsun.com!2002-JlIne/07062002/I0caI2-v8ill.html> at 3 November 
2003 
Foust, Dean, {f This Sqfety Net Snaps, Who Pays? (1998) Business Week 
<hltp:llwww.businessweekcom!1998!l7/b3575005.htm> at 3 November 2003 
Ghosh, Abhijit, No COllntlY Wins in Hal'mjul Tax Competition (2000) 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (Singapore) 
<http://www.pwc.com!exlweb/ncinthencws.nsfJdocidID85BBCE272CE73F28525688 
E00214E8F> at 3 November 2003 
Godfrey, Mike, US li'easlllY to Review Proposed blfol'lI/alion Exchange Rules (2001) 
Tax-News.com <http://www.tax-news.com/asp/story/story.asp?stOlyname=4289> at 3 
November 2003 
Goodspeed, Timothy J, 'Tax Competition, Benefit Taxes, and Fiscal Federalism' 
(1998) 60 National Tax JOlll'llal 579 
Gouldel', Robert, 'OECD Official Previews Futnre Changes to Model Treaty 
Commentaries' (2003) 30 Tax Notes Internationai972 
Greene, Caroline A A, 'lntemational Securities Law Enforcement: Recent Advances 
in Assistance and Cooperation' (1994) 27 Vanderbilt J01l1'l1ai oj Transnational Law 
635 
Grob, Michael, Michaels, Marnin J, Marcovici, Philip, GClTits, Paul and .T arrett, 
Stephanie, The EU Saving Directive and its Impact on the Banking IndlistlY (2003 
Tax Planuing International, Baker & McKenzie) 
Gurule, Jinuny, 'The 1988 UN Convention against illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and 
psychotropic substances - a ten year perspective: is international co-operation merely 
i!lUSOlY' (1988) 22 Fordham International Law .10111'11((174 
Gllstitus, Linda, Bean, Elise and Roach, Robert, Correspondent Banking: A Gateway 
jor Money Laundering (2001) United States Dcpartment of State 
<http://usinfo.statc.gov(journals/ites/0501lijeellevin.htm> at 10 July 2004 
Gyandoh, Mark L, 'Foreign Evidence Gathering: What Obstacles Stand in the Way of 
Justice' (2001) 15 Tempie International and Comparative Law JOIl/'l1a/ 81 
487 
Hammer, Richard M, 'The OECD's Hannful Tax Competition Project' (2003) 32 Tax 
ManagemenlIntel'l1alionai JO/l/'l1a/ 85 
Hale, David, 'Ten Things to Watch in 2000', The Economist: The World in 2000, 
JanualY 2000 
Harpum, Charles, 'AccessOlY Liability for Procuring or Assisting a Breach of Trust' 
(1995) 111 Lmv Quarterly Review 545 
Hasseldine, John, 'Increasing Voluntary Compliance: The Case of Tax Anmesties' 
(1989) 6 Australian Tax ForI/ill 509 
Haupt, Alexander and Peters, Wolfgang, Restricting Preferential Tax Regimes to 
Avoid Hal7lzjill Tax Competition (2004) Institutional Design of Federal Systems: 
Theory and Empirical Evidence (SPP 1142) 
<http://www.zeLde/federalismlindex.html> at 10 July 2004 
Hay, Richard J, 'Tax Information Exchange; A Rethink, After the EU Savings Tax 
Directive' (2003) supplement to 10(1) Trusts & 1}'ustees 
Hetherington-Gore, Jeremy, The Bahamas - Part ll: The Third Pillar (2001) Bahamas 
Special Report <http;/lwww.lowtax.uetllmvtax/htmlljbaspec2.htm> at 10 July 2004 
Hibbert, Tom, 'Dishonesty and Knowledge of Accessories and Recipients' (2000) 15 
JOllrnal of International Banking Law 
Hines Jr, James R, 'Lessons from Behavioral Responses to International Taxation' 
(1999) 52 National Tax JOlll'l1al30S 
Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office (Washington, DC), (2002) 6(6) Hong Kong 
Circle 
The ILS Group, Around the World (2002) <http://www.ils-
world.com/newsletterl42/world.shtml> at 10 July 2004 
'IMF Savages Vanuatu in Recent RepOlt' (2003) 8 Offi;hore Red: An OFC News 
Update 127 
Inland Revenue (United Kingdom), Countering Cross-Border Tax Evasion by 
Individuals <http://www.inlandrevenlle.gov.uk/esd/> at 10 July 2004 
Intel'llational Business Formation Inc, Changes in the British Virgin Islands 
Concel'l1ing Bearer Shares and Director Requirements (2003) 
<http://www.ibcf.com/news/llews050S03-BVI-bearer-shares.html> at 28 April 2004 
International Monetary Fund, OfJ.vhore Financial Centres - The Assessment Program 
- An Update (2004) <http://www.imf.orgiexternallnp/mfdI2004/cngI031204.htm> at 
10 July 2004. 
488 
International Monetary Fund, qlfthore Financial Centres IMF Background Paper 
(2000 IMF) 
International Monetary Fund, qlftlw/'e Financial Centres T71e Role of the IMF (2000 
Th1F) 
International Monetary Fund, Ojj~'hore Financial Centre Program: A Progress Report 
(2002IMF) 
International Monetary Fund, Vanuatu - Assessment of the Supervision and 
Regulation of the Financial Sector, Volume 1: Review of Financial Sector Regulation 
and Supen';sion (2003 IMF) 
International Monetary Fund, Singapore: Financial System Stability Assessment, 
including Reports on the Obsen'ance of Standards and Codes on the following topics: 
Banking Supen';sion, Insurance Regulation, Securities Regulation, Payment and 
Settlement Systems, Monctmy and Financial Policy Transparency, and Anti-Money 
Laundering (2004 IMF) 
International Organisation of Securities Commissions, Report on Money Laundering 
(1998) <http://www.oecd.Ol'g/fatfJIOSCO> at 7 November 2003 
Jersey Financial Services Commission, the Office ofthe Data Pl'Otection Registrar, the 
Law Officers' Department, and the Joint Financial Crimes Unit, Anti-Money 
Laundering Legislation and the Data Protection (Jel'seJ~ Law 1987, Guidance for 
Financial Sen'ices Businesses (2003 Jersey Financial Services Commission) 
'Jersey Issues Report on Company Data' (2003) 8 Offihore Red: An OFC News 
Update 101 
Johnson, Jackie, 'Blacklisting: Initial Reactions, Responses and Repercussions' (2001) 
4 JOIIl'llal of Money Laundering Control 21 I 
Johnston, David Cay, 'IRS Says Offshore Tax Evasion is Widespread', The Nell' York 
Times (New York) 26 March 2002, section A p. I 
Jolmston, Keith, 'Changing the Rules of the Game' (2003) 11(1) The STEP JOIII'IJal 
16 
Joint Anti-Money Laundering Coordinating Committee, Guidance Notes 011 the 
Prevention of Money Laundering, British Virgin Islands, Anti-money Laundering 
Code Of Practice, 1999 (J 999 Joint Anti-Money Laundering Coordinating Committee) 
Joint Money Laundering Steering Group, Money Reporting Officers 1996 Seminar 
and Workshop, Consolidated Workshop Report (1996 Joint Money Laundering 
Steering Group) 
Kaplan, Barbara T and O'Brien, Patrick T, 'Secrecy Associated with Offshore 
Banking is Evaporating' (2002) 119 Banking Law JOIII'IJai736 
489 
Keen, Michael, 'Preferential Regimes Can Make Tax Competition Less Harmful' 
(2001) 54 National Tax Journal 757 
Kelly, W Raymond, HOllse Judicial)' Committee all Crime (1997) Committee on the 
Judiciary - Kelly Statement <http://www.hollse.gov/judiciary/367.htm> at 9 
November 2003 
Khanna, Vikram, 'S'pore an Alternative to Switzerland?', Business Times (Singapore), 
5 Nov 2003 
Khanna, Vikram, 'Tougher Times for Private Banking', Business Times (Singapore), 
5 Nov 2003 
King, Harlan W, 'The International Investment position of the United States at 
Yearend 2000' (2001) Survey oj'Current Business 7 
Kochbel'g, Cary, Getting 1'0111' Principles RighI - On New Regulations to Combat 
Money Laundering (2000) <http://www.accountancyage.comlNews/ll13604> at 7 
November 2003 
Koh, Francis, Lee, Choon Li, and Jindai, Parthsmthi, 'Singapore as an Emerging Hub 
for Wealth Management' (2003) November Pulses 16 
Kung, Peter, and Cheung, Bolivia, Tighter Tax and Duty Collection in PRC (2000) 
The Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce 
<hHp:/!www.chamber.org.hklinfo/the_bulletin/dec _2000/tighteI'.Rsp> at 7 November 
2003 
Lawless, David, The Savings Directive Miracle! (2003) PricewaterhouseCoopel's, 
Republic oflreland 
<http://v',;vlw.Jlwcglobal.comlExtweblsel'vice.nsf/docidl8B 1 B6AC49D9ABD3B80256 
CDF003F7 AE7> at 3 November 2003 
Levin, Mattias, T7w Prospects jar Offshore Financial Cenh'es (2000 The Centre for 
European Policy Studies) 
'Liechtenstein Gets Positive Report ji'Olll IMP' (2003) 8 Offshore Red: An OFC News 
Update 126 
Loyens & Loeff, 'Singapore' (2003) Asia Newslelter 13 
Louis, David, Blacklist (2000) Minden Gross 
<http://wvvw.mggg.com/publications/assets/mticle _ blacklist.pdf> at 7 July 2004 
Magnus, Stephanie, 'Singapore ··lmproving the Financial Services and Private Equity 
Industry' (2003) 18 Asia Pacific Legal Development Bulletin 12 
Mann, Frederick Alexander 'TIle Doctrine of International Jurisdiction Revisited 
After Twenty Years' (1984) 186 Reclteil Des COllI'S 9 
490 
Langer, Marshall J, Hal'lliful Tax Competition: Who are (he Real Tax Havens? (2000) 
Center for Frcedom and Prosperity 
<http://www.freedomandprosperity.ol'g/ A11icles!tniI2-18-00.pdf> at 7 November 
2003 
Masciandro, Donato and Filotto, Umbe110, 'Money Laundering Regulation and Bank 
Compliance Costs. What Do Your Customers Know? Economics and Italian 
Experience' (2001) 5 Journal of Money Laundering Control 133 
Masciandaro, Donalo and POI'tolano, Alessandro, 'It Takes Two to Tango: 
International Financial Regulation and OffShore Centres' (Working Paper No 1114, 
Universita di Leece Department of Economics, 2003) 
Mathavious, Robert, 'Overview of the Regulatory Environment in the BV!' (Speech 
delivered at the "The BVJ Advantage" Seminar held by the BV1 International Finance 
Centre, Singapore, 13 May 2(04) 
'Mauritius Toughens Laundering Rules' (2003) 8 Offshore Red: An OFC News 
Update 103 
Maysami, Cooper, Gan, Suet Lin, Seo, Slew Pheng, 'To Enter the Billion Dollar Club: 
Recent Reform in Singapore's Offshore Banking' (2001) 12 Joumal qr Banking and 
Finance Law and Practice 
McCarthy, lan, Hosting Qffshol'e Banks: Benefils and Costs (1979 IMP) 
Meier, S W, 'Bank Secrecy in Swiss and Intel11ational Taxation' (1973) 7 
International Lawyer 16 
Ministry of Law, Singapore & US Si&'11 Agreement on Co-operation Against Drug 
11'(lfficking (2000) Get For Me 
<http://www.getforme.comiprevious051100_USSil1gaporecooperateagainstdrllgtraf.ht 
m> at 7 November 2003 
Minority Staff of the U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee, investigations Report 011 
Correspol1denllJanking: A Gateway 10 Money Laundering (2001 Minority Staff of the 
U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee) 
Mitchell, Daniel .T, An OECD Proposal to Eliminate Tax Competition Would Mean 
Higher Taxes and Less Privacy (2000) The Heritage Foundation 
<http://www.heritage.orglReseal.chiTaxes/BG1395.cfm>at 7 November 2003 
Mitchell, Daniel J, Low-Tax Jurisdictions Are Not A10ney Laundering Havens -
Center for Fi'eedolll and Prosperity (2002) Cayman Net News 
<http://www.caymal1l1etnews.com/Archive! Arch ive%20Articl esl] anual'y%20200211 ss 
ue%20 I 43!LowTax.html> at 7 November 2003 
Mohr, Patti, 'President Bush Signs Extensive Money Laundering, Anti-Tel1'0l'ism 
Bill' (2001) Tax Noles intemational582 
491 
Monetary Authority of Singapore, Notice to Banks (2002) 
<http://www.mas.gov.sg/maslllcmlbinipt I Notice _ 626 _Guidelines _on_Prevention _ of 
_Money_Laundering.htm> at 10 July 2004. 
Money Laundering Report Office Switzerland, 5th Annual Report (2002 MROS). 
Manis-Cotterill, Nigel, 'Money Laundering' (2001) Foreign Policy 16 
MOl1'is, Gilbert N M 0, 'The Loss of Sovereignty, the United Nations, and Offshore 
Financial Centres' (2001) 10 Tax Notes Intel'l1ational1297 
Ernst & Young (Nassau), 'Mutual Funds in The Bahamas' (2003) 8 Ojfshore Red: An 
OFCNe1l's Update 138 
Neate, Francis, 'Bank Secrecy' (1979) 7 Intel'l1ationai Business Lmv 230 
Neocleous, Elias, Offshore Financial Centres - Recent developments (2002) 
at 7 Legal500.com <http://www.legaI500.com/devs/cYPl1ls/of/cyo(OOI.htm> 
November 2003 
'New Package of Laws Expands Range of Financial Services' (2003) 8 qjfi'hore Red: 
An OFC News Update .1 02 
Ng, Linda, Authorities Announce Details of 2003 Budget, Other Tax Measures (2003) 
Tax Notes International 
<http://www.whitecase.com!article_authorities_ aIillOUnCe_ budget_7_3 _ 03.pdf> at 10 
July 2004 
Nordea Bank S.A. Luxembourg, 'The EU Savings Tax Directive' (2003) 
<http://www.llordea.ch> at 7 July 2004 
O'Hanley, Stephanie Password Please (2001) Vault 
<http://www.ofcpublications.com!Indexiarticies/al.ljfOl-0028.html> at 9 
2003 
Magazine 
November 
O'Neill, Paul, 'Treasury Secretary O'Neill Statement on OECD Tax Havens' (Press 
Release, 10 May 2001) 
O'Neill, Paul H, 'Statement before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, OECD harmful Tax Practices Initiative' 
(Press Release, 18 July 2001) 
Oates, Wallace E, 'Fiscal Competition or Harmonization? Some Reflections' (2001) 
54 National Tax Journal 507 
Oberson, Xavier, 'The OEeD Model Agreement on Exchange of lnformation - a 
Shift to the Applicant State' (2003) 57 Bulletin for International Bureau of Fiscal 
Docl/mentation 14 
492 
'OECD Threatens Swiss Over Tax' (2003) 8 Ojjvhore Red: An OFC News Update 
100 
Mitchell, Daniel J, Low-Tax Jurisdictions Are Not Money Laundering Havens -
Center for Freedom and Prosperity (2002) Cayman Net News 
<http://wwv{.caymannetnews.com!Archive! Arclli ve%20 Articl esl J anuary%202002/1ss 
ue%20143/LowTax.html> at 7 November 2003 
qfJ the List bllt at What Price? (2001) Cayman Net News 
<http://W\vw.caymannetnews.com!Archi vel Arcluve%20Articiesl J une200 II1ssue91 ICo 
mmentary.i1tm1> at 7 November 2003 
Offshore Incorporations Limited, Due Diligence, Know YOllr Client Requirements and 
the Changing Face of Compliance (2002) Offshore Featnre <http://www.offshore-
inc.com> at 3 November 2003. 
Offshore lncorporations Limited, Ojjvhore Jurisdictions - Rear!y for Stand against 
OECD (2002) Asian Legal Business <ht1p;llwww.offshore-inc.com> at 3 November 
2003 
Olensnicky, Michael, 'Recent Developments Affecting the Private Banking lndustry 
in Key Jurisdictions . Hong Kong' (2003) Baker & McKenzie, Eight Annual 
lnternational Tax and Trusts Training Course, Singapore 
Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development, Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations (1995 OECD) 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, International Tax 
Avoidance and Evasion (1987 OECD) 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Harmful Tax Competition: 
An Emerging Global Issue (1998 OECD) 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Improving Access fa Bank 
Injormationfor Tax Purposes (2000 OECD) 
Organisation for Ecollomic Co-operation and Development, Towards Global Tax Co-
operation: Progress il1 Idenlifj'ing and Eliminating Harmful Tax Practices (2000 
OECD) 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD's Project 011 
Harmful Tax Practices: The 2001 Progress Report (2001 OECD) 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Tax and the Economy: A 
Comparative AsseSSllleilt of OECD COllntries, Tax Policy Studies No.6 (200 1 OECD) 
Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development, A Process for Achieving a 
Global Level Playing Field (2004 OECD) 
493 
Organisation fur Economic Co-operation and Development, GECD's Project on 
Harmful Tax Practices: The 2004 Pmgress Report (2004 OEeD) 
Organisation of American States, The Bahamian International Cooperation Regime 
for Criminal Matters (2000) 
<http://vvww.oas.org/jlll'idico/MLAlenlbhs/en_ bhs_llllat.html> at 7 July 2004 
Owens, Jeffrey, Towards World Tax Cooperation (2000) OECD Observer 
<htlp:llwww.oecdobserver.org/news/fullstory.php/aidI271> at 7 November 2003 
Policy Department ofOxfam (Great Britain), Oxfam 's Presentalionjol' UN Financing 
for Development NGO Hearings (2000) Global Policy Forum 
<http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/develop/2000/11000x.htm> at 7 Novembcr 
2003 
Policy Depatiment of Oxfam (Great Britain), Tax Havens: Releasing the Hidden 
Billions for Poverty Eradication (2002) ATTAC International 
<http://attac.org/fraitoiVdoc/oxfam2.htm> at 22 October 2003. 
Paget-Brown, I, 'Bank Confidentiality and Criminal Mattcrs: Cayman Islands and 
United States: Cooperative Development' (1988) 20 Case Western Reserve .tal/mal of 
lnternational Law 369 
Ron Paul, 'Paul Rencws Fight for Banking Privacy: Proposed Lcgislation Grants 
Dangerous Power to Federal Regulators' (press Release, July 19,2000). 
Paul, Ron, Opening Statement of Rep. Ron Paul, International Counter Money 
Laundering Act and Foreign Anticorruption Act of 2000 H R. 3886 (2000) House 
Committee on Financial Services (United States) 
<http://financialservices.honse.gov/banking/6800pau.htm> at 7 November 2003 
Pocock, Charles, Inforlllation Exchange (2001) Taxation 
<http://www.ebldirect.com/ebl/currenCawareness/dataitem.asp?ID=3474&tid=7> at 7 
November 2003 
Proctor, Kenneth W, USA Patriot Act and Anti-Money Laundering (2003) Bl'intech 
Inc <http://www.brintech.com> at 10 July 2004. 
Razin, Assaf and Sadka, Efraim, 'International Tax Competition and Gains from Tax 
Harmonization' (Working Paper No 3152, National Bureau of Economic Research, 
Inc, 1991) 
Recueil Systematique du Droit Federal, Federal Law Relating to Banks and Saving 
Banks, amcnded 134, 1991 
Research Centre on Transnational Crinlc - University of Trcnto, Transparency and 
Money Laundering: Study of the Regulation and its Impiementation in the EU 
Member States, that obstruct Anti-Money Laundering Intel'llationai Co-operation 
(2001 Rcsearch Centre on Transnational Crime - University ofTl'ento) 
494 
Reynolds, Bob, 'Editor's Note' (2003) 8 OffShore Red: An ()FC News Update 129 
Reynolds, Bob, 'Editor's Note' (2003) 8 Offshore Red: An OFC News Update 153 
Rider, BatTy, 'The Limits of the Law: An Analysis of the Interrelationship of the 
Criminal and Civil Law in the Control of Money Laundering' (1999) 2 Journal 0/ 
Money Laundering Conh'ol 
Roin, Julie, 'Competition and Evasion: Another perspective on International Tax 
Competition' (2001) 89 Georgetown Law Journal 543 
Rossant, John, Capell, KelTY, Ewing, Jack, Edmondson, Gail and Magnuson, Paul, 
Now, 'A Difjel'ent Kind 0/ War' (2001) BusinessWeek Online 
<http://europe.businessweek.com/magazine/content/Ol __ 49/b3760708.htm> at 3 
November 2003 
Salinas, Javier G, 'The OECD Tax Competition Initiative: A Critique of its Merits ill 
the Global Marketplace' (2003) 25 Hal/stan JOllmal o/lntemational Law 531 
Sanders, Ronald Michael, 'The Fight Against Fiscal Colonialism - The OECD and 
Small Jurisdictions' (2002) 365 The ROllnd Table: The Commonwealth Journal 0/ 
[nlemational AfJail's 325 
Sanders, Ronald Michael, 'The OECD's 'Harmful Tax Competition' Scheme: The 
Implications For Antigua And Barbuda', presented at the luncheon meeting of the 
Antigua and Barbuda Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 27 March 200! 
Sandford, Cedric, 'International Comparison of Administrative and Compliance Costs 
of Taxation' (1994) II Allstrali(f}1 Tax FOl'II111291 
Santangelo, Betty, Analysis o/Anti-Money Laundering Provisions (if US,/l Patriot Act 
(200 I) Securities Industry Association 
<http://vl'ww.sia.com/moneyLaundering/pdVusPatriot.pdt> at 7 November 2003 
Schroth, Peter W, 'Bank Confidentiality and the War on Money Laundering in the 
United States' (1994) 42 American JOlll'l1al o/Comparative Lmv 369 
Scott, Cordia, 'As OECD Tax Haven Deadline Passes, Many Countries Hold Out' 
(2002) 94 Tax Notes 1099 
Sedore, F Roy, Michaels, Manrin J and Assai', Sahel, How the US Focus on Tax 
Shelters Affects Non-US Bank~ (2003) International Tax Review 
<htlp:llwww.intemationaltaxreview.com> at 9 November 2003 
Sen, Samanta, (?f{shore Tax Havens Reject Calls for Transparency (2001) Third 
World Network <http://www.twnside.org.sg> at 9 November 2003 
Shelton, Cyntiria, Michaels, Marnin J, Jarrett, Stephanie and Berdoz, Denis, 
'Switzerland and US Agree to Swap Tax Information' (2003) Journal o/International 
Taxation 
495 
Shmma, Sanjay, 'Dilty Money: How the UK Secnrities and Derivatives Markets are 
used to Launder Mouey' (2001) 4 JOlll'l1al of Money Laundering Control 
Sharp, Sr, William M, Hanison Ill, William T, Harty, and Scott A, 'Post-ll 
September Use of Offshore Tax Havens: The Dos and Don'ts' (2002) 26 Tax Notes 
International 3 51 
Sharp, Sr, William M, Harrison 1Il, William T, Luusford, Rachel A, Harty, and Scott 
A, 'U.S. Tax Information Exchange Agreements: A Comparative Analysis' (2002) 97 
Tax Notes 827 
Sieker, Steven, 'Offshore Financial Centers and 'Harmful Tax Competition': The 
Year 2000 ill Review' (2001) 22 Tax Notes Intel'l1ational557 
Sikka, Prem, 'The Role Of Offshore Financial Centres In Globalization' (2003) 6(4) 
J01ll'l1al of Money Laundering Control 311 
Society for Advanced Legal Studies Anti-Corruption Working Group, Banking on 
Corruption: The Legal Responsibilities of Those Who Handle the Proceeds of 
Corruption (2000 Society for Advanced Legal Studies) 
Stanley, Christopher, 'Speculation on the Conflict of Discourse: Finance, Crime and 
Regulation' (1996) 4 JOI//'I1a/ of Financial Regulation and Compliance 242 
Stiglitz, Joseph E, 'The General Theory of Tax AvoidmlCe' (1985) 38 National Tax 
JOIIl'l1a/325 
StrafeI', G Richard, 'Money Laundering: the Crime of the '90s" (\989) 27 American 
Criminal Law Review 149 
Stratton, Sheryl, 'Identity Privilege Pits Shelter Clients against Accounting Finns' 
(2003) 98 Tax Notes 168 
Stibbard,Paul, 'Thrivhlg in a Transparent World - Understanding Clients' Needs' 
(2003) Baker & McKenzie, Eight Annual Intemational Tax and TlUsts Training 
Course, Singapore 
Strong, Ben, 'Civil Asset Recovery Procedmes: How Equity Deters Fraud' (1992) 13 
The Company Lawyer 
Sweetman, Simon, Where will il All End? (200 1) 
<http://www.simonsweetman.eo.uklwhere-will-it-all-end.htm> at 7 July 2004 
'Swiss Tax Decision could see Singapore Shine as a Haven' (2003) 8 Offshore Red: 
An OFC News Update 175 
SwissIllfo, Ell Tax Deal Leaves Swiss Banking Secrecy inlacl (2003) 
<http://www.swissillfo.org/sen/Swissinfo.html?siteSect= 1 05&sic\=3900237> at 24 
October 2003 
496 
Sunita Sue Leng and Warden, Goola, 'Banking on Wealth' (2003) December 1_ 
December 7 The Edge (.'>ingapore) 10 
Szeto, Allen, Is Tax Compelition Harmful? (200]) 
<http://www.camagazine.com/index.cfm/ci_id/6725/1ajdll.hlm> 
2003 
CA Magazine 
at 9 November 
Tan, Sin Liang, 'Singapore: Money Laundering - Legal Implications for Financial 
Institutions' (1997) I (2) Journal of Money Laundering Control 184 
Tan, Sin Liang, 'Singapore: New Money-Laundering Law under tbe Corruption, Drug 
Trafficking and other Serious Crimes (Confiscation of Benefits) Act' (2000) 3(3) 
Journal of Money Laundering Control 260 
Tan, Sin Liang, 'The Threat of Tcrrorism & Singapore's Legislative Response to 
Terrorism Financing' (2003) Journal of Money Laundering Control 
Townsend Jr, Alexander, 'The Glohal Schoolyard Bnlly: The Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development's Coercive EffOits to Control Tax 
Competition' (200 I) 25 Fordham International Law JOllrnal215 
Task Force on lnformation Exchange and Financial Privacy, Report on Financial 
Privacy, Law Eriforcel11ent and Terrorism (2002 Task Force on Information Exchange 
and Financial Privacy) 
Transcrime - University of Trento, l'·ansparency and Money Laundering: Study of 
the Regulation and its Implementation in the EU Member States, that obstruct Anti-
Money Laundering International Co-operation (2001 Transcrime) 
Trapp, Roger, 'Asia's Offshore Centres will Benefit from Europe's Tightening 
Regulations', The Asian Wall Street Journal (Singapore), 10 September 2003 
Treaster, Joseph, 'Bermuda Shifts fi-om a Fading Tourist Paradise to a Haven for 
Insurance', I1w New York Times (New Yark), 28 April J 999 
'Trident Trust Cayman Islands: Custody of Bearer Shares' Trident Trust <http:// 
www.tridenttrust.coll1/ PDFs/Cayman_BearerShares_Memo.pdf> as at 28 April 
2004 
The UK Treasury, Reguia/Oly Impact Analysis Disclosure of Beneficial Ownership of 
Unlisted Companies (2002) 
<http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uklmediaJD6C 13/bel1eficial_ condoc. pdf> at 9 
November 2003 
u.S. Treasury Press Release, Agreement Between u.s. and Gov'/ of UK, Northern 
Ireland and Cayman Islands frJr Tax lrifo Exchange (2001) 
<http://www.ustreas.gov/press!releases/archivesI2001.html> at 28 April 2004. 
497 
United Nations Economic and Social Council, Commission on Crime Prevention and 
Criminal Justice, Review oj Priority Themes: Conlrol oj Proceeds oj Crime (1996) 
<http://www.uncjin.orgIDocuments/ScOlllil1/3e.htm> at 9 November 2003 
United Nations Oftlce for Dmg Control and Crime Prevention (UNODCCP), Blum, 
Jack, Levi, Michael, Naylor, Thomas, and Williams, Phil, Financial Havens, Bonking 
Secrecy and Money Laundering (1998) 
<htlp:llwww.imolin.org/imolinlen/finhaeng.html> at 9 November 2003 
United Nations, Office on Dmgs and Crime, Money Laundering (Proceed~ ql Crime) 
Act, 1996 (1996) 
<http://www.unodc.org/unodc/enllegal1ibrary/bs/legaUibrarL 1999-06-10_1999-
1.html> at 9 November 2003 
United Nations: Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Ad Hoc Group oj 
Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters 
<htlp:llwww.un.org/esalffd/ffdtaxationmandate.htm> at 10 July 2004. 
United States Department of Treasury, 'Corporate Inversion Transactions: Tax Policy 
Implications' (press Release, 17 May 2002) 
United States Department of the Treasury and United States Department of Justice, 
The National Money Laundering Strategy Jo/' 2000 (2000) <hUV:11v.'WW.treas.gov> at 
3 November 2003. 
United States General Accounting Office, Private Banking: Paul Salinas, eitibank, 
and Alleged Money Laundering (1998 GAO) 
Uhrie, Mathilda C R, 'Measlll'es Taken in the Cook Islands to Counter Money 
Laundering' (Speech delivered at the Asian Development Bank 34th Annual Meeting 
ofthe Board of Governors, Honolulu, 7 May 2001) 
Vogel, Klaus, 'Worldwide vs. Source Taxation of Income "- A Review and Re-
Evaluation ofjhe Arguments' (\988) 8-11 Inter/ax 
Voge1aar, Pieter J, 'Developments with Regard to the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines' (Paper presented at the 10th meeting of the Ad Hoc Group of Experts on 
International Cooperation in Tax Matters, Geneva, J 0 - 14 September 2001) 
Wadsley, Joan, 'Banks in a Bind: The Implications of the Money Laundering 
Legi~lation' (2001) 16 JOIIl'11ai oj lntemational Banking Lm!' 125 
Weiner, Joann M, 'OECD Forum on Hannflll Tax Practices Marks Fifth Year' (2003) 
31 Tax Notes Inlernational233 
Weiner, Joann M and Aul!, Hugh J, '111e DECD's RepOit on Harmflli Tax 
Competition' (1998) 51 National Ta;; J01ll'l1al601 
Weisbach, David A, 'Formalism in the Tax Law' (1999) 66 Chicago Law Review 860 
498 
Weisbach, David A, 'Ten Tmt118 about Tax Shelters' (2002) 55 Tax Law Review 201 
Wilson, Jolm Douglas, 'Theories of Tax Competition' (1999) 52 National Tax 
JOllrnal269 
Wright, Arthur W, 'Review: OECD Harmful Tax Competition RepOlt Falls Short' 
(1998) 17 August Tax Notes lntel'llational 461 
The WolIsbcrg Group, Woljsberg Anti-Money Laundering Principles on Private 
Banking (2002) <http://www.wolfsberg-principles.comJprivat-hanking.html> at 10 
July 2004 
The Wolfsbel'g Group, 'Leading Intemational Banks Establish Anti-Money-
Laundering Principles: Banks Work with Transparency International on Guidelines 
for Private Banking' (press Release, Oetoher 30, 2000). 
Zagaris, Bruce, 'TIEAs and the Case for Caribbean Tax and Investment Incentives' 
(2002) 4 March Tax Notes 1l1tel'l1atiol1ai983 
Zaleski, Paul, Bank Secrecy Waiver Agreements: The COIifidenliality Exception (2000) 
Offshore Finance U.S.A. Magazine 
<http://www.eseapeartist.com/OffshoreFinanceUSAfBank _Secrecy _ Waiver.html> 
at 9 November 2003 
Websites 
Asia Pacific Offshore Institute <htlp:llwww.asiaoffihore.org> at 3 Novemher 2003 
The Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs <htlp:llwww.state.gov/p/wha> at 3 
November 2003 
The Capital TlUst Company of Delaware <http://www.ctcdelaware.com> at 3 
November 2003 
Cayman Islands Monetary Authority <http://www.cimoney.com.ky> at 3 November 
2003 
The Delaware Company <www.thedelawarecompally.com> at 3 November 2003 
State of Delaware, Division of Corporations <http://www.state.de.lk~/corp> at 3 
November 2003 
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network <http://www.treas.gov/fmcen> at 3 
November 2003 
Forbes <http://www.forbes.com> at 3 November 2003 
Jersey Financial Services Commission <http://www.jerseyfsc.org> at 3 November 
2003. 
499 
Monetary Authority of Singapore <http://www.mas.gov.sg> at 3 November 2003 
National Criminal Intelligence Service <http://www.ncis.co.uk> at 3 November 2003 
500 
